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Speeches Moving Europe through the Decades after World War II to the Present Day

Michael Gebler, Maria Eleonora Guasconi and Francesco Pierini

The background and the rationale of this volume is the assumption that language is a powerful means, able to persuade people and make them cooperative. Although it's quite obvious that public speeches delivered by political leaders and officers of EU institutions have influenced European citizens' attitudes towards various aspects of the integration process in the past and are still able to influence Europe's image among citizens, the issue of the role played by public speeches on European integration still deserves to be studied and addressed from a scientific point of view.

In this book, the authors focus on memorable speeches given by European leaders in favour or against European integration, which have contributed to the construction of a pro- or anti-European discourse in their countries, in which the word 'discourse' is meant as 'language in use' or 'language in real communication works'. The method of discourse analysis (DA) is here meant as "how addressers construct linguistic messages for addressees and how addressees work on linguistic messages in order to interpret them"¹. Discourse may be seen as "a mode of organizing knowledge, ideas, or experience that is rooted in language and its concrete contexts (such as history or institutions)"².

Since all communication produces a reaction, it becomes effective when the recipient understands and shares the message conveyed by the sender. The changes that can be produced in communication may take place on three levels: 1) cognitive changes: when new knowledge is conveyed, 2) affective changes: when new feelings and ideas are produced in the recipient's mind, and 3) behavioural changes: when new forms of behaviour are brought into being. In order to communicate effectively and generate processes of change, the speaker or writer may resort to persuasion, with psychological techniques, such as the ones described by social psycholo-

1 Gillian Brown and George Yule, *Discourse analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p.ix.

2 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary

gist Robert Cialdini³, as well as through linguistic and extra-linguistic elements, such as words, body language and tone of voice.

This volume is the result of a Jean Monnet Project titled “Speeches on Europe”, carried out from 2019 to 2021 by the Department of Political Science at the University of Genoa in Italy, in cooperation with the Institut für Geschichte at the University of Hildesheim in Germany, which has led to close confrontation among linguists, historians and political scientists from different European universities, who have studied a series of famous and lesser known speeches on European integration from different perspectives.

All the authors have conducted textual analyses of a series of speeches on European integration from a large time span (1946–2019) by using the *historical method*, bringing each speech back to its contemporary historical context, to the personal background of the speaker, to its ideological framework, to the traditions from which the formulations of those discourses derived, to the socio-cultural backgrounds of the actors and of the parties involved and the effects of the speeches on public opinion.

Considering the overwhelming phenomenon of Euroscepticism spread all over Europe since the beginnings of the 1990s starting with the Maastricht Treaty, acquiring a correct historical perception of the role played by speeches on European integration can be considered a useful instrument with which to understand when and if a common Eurosceptical or Euro-critical consciousness started to grow in Europe and to debate its consequences for the future of Europe.

As the contributions come from scholars of different disciplines—mainly historians, linguists and political scientists—, each of them has individually developed their work both on the basis of their own research interests and on the reference principles of their discipline, while being able, in many cases, to perfectly meet the requirements underlying the project, i.e. striving to make different disciplines cooperate and work on similar approaches.

We could not cover all the important speeches which were held, so a next volume is in preparation. In many cases, e.g. for the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and to some extent also for the 1980s, there are only written legacies and testimonies to the speeches, in a few cases also sound recordings but in many cases no film recordings at all, so the contributors to this book had

3 Robert Cialdini, *Influence: The psychology of persuasion*, NY: William Morrow & Company, 1984.

only limited means to analyse the speeches in question and had to rely, for the most part, entirely on the written statements.

In this pioneering volume, we have decided to divide the speeches into five sections, corresponding to various phases of the European integration process and different generations of leaders, with the aim of highlighting the different perceptions of Europe in a wide chronological time span. Starting from the hope of Europe as a future space of 'peace and security' shaped by famous speeches delivered by Winston Churchill as a non-European but acting as a pro-European sponsor and supporter and Jean Monnet as a forefather, inspirer and provider of ideas for Western European integration, in its second section the volume analyses the image of Europe shared by the so-called pioneers of European integration, the founding fathers Robert Schuman, Alcide De Gasperi and Walter Hallstein, when the memory of the dictatorships in Europe and the tragedy of World War II were still fresh.

The third section focuses on the image of a 'second Europe' which emerged at the end of the 1960s, between idealism and federalism on the one hand and pragmatism and realism on the other. The speeches delivered by Josef Klaus, Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher, Ralph Dahrendorf, Enrico Berlinguer, Giulio Andreotti and the written piece by Altiero Spinelli challenged the stereotype of the 1970s as a decade of so-called Eurosclerosis and portrayed different images of Europe, which influenced the future developments in European integration.

Then the fourth section on the builders, conveyers and promoters of the European Union analyses what image of Europe emerged from the final phase of the Cold War, focusing on a series of speeches held by Emilio Colombo, Jacques Delors, Hans Dietrich Genscher, Mikhail Gorbachev, François Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl and Felipe Gonzales.

Finally, the fifth section on challenges and responses to the crisis of Europeanisation or the renationalisation of opponents inside and outside the EU deals with a long series of speeches, delivered from the 1990s up to the present, which demonstrate the gradual shift from enthusiastic support for Europe and European integration after the end of the Cold War, to a growing sense of insecurity shared by European leaders at the beginning of the 21st century and a creeping sense of malaise, which became a fertile ground for the development of populism and Euroscepticism. These developments are well described in the different images of the European Union contained in the speeches delivered by Silvio Berlusconi, Romano Prodi, Mario Monti, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Tommaso Padoa Schioppa and Matteo Salvini, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, Joschka Fischer, Tony Blair, Mark Rutte and Emmanuel Macron.

I. Present at the Creation 1945–1946: Sponsors and Providers of Ideas and Impulses

Francesco Pierini's contribution deals with the famous speech delivered by Winston Churchill at the Swiss University of Zurich in September 1946, a cornerstone of pro-European narrative in which the former British Prime Minister advocated the building of the 'United States of Europe', with Franco-German reconciliation as its core. In the linguistic analysis of the speech, Pierini investigates the use made by Churchill, known for his brilliant oratory, of words, grammatical features and rhetorical figures, such as metaphors and antithesis. In this masterpiece of rethoric, Churchill used very negative adjectives to describe the situation in which the European people were living, 'quivering', 'tormented', 'hungry', 'careworn', 'bewildered', through which he was able to arouse a sense of fear and anxiety. These very negative feelings contrasted sharply with the optimistic perspectives represented by the remedy of the 'United States of Europe', described by encouraging words like 'miracle', 'free', 'happy', 'peace', 'freedom' and 'safety'. The result was a persuasive and expressive speech which dealt with post-war Europe, describing with vivid images the tragic situation in which European people were living, expressing the hope of establishing the 'United States of Europe' as a safeguard against the possibility that a tragedy such as World War II would happen again and outlining the world order and the place that Great Britain would have had in it.

Churchill, known for his visionary political thinking, suggested that Britain would support that project but would never be part of it, demonstrating that his pro-European attitude as a non-European was not based on Britain in Europe but with Europe, thus anticipating a long history of non-alignment and divorce which has characterised the relationship between Great Britain and the European Union.

Gilles Grin's contribution examines Jean Monnet's two founding speeches in his new role as President of the ECSC High Authority. The first was delivered on 10 August 1952, at the inauguration in Luxembourg, the seat of the first European Community. The second founding speech was delivered in Strasbourg on 11 September 1952, on the second day of the first session of the ECSC Common Assembly. Grin has identified exact percentages for the content of both speeches, with the issues of the integration method and institutions and the common market to be created dominating, but with the issue of external relations also gaining weight. Here, Monnet expressed his belief that the ECSC would help solve the world's trade problems. At the very least, a close and lasting ECSC association should be found with the United Kingdom. As for De

Gasperi, cooperation with the United States was essential for Monnet too. Grin identifies key concepts in Monnet's speeches and divides them into four categories: values and goals; integration method, law and institutions, and the economy. There is no mention of culture. As for values and goals, the key words are 'peace', 'prosperity', 'freedom', 'unity', 'diversity', 'civilization', 'building Europe', 'union', 'unification', 'common advantage', 'common interest', 'common vision', 'renaissance' and change. Monnet knew how to persuade through his expressive use of words, while his often-cited method remained ambiguous and versatile.

The 'Method-Monnet' is interpreted in different ways. Its core elements include elite decisions behind the scenes ("clandestine integration") and the generation of spillover effects in economic integration. It generated less, however, in synergies from the economy for politics. Commission President Jacques Delors (1985–1995) later used this method to transform the EC into the EU. However, due to its democratic shortcomings, it lost its persuasive power as the single market programme also had a greater impact on people's everyday lives.

II. Creating the First Communities: Founding Fathers and Pioneers in the 1950s

In the second section of this volume, Jean-Marie Palayret's article deals with Robert Schuman's famous statement of 9 May 1950, when, quite surprisingly for his officials and the public, he, as French foreign minister, proposed merging France's coal and steel resources with Germany's in a one-and-a-half-minute speech at a press conference around 6 p.m. in the Quai d'Orsay Clock Room. Paris-based journalists had been informed at the last minute. According to Schuman, the main aim was to overcome the centuries-old hereditary enmity between the neighbours on either side of the Rhine. The policy was to primarily involve the two countries, but also to be open to other European nations. A joint High Authority was to be empowered to control the production and distribution of heavy industrial goods and to intervene accordingly to ensure fair competition at the national or corporate level. The High Authority would be composed of independent individuals and have equal representation. Its decisions were to be binding on and implemented by all member countries and their coal and steel companies. According to Schuman, the merger was to contribute to raising the standard of living and to forming a European federation. The suggestion came from Monnet's former team of the French National Liberation Committee from Algiers. Monnet was by then a planning commissioner. Paul Reuter, Schuman's legal advisor at the Foreign Ministry,

and Pierre Uri, as an economist, had contributed to the final version of the declaration. In all, there were nine versions of the text, after which the final version toned down the finality of the federation. The first draft, remarkably, still envisaged two “organisations”, one for coal and one for steel. Schuman gratefully took up the proposal and put it into practice politically, which was decisive. Christian Democratic ideas formed the basis for his courageous actions and his idea of Europe, which was based on the unity of civilisation, historical reconciliation and common values, such as pluralistic democracy, individual freedom and the rule of law. As Palayret shows, Schuman believed that democracy owed its existence to Christianity. In the third chapter of Schuman's book, “Pour l'Europe”, he paid tribute to the writings of the wartime French philosopher Jacques Maritain, who envisioned a personalist as well as a communitarian society. This position was modelled on writings by Pius XII, who called for the subordination of public authority to Gospel principles and for a post-war order based on a supranational model. Schuman's clever and courageous policies served as a source of inspiration, strength and motivation for Franco-German rapprochement, understanding and reconciliation and contributed to peaceful change in Western Europe. With the ECSC, on which the EEC and EURATOM were built, he helped lay the foundations for the later EU.

Following the analysis of Schuman's vision of Europe and sharing the same Christian values, the volume deals with two speeches delivered by Alcide De Gasperi, commented on by Daniela Preda. The first clarifies basic ideological and theoretical convictions, the second their implementation. The Italian Prime Minister advocated a federalist point of view on 20 November 1948, when he accepted an invitation to participate in the Great Catholic Conference in Brussels. Here, he articulated his distrust of state centralism, which could degenerate into tyranny, reflecting on his experiences with Italian fascism and the Habsburg monarchy. For him, it was all the more important to guarantee freedom and democracy. Subsequently, the “peace of Europe” was the focus of his remarks. In order to create a European army, De Gasperi supported the idea of giving constituent powers to the Common Assembly of the ECSC. He did so in his speech to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe on 10 December 1951. In his thinking, a first pillar consisted of a common elected and consultative body whose decision-making and supervisory powers would be limited to what was jointly administered and on which a collegial executive body would depend. The second pillar would consist of a common budget, a significant part of which would come from individual contributions, that is, from the tax system. Above all, De Gasperi saw a European Political

Community (EPC) as a *sine qua non*. In his federalist commitment to a united (Western) Europe, he went far beyond the previous European approach of contemporary politicians and gave new impetus to Western European integration. In doing so, he did not limit himself to a functionalist approach, but unhesitatingly advocated a federal Europe with strong ties to the United States. In 1952, he was awarded the prestigious Charlemagne Prize. The creation of a federal organisation was proposed, which would combine the ECSC and the EDC within two years. In 1954, a few months before De Gasperi's death, he was elected President of the ECSC Common Assembly. Just twelve days after his death, the French National Assembly decisively rejected the proposed EDC. This was its end.

In the same chapter, Giuliana Laschi has selected a speech made by Walter Hallstein at the European Parliament, which met for the first time on 20 March 1958, in succession to the Common Assembly of the ECSC: it was the first speech made by the EEC Commission President before this body and already reveals the core elements of his European thought and actions, which were to be fundamental during his term of office from 1958 to 1967 and were to be continuously reiterated in many other speeches in subsequent years. Because of Hallstein's tireless efforts and his deep communitarian convictions, the EEC Commission, with its nine members, persistently pursued the goal of building a political united continent as a single entity, in order to preserve Europe's peace, ensure its external security and strive to regain the role in international politics that it had lost in the two destructive world wars. The speech analysed by Laschi covers the fundamental problems and objectives of the integration process, the decision to implement the Treaties of Rome, but above all the idea of community based on law, which was Hallstein's speciality. He was, however, concerned not only with the community but also with the citizens of Europe. Individuals were to have a right to European citizenship, which was to be guaranteed by the prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of nationality. Hallstein's speech is characterised by his certainty and conviction of the meaningfulness of the task assigned to him, to develop a community through institutions that would have the technical and political capacity to solve the problems existing at the beginning of integration. Laschi judges Hallstein's speech as partly abstract, partly prescriptive, but nevertheless always focused on practical proposals. It was both suggestive and technical and precisely formulated as an expression of a community of only men who wanted to build a new and united Europe.

III. *Idealism and Pragmatism, Federalism and Realism : Alternatives, Decisions, Initiatives, Perceptions and Reactions from the 1960s to the 1980s*

The third section of the book starts with an article, written by Altiero Spinelli, in the review *Foreign Affairs* in July 1962, commented on by Piero Graglia, who analyses the origins and the international framework which contributed to its publication. This is a special case not only in this volume, but because the article was originally conceived as a speech that Spinelli delivered at a meeting of an informal group called “Men of Democratic Action”, which took place in Bologna at “il Mulino association” in April 1961.

The author investigates Spinelli’s effort to establish a strong political transatlantic network between young Italian centre-leftists and the Kennedy administration, involving top-ranking American politicians, journalists from different European countries, several Italian political leaders and representatives from the European Community. In a long paper, titled the “Idea of democratic revolution”, Spinelli addressed the need to strengthen the links between Europe and the United States under the common flag of a renewed democratic ideal. The Italian federalist considered the struggle for the federation of Europe as a more general battle for the affirmation of the democratic values in the Western world and suggested a series of general objectives that, in his opinion, represented the core values of a stronger transatlantic partnership, such as the fight against racial discrimination, the setting up of economic integration between Europe and the United States, the need to set up Western economic policy according to a series of social, scientific and cultural values, and finally international solidarity. However, it was during a journey undertaken by Spinelli in the United States in June 1961, where he tried to mobilise American support for European ideals, that the federalist was invited to write an article for the prestigious review “Foreign Affairs”, titled “Atlantic Pact or European Unity”, which represented a sort of manifesto of Spinelli’s vision of transatlantic relations. The article was an appeal to the so-called “satisfied Europe”, anxious to defend its position among the privileged countries in the world, to step up from purely economic integration to become a real political unit through the establishment of a federal government, a step he considered necessary if Europe wanted to play a relevant role in the international system.

A different narrative of Europe is delivered by the speech “We are citizens of Europe”, held by the Austrian Christian Democrat of the Austrian People’s Party and Federal Chancellor (1964–1970) Josef Klaus to the Council of Europe on 26 January 1965, analysed and presented by

Michael Gehler. This speech to the Council of Europe can be read as a personal commitment to the idea of European integration and as an expression of his European political conviction of the necessity of Austrian participation in European integration. Klaus spoke out in favour of European citizenship in practice, thus anticipating the idea of European citizenship as Union citizenship, which was first enshrined in the EU Treaty of Maastricht. Klaus presented himself in Strasbourg not only as a citizen and politician of the Republic of Austria, but also as an Austrian patriot, referring both to the history and culture of his country of origin and, in particular, to the conditions under which the Second Republic had come into being as an independent nation state with the Austrian State Treaty and neutrality ten years earlier. Nevertheless, Klaus appreciated the importance of the Council of Europe, which stood for a larger Western Europe than the EC, in terms of its cultural function and its competence in matters of fundamental and human rights, even though Austria was not a founding member: it was only able to join the Strasbourg organisation in 1956.

Klaus also presented himself as a Danube European with his speech. He made it even clearer that Europe could not remain with a Carolingian–Western European “Little Europe”, but that there would also be a Europe beyond the Iron Curtain and that it had to be shaped in a unity that was also part of a common history and culture of the continent. He concluded that the border fences should be made more permeable, which also makes Klaus a pioneer of the policy of détente in the first half of the 1970s. At the end of his speech, it became clear that he was speaking not only as a Danube European and a Great European, but also as a Pan-European and a European of culture and human rights.

After the analysis of Josef Klaus’s speech, Ilaria Poggiolini’s contribution deals with the speech on “A Greater United Europe”, held by the British Prime Minister Edward Heath at the ceremony for the signature of the Treaty of UK accession to the EEC in Brussels on 22 January 1972. Poggiolini investigates this peculiar British politician, known not only as the politician who finally negotiated British accession to the EEC, but also as the most communautaire of British Prime Ministers, who spoke as a convinced and sincere European, recognising that the values which distinguished the process of European integration, such as peace, security and prosperity, could flourish once economic and political integration was achieved. A pragmatist rather than a federalist, Heath believed that national interests remained vital in shaping the European Community, whose development was not “preordained”, but advanced by trial and error. Poggiolini argues that the speech delivered by Heath reflected his

expectation that the enlargement process would bring about a “second Europe”, characterised by a more cohesive and industrial Community, able to reinvent its external relations especially in dealing with Eastern Europe, where the UK could play a constructive and important role. In particular, Heath aimed at establishing a triumvirate composed of himself, Brandt and Pompidou, with the task of ruling the Community. What he described was, as Poggiolini argues, “a comfortable political marriage, neither a marriage of convenience, nor a passionate one”.

Following the image of a further generation of politically motivated Europeans advanced by Edward Heath, Simone Paoli presents the Jean Monnet Lecture held by Ralf Dahrendorf at the European University Institute in Florence on 26 November 1979, an important speech which represented an appeal for the realisation of a “new Europe”, or a “third Europe”, able to save the Community from the crisis in which it had been struggling since the 1970s. Dahrendorf, a brilliant and prestigious German sociologist who had been responsible for external relations and foreign trade in Franco Maria Malfatti’s and Sicco Mansholt’s Commissions, did not hesitate to criticise sharply the image of the Community that had emerged from the Hague Conference of 1969: less idealistic and more pragmatic, which reflected the generation of European leaders whom he called the ‘founding grandsons’. In his opinion, the main problems of the Community in the 1970s were its confusion, uncertainty and its institutional shortcomings, performed particularly by the Commission and considered an obstacle to European progress.

Paoli argues that Dahrendorf did not consider himself a Eurosceptic, but a sceptical Europeanist, who also made prophetic proposals to move towards what he called a “third Europe”, which was supposed to become a model of international liberalism and cooperation. In his reappraisal of European policies, Dahrendorf thought that differentiated integration, or Europe à la carte, was a necessary tool to cope with the shortcomings arising from the enlargements of the Community and suggested giving a basis of legitimacy to the Commission, through its election by the European Parliament, which was to play a central role in the Community. His recommendations, if not immediately accepted by the European Communities, would be taken into serious consideration decades later as a model for European governance.

A completely different vision of Europe emerges in the speeches delivered at the European Parliament by the PCI’s secretary Enrico Berlinguer, who joined the Communist and Allies Group after the general elections of 1979, which are analysed and discussed by Elena Calandri. Her contribution highlights how Berlinguer’s attitude towards European integration

changed dramatically from Eurorealism to Europeanism as a consequence of the shift in the policy pursued by the PCI, known as Eurocommunism. The author debates the influence and the role played by Altiero Spinelli in the 'Europeanization' of the Communist Party, whose candidature at the European Parliament as an independent was aimed at guaranteeing the party's Europeanist choice and stresses the role played by the European Parliament as a place where European socialisation took place. If in his first speeches, Berlinguer maintained a critical attitude towards the EC's institutions and policies, seen through the lens of the Cold War as instruments of capitalism and of US imperialism, unable to solve the economic crisis of the Community and to contrast the serious problem of unemployment, which affected the European countries in the 1970s, he considered the European Communist Parties representative of workers' interests and made an appeal for a future "Europe of the workers and the people". The author underlines that, after 1980, Berlinguer's approach towards European integration became less critical, focusing mainly on positive proposals for the European Community. In particular Calandri deals with a speech delivered by Berlinguer on 11 February 1981 in response to Gaston Thorn's inaugural address as President of the European Commission (1981–1985), showing that the PCI's secretary had started to consider European integration the solution to problems, instead of a problem to be confronted. As Calandri argues, Europe's image in Berlinguer's speech echoed the Brandt Report published in 1980 and projected a vision of Europe as an international actor in favour of détente, able to take the lead in North–South relations and to defend workers' rights.

A completely different narrative about Europe is contained in the famous speech held by Margaret Thatcher in Bruges in 1988, in which the role played by the Iron Lady in the growing British Euroscepticism that eventually led to Brexit in 2016 is clear. Thatcher had been invited to speak to the College of Europe in Bruges, and her text may be considered a response to the speech given by Delors—the then President of the European Commission (1985–1995)—two weeks earlier to Britain's Trades Union Congress. Thatcher was often regarded as adverse to a federal Europe since Europe was held responsible for a possible and unquestionable loss of national sovereignty and a burden on Britain's values, traditions and economic development. This article, which is based on newly published material, explores Thatcher's idea of Europe, as it emerged in Bruges in 1988, considering the change over the years from a sort of mild support for the European project to a growing apprehension about the consequences that British involvement in the project might have brought about.

Garau examines the Conservative Party's approach to European integration, the internal debate on whether or not to accept the invitation to Bruges and its implications, as well as the role played by the Foreign Office and Thatcher's closest advisors. The author examines the content of the speech and the consequences it would have had, notably Thatcher's resignation as well as what Garau defines as the "watershed in the emerging of an increasingly critical British stance on the European project".

Switching to the Italian political scene, Antonio Varsori has chosen several speeches by Giulio Andreotti as examples for analysis. On 12 December 1978, the head of government spoke in the Chamber of Deputies, presenting Italy's decision to become a founding member of the EMS. He referred to the Treaty of Rome and outlined the main developments of the EC, enumerating the political, social and economic benefits Italy had enjoyed through its participation in European integration. The Prime Minister of Italy offered mild criticism of the UK's decision not to belong to the EMS and referred to concessions that had been made to Italy. Andreotti stressed Italy's obligation, as a founding member of the EC, to European integration, which should confirm its European commitment. He referred to the support given by Italy's European partners, especially by the FRG, and linked this fact to the optimistic expectation that participation in the EMS would bring recovery to Italy's economy. For Varsori, Andreotti's speech was both a political and a rhetorical masterpiece, expressing pride in Italy's role in European integration, but also holding out the prospect of long-term practical benefits for his country, pointing to its close relations to its main European partners.

The second example is a June 1984 speech by Andreotti in the Chamber of Deputies, in which he spoke about the union project of the federalist Altiero Spinelli. Andreotti praised the plan eventually presented by the European Parliament and criticised the negative attitudes of some member states towards European construction, e.g., in particular, entering into bilateral relations. Andreotti underlined Italy's traditional demands for stronger initiatives in the social and cultural fields. He considered some kind of European identity important because such an objective would strengthen the EC's international position and its role vis-à-vis the US and the Eastern bloc. By supporting the Spinelli project, Andreotti expressed his concern about Franco-German bilateralism at the same time, which assigned Italy a subordinate role in the Community. Andreotti was betting that a stronger European Parliament would support Italy's traditional interests. He was therefore convinced that Italy could have more influence in Strasbourg than in the Council or the Commission.

In December 1985, Andreotti reported to the Senate on the results of Rome's initiatives during the six months of the Italian presidency of the EC, and gave a positive assessment of the decisions taken at the Milan European Council, particularly with regard to the conclusion of negotiations on the full EC membership of Spain and Portugal and the convening of an intergovernmental conference whose main objective would be to strengthen the supranational character of the European Community.

In a speech to the European Parliament's Committee on Institutional Affairs at the end of January 1990, Andreotti informed its members of the Italian project to convene an intergovernmental conference on the political reform of the treaties and the creation of a European Union, a conference that would complement the conference on economic and monetary union, since, in Andreotti's view, the EMU could only succeed on the condition of a profound transformation of the EC's political structure.

In September 1992, Andreotti spoke on the occasion of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, full of pride in his and Italy's role in the progress of European integration. Five years later, in another speech to the Senate, he drew attention to the importance of the concept of a "Europe of the peoples", which should not be tied to any particular party policy. He made it clear that, despite the relevance of the economic dimension of European integration, especially in view of the envisaged introduction of the euro, he continued to believe in the overriding goal of political integration. In his comparative analysis of Andreotti's speeches, Varsori notes that his European policy was subject to slow change. At the beginning, the European question did not play a major role, even though Andreotti traditionally advocated European unification as Italy's goal, although this was partly at odds with some of his political decisions. Since the late 1970s, Andreotti's commitment and dedication to European integration had become increasingly clear, which was consistent with an interest in Italy's international role in the European context and in defending Italy's national interests. Andreotti saw an overly strong Franco-German connection as a problem, as it seemed to jeopardise Italy's position in European integration. Varsori describes Andreotti, somewhat in contrast to De Gasperi, who was a very different type of politician, as a convinced European politician, but with necessary realism.

IV. Building, Conveying and Promoting the European Union in the 1980s and 1990s

The fourth section of the volume starts with the analysis conducted by Maria Eleonora Guasconi of two speeches delivered by another prominent member of the Italian party Democrazia Cristiana: Emilio Colombo, who played a central role in several phases of Italian history after the Second World War, but also in the process of European integration.

Guasconi focuses on Colombo's long political career, which was strongly devoted to the ideals of a united Europe, in which he proved to be a skillful negotiator in complex talks such as those regarding the first UK application to the EEC, or during the 'empty chair' crisis of 1965, or even later as president of the European Parliament.

After that, the contribution addresses Emilio Colombo's idea of Europe, as it emerged in two of his speeches: one delivered in Florence in January 1981 and the other in the European Parliament in October 1982. Both were meant to promote the revitalisation of European ideals in the early 1980s through the plan, drafted by Colombo himself together with German Foreign minister Genscher, known as the "Genscher-Colombo Plan" of 1981.

Guasconi examines the main themes sketched out in the two speeches, notably the main challenges of European politics and the type of vision of Europe Colombo tried to convey.

However, as a historian, Guasconi is concerned with the fact that regardless of all Colombo and Genscher's strong efforts to put into effect the Single European Act, the plan substantially failed due to "endless discussions and general hostility", and only in June 1983 did the member states finally adopt a much milder version of the plan. Basically, it had turned into a declaration of intent with no reference to the signing of a future Treaty, to the establishment of a European Union or to a partial revision of the Luxembourg compromise.

Colombo's speeches may give "a prudent, intergovernmental, gradual and realistic vision of Europe", thus highlighting his skills and acquaintance with the long-lasting negotiations which would characterise the construction of the Community and, as Guasconi underlines, would indicate "the road to travel along [...] to enhance the political dimension of European integration and the international role of the Community". Colombo's vision of Europe was clearly rooted in the history of European civilisation and based on the principles of "tolerance, solidarity, stability and an enduring faith in European integration as a mechanism for creating and preserving European peace".

If Colombo's efforts were doomed to failure, Marinella Neri Gualdesi's contribution deals with three speeches delivered by one of the architects of the relaunch of European integration in the second half of the 1980s: Jacques Delors. Neri Gualdesi's analysis investigates the three mandate speeches of this famous EC/EU Commission President (1985–1995), in which he demonstrated an ability to speak clearly and concretely about Europe, which he combined with an educational task without exaggeration. He saw lack of communication as a serious cause of a poorly functioning Community. Instead of holding elitist debates, Delors tried to explain the unification process in simple and understandable terms. His first speech analysed by Neri Gualdesi was made when he took office before the European Parliament on 14 January 1985. On that occasion, he presented a programme with a precise and binding timetable, describing the method by which he wanted to act as the head of the Commission, based on three principles: being at the service of governments, defending European interests and seeking convergence. According to Delors, Europe should achieve "economic, technological, financial and monetary strength". He emphasised new technologies as a means of ensuring Europe's economic renewal in order to halt the Community's industrial decline and its loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis Japan and the United States.

The second speech by Delors was delivered on the occasion of the presentation of the new Commission to the European Parliament on 17 January 1989. Delors identified the three major challenges of the method of increasing the Community's room for manoeuvre by strengthening integration and financial reform, more European responsibility ("because history is knocking at the door"), and the reaffirmation of European values to give the Community an additional soul. After the stock market crash of October 1987, Delors emphasised the positive results of the Community's economy. In the new international context, he said, Europe must develop a global geopolitical vision. In contrast to Gorbachev's slogan of the 'Common European Home', Delors called for a "European community home [...] in the Europe of tomorrow, of which we alone are the architects and of which we carefully keep the keys".

Before his last mandate, Delors addressed the European Parliament on 10 February 1993, emphasising the democratic dimension of Community life. The triad of 'democracy, subsidiarity, transparency' had been put forward by the Commission to the Lisbon European Council as proposals to bring the Community closer to its citizens. The project was to be achieved in close consultation with the European Parliament. As Monnet was, Neri Gualdesi also sees Delors as a pragmatic visionary: for him, vision, pragmatism and realism were inseparable. The three Delors speeches give

impressive evidence of his Commission's goals in a dynamic period: 1985 was marked by an unbroken upswing, 1989 by stable continuity, and 1993 by growing unrest.

It's very interesting to compare the vision of the Europe proposed by Jacques Delors with the famous speech delivered by Mikhail Gorbachev in front of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 6 July 1989, which came to be known as the 'Common European Home', examined by Lara Piccardo, an idea that, in the author's words, was regarded by many as "utopian rather than revolutionary". Piccardo looks at the deep and pioneering aspects that emerge from Gorbachev's words. She praises the role played by history and linguistics working together in the analysis of texts which make it possible to go beyond explicit meaning and get to a deeper level, which contemplates what is said and unsaid and highly takes into consideration that "as a communicative unit endowed with meaning, each text is seen, in this common perspective, as the precipitate of the social practices that produce it".

It is clear that words must be analysed in a wider framework since identity and culture are notoriously difficult concepts, linked to philosophy and history as much as to social psychology and politics. Like all the other 'national' speeches, the Soviet and Russian ones on European integration must also be read with two issues in mind: identity on the one hand and culture and geography on the other.

On 6 July 1989, Gorbachev chose the Council of Europe to launch a new proposal for disarmament (unilateral reduction of short-range nuclear missiles), promoting the idea of a 'Common European Home' (abandoning the use of force and the 'Brezhnev doctrine', maintaining socialism) and dealing with human rights (however, without mentioning the European Convention on Human Rights by the Council of Europe).

Piccardo states that the use of some words makes the speech almost religious: 'spiritual parameters', 'mankind', 'community', 'destiny', 'spirit', 'humanism' and 'Man', which, in the written speech, is done with capital letters. Europe needed a new project that was a 'Common European Home', and Piccardo makes us notice that, according to Gorbachev, the Soviet Union feels a part of it. Unfortunately, as the author underlines, within the next three years, the Soviet Union imploded and the political scenario was doomed to change.

In the same year of Gorbachev's 'Common European Home' speech, on 14 September 1989, the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher gave a little-known speech titled "European Community — Towards the European Union. Europe as a whole — on the way to itself" at the Austri-

an National Library in Vienna, where he addressed business circles. This historical document is analysed by Michael Gehler.

Genscher is to be understood as a key historical figure in advocating, with diplomatic skill, ending the Cold War in Europe and thus also overcoming the division between Germany and Europe. His speech in Vienna served as preparation for a spectacular undertaking, namely his visit to the German embassy in Prague on 30 September 1989, when he announced to thousands of GDR citizens who had fled their home country, to great cheers, that they would be leaving on special trains for the Federal Republic. There was another occasion for Genscher's appearance: three days after the opening of the Hungarian border to Austria on 10–11 September, he gave this historic speech in Vienna to take the opportunity to thank the Austrian Federal Government and all Austrians “for the understanding and helpfulness with which they have received our German fellow citizens from the GDR”. In the same breath, he also conveyed his thanks to the Hungarian people and their government, who had “committed themselves to the great traditions of Hungarian history and Europe with their decision, which was as humane as it was courageous”. This will never be forgotten. According to Genscher, it was an act of humanity. Europe was looking back on itself and, alluding to Gorbachev, Genscher said that the European house was being built.

Genscher took up Gorbachev's idea of a ‘Common European Home’ and linked it to his own ideas. Terms as ‘internal market’, ‘economic and monetary union’ and ‘political union’ for the EC appeared repeatedly in Genscher's speech as a triad intended to increase the weight of the EC. He presented himself as a proponent and champion of a single European currency and a European Central Bank by also making a plea for a stable European currency. In doing so, he anticipated the EU as well as the euro, which both, admittedly, would not become a reality until 1993 and 1999/2002. Genscher also gave a provisional answer to the question of the finality of integration. He never tired of emphasising that Germany had a responsibility to Europe: it seemed Kantian like a categorical imperative of integration when he exclaimed: “Be good Germans as good Europeans!” Like Kohl, Genscher was both a German and a European politician. Like the Chancellor, Genscher was not only a foreign and national politician, but also a domestic and party politician. Both agreed on a quick solution to German unity in 1990.

The vision of Europe suggested by Genscher had much in common with the image that François Mitterrand intended to convey to the French people in his Christmas greetings speeches. Frédéric Bozo has focused his analysis on these fourteen speeches, considering them the most important

ritual of the Presidency of the French Republic and a key element of Mitterrand's oral and visual communication strategy. As argued by the author, the issue of the European Community became increasingly important and intense in Mitterrand's speeches after 1983, a year which is considered by historiography a real turning point in the French President's European policy, when the distinction of the image of Europe as a geographical continent decreased and finished as a consequence of the end of the Cold War.

According to Bozo, the European approach of the French President could not be compared to that of Robert Schuman or Jean Monnet, neither to that of Charles de Gaulle, whose vision of Europe was at the same time pragmatic and evolutionary; instead he can be considered a visionary European. In this series of Christmas greetings, Mitterrand delivered several images of Europe, according to the various phases of European integration and the Cold War. He considered the European Community a historical process, thus proposing the suggestive image of Europe as an extension of the nation state, clearly described with the formula: "France is our homeland and Europe is our future" delivered in the speech held in 1986, which created an inseparable link between the homeland and the European future. In his vision, France was at the heart of Europe and European integration, a suggestive image which reached its climax in 1988, when Mitterrand held his Christmas greetings in Strasbourg. In the final phase of the Cold War, in Mitterrand's rhetoric the vision of pan-Europe, enlarged to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union, took shape, as demonstrated by his project of a European Confederation built around the EC, which was advanced in his Christmas speech of 1989, which can be considered the French reply to Gorbachev's "European Common Home" speech.

If France and its place in the EU was at the core of Mitterrand's Christmas greetings speeches, Germany's role in Europe was a key element of the speech delivered by Helmut Kohl on 14 January 2001, in the Audimax lecture theatre at Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Bonn, on the occasion of the introduction of the European single currency, the euro, two weeks earlier. The speech is analysed by Deborah Cuccia. The German ex-Chancellor's (1982–1998) speech contained three parts linked by a central idea: German and European unity are inseparable, and the common currency should be the link between them. The main element of the speech was to conceive of the single currency as a caesura in European history. Kohl began by outlining the beginnings and development of the common European currency, as well as his personal decisions that contributed significantly to the creation of the euro. His Bonn speech

can therefore also be understood as his legacy to subsequent generations, because for the second ‘honorary citizen of Europe’ after Jean Monnet, the euro was a question of war and peace. Another central issue for Kohl was the EU’s ‘eastward enlargement’. Although the main concern of his speech should have been the common currency, Kohl directed his attention to the importance of Franco-German relations several times. He no longer considered the ‘United States of Europe’, on the other hand, an appropriate term—also in consideration of sensitivities especially in France, where a possible analogy to the US would be perceived as critical. With regard to the euro, Kohl drew the auditorium’s attention all the more to the utmost importance of smooth Franco-German cooperation and the need to respect French sensibilities as well as their attachment to their values of ‘greatness’, ‘prestige’ and ‘rank’ in international politics. Kohl was convinced that the success of European unification would depend on strengthening the powers and prerogatives of supranational institutions, such as the European Parliament. Like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, he believed that the unification of Europe could only be achieved gradually and that the fundamental decisions would have to be accepted and taken by the member states.

Another great European political leader of Kohl’s generation is Felipe Gonzales, whose speeches in Strasbourg 1984, Madrid 1985, Aachen 1993 and Cuacos de Yuste 2000 have been analysed by Antonio Moreno Juste and Carlos Sanz Diaz. In their contribution, they deal with the evolution of the Spanish narrative about Europe. Starting from the talk delivered by Gonzales at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in 1984, the authors show how the image of Europe changed and evolved in Gonzales’s speeches according to the different phases of European integration. A pragmatic and charismatic leader, alien to metaphors and tropes, Gonzales soon became a pedagogue of the idea of Europe in Spain. His speeches can be divided into two phases, which also represent two different narratives of Europe. From 1982 to 1996, when Gonzales was Prime Minister, the idea of Europe was synonymous with ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’ and ‘modernisation’, which represented the ideals of an entire generation of Spaniards who had suffered during Franco’s dictatorship. This image of Europe started to be challenged in the second phase of Gonzales’s speeches between 1996 and 2000, when the Spanish politician developed a more complex and intellectual narrative about the European Union, threatened by the rise of Euroscepticism and Eurosclerosis, but showing a constant faith in European integration and considering this the only project for the continent, if Europe aimed to play a role in a globalised world.

*V. Challenges and Reactions to Crises: Euroscepticism or Europeanisation?
Opponents and Supporters from Within and Without, but also Visionaries
for the EU of the 21st Century*

V.1 Different Italian Speeches between Stopping and Moving on Europe

The fifth section begins with an analysis of different visions and narratives of Europe contained in the speeches delivered by six Italian political leaders, who were members of different political parties: Silvio Berlusconi, Romano Prodi, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Mario Monti and Matteo Salvini.

In his paper, Andrea Catanzaro conducts an analysis of Berlusconi's attitude to Europe through time. He analyses the linguistic and stylistic elements of some speeches when Berlusconi was Italian Prime Minister in different periods of time (1994–1995, 2011–2005, 2005–2006 and 2008–2011) and focuses on their main underlying figures of speech and on substantial lexis.

Catanzaro borrows a happy expression from Emidio Diodato to describe Berlusconi's attitude to politics: the “theatrical plot”. This sees him as the main character on a theatrical stage who tries to upstage all the other actors, whoever they are.

Catanzaro examines the most relevant aspects of Berlusconi's discourse on Europe and the political analysis seems to show Berlusconi's conviction that the integration process is of huge importance to Italian interests and that he is capable of using words that are clear, direct and therefore very persuasive. In doing so, he uses rhetorical devices such as the massive use of tricolons—a figure of speech which seems characteristic of Berlusconi's speeches—and the use of metaphors, with their intrinsic ability to turn complex ideas into powerful tools of clarification and persuasion. According to the author, this may be the reason why we find such a great number of tropes in these excerpts, and Catanzaro skilfully analyses the most relevant ones by making clearer what may easily escape our attention.

Romano Prodi was certainly an enthusiastic advocate of Europe, whose speeches as President of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004 are analysed by Laura Fasanaro. The author stresses that Prodi's intellectual background encompassed a federalist tradition and, although he never used the terms ‘federal’ or ‘federation’ in his speeches, this approach influenced his narrative about Europe. The vision that emerged in Prodi's speeches reflected the time of complexity and change the EU was going through, due to the Eastern enlargement, the EU's complex relations with Russia, the issue of institutional reforms, the economic and social goals en-

visioned by the Lisbon agenda and, more in general, the challenges posed by globalisation and sustainable development. The author highlights a change between the early and the latest speeches. Whilst in the first two years of Prodi's mandate, his speeches evoked optimism and an era of trust and dynamism for the new Commission, so the image of Europe was associated with a peaceful and stable order, an energetic and dynamic Europe, a history of successes, such as for example the realisation of the EMU and the entry into force of the euro, in the post-Nice phase the speeches revealed his serious concerns about the consequences of enlargement and the international crisis triggered by 9/11. Prodi's speeches reflected a European environment that was more unstable and unpredictable, as they became less emphatic, reassuring and optimistic. However, as argued by Fasanaro, Prodi's image of Europe did not change, and he reaffirmed his vision of a pan-European order, defined by a set of common values, such as 'peace', 'security', 'freedom', 'justice', 'equality', a 'democratic Europe', 'human rights', 'rule of law', 'growth', 'prosperity', 'solidarity', 'social justice' and 'inclusiveness'.

The discourse on Europe unveiled by Prodi in his narrative is followed by three Italian technocrats, who served in various important roles in the Italian government and inside European institutions: Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Tommaso Padoa Schioppa and Mario Monti.

In the case of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, a technocrat from the Bank of Italy, the vision of Europe was strictly linked to the issue of a common homeland. Sante Cruciani analyses a series of speeches held by Ciampi as President of the Republic from 1999 to 2006. In his contribution, the author stresses the importance of Ciampi's biography, his experience during the Second World War, his long career with the Bank of Italy, the legacy of Luigi Einaudi, his faith in European ideals, and his role as one of the architects of Italian participation in the EMU and in the eurozone. The period when Ciampi was President of the Republic was characterised by a series of international crises, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Iraqi war, which radically changed the atmosphere of transatlantic relations and the image of Europe in the international system. Cruciani demonstrates that Ciampi delivered a series of speeches with a clear pedagogical goal, aiming at fostering Italian patriotism as part of a common European homeland. Ciampi's narrative about Europe is characterised by the themes of 'peace', 'freedom', 'stability', 'economic growth', 'social rights' and 'cultural identity'. In particular, European identity is defined as richer and stronger, but not contradictory to the Italian one. However, as argued by the author, the rejection of the EU Constitution by the French and Dutch referendums of 2005 represented a turning point in Ciampi's

vision of Europe. In his speeches delivered after 2005, the President of the Republic described the increasing feeling of malaise and insecurity which was spreading throughout Europe, threatening its construction and challenging its stability. His appeal to the young generation of Italians delivered in a speech held in 2005, at the end of his Presidency, to defend the ideals of peace and freedom clearly demonstrates the pedagogical aim of Ciampi's narrative about Europe.

Andrea Becherucci's article analyses the story of another enthusiastic supporter of Europe, in whose speeches a genuine interest in the process of European integration is evident: Tommaso Padoa Schioppa. He participated in the process of EU integration thanks to the political roles he had at both national and international level. The author has selected some of the most significant pages taken from the speeches, conference papers and articles that Padoa Schioppa dedicated to his ideas on the construction of Europe.

After having retraced the stages of his youth and his studies in which the pro-European ideals matured, Becherucci describes Padoa Schioppa's first occasion to get to know Europe closely, which was offered to the young economist in 1979, when he presented his candidature to Brussels as Director General for Economic and Financial affairs of the European Commission.

The document that most represents Padoa-Schioppa's involvement in this phase is the report written in February 1983 at the end of his duties. What comes out of this internal manuscript is that in spite of the progress made in integration, the ultimate political objectives are mere rhetoric because of the intangibility of national sovereignty resulting in a dogma and depriving the Community of its dynamic vocation. Though an internal document, these statements would recur over and over again in his future speeches on Europe. In November 1998, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa gave a speech at the 14th Annual Mulino Lecture in Bologna, in which he stated that the European process of unification was "the most important positive legacy that the last century left in the political order and the creation of supranational economic, judicial and political orders constitutes the most revolutionary event that the 20th century experienced".

The idea of a united Europe is regarded as a revolutionary one, which is not led by 'conventional' revolutionary figures but by more common people such as employees, managers, bankers and professors. According to Padoa-Schioppa, Europe had the merit of having created a free trade area as well as "the infrastructure of state public affairs and the necessary powers for the good functioning of the new market which was being created".

When, in November 1999, Padoa-Schioppa was awarded an honorary doctorate in economics by the University of Trieste, he gave a lecture on “Money, trade and institutions based on the experience and prospects of the European construction”. Starting from the Treaty of Rome, which lay at the origins of the EEC, he got to the phase of the adoption of the single currency, witnessing how Europe had finally turned into a model of a state entity, though the time for the entire process to take shape would be long.

In May 2000, Padoa-Schioppa was invited to Edinburgh to give the David Hume Lecture and the central question he addressed there, which had already been raised in 1983, was, notably, focusing on the possibility of combining joint elements of economic governance with the nature of the sovereign state. The last speech taken into consideration by Becherucci is a lecture dedicated to Altiero Spinelli in Turin by the Centro Studi per il Federalismo, when Padoa-Schioppa had been appointed Minister for the Economy in the second Prodi government. There, Padoa-Schioppa showed his appreciation to the people who had dedicated their lives to the idea of a united Europe, focusing on Spinelli’s qualities, thoughts and mutual friendship.

Overall, Padoa-Schioppa attributes the problem of the absence of Europe to the lack of the principle of a federal union, seen as the only remedy able to win back those who have lost faith in a project which had seemed so attractive at the beginning. The author concludes that the importance of European integration for Padoa Schioppa has never decreased, not even in challenging periods.

Daniele Pasquinucci deals with four speeches held by Mario Monti as Prime Minister between May and September 2012, when Italy was in a difficult period, running the serious risk of dramatic bankruptcy. As the author argues, the main goal of these speeches was to re-establish the mutual trust between Italy and the EU, because the peninsula was facing an increasing wave of Euroscepticism as a consequence of the long economic recession and the political instability it was experiencing after 2008. Pasquinucci stresses the fact that Monti was not a politician, but a technocrat that aimed at fostering the image of his country abroad and that of the EU in Italy, a technocrat that was facing the difficult task of promoting unpopular reforms in his country. The author highlights that Monti promoted the vision of Europe as a constraint, a concept coined by Guido Carli, needed to impose unpopular reform and painful sacrifices in Italy, such as for example the pensions reform. So the terms that Monti frequently associated with the EU in his speeches were ‘discipline’, ‘rules’, ‘sanctions’ and ‘commitment’. The importance of language and communication is evident because, as the author provocatively argues, the narrative

of Europe as a constraint produced a short circuit and Monti, unintentionally, encouraged Eurosceptical propaganda in the country.

The emerging threat represented by populism and Euroscepticism in Italy is discussed in the article written by Guido Levi on the leader of the Lega Matteo Salvini. The author first of all deals with the idea of a Europe of the party over time, initially positive and in any case substantially accepted, to later develop a strong Euro-critical and Eurosceptical attitude. This vision is also described through the political parable of Matteo Salvini himself, who in recent years — the period in which he held the post as Minister of the Interior in the government called Conte I — has thus come to blame Europe for most of the evils that afflict the EU's member states, and in particular Italy.

After providing the reader with the necessary information on the birth and evolution of the League (Lega) and its current leader, he describes the historical and social context in which we find ourselves and analyses three of the most significant public speeches given by Salvini on Europe during his accession to the Conte I government, with reference to Pontida, Milan and the parliament.

As the author explains, the League's Eurosceptical discourse, though comparable to those of most populist movements in Europe, dramatically increased when the party was sent to the opposition during the second Prodi government and then with Mario Monti, regarded by Salvini as the expression of the economic and financial lobbies that dominate in the EU.

The first speech taken into consideration was given by Salvini on 1 July 2018 in Pontida, before the activists and the audiences of social networks. Levi pinpoints the typical tones of the rally, whose aim is to incite the militants, but is void of any political vision and only briskly alludes to the government's programme, i.e. the priorities of the Lega. The second speech analysed took place in Milan, in May 2019, at a time when Salvini felt strong and secure, reassured by the polls and supported by his fellow European sovereignists. The speech did not differ much from the previous one, though the attacks on his opponents and the press sound stronger. His idea about Europe may be summarised in the utterance in which he wishes for Italy and the continent to free itself "from the illegal occupation organised by Brussels in recent years". The third speech is related to the crisis and subsequent fall of the Conte I government when he announced, in August 2019, the end of his party's support for the government and advocated a return to the polls. He was aware it was an important speech given before the Italian people and in which he kept his word by reaffirming that he would do everything he had done again without (apparently) any regrets.

V.2 Reactions and Counter-Reactions by Russian Leaders and Statesmen

After the analysis of the different narratives of Europe proposed by a series of Italian politicians, the volume investigates the vision of Europe delivered by such an external and important partner as Russia, through an analysis of a series of speeches held by two Russian Presidents: Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin.

In her paper, Elena Dundovich addresses the issue of Yeltsin's vision of Europe by asking the question of whether this political leader wanted a 'United Europe' or a 'Greater Europe'. Although Yeltsin decided to maintain the 'new course' given by Gorbachev towards better relations with the West, his approach towards the European Union is hard to assess. Influenced by an initial idea borrowed from Gorbachev, he gradually moved to an idea of a 'Greater Europe' whose privileged connection was supposed to be between Moscow, Berlin and Paris.

Dundovich identifies five stages in the relationship between Russia and Europe, focusing on the one that opened up the opportunity of genuine cooperation between Moscow and Brussels, that is, the 1994 agreement signed in Greece during a meeting of the EU heads of state and government. Yeltsin had always been very interested in the role that Germany, a sort of favourite ally, could play in favour of Russia.

Dundovich also highlights that in the following years the EU–Russia relationship underwent “a schizophrenic alternation between antagonism and cooperation”. For example the first war in Chechnya, which started in 1994, exacerbated relations between Russia and the EU, which also marked the suspension of the 'Partnership and Cooperation Agreement', signed only a few years earlier. Therefore, fluctuation has always characterised the relationship between the Russian Federation and the European Union, as is clearly portrayed by Dundovich; this vacillation was also complicated by the admission of new members to the EU since, on the one hand, the European powers such as Germany, France and Italy have used a more articulated and nuanced approach to Russia, whereas smaller countries of Central-Eastern Europe have sometimes shown a more disapproving and suspicious attitude.

If Boris Yeltsin's vision of Europe identified the delicate and difficult relationship between the EU and Russia during the 1990s, Mara Morini shows Putin's change of mind on Europe since he first came to power and showed a positive attitude towards the EU and Europe. What comes out later on (from the enlargement of both the EU and NATO) is a gradual shift towards a more negative perspective on and detached behaviour towards the EU, as shown in 2007 in his Munich speech.

Morini examines Putin's rhetoric when he deals with Western issues (the EU included) and analyses several speeches and interviews given during his three terms as Russian president, which are available on the official Kremlin website, as well as several articles published under his name. In his first mandate, Putin seems to have always stressed that Russia shared the same values and principles as the vast majority of Europeans (respect for international law and rejection of force as a means of settling international problems). He seems convinced that a firm, affluent and united Europe corresponds to Russian interests, though Russia does not take into consideration joining the EU.

With the passing of time some political events took place which contributed to spreading anxiety and distrust and made relations between Russia and the EU colder and detached. There was a widespread feeling that a new Cold War was in progress due to the idea that Putin seemed to feel the need to return to the period in which Russia was a strong and powerful country in a bipolar system. Morini affirms that "What seems a concrete political result is that the stronger Russia has become, the worse the EU–Russia relations are, the direction and development of which is at the moment uncertain".

In her examination of Putin's narrative, the author outlines that Russia's strategy and urgency are to protect its interests, country and people from unsolicited Western infringements, such as when Putin uttered his 'victory speech' after the successful reconsolidation of Crimea, stating that its Western partners had caused severe harm and acted in a careless and unprofessional way. This is what leads Morini to conclude that the early 1990s narrative of collaboration and sharing of values has been substituted by a different Russian attitude towards the EU which is diffident, disconnected and distant.

V.3 Some Impulses and Statements but even more Groundbreaking Proposals by Top Representatives of EU Member States

The radical shift in the vision and narrative about Europe that occurred at the beginning of the 21st century after the terrorist attack of 9/11 and the debt crisis after 2008 is clearly demonstrated by the analysis of the speeches held by Joschka Fischer, commented on by Giorgio Grimaldi.

At the beginning of his paper, the author focuses on an overview of Joschka Fischer as a politician and says that there are three basic elements to consider: his commitment as an ecologist; his participation in the national government of the Federal Republic of Germany as Foreign

Minister (1998–2005); and his intention to turn the EU into a federation of nation states. Grimaldi provides relevant biographical information and then shifts to the analysis of two significant speeches given by Fischer during his mandate as German Foreign Minister in two different contexts which outline his peculiar oratorical virtues as well as his compelling style. Fischer seemed to have a strong reformist image of Europe and his aim was to build ‘peace’, ‘security’, ‘inter-ethnic coexistence’ and ‘ecological sustainability’ in the context of an insecure and unstable world.

The author outlines the change of Fischer’s mind through time, though he stresses his stable Euro-federalist attitude. Fischer criticised the EU’s shortfall in foreign and security policy, as well as its mismanagement of the eurocrisis. A noteworthy element is outlined by the author just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the EU was generally regarded as a model of ‘freedom’, ‘security’ and ‘wealth’, which after the long economic crisis of 2008 turned into a symbol of financial expropriation in the North and long-lasting desolation in the South, giving rise to Eurosceptical and xenophobic stances across the community.

By looking at the Swiss model, Fischer promoted the idea of deeper political integration to finally create the ‘United States of Europe’ characterised by a European government, a common parliament with delegated members of national parliaments, a common fiscal policy, an energy union, a common foreign and security policy and the possibility of referendums in cases of substantial transfer of sovereignty. The two speeches analysed by Grimaldi faithfully mirror a difficult transition, with a quantity of still unresolved issues relative to lasting peace and a strong continental union in a rapidly changing international system.

Laura Wolf’s contribution analyses Tony Blair’s speech at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, delivered on 2 February 2006. The author’s first step is to consider the context in which it takes place, so she includes some biographical information about the British leader and the political and historical situation in Europe. After that, she looks at the medium and, after drawing on Blair’s previous speeches, focuses on the one chosen and examines it in detail in terms of content and language.

In her analysis of Blair’s language and use of terminology, Wolf pinpoints that it is crucial to remind the reader that both language and vocabulary depend on the person who writes and delivers the speech and that the rhetorical and linguistic skills used by the speaker are also the result of their social background.

Blair can adapt his style to the context well, and changes in tone are evident between the ordinary British citizen and his persona as a prime minister. Wolf refers to previous studies on Blair’s discourse, such as Fair-

clough's and Charteris-Black's. The former highlights Blair's toughness through the use of modal verbs and the way he uses literary devices and characters. The latter notices how Blair's communication is in direct contrast to "Old Labour" and above all the numerous linguistic devices used in Blair's speeches, such as the ethical terms 'good' and 'evil', in order to dramatise/express feelings and personification to quickly establish a relationship with his audience.

Wolf's analysis makes clear that the speech has different levels. Blair begins with a historical introduction starting from the Second World War, gets to the current situation and concludes his speech with demands and reform proposals for a future Europe.

The author highlights how Blair uses intertextual references to other speeches or protagonists in addition to various argumentation structures. As regards linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms, she points out that Blair does not use any jargon in his speech. Nevertheless, it can be seen that he certainly changes his language depending on the topic's content. Blair's speech from a grammatical perspective is really eye-catching, for example in the number of occurrences of some personal pronouns. Also, modal verbs are clear expressions of what the speaker considers possible or even necessary. Blair uses enumerations, anaphors, di-, tri- and tetracolons, synecdoches, metaphors, rhetorical questions and phrases to enrich his speech and make it more persuasive.

What Wolf notices in her analysis of the speech's content is that even though Blair takes stock of his European policy in the speech, he practises very limited self-criticism. The aspects lost in his speech were the Iraq war and the American-European relationship. He mentions the UN and the relationship with the EU only once. At the same time, he advocates a new union, which, among other things, should be 'Atlanticist'. However, it remains open whether this means an intensification of the relationship with the UN or an EU reconciliation with the USA.

Blair's speech is probably more an assessment of general European policy than of his own political decisions. Nevertheless, it remains an appeal and a call for a more extensive, open and reformed EU with a more present Britain.

The contribution focusing on Blair is followed by Jan van der Harst's analysis of a speech held by the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte in March 2018, which was the first in a series of three EU-related public lectures Rutte presented for an international audience within a year's time. Until that time, Rutte had not given any important public speech on Europe, either at home or abroad, and this was a sudden change in his political attitude. The author states that Rutte's chief reason to deliver

the three speeches on the EU was the result of his wish to give a foreign audience the Dutch view on the state of the EU.

In the analysis of the speech, comments are made both on Rutte's performance and the speech's content. The author refers to Aristotle's *Rhetorica* by saying that Rutte aims to be seen in a rational light as possible, as a leader who cunningly builds a well-structured and understandable speech, filled with tangible proposals, urgencies and recommendations. In spite of that, van der Harst thinks his speech seems to be lacking in *pathos* and does not "excite emotions, voice the public's feelings or enchant the audience". Even on a non-verbal level, it is characterised by a lack of gestures which might back his arguments, and in the end van der Harst concludes that regardless of the absence of *pathos*, the real weakness in Rutte's speech is an *ethos* of hesitation, which really brings him down.

As previously stated, the author rejects Rutte's performance as well as the content of the speech, notably the ordering of the three guiding principles and nine proposals sounds arid, defining it as a "typical Rutte product" and even as "a typical Dutch product"; something that has to do with business rather than ideals, the speech of a skilled salesman who is incapable of considering non-material issues and conveying any intellectual form of abstraction.

The last case analysed in the volume is the well-known Sorbonne speech "Pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique" delivered by Emmanuel Macron on 26 September 2017, commented on by Sabine Ruß-Sattar. The speech was held by the French President at a really difficult time for the EU, when trust in the European institutions and values had been eroded by the economic crisis, the threat of migration, the rise of illiberal ideologies and the violent blow represented by Brexit. In such a threatening scenario, Macron's speech aimed at challenging the other European leaders, in particular the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, to get rid of the taboos which were hindering the European project and to relaunch European integration in view of a dramatically changing geostrategic environment and global challenges. According to the author, the speech held by the French President, who linked himself to a 'Gaullist-Mitterrandist tradition', represented Macron's reinterpretation of the traditional French narrative on Europe. He appealed to all fellow Europeans as a community of destiny to unite, facing the double threat represented by the nationalist 'obscurantism' and the creeping danger of doubts towards the European project. Ruß-Sattar argues that, demonstrating remarkable use of rhetorical devices and a creative combination of different formats and styles, Macron transferred the political lexicon linked to the nation state to Europe as a new polity, speaking of "our history, our identity

and our horizon” and meaning that there is a collective European identity to defend. In the speech, the French President envisioned a road map to tomorrow’s Europe, characterised by the deepening of cooperation among the member states at a variable speed in different fields, in permanent dialogue with the citizens of Europe. The author argues that Macron aimed at building tomorrow’s Europe around the core of the monetary union, with more strategic autonomy in the field of defence, more social and economic convergence in the inner market and strengthening the common European ground of knowledge and culture by intensifying students’ and trainees’ education and exchange of knowledge. Sabine Russ-Sattar underlines that the originality of Macron’s project lies in its institutional fluidity: he not only talked about a multi-speed Europe, but also suggested, thus differentiating his proposal from the Federal Europe outlined by Joschka Fischer in 2000, no concrete constitutional frame and allowing new cooperative agreements beyond the frame of EU membership, such as for example allowing the UK to participate in the field of defence policy in spite of Brexit.

VI. Preliminary Conclusion

The collection of speeches in this volume includes five generations of politicians.

The speeches of the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s, from Churchill and Monnet to Hallstein, were characterised by awakening and enthusiasm.

In the shadow of Gaullism and a new wave of renationalisation, tendencies towards pragmatism and realism dominated speeches in the 1960s (exceptions included like the example of Josef Klaus’ speech). This trend continued in the 1970s until around the early and mid-1980s. From this time onwards, new momentum became noticeable, which also made itself felt in the speeches.

The opening up of the centre and east of Europe from the end of the 1980s made possible a pan-European perspective of European integration that had not existed before 1989. This phase of renewed awakening promised a great deal of confidence and optimism for the future of a pan-European peace order, whose opportunities, which were also expressed in speeches, remained politically unused, however, because the continuation and deepening of the EU’s western integration was initially pursued, i.e. a renewed realism, even pragmatic rationalism of enlargement policy restraint prevailed.

The collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) ran parallel to the preparations for the founding of the European Union with Maastricht (1991-1993) to integrate the new united Germany, while in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, on the one hand, NATO and EU accession wishes were to be articulated, on the other hand, national egoisms became apparent. Rudiments of these trends can also be found in the speeches.

In the triumphal picture of the end of the Cold War and the enlargement to the East, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty can be considered as the beginning of a new stage in Europeanism, in which the public debate turned to criticisms of European integration.

The results of the Danish and French referendum, which directly involved public opinion in European questions, demonstrated how much the EU's image had changed, and how deep the criticisms ran of the democratic deficit and the technicality-leaden negotiations preceding the Maastricht Treaty.

The Europe of the 2000s of the first two decades was characterised by a persistent reform backlog of the community institutions, various external and internal crises as well as increased populism. Challenges of increased Europeanisation needs were followed by renationalisation tendencies in the EU member states. Euroscepticism and opposition to the EU were expressed in speeches after the impression arose that the Union allegedly could not solve the problems and was out of its depth. Only the French President Macron mustered the courage to point out new dimensions and perspectives for a renewed EU, which, however, did not find the necessary resonance.

Genoa, Hildesheim 21 December 2021

CHAPTER I:
PRESENT AT THE CREATION 1945–1946:
SPONSORS AND PROVIDERS OF IDEAS
AND IMPULSES

Friends and Sponsors of the new Europe: A Discourse Analysis on Churchill's Speech at the University of Zurich, 19 September 1946

Francesco Pierini

Introduction

On 19 September 1946 Winston Churchill, who was no longer the British Prime Minister after leading the United Kingdom through World War II, gave a speech at the Swiss University of Zurich in which he talked about his priorities in foreign policy. On that occasion he introduced two issues of great importance for the future process of European construction and integration, which would soon begin. He advocated the reconstruction of a “European family”, to be implemented, in his opinion, through Franco-German reconciliation, a concept he would express two years later, on 7 May 1948, at the Congress of The Hague, presided over by Churchill himself, where the idea of a Council of Europe really took shape¹.

In the life of the statesman, these years represented the culmination of a pro-European process built in a few decades, because it was only from the post-war period—particularly from 1922—that Churchill began to take precise stances on Europe in response to both the military and financial devastation of the continent, and the threat to the established order posed by the communist and socialist revolution. However, his pro-European ideas were not based on a Britain in Europe, but with Europe, as was already evident from an article published in 1930 in the *Saturday Evening Post* in which he stated, “We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not comprised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed”².

In this contribution, it is my intention to examine Churchill's level of adherence to the idea of Europe by investigating how the statesman used language in delivering his speech, which still remains both one of the best

1 See Pierini Francesco, “Churchill sull'Europa al Congresso de L'Aia: considerazioni linguistiche” in D. Preda, F. Velo (eds), *A settant'anni dal Congresso d'Europa a L'Aja. Unità ideale e unità politica*, Bari: Cacucci ed., 2020.

2 Churchill uttered these words on 15 February 1930 in an interview to the *Saturday Evening Post*.

examples of his great personal oratory and a cornerstone of the post-war Pro-European narrative. In particular, I will try to define how Winston Churchill used language to convey his idea of a united Europe.

2. *Churchill's Europeanism*

Winston Churchill is known for both his talent in oratory and public speaking as well as his political and diplomatic activity, which he also expressed in sponsoring a united Europe soon after the evil consequences of World War II. As he was a gifted speaker, we will see how he constructs an effective speech in terms of persuasiveness and expressiveness, but first I will touch on some of his biographical features related to the European cause he called for³. He was alternately an army officer, a war correspondent and a British Prime Minister (from 1940 to 1945 and from 1951 to 1955), but he was also one of the most eager supporters of a united Europe, at least theoretically speaking. He advocated the establishment of a so-called 'United States of Europe' and after the Second World War, he became more confident that only through a united Europe could a stable peace in the continent be assured. This is evident in the speech analysed in this paper, which was delivered at the University of Zurich in 1946, as well as in other talks he gave in Europe and America in the same period. Thus, after being the leading supporter of the anti-Nazi coalition, he became an enthusiastic promoter of the cause of Europe.

In spite of the fact that Churchill had this optimistic and constructive idea of a united European government, he was always keen to maintain that Great Britain—as a non-European world power—could be involved in this venture as an ally and not as a full member of a European federation. Britain, in both his words and those of other eminent partners, could support Europe but could not be part of it. Conceivably, it would be enough to study Churchill's approach to the European question between 1946 and 1951 to understand the 'Anglocentric' perspective adopted by Britain towards the Old Continent.

Even though Churchill promoted his project of European unification on many occasions in the speeches he delivered after the war, there are three main events at which he supported his idea of a united Europe. At the first one, held on 5 March 1946, when he was invited by President Truman to Fulton, Missouri, he gave a talk which became memorable and

3 Keegan, John, *Winston Churchill*, New York: Viking, 2002.

famous as the 'Iron Curtain Speech'⁴. There, he spread his idea on the part of the West to pursue a forceful challenge to Soviet supremacy. "Sinews of Peace", the original title of the talk, was an answer to the risk of war, in which he identified "two gaunt marauders, war and tyranny"⁵. He resorted to brotherly involvement of the English-speaking peoples, implying a kind of "special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States of America"⁶. Though mostly focused on the Anglo-sphere, Churchill also referred to an idea he developed in his following speeches, that is, the idea of a united Europe, as in

The safety of the world, ladies and gentlemen, requires a new unity in Europe from which no nation should be permanently outcast⁷.

But it was only on 19 September 1946, with the Zurich speech, which is the very basis of this analysis, when Churchill did not hesitate to say that he was in favour of the 'United States of Europe' and much of his pro-European attitude really came out here. From that date on, this became more and more evident, and two years later, on 7 May 1948, at the Hague Congress, which was personally chaired by Churchill, the idea of a Council of Europe really took shape⁸. The Hague Congress represented the culmination of a pro-European process built in more than a few decades, timidly started in the post-World War I period—particularly from 1922—when Churchill began to take precise positions on Europe, since he took into consideration both the destruction of the Continent and the looming danger of the communist revolution⁹.

3. Methodology

In order to answer the question, I will avail myself of discourse analysis (DA). DA is a research method for exploring language (written or spoken) in relation to the social context in which communication takes place. It sets its sights on analysing language use in real-life contexts. Using DA has to do with understanding how language works and how meaning can

4 'Iron curtain' speech – The National Archives (Last accessed 12 October 2021)

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 The Churchill Society London. Churchill's Speeches. (churchill-society-london.org.uk) (Last accessed 12 October 2021)

9 Churchill and Europe (churchillarchive.com) (Last accessed 12 October 2021)

be produced in various social contexts. Differently from typical linguistic approaches, it does not only concentrate on the rules of language use, but instead focuses on the meaning of language in context. In fact, humans use language in order to achieve their goals, which may vary from evoking emotions, building empathy, arousing fear, motivating others and so on.

It is of course difficult to define discourse, and linguists have often defined it in different ways. Some scholars regard it as a way of talking and writing in a given social context, and they focus their analysis on the conventions used in these contexts¹⁰. Others concentrate on the themes of power and inequality, which underlie discourse, and how they are preserved and opposed¹¹.

Discourse analysis is actually an important instrument for the understanding of the political meanings that lie beneath texts. The works of discourse analysts, notably Chilton and Fairclough, are the foundations of this methodology; however, in this paper DA will be exploited for a text-based, qualitative analysis.

Since the study of political communication is challenging as it is based on more than a few disciplines and schools of thought, the central questions we might ask ourselves are related to how the things that people say and do touch society on the whole, and how society in turn influences people.

If we focused on discourse theory to answer this question, we would get lost in a wide range of debated points of view of sociologists and political scientists, who have debated around this controversial term, not to mention the fact that researchers use a large number of tools to analyse discourse. The founder of this method, Michael Foucault, regarded the world we live in as structured by knowledge and believed that some people

10 Michael Foucault, the father of DA, basically believed that the world we live in is structured by knowledge and that some people groups create ideas about our world which may become unquestioned truths and start to be regarded as normal. For further details, see Foucault, Michel, *The Archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language* (A. M. S. Smith, Trans.), New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972.

11 Fairclough Norman (1995), Van Dijk Teun (1988) and Wodak Ruth (1989) seem to be more interested in the dynamics of power, dominance and inequality that are in discourse. This approach is called critical discourse analysis (CDA) and evaluates speech, in fact, as language in use, a form of social practice shaped by power relations and charged with ideology. In this sense, CDA allows us to understand how the discourse reproduces or opposes social and political inequalities, power and social control.

and groups produce ideas about the world that may become accepted truths, axioms that end up seeming normal¹².

4. Structure of the speech

This single text represents a speech of historical importance in the process of building post-war Europe and is therefore certainly worthy of linguistic analysis as it outlines an effective example of persuasive communication. Structurally it may be divided into four parts: The first one is about post-war Europe and it works as the introduction to the speech. The second part is about the people of Europe and the present tragic situation in which they are living. In the third part, Churchill suggests the solution to make Europe arise from that awful condition, that is, “a kind of United States of Europe”, and in the fourth part he talks about a world order based on “broad natural groupings” formed from the USA, Britain and the Commonwealth, Europe and the Soviet Union. Churchill deals with this last part more widely, focusing on the advantages given by the solution and coming to the conclusion that Britain will be one of the “friends and sponsors of Europe”, a statement that was to be strongly outlined from that moment onwards and that would explain the attitude shown by Britain towards the EU since then. As a discourse analyst, I will focus on what I consider the most significant aspects of language; though I am conscious I will necessarily neglect others that could be taken into consideration. Notably, I will analyse the following categories of language, not in their entirety but concentrating on some parts of them:

Word groups: with special regard to the lexical choice made by the speaker, which implies the use of positive and negative words (able to create a sense of general approval or disapproval), their denotation and connotation, and the contribution given by the words chosen as regards the creation of pathos in the audience¹³.

Grammar features: the use of grammar structures to express thoughts and ideas with particular emphasis on agency¹⁴.

¹² See note 10.

¹³ Partington, Alan & Taylor, Charlotte, *The Language of Persuasion in Politics*, London & New York: Routledge, 2018.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Rhetorical figures: any stylistic form and the use of tropes such as metaphor, metonym, tricolon and repetition can reinforce one's ideas and emphasise the speaker's point of view on something.

Modality: as the speaker's commitment towards what he/she is saying and how he/she evaluates things.

Evidentiality: as a way through which the presenter may convey ideas as either evident or assumptions.

4.1. Word groups

As a very persuasive speaker, Churchill knows how to use words and how to combine them with one another. He is able to use powerful language in order to entice the audience and create a sense of joy and enthusiasm as well as a sense of hopelessness and despair depending on the situation given. In particular, he starts by showing the present situation from a disagreeable perspective by using negative words and he arrives at predicting how things could be in future through a wide range of positive words. As shown below, he announces what he is going to talk about with a very heavy word such as 'tragedy', which conveys a strong negative connotation:

I wish to speak about the tragedy of Europe

When trying to arouse positive feelings about the solution he is going to offer, he wisely uses positively connoted words, whether with qualitative adjectives like 'noble' or 'great' or with proper adjectives such as 'Western' and 'Christian'¹⁵. He uses nouns that are inherently positive, 'happiness', 'prosperity' and 'glory', as well as semantically neutral nouns, such as 'faith', 'ethics', 'culture', 'arts', 'philosophy', 'science', which acquire a good evaluation in the context in question:

this noble continent, the home of all the great parent races of the Western world, the foundation of Christian faith and ethics, the origin of most of the culture, arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and modern times. If Europe were once united in the sharing of its common inheritance there would be no limit to the happiness, prosperity and glory which its 300 million or 400 million people would enjoy.

15 Proper adjectives derive from proper nouns, whereas qualitative adjectives show the kind and quality of something or someone.

When he wants to describe the people of Europe, he focuses on negative adjectives that arouse a sense of fear and anxiety, such as ‘quivering’, ‘tormented’, ‘hungry’, ‘careworn’ and ‘bewildered’. Through nouns he does exactly the same thing by using words such as ‘ruins’, ‘tyranny’, ‘terror’, ‘despair’ and ‘havoc’:

but over wide areas are a vast, quivering mass of tormented, hungry, careworn and bewildered human beings, who wait in the ruins of their cities and homes and scan the dark horizons for the approach of some new form of tyranny or terror.

Among the victors there is a Babel of voices, among the vanquished the sullen silence of despair. That is all that Europeans, grouped in so many ancient states and nations, and that is all that the Germanic races have got by tearing each other to pieces and spreading havoc far and wide.

After producing such feelings of worry and unease, he is able to build up an optimistic perspective which is a prelude to his idea or ‘remedy’ as he calls it, with the result that encouraging words like ‘miracle’, ‘free’, ‘happy’, ‘peace’, ‘freedom’ and ‘safety’ occur:

Yet all the while there is a remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously adopted by the great majority of people in many lands, would as by a miracle transform the whole scene and would in a few years make all Europe, or the greater part of it, as free and happy as Switzerland is today. What is this sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the European fabric, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, safety and freedom.

As previously said, persuasion is a complex art or, as defined by Aristotle, “the arts of persuasive discourse”, and since we use it in everyday life, his is a theory of human interaction. As Simons maintains, “human communication [is] designed to influence the autonomous judgments and actions of others”¹⁶; consequently, it is “a form of attempted influence in the sense that it seeks to alter the way others think, feel, or act”¹⁷.

Persuasion is a psychological process that may be achieved through linguistic and extra-linguistic elements. In our investigation, we will focus

16 Simons Herbert W. & Jones Jean G., *Persuasion in Society*, New York and London: Routledge, 2011, p.23.

17 Ibid.

on the main linguistic aspects and, in particular, on the value of lexis (words) and its role in persuasive communication.

Lexical choice is therefore essential in order to express meaning and to persuade. As Kress says, “words describe a picture of the world that is completely subjective and exists within structures that are organized by the ideological systems that they represent”¹⁸.

Since persuasion is aimed at convincing the recipient to think or act in a different way, we cannot but forget the Aristotelian principles on which persuasion lies, the appeals to logos, ethos and pathos. Structurally the speech contains 1,490 tokens—of which there are 556 types—and it may be divided into 4 parts:

- 1) post-war Europe (the introduction to the speech).
- 2) the people of Europe and the present tragic situation (he builds empathy and prepares people to accept the solution)
- 3) the solution to make Europe arise from it (“a kind of United States of Europe”)
- 4) a world order based on “broad natural groupings” (USA, Britain and the Commonwealth, Europe and the Soviet Union):

This last part is particularly substantial since not only does he focus on the advantages given by the solution to the tragic European post-war context, but because he states that Britain will be one of the “friends and sponsors of Europe”, a statement that was to be strongly outlined from that moment onwards and that would explain the attitude shown by Britain towards the EU from then on.

4.2. Grammar features

As regards agency, in other words ‘who does what to whom?’, it is evident how Churchill deals with the doer and the done to¹⁹. Any time he wants to avoid directly mentioning the subject of the action or to leave it blurred, he uses the pronoun ‘we’ without directly referring to who is supposed to take action, such as in,

We must build a kind of United States of Europe

18 Kress, Gunther R., “Ideological Structures in Discourse”, in Teun. A. Van Dijk, (ed.), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis 4*, London: Academic Press, 1985.

19 Partington, Alan &, Taylor C., op.cit.

And though it is implicitly conveyed, it is not evident who should do it. In other cases, the statesman uses the same device through the structure 'there is', in which he outlines the presence of somebody/something; though he leaves that unspecified again:

Among the victors there is a Babel of voices (*who are they?*)

There is also that immense body which was brought into being amidst high hopes after the first world war (*by whom?*)

All that is needed is the resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women to do right instead of wrong (*by whom?*)

There is therefore much knowledge and material with which to build (*who has it?*)

There are things that must be done (*what and who should do them?*)

If Europe is to be saved from infinite misery and indeed from final doom there must be this act of faith (*by whom?—who should?*)

This also happens through the use of the modal verb 'must' when something should be done categorically, though the doer is not explicitly mentioned:

This disaster must not be repeated (*who caused it?*)

In order that this may be accomplished there must be an act of faith (*by whom?—from whom?*)

The guilty must be punished. (*by whom?*). Germany must be deprived of the power to rearm and make another aggressive war. But when all this has been done, as it will be done, as it is being done, there must be an end to retribution. (*by whom?—by whom?*)

We must all turn our backs upon the horrors of the past and look to the future... (*who should really?*)

Germany must be punished (*by whom?*)

4.3. *Rhetorical figures*

Rhetorically speaking, Churchill is a master since he often uses figures of speech very effectively. His style is filled with metaphors that give his communication a weapon of attention and stimulate his audience's minds. Metaphors are powerful and through them persuasive arguments can be made by means of comparison or analogy. Political discourse is rich in metaphors since they increase the vigour of language and explain how we see the world and portray it to others. Below, in order to describe the tormented people of Europe, he portrays them as being 'in the ruins of their cities and homes', a semi-literal metaphor since there may be some

truth in it though the image given does not refer to a physical picture of what is happening but to a spiritual experience they live in. Similarly, they 'scan the dark horizons' does not mean they look to the sky as in foreboding at a return to war and bombardments; rather it refers to their anguish and fear of conflicts:

...but over wide areas are a vast, quivering mass of tormented, hungry, careworn and bewildered human beings, who wait in the ruins of their cities and homes and scan the dark horizons for the approach of some new form of tyranny or terror.

When it comes to the countries who won the war and in order to highlight their desire to have their say, he talks about 'a Babel of voices', showing that everybody wants to prevail over others and cannot find common ground on which to solve problems. The defeated countries are described as affected by 'a sullen silence of despair'. In this sentence, the contrasting image conjured up by the following antithesis is also evident:

Among the victors there is a Babel of voices, among the vanquished the sullen silence of despair (*metaphor*)

This antithesis also occurs when he suggests his idea of a United States of Europe: Churchill offers it as a solution capable of causing people 'to do right instead of wrong' and obtain a reward based on 'blessing instead of cursing':

...hundreds of millions of men and women to do right instead of wrong and to gain as their reward blessing instead of cursing. (*antithesis*)

In the following example, Churchill implicitly thanks the USA for intervening in the war and preventing Europe from falling into what he calls the 'Dark Ages':

...the Dark Ages would have returned in all their cruelty and squalor. (*metaphor*)

He also resorts to other rhetorical figures such as the tricolon, which gives special rhythm to what he is saying. Below we find two examples of tricolon used to emphasise his idea as a constructive one, since in both sentences the nouns have a positive connotation:

...it can dwell in peace, safety and freedom (*tricolon*)

Let there be justice, mercy and freedom. (*tricolon*)

As a last example of rhetorical devices used by the statesman, metonym should be mentioned.

The atomic bomb is still only in the hands of a nation which, we know, will never use it (*metonym*)

At present there is a breathing space. The cannons have ceased firing. (*metaphor and metonym*)

4.4. Modality

Grammatically speaking, modality denotes the system that speakers can use to express their degree of commitment to the belief/idea that:

- Something happened or didn't happen—will or won't happen—should or shouldn't happen
- Someone did or didn't do something—is or isn't able to do something—is or isn't willing to do something—should or shouldn't do something

Modality goes from certainty to doubt and it is often expressed through modal verbs and modal expressions (adverbs or adverbials): Must, need and should are common examples of modal verbs, but adverbs may also express what the speaker/writer thinks about something or someone such as with possibly, definitely, maybe, allegedly, etc., and adverbials follow the same rule, as with it is vital that, this is not the time to, I'm quite sure that, etc.

Starting from modal verbs, we see that they are often used in the text, since most of them occur in the list of top words. In a relatively short speech of 1,490 tokens—556 types, I found that 'must', 'will' and 'may' play a substantial role in the text:

Token	Occurrences	Percentage in text
Must:	21	1.41
Will:	12	0.81
May:	7	0.47

Must has to do with obligation, necessity, prohibition and is used by Churchill to say what his views on some issues are and how they should be managed:

739. ure under which it can dwell in peace safety and freedom we **MUST** build a kind of united states of europe in this way onl
740. to face the facts and act while time remained this disaster **MUST** not be repeated there is therefore much knowledge and m
741. destiny of man in order that this may be accomplished there **MUST** be an act of faith in which the millions of families sp
742. h in which the millions of families speaking many languages **MUST** consciously take part we all know that the two world wa
743. th century no equal at any time in human history the guilty **MUST** be punished germany must be deprived of the power to re
744. y time in human history the guilty must be punished germany **MUST** be deprived of the power to rearm and make another aggr
745. has been done as it will be done as it is being done there **MUST** be an end to retribution there must be what mr gladston
746. it is being done there must be an end to retribution there **MUST** be what mr gladstone many years ago called a blessed a
747. dstone many years ago called a blessed act of oblivion we **MUST** all turn our backs upon the horrors of the past and loo
748. saved from infinite misery and indeed from final doom there **MUST** be this act of faith in the european family this act of
749. ou the first step in the re creation of the european family **MUST** be a partnership between france and germany in this way
750. r individual places among the united states of europe but i **MUST** give you warning time may be short at present there is
751. m a united states of europe or whatever name it may take we **MUST** begin now in these present days we dwell strangely and
752. m up the propositions which are before you our constant aim **MUST** be to build and fortify the united nations organisation
753. nations organisation under and within that world concept we **MUST** recreate the european family in a regional structure ca
754. states of europe are not willing or able to join a union we **MUST** nevertheless proceed to assemble and combine those who
755. people of every race and every land from war and servitude **MUST** be established on solid foundations and must be created
756. and servitude must be established on solid foundations and **MUST** be created by the readiness of all men and women to die
757. to submit to tyranny in this urgent work france and germany **MUST** take the lead together great britain the british common
758. and i trust soviet russia for then indeed all would be well **MUST** be the friends and sponsors of the new europe and must
759. well must be the friends and sponsors of the new europe and **MUST** champion its right to live therefore i say to you let

We must build a kind of United States of Europe
In order that this may be accomplished there must be an act of faith
This disaster must not be repeated.
The guilty must be punished. Germany must be deprived of the power to
rearm
The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partner-
ship between France and Germany
But I must give you warning , time may be short.
Our constant aim must be to build and fortify the United Nations Organi-
sation
The salvation of the common people of every race and every land from
war and servitude must be established on solid foundations, and must
be created by the readiness of all men and women to die rather than to
submit to tyranny.
[...] must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must cham-
pion its right to live.
Will may be used to express prediction and volition. In the first case as
an auxiliary for the future, it is used to convey an idea of how things will
be or will develop with time:

1438. st build a kind of united states of europe in this way only **WILL** hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the s
1439. nother aggressive war but when all this has been done as it **WILL** be done as it is being done there must be an end to ret
1440. there be justice mercy and freedom the peoples have only to **WILL** it and all will achieve their heart desire i am now goi
1441. mercy and freedom the peoples have only to will it and all **WILL** achieve their heart desire i am now going to say someth
1442. eve their heart desire i am now going to say something that **WILL** astonish you the first step in the re creation of the e
1443. great germany the structure of the united states of europe **WILL** be such as to make the material strength of a single st
1444. ial strength of a single state less important small nations **WILL** count as much as large ones and gain their honour by a
1445. c bomb is still only in the hands of a nation which we know **WILL** never use it except in the cause of right and freedom b
1446. ell be that in a few years this awful agency of destruction **WILL** be widespread and that the catastrophe following from i
1447. tastrophe following from its use by several warring nations **WILL** not only bring to an end all that we call civilisation
1448. be the united states of europe and the first practical step **WILL** be to form a council of europe if at first all the stat
1449. must nevertheless proceed to assemble and combine those who **WILL** and who can the salvation of the common people of every

I am now going to say something that will astonish you.
The structure of the United States of Europe will be such as to make the material strength of a single State less important.
Small nations will count as much as large ones
...will not only bring to an end all that we call civilisation but may possibly disintegrate the globe itself.
and the first practical step will be to form a Council of Europe.

May is used to express possibility and likelihood, and Churchill resorts to it when he wants to give a warning or to alarm somebody about possible dangers if (his) solutions are not taken into consideration and implemented:

'08. s would have returned in all their cruelty and squalor they MAY still return yet all the while there is a remedy which i
'09. p to shape the honourable destiny of man in order that this MAY be accomplished there must be an act of faith in which t
'10. he united states of europe but i must give you warning time MAY be short at present there is a breathing space the canno
'11. e are to form a united states of europe or whatever name it MAY take we must begin now in these present days we dwell st
'12. ever use it except in the cause of right and freedom but it MAY well be that in a few years this awful agency of destruc
'13. not only bring to an end all that we call civilisation but MAY possibly disintegrate the globe itself i now sum up the
'14. reate the european family in a regional structure called it MAY be the united states of europe and the first practical s

[Dark Ages] they still may return
[the United States of Europe.] But I must give you warning, time may be short.
If we are to form a United States of Europe, or whatever name it may take, we must begin now.
[The atomic bomb] ...will not only bring to an end all that we call civilisation but may possibly²⁰ disintegrate the globe itself.

4.5. Evidentiality

Evidentiality is the sign of the nature of evidence for an assumed statement; whether evidence exists for the statement and if so, what kind. Something evidential is the particular element that shows evidentiality.

Whether the speaker saw the event happen, didn't see it but heard it (or smelt it), made an inference about it based on visual traces or reasoning or

20 In this case, the strength of the modal verb 'may' is accompanied by the modal expression 'possibly' in order to mitigate the idea of the evil consequences of the atomic bomb.

general knowledge, or was told about it. This is the essence of evidentiality, or grammatical marking of information source²¹.

We all know that the two World Wars through which we have passed arose out of the vain passion of Germany to play a dominating part in the world.

The atomic bomb is still only in the hands of a nation which, we know, will never use it except

Indeed, but for the fact that the great republic across the Atlantic realised that the ruin or enslavement of Europe would involve her own fate as well, and stretched out hands of succour and guidance, if it were not for

In this urgent work France and Germany must take the lead together. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America—and, I trust, Soviet Russia, for then indeed all would be well—must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live.

5. Conclusions

Churchill proves, as in most of his public speeches, to be a master of rhetoric. He structurally builds his speech through the use of logos, so that cause is linked to effect. As a result, his reasoning seems to flow without showing nonsense or contradictions.

Linguistically he is an expert in using words effectively, giving vivid images through positive vocabulary when he wants to make the public feel the real benefits of his solutions. Similarly, he is able to provide the audience with strong negative images, favouring their removal from the listeners' minds and making them accept his ideas (empathy).

Sentences show his ability to identify a doer when he wants to outline positive/negative responsibility towards something and avoid blaming/praising somebody when this is not the case (there is/there must).

Rhetorical figures give rhythm to what he is saying besides being immediately available to the audience.

He uses modal expressions of obligation and necessity to show how committed he is to what he is saying and leaving little room for alternative points of view (we must build a kind of United Europe). Through eviden-

21 Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald, "Evidentiality: the basics", in Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Evidentiality. Oxford Handbooks in Linguistics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 148–172.

Friends and Sponsors of the new Europe

tiality (we all know that...) he can also convey controversial ideas or those that could be subject to debate.

All these elements can highly contribute to strengthening his idea of a United Europe, based on a Franco-German guide and supported by a Britain who can be a friend, sponsor and an active player on the world political scene.

Jean Monnet à la présidence de la Haute Autorité de la CECA : analyse de deux discours fondateurs

Gilles Grin

1. Introduction

1.1 Jean Monnet

Jean Monnet, né en 1888, s'est trouvé placé au cœur des questions européennes et internationales durant presque deux tiers de siècle, depuis son rôle dans la coordination de l'effort de guerre des Alliés durant la Première Guerre mondiale jusqu'à sa disparition en 1979.¹

Jean Monnet commence son activité professionnelle au sortir de l'école obligatoire. Il n'entreprend pas d'études mais devient représentant en cognac dans l'entreprise familiale J.G. Monnet & Co. Jusqu'à l'âge de 25 ans, avant l'éclatement de la Première Guerre mondiale, il parcourt le monde pour vendre l'eau-de-vie familiale à une époque où les gens voyagent encore très peu. Découvrir notamment les États-Unis et le Canada, ces unions d'États où il est possible à chacun de voyager à travers un continent dépourvu de rivalités internes, est un choc pour un jeune homme ayant grandi dans une Europe morcelée, bardée de frontières, d'orgueils et de

1 Pour des publications de référence sur Jean Monnet, voir : Jean Monnet, *Mémoires*, Paris : Fayard, 1976 ; Gérard Bossuat, Andreas Wilkens (éd.), *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les chemins de la Paix*, Paris : Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999 ; Sherrill Brown Wells, *Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman*, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011 ; François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet. The First Statesman of Interdependence*, New York, London: Norton & Co, 1994 ; Pascal Fontaine, *Jean Monnet : actualité d'un bâtisseur de l'Europe unie*, Lausanne : Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Paris : Economica, 2013 ; Gilles Grin, *Méthode communautaire et fédéralisme : le legs de Jean Monnet à travers ses archives*, Lausanne : Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Collection débats et documents, no 2, septembre 2014 ; Gilles Grin, *Shaping Europe: The Path to European Integration according to Jean Monnet*, Lausanne: Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe, Debates and Documents Collection, no 7, March 2017 ; Éric Roussel, *Jean Monnet 1888-1979*, Paris : Fayard, 1996 ; Klaus Schwabe, *Jean Monnet : Frankreich, Die Deutschen Und Die Einigung Europas*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016.

rivalités nationales. Cela marque sa pensée et forge le principe d'une vie : la volonté d'unir les peuples autour de l'intérêt commun.

L'Europe s'embrase en 1914, mais Jean Monnet est exempté de service militaire pour des raisons médicales. Il souhaite être utile à l'effort de guerre de son pays, la France. Fort de son expérience en matière de négoce et d'échanges internationaux, il constate que les pays alliés se retrouvent en concurrence pour l'achat de matières premières, faisant monter les prix artificiellement alors même qu'ils sont alliés sur le plan militaire. Grâce à ses contacts, il parvient à convaincre le président du Conseil René Viviani de l'envoyer à Londres où il préside un comité interallié pour l'achat des matières premières puis l'acheminement des troupes sur le continent.

Cette expérience est un succès. Jean Monnet démontre un grand savoir-faire d'organisation et de conciliation, reconnu par les États. Cela lui vaut, après la fin du conflit, d'être nommé secrétaire général adjoint de la toute nouvelle Société des Nations. Homme de consensus, il ne se sent toutefois pas à l'aise dans une institution où le droit de veto des nations, trop fort, bloque les négociations. Il quitte son poste en 1923 pour redresser l'entreprise familiale en difficulté puis se lance dans les affaires privées qui lui offrent plus de souplesse. Il reste toutefois animé par une volonté de servir la coopération internationale. Ainsi se rend-il notamment en Chine pour lever des investissements en faveur du développement des chemins de fers en Mandchourie, chose demandée par la Chine à la SDN mais bloquée par le veto du Japon.

Lorsque la Seconde Guerre mondiale éclate, Jean Monnet est à Londres. Il se met au service des Alliés et côtoie Charles de Gaulle et Winston Churchill. Après la débâcle française, il les convainc qu'une fusion des empires français et britannique est la meilleure chose à faire pour éviter l'armistice de l'Hexagone. Cette proposition d'union franco-britannique, datée du 16 juin 1940, n'arrive toutefois pas à temps auprès du gouvernement français. À Bordeaux, le maréchal Pétain, fraîchement nommé président du Conseil, signe l'armistice avec les Allemands le 22 juin. Monnet ne s'arrête pas là et devient l'envoyé de Churchill auprès du président américain Franklin Delano Roosevelt pour le convaincre d'augmenter la production militaire américaine.

À Washington, il sait se faire entendre et noue des liens de confiance avec le président et ses proches. À tel point qu'en 1943, Roosevelt l'envoie comme représentant à Alger lors des réunions pour organiser le Comité français de libération nationale (CFLN) dont il devient membre à part

entière. C'est à cette époque qu'il rédige ses premières réflexions sur une Europe d'après-guerre unie.²

Après la Libération, il propose au général de Gaulle la création du Commissariat général du Plan dans le but de stimuler la modernisation et l'équipement du pays. Il devient le premier commissaire général au plan (1946-1952). Fort de sa position où il bénéficie d'une vue panoramique sur l'économie française et ses interactions avec l'extérieur, Jean Monnet développe l'idée pour laquelle il deviendra le plus connu, à savoir la CECA.

En effet, en 1950, Jean Monnet prend l'initiative de préparer un projet à la fois visionnaire et concret qu'il soumet au ministre français des Affaires étrangères Robert Schuman. Ce dernier prend la responsabilité politique de le proposer, à son gouvernement tout d'abord, aux autres États européens ensuite. La Déclaration Schuman conçue par Jean Monnet est ainsi rendue publique le 9 mai 1950. Elle propose de placer l'ensemble de la production de charbon et d'acier de la France, de l'Allemagne et des autres pays européens qui voudraient s'y joindre, sous une Haute Autorité commune. Cette initiative représente la première étape devant conduire à une Fédération européenne.³

Au mois de juin 1950, les représentants de l'Allemagne fédérale, de la Belgique, de la France, de l'Italie, du Luxembourg et des Pays-Bas entament des négociations intergouvernementales qui aboutissent à la signature, le 18 avril 1951, du traité de Paris instituant la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier (CECA).⁴ Le traité de Paris entre en vigueur en juillet 1952 pour une durée de cinquante ans. La CECA est la première Communauté européenne, suivie en 1958 par la naissance de deux autres communautés : la Communauté économique européenne (CEE) et la Communauté européenne de l'énergie atomique (CEEA ou Euratom).

Plusieurs organisations de type intergouvernemental ont été créées en Europe occidentale dans les années suivant la Seconde Guerre mondia-

2 Voir la contribution de l'auteur intitulée « Jean Monnet et l'idée d'Europe au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale », à paraître dans l'ouvrage édité par Andreas Wilkens sur les projets d'Europe dans les résistances allemandes et européennes, 1939-1945.

3 Henri Rieben, Martin Nathusius, Françoise Nicod, Claire Camperio-Tixier, *Un changement d'espérance : la Déclaration du 9 mai 1950, Jean Monnet – Robert Schuman*, Lausanne : Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, 2000.

4 Le texte du traité peut être trouvé à l'adresse suivante : [<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11951K/TXT&from=FR>], page consultée le 10 octobre 2021.

le : en particulier l'Organisation européenne de coopération économique (OECE), l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN) et le Conseil de l'Europe. Les Communautés européennes, toutefois, étaient d'essence supranationale. Même si elles allaient en réalité fonctionner selon un savant mélange de pratiques supranationales et intergouvernementales, cette nouvelle réalité de l'Europe dite communautaire allait modifier durablement le paysage légal, institutionnel, politique et économique de l'Europe.⁵

Jean Monnet est appelé par les gouvernements des six États membres de la CECA à devenir le premier président de sa Haute Autorité, c'est-à-dire l'autorité exécutive de la nouvelle Communauté (l'ancêtre de l'actuelle Commission européenne si l'on veut bien).⁶

La CECA n'est, pour Jean Monnet, qu'un premier pas pour unir et fédérer les pays européens et leurs citoyens. L'étape suivante, imposée par les événements internationaux, est de résoudre le problème de la défense du front est et du réarmement de l'Allemagne. Il en naît le projet de la Communauté européenne de défense (CED). Ce traité n'aboutit cependant pas, sa ratification étant refusée en 1954 par l'Assemblée nationale française sous la pression des gaullistes et des communistes. Ce contrecoup dans le projet européen crée la première grave crise de la construction européenne.

Jean Monnet démissionne alors de la présidence de la Haute Autorité de la CECA et fonde le Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe. Ce groupe, qu'il préside durant 20 ans (1955-1975), réunit les principaux représentants politiques et syndicaux de l'Europe communautaire pour réfléchir et proposer des projets afin de relancer et poursuivre l'intégration européenne. Les travaux de ce comité contribuent à donner naissance, en 1957, aux traités de Rome et continuent d'être une force motrice du projet

5 Sur les conceptions visant à créer la paix entre les États européens dans une perspective historique de long terme, voir : Bruno Arcidiacono, *Cinq types de paix : une histoire des plans de pacification perpétuelle (XVII^e-XX^e siècles)*, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2011. Pour un essai historique sur la construction européenne et ses prémices, balayant deux siècles d'histoire du continent (1815 à 2021), voir : Gilles Grin, *Construction européenne : la révolution d'un continent*, Lausanne : Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Collection débats et documents, no 21, juin 2021.

6 Jean Monnet exerce ces fonctions européennes d'août 1952 à juin 1955, à la suite de quoi il crée le Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe qu'il préside de 1955 à 1975. Sur le Comité d'action, voir : Pascal Fontaine, *Le Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe de Jean Monnet*, Lausanne : Centre de recherches européennes, 1974.

européen jusqu'au début des années 1970. En 1975, Jean Monnet, âgé de 86 ans, se retire de la vie publique européenne. En 1976, il est désigné premier « citoyen d'honneur de l'Europe » par le Conseil européen.⁷ Il se consacre à la rédaction de ses Mémoires, parues la même année, et fonde en 1978 à Lausanne une institution dédiée à la conservation de la mémoire de son travail et de ses idées : la Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe. Il s'éteint en 1979, à l'âge de 90 ans, et est inhumé dans le petit village des Yvelines où il a résidé depuis la fin de la guerre. Neuf ans plus tard, en 1988, le président François Mitterrand le fait entrer au Panthéon.

Durant plus de soixante ans, Jean Monnet a été un acteur discret mais crucial des grands tournants historiques. Que ce soit durant les deux Guerres mondiales, les années folles ou les Trente Glorieuses, il a toujours été présent, ayant à cœur de réunir les décideurs autour de l'intérêt commun pour faire avancer la paix. Mais, celui que Charles de Gaulle appelait *l'Inspireur*, était-il lui-même inspiré par une doctrine, une école de pensée qu'il aurait suivie et appliquée ? La réponse est négative. Issu du terroir charentais, un milieu artisanal bercé d'un savoir-faire ancestral, Jean Monnet n'a pas fait d'études supérieures ni même n'a obtenu le baccalauréat. Il était peu friand de textes amphigouriques et de théories provenant du monde académique, lui à qui il arrivait d'annoter sur les mémos de collaborateurs l'appréciation « trop intelligent – refaire ». Son école était le pragmatisme basé sur quelques sains principes : trouver une solution simple, claire et élégante à un problème concret, fût-il complexe. Pour ce faire, et c'est là son génie, il procédait à l'image d'un maître de chais de sa ville natale de Cognac. Il savait où trouver les spécialistes – souvent plus jeunes que lui d'ailleurs – au fait des dernières doctrines et dont il distillait, maturait et assemblait les travaux pour arriver à un produit unique aux saveurs subtiles, propre à répondre aux besoins du moment.⁸

Quant à se demander si Jean Monnet fut habité par une vision unique et arrêtée de ce que devait être l'Europe et s'il avait une ambition de devenir un leader européen, là aussi il convient de répondre par la négative. Ce rapide survol de sa vie montre bien qu'il fut habité d'une envie de voir les États européens s'unir et prospérer dans la paix plutôt que de les voir se perdre dans des rivalités, des concurrences nationales et des guerres

7 Cette distinction a été conférée par le Conseil européen à trois reprises seulement. Helmut Kohl et Jacques Delors ont été par la suite honorés du même titre, en 1998 et 2015 respectivement.

8 Sur les idées économiques de Jean Monnet, voir : Gilles Grin, « L'actualité de la pensée économique de Jean Monnet » in *The European Union Review*, no 1-2-3, vol. 21, 2016, pp. 69-82.

funestes. Cette volonté était un but idéal, le phare lointain qui le guidait, mais le cap, il ne l'a pas tracé à l'avance, ni même ne savait-il à quoi ressemblerait ce phare. Il savait qu'il voulait le rejoindre et a réglé son cap à chaque fois qu'il était face à une tempête ou des hauts-fonds, tout en cherchant toujours à avancer dans la bonne direction. D'abord en unissant économiquement les Alliés de la Grande Guerre. Puis, à la SDN, où il essaya d'atténuer les carences du traité de Versailles. En 1940, lorsqu'il proposa une union franco-britannique devant le péril nazi. À Alger, en 1943, en rassurant les États-Unis hostiles à de Gaulle, permettant au CFLN d'être un acteur de la reconquête de l'Hexagone. Dès 1945, en France, où il réussit à mettre d'accord le patronat et la Confédération générale du travail sur un plan de relance et de modernisation économiques. Enfin, en 1950, lorsqu'il conçut le projet révolutionnaire de réconciliation et d'union franco-allemande avec le pool charbon-acier. Et, alors qu'il avait déjà 66 ans et présidait le premier exécutif européen, alors que le projet d'intégration avait du plomb dans l'aile avec l'échec de la CED, il ne se contenta pas de finir sa carrière à un poste prestigieux ou de prendre une retraite bien méritée, mais il démissionna pour animer – souvent sur ses propres deniers – un comité visant à poursuivre le projet d'unité. Et cela pendant encore 20 ans.

Jean Monnet ne fut jamais un doctrinaire ni même ne fut habité d'une vision messianique. Au contraire, c'est en étant dépourvu d'idéologie mais animé de quelques grands principes, de persévérance et d'un pragmatisme presque industriels qu'il réussit tout au long de sa vie à se faire entendre et à s'attirer la confiance des dirigeants d'Europe et d'Amérique pour les faire tendre vers un principe simple : collaborer à l'intérêt général afin de promouvoir la paix, la prospérité et la liberté.

1.2 Choix des deux discours

Dans la présente contribution, nous avons choisi d'étudier les deux discours fondateurs de Jean Monnet dans ses nouvelles fonctions de président de la Haute Autorité de la CECA.

Le premier est celui qu'il délivre le dimanche 10 août 1952 lors de l'installation de la Haute Autorité à Luxembourg.⁹ La capitale du Grand-Duché avait en effet été choisie par les Six comme le siège provisoire de la première Communauté européenne.

Le deuxième discours fondateur de Jean Monnet est prononcé le jeudi 11 septembre 1952 à Strasbourg lors du deuxième jour de la première session de l'Assemblée commune de la CECA.¹⁰ Cette session s'est tenue du 10 au 13 septembre 1952.

Ces deux discours fondamentaux se trouvent au cœur du lancement des institutions de la CECA. Comme on va le voir, ils partagent beaucoup de thèmes et peuvent être vus comme complémentaires.

Le fait que la CECA ait publié ces deux discours – et eux seuls – dans une brochure parue au mois de septembre 1952 atteste de leur complémentarité.¹¹

2. Contenu des discours

2.1 Analyse quantitative des thèmes

Nous avons recherché les thèmes présents dans les deux discours, puis nous avons établi quelles parties des discours correspondaient à ces thèmes. Nous avons ensuite compté le nombre de mots se rattachant à chaque thème et déterminé des proportions. Le résultat est le suivant :


9 *Discours prononcé à la séance d'installation de la Haute Autorité par son président, Monsieur Jean Monnet, le 10 août 1952*, Lausanne : Archives de la Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe (ci-après FJME), AMH 2/1/3.

10 *Allocution prononcée par Monsieur Jean Monnet, président de la Haute Autorité, à la première session de l'Assemblée de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier*, Lausanne : FJME, AML 40.


11 Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier, *Allocutions prononcées par Monsieur Jean Monnet, président de la Haute Autorité - à la première séance de la Haute Autorité le 10 août 1952 à Luxembourg ; - à la première session de l'Assemblée le 11 septembre 1952 à Strasbourg*, Strasbourg, CECA, septembre 1952. Cette publication peut être trouvée sur internet à l'adresse suivante : [<https://op.europa.eu/fr/publication-detail/-/publication/ce1755c1-c10a-442c-9976-9d499023f0ce>], page consultée le 10 octobre 2021.

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Discours du 10 août 1952¹²



Discours du 11 septembre 1952¹³



12 Les pourcentages sont les suivants : méthode d'intégration et institutions 38% ; création d'un marché unique 43% ; relations extérieures 9% ; hommages 6% ; dimension temps 4% ; total 100%.

13 Voici les pourcentages respectifs des thèmes : méthode d'intégration et institutions 36% ; création d'un marché unique 27% ; relations extérieures 35% ; hommages 0% ; dimension temps 2% ; total 100%.

2.2 Analyse qualitative des trois grands thèmes

Après l'analyse quantitative des thèmes aboutissant aux deux graphiques ci-dessus, il est temps de se plonger dans le contenu des discours et de passer à un niveau plus qualitatif. Voici donc la substance des discours.

2.2.1 Méthode d'intégration et institutions

Les hommes et les institutions: les événements tragiques des guerres ont peut-être rendu les hommes plus sages. Mais les hommes passent et leur expérience personnelle disparaît avec eux. D'où l'importance de laisser des institutions. Leur vie est plus longue que celle des hommes et elles peuvent accumuler et transmettre la sagesse des générations successives.

Une nouvelle méthode d'intégration avec des institutions supranationales: ces nouvelles institutions peuvent être qualifiées de fédérales. La nouvelle Communauté européenne fusionne une partie des souverainetés nationales et les soumet à l'intérêt commun. La Communauté bénéficie de ressources financières propres.

Relations entre les quatre institutions de la CECA: la Haute Autorité a la charge de la réalisation des objectifs fixés par le traité de Paris. Elle est responsable, non devant les États, mais devant une Assemblée européenne. Chaque membre de cette Assemblée représente la Communauté entière. L'Assemblée est dotée de pouvoirs souverains et peut retirer sa confiance à la Haute Autorité. Les actes de la Haute Autorité sont susceptibles de recours devant un tribunal européen, la Cour de justice. Cette Cour a pour mission d'assurer le respect du droit dans l'interprétation et l'application du traité. Le Conseil des ministres assure l'harmonie entre la politique de la Haute Autorité, limitée au charbon et à l'acier, et celle des États membres, en charge de la politique économique d'ensemble. La CECA est donc fondée sur la séparation des pouvoirs.

Importance particulière des relations entre la Haute Autorité et l'Assemblée commune: ces relations sont cruciales pour assurer la bonne marche et l'avenir de la Communauté.

Nomination des membres de la Haute Autorité: ceux-ci sont désignés d'un commun accord entre les gouvernements des six États membres et sont ensemble les mandataires communs de tous.

Indépendance des membres de la Haute Autorité: ceux-ci exerceront leurs fonctions dans l'intérêt général de la Communauté, seront indépendants des gouvernements nationaux ou de tout autre organisme et ne rendront pas de comptes spécifiques à leur État d'origine.

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Un appareil administratif réduit: les services de la Haute Autorité devront en effet recourir dans la plus large mesure aux connaissances et à l'expérience des États membres, des milieux patronaux, des syndicats et des organisations internationales.

2.2.2 Création d'un marché unique

Charbon et acier: il s'agit d'établir et de maintenir un marché unique du charbon et de l'acier sur tout le territoire de la Communauté. Un bassin naturel unique au monde sera réunifié.

Coopération avec toutes les parties prenantes: il s'agit, pour la Haute Autorité, de collaborer aussi bien avec les gouvernements nationaux, les producteurs, les travailleurs et les consommateurs. Le fonctionnement de la Communauté sera placé dès le début sur une base de consultation constante.

Obstacles à éliminer: toutes les entraves douanières, toutes les restrictions quantitatives et toutes les discriminations seront supprimées entre les Six. Le charbon et l'acier ne connaîtront plus de frontières à l'intérieur de la Communauté. Ceci implique d'entreprendre l'examen des dispositions législatives, réglementaires et fiscales existantes.

Saine concurrence: le traité est la première loi anti-trust de l'Europe. Les cartels doivent être dissous, les pratiques restrictives interdites, les concentrations excessives empêchées.

Politique industrielle et économique: si nécessaire, les effets des fluctuations économiques seront atténués, le développement et la modernisation des industries du charbon et de l'acier seront facilités.

Politique sociale: la promotion de l'amélioration des conditions de vie et de travail de la main-d'œuvre sera poursuivie, permettant leur égalisation dans le progrès.

Avantages économiques: un marché unique du charbon et de l'acier sera créé pour 155 millions de consommateurs. Ces ressources interviennent dans la fabrication de tout ce qui est nécessaire à l'homme moderne, jusque dans les maisons, les vêtements et la nourriture. Le charbon et l'acier seront plus abondants, de meilleure qualité, à un prix plus bas. Une production de masse permettra de diminuer les prix de revient. Le niveau de vie augmentera. Les États-Unis et leur vaste marché sont mentionnés comme référence, eux qui disposent de deux fois plus de charbon et d'acier par habitant que les États membres de la CECA.

2.2.3 Relations extérieures

Contribution au règlement des problèmes mondiaux: la prospérité de la CECA est indissolublement liée au développement des échanges internationaux. La Communauté va contribuer à régler les problèmes d'échanges qui se posent dans le monde.

Association avec le Royaume-Uni: il faut rechercher sans délai les moyens de mettre en œuvre une association étroite et durable.

Collaboration avec les États-Unis: une collaboration étroite et fructueuse peut être envisagée avec les États-Unis, qui ont donné des preuves répétées de leur sympathie active.

Lien avec des organisations internationales: des formes de collaboration et d'assistance mutuelle seront développées avec le Conseil de l'Europe. Il ne faudrait pas tracer entre le Conseil de l'Europe et la CECA une ligne de démarcation rigide et absolue, tout comme il ne faudrait pas les mélanger. Toutes les liaisons utiles seront assurées avec les Nations Unies et l'OECE.

2.3 Analyse qualitative des deux thèmes secondaires

2.3.1 Hommages

Aux hommes d'État des Six: hommage est rendu aux hommes d'État des Six dont la clairvoyance et la volonté ont rendu possible la création de la Communauté. Tous ceux qui ont contribué à l'élaboration du traité de Paris sont aussi remerciés.

Au président Robert Schuman: celui-ci est nommé et particulièrement remercié d'avoir, en lançant l'appel du 9 mai 1950, pris l'initiative et la responsabilité d'engager le continent européen dans la voie de son unité.

2.3.2 Dimension 'temps'

Rythme du temps: les Européens ne peuvent réaliser toutes les possibilités que la nature et l'histoire ont placées en eux que s'ils vivent au rythme de leur temps.

Urgence de l'action: il y a à la fois des responsabilités immédiates et des transformations si importantes à préparer qu'aucun temps ne doit être perdu pour les mettre en œuvre.

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Début de l'effort: l'Europe n'est qu'au début de l'effort à accomplir pour connaître enfin l'unité, la prospérité et la paix.

2.4 Complémentarité des discours

À l'exception des hommages présents seulement dans le discours d'installation de la Haute Autorité de la CECA, les mêmes thématiques sont présentes dans les deux discours.

Il apparaît compréhensible que des hommages se trouvent dans le discours qui lance le travail de l'institution exécutive par essence de la nouvelle Communauté, que Jean Monnet préside. Le premier discours devant l'Assemblée commune, postérieur d'un mois, peut être vu comme faisant déjà partie de la nouvelle vie des institutions communautaires.

Pour le reste, la différence de pondération relative entre les deux discours concerne essentiellement le fait que le discours d'installation de la Haute Autorité met plus l'accent sur la création d'un marché unique que sur les relations extérieures de la nouvelle Communauté. Les relations extérieures quant à elles occupent une place plus importante dans le premier discours devant l'Assemblée commune, même si la création d'un marché unique reste évidemment très présente. Ce poids conséquent des relations extérieures montre l'importance des enjeux en la matière et le fait que plusieurs partenaires sont concernés, au premier chef le Royaume-Uni, les États-Unis et le Conseil de l'Europe.

2.5 Analyse de langage

Une étude du vocabulaire utilisé par Jean Monnet dans ses deux discours est intéressante. Nous avons identifié des mots-clés et les avons classés dans les quatre catégories suivantes : valeurs et objectifs ; méthode d'intégration, droit et institutions ; économie ; autres. Les résultats suivent.

Concernant les valeurs et objectifs, les mots-clés sont les suivants : 'paix', 'prospérité', 'liberté', 'unité', 'diversité', 'civilisation', 'construction de l'Europe', 'union', 'unification', 'avantage commun', 'intérêt commun', 'vue commune', 'renaissance', 'transformations'.

Voici les mots-clés relatifs à la méthode d'intégration, au droit et aux institutions : 'Communauté' (dans le sens de la CECA et dans un sens général), 'souveraineté', 'supranational', 'fédéral', 'droit', 'institutions'.

Les mots-clés concernant l'économie sont les suivants : 'marché commun', 'marché unique', 'concurrence', 'production de masse', 'ressources', 'producteurs', 'consommateurs', 'expansion', 'modernisation', 'progress', 'conditions de vie', 'niveau de vie'.

Voici finalement trois autres mots-clés trouvant leur place dans les discours : 'effort', 'règles', 'responsabilité(s)'.

Le nombre d'occurrences de chacun des mots-clés indiqués ci-dessus se trouve dans le tableau annexé à la présente contribution.

Les phrases construites par Jean Monnet sont à la fois sobres et précises. En général, les mots pertinents à sa pensée et à son message sont utilisés un nombre limité de fois. L'ensemble de ces mots pertinents va dans le sens de l'analyse qualitative de ses discours faite plus haut.

3. Écho des discours

Nous avons trouvé de larges échos du lancement des institutions de la CECA dans la presse. La présente recherche ne saurait naturellement être exhaustive et ne prétend pas l'être. Elle s'est concentrée sur les ressources disponibles dans les archives de Jean Monnet à Lausanne et sur des collections historiques de journaux en *open access*.

Le quotidien belge *Le Soir* détaille le déroulement annoncé des événements du dimanche 10 août 1952 à Luxembourg : « [...] à 11 h. 30, une première séance de la Haute Autorité aura lieu dans la grande salle de l'hôtel de ville. Un discours sera prononcé par M. Jean Monnet, président de la Haute Autorité, en présence du corps diplomatique, des membres du gouvernement luxembourgeois, du bourgmestre et du collège échevinal de Luxembourg. »¹⁴ Une réception sera ensuite offerte à 16 heures par les autorités luxembourgeoises. À 20 heures, les membres de la Haute Autorité seront invités à dîner par le gouvernement luxembourgeois.¹⁵ Concernant la façon dont Jean Monnet a prononcé son discours, *Le Soir* écrit qu'il « parlait d'une voix lente, pesant les mots pour leur conférer de la solennité ».¹⁶

Jean Monnet était accompagné des huit autres membres de la Haute Autorité. *Le Soir* offre la description suivante de la salle et de l'audience : « De-

¹⁴ *Le Soir*, 8 août 1952.

¹⁵ *Le Soir*, 8 et 11 août 1952.

¹⁶ *Le Soir*, 11 août 1952. La même chose peut être dite de son deuxième discours dont la version audio est disponible à la FJME à Lausanne, dans le fonds d'archives de Jacques Van Helmont, proche collaborateur de Jean Monnet.

vant lui [Jean Monnet], dans la salle décorée des drapeaux des six nations de la communauté et de massifs de roses blanches, avaient pris place le corps diplomatique, les membres du gouvernement luxembourgeois et du collège échevinal de la ville, ainsi que les membres des délégations qui ont pris part à l'élaboration du traité [...] ».¹⁷

La ville de Luxembourg est aussi décrite par *Le Soir* dans les termes suivants : « Dès la veille, la ville de Luxembourg était en fête. Le long des artères principales une forêt de mâts arborait les couleurs du Grand-Duché. Sur les places et sur les monuments publics flottaient les six drapeaux des États membres de la communauté. Luxembourg a l'expérience des réunions internationales : conférences de Benelux, ou du Pacte de Bruxelles. À ces occasions les couleurs nationales de ces pays étaient hissées à quelques monuments publics. Mais cette fois ce sont aussi les maisons particulières qui décorent de drapeaux leurs balcons et leurs fenêtres. Luxembourg semble célébrer l'entrée en vigueur du plan Schuman comme l'occasion d'une réjouissance populaire, et l'annonce d'une ère nouvelle et plus heureuse. Dimanche matin devant la mairie, de nombreux spectateurs s'étaient rassemblés pour voir entrer les personnalités. Les premiers à arriver sont les délégués et diplomates allemands, le fanion de la République fédérale déployé à l'avant de leur voiture. Puis ce sont les autorités luxembourgeoises et les autres délégués, MM. Coppé et Finet descendant de la même automobile. Les photographes et les cinéastes opèrent en cohortes serrées. Et enfin, M. Monnet prend la parole. »¹⁸

Des deux discours étudiés dans cette contribution, celui de Jean Monnet à l'installation de la Haute Autorité a eu le plus d'échos. Il venait en premier chronologiquement. La nouvelle Haute Autorité s'y trouvait au centre, et Jean Monnet était son président. Le discours de Monnet à l'Assemblée commune est postérieur d'un mois et somme toute plus noyé au milieu d'autres événements : discours de Konrad Adenauer, chancelier fédéral de la République fédérale d'Allemagne en sa qualité de président du Conseil des ministres de la CECA ; élection du premier président de l'Assemblée commune, où Paul-Henri Spaak est choisi contre Heinrich von Brentano ; débats autour de la préparation d'un futur projet de Communauté politique européenne.¹⁹

17 *Le Soir*, 11 août 1952.

18 *Idem*.

19 *Le Monde*, 11 septembre 1952. *Le Sud-Ouest*, 11 et 13 septembre 1952. *Le Soir*, 11, 12 et 13 septembre 1952.

À l'occasion de l'installation de la Haute Autorité le 10 août 1952 à Luxembourg, on relève l'importance de la dimension extérieure avec des déclarations officielles britannique et américaine. Nous avons trouvé des dépêches d'agences et des articles de presse, sans qu'il soit évidemment possible d'être exhaustif. Une revue européenne, *Notre Europe*, a le plus largement couvert l'installation de la Haute Autorité. Voyons tout cela plus en détail.

La déclaration du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni apporte son soutien aux objectifs de la CECA et son intention d'établir la plus proche association possible.²⁰

Dans sa déclaration, le secrétaire d'État américain Dean Acheson souligne l'importance de l'événement dans l'histoire de l'Europe. Une partie de la souveraineté se voit dorénavant exercée à travers une autorité supranationale commune. Pour le gouvernement américain, il s'agit de la première étape majeure vers l'unification de l'Europe. Cela est source d'espoir. La déclaration témoigne du fort soutien des États-Unis, qui reconnaissent la CECA comme leur nouvel interlocuteur pour ce qui touche au charbon et à l'acier.²¹

Ces deux déclarations gouvernementales précitées sont évoquées par les médias.²²

L'AFP a couvert la presse parisienne et indique : « Tous les journaux citent les passages essentiels du discours prononcé à cette occasion par M. Jean Monnet ». ²³ Le journal *Le Sud-Ouest* fait de même.²⁴ La portée de l'événement que représente la naissance de la CECA est bien mise en avant dans la presse. Il en va de même du rôle et de la responsabilité de la CECA. *Le Monde* évoque la signification et les implications de la nouvelle Communauté : unité de production comparable à l'Union soviétique, marché aussi important que celui des États-Unis.²⁵ Les seuls échos négatifs trouvés viennent de la presse communiste. Pour *L'Humanité* : « Véritable supertrust des marchands de canon, la Haute Autorité a pour but de livrer

20 *Déclaration du gouvernement du Royaume-Uni*, 11 août 1952, Lausanne : FJME, AMH 2/4/3.

21 *Déclaration de M. Acheson le 11 août 1952 à Washington*, Lausanne : FJME, AMH 2/5/2.

22 *The New York Times*, 12 août 1952. *Le Soir*, 12 et 13 août 1952. Voir aussi : « Numéro spécial. Les premiers pas de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier », *Notre Europe*, nos 16-17, 1952, pp. 16-27, Lausanne : FJME, AMH 8/1/1.

23 *Paris – Presse parisienne, dépêche AFP*, Lausanne : FJME, AMH 2/7/2.

24 *Le Sud-Ouest*, 11 août 1952.

25 *Le Monde*, 11 août 1952.

nos mines et notre sidérurgie aux magnats nazis, qui, à brève échéance, occuperont une position prédominante au sein de cet organisme ».²⁶

En Allemagne, les milieux industriels de la Ruhr soulignent que la Haute Autorité devra assurer l'égalité des droits entre les États membres et organiser rationnellement l'industrie lourde. Une demande est faite pour que l'industrie allemande de l'acier ait une liberté de mouvement suffisante. Il faut en effet que certains groupements d'entreprises puissent se réaliser.²⁷

En Allemagne de l'Est, de l'autre côté du rideau de fer, la *Berliner Zeitung* critique le lancement de la CECA. Elle affirme que le niveau de vie des travailleurs et la paix ne seront pas soutenus par la nouvelle Communauté occidentale. Il s'agirait d'un « instrument de guerre de Wall Street », servant au réarmement exigé par les Américains. La SPD ouest-allemande est aussi fortement critiquée.²⁸

Le journal du parti communiste belge, nommé *Le Drapeau rouge*, est aussi extrêmement critique. Il aligne des arguments chocs: trop grande influence américaine, continuité avec l'ordre européen voulu par les nazis, projet en faveur des grands trusts, conflits d'intérêts des membres de la nouvelle Haute Autorité (Jean Monnet est nommé cité comme étant proche des banques américaines), critique des coûts de la nouvelle organisation. La classe politique belge est aussi égratignée à l'occasion : l'establishment national se partagerait les postes et rechercherait des avantages matériels.²⁹

On trouve des échos venant de la presse britannique. Le *Daily Telegraph* (conservateur), le *Daily Herald* (travailliste) et le *News Chronicle* (libéral) font une couverture très positive de l'installation de la Haute Autorité. Le premier parle par exemple d'une « nouvelle expérience internationale d'une immense signification ». L'accent est mis sur le fonctionnement novateur des institutions communautaires.³⁰

La revue *Notre Europe* publie un numéro spécial sur « Les premiers pas de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier ». Il s'agit en fait d'un recueil de documents incluant notamment le discours de

26 *Paris – Presse parisienne, dépêche AFP*, Lausanne : FJME, AMH 2/7/2.

27 *Dépêche AFP, Düsseldorf, 11 août 1952*, Lausanne : FJME, AMH 2/7/4. *Le Soir*, 12 août 1952.

28 *Berliner Zeitung*, 12 et 13 août 1952.

29 *Le Drapeau rouge*, 11, 12 et 13 août 1952.

30 *Dépêche AFP, Londres, 11 août 1952*, Lausanne : FJME, AMH 2/7/1. *Commentaires du Daily Telegraph, après la première réunion de la Haute Autorité du plan Schuman*, *dépêche AP, Londres, 11 août 1952*, Lausanne : FJME, AMH 2/7/5.

Jean Monnet du 10 août 1952 et d'autres sources concernant les réactions britannique et américaine ainsi que la première réunion du Conseil des ministres.³¹ L'introduction suivante est faite au discours de Monnet : « Le 10 août 1952 fut une journée solennelle à Luxembourg. Dans le cadre de la ravissante capitale du Grand-Duché, le plan Schuman qui n'était encore qu'un traité, une abstraction, devenait une réalité. C'est ce qu'exprime en termes vigoureux celui qui, après avoir veillé, dès l'origine à l'élaboration du plan, est appelé désormais à diriger les destinées de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier. »³²

Concernant la première session de l'Assemblée commune à Strasbourg les 10-13 septembre 1952, *Le Monde* mentionne que Jean Monnet et Konrad Adenauer prendront la parole en leurs qualités respectives de président de la Haute Autorité et de président en exercice du Conseil des ministres. Les propos du président de l'Assemblée consultative du Conseil de l'Europe, François de Menthon, marquent les esprits. Celui-ci souligne l'urgence de créer une autorité politique européenne et la nécessité d'une assemblée « véritablement souveraine » afin de garantir un contrôle démocratique.³³

Le journal français *Le Sud-Ouest* et le journal belge *Le Soir* couvrent bien la première session de l'Assemblée commune. On peut lire notamment que le discours de Jean Monnet a été précédé de l'élection à la présidence de l'Assemblée de Paul-Henri Spaak, et suivi du discours du chancelier Adenauer. L'Assemblée est ensuite entrée dans l'adoption de son règlement.³⁴ *Le Soir* évoque la « chaleureuse poignée de main » entre Spaak et Monnet.³⁵ Ce même quotidien, dans son édition du 12 septembre (soit le lendemain de l'allocution de Monnet), revient de façon assez détaillée sur cette intervention. Sous-titre : « M. Monnet définit les tâches et souligne l'importance d'une coopération étroite ». Les « principaux passages du discours » sont cités : ils concernent l'importance de l'Assemblée et sa collaboration avec la Haute Autorité, soit la dimension institutionnelle du discours de Jean Monnet.³⁶

31 « Numéro spécial. Les premiers pas de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier », *Notre Europe*, nos 16-17, 1952, pp. 1-52, Lausanne : FJME, AMH 8/1/1.

32 Ibid., p. 9.

33 *Le Monde*, 11 septembre 1952.

34 *Le Sud-Ouest*, 11 et 13 septembre 1952.

35 *Le Soir*, 11 septembre 1952.

36 *Le Soir*, 12 septembre 1952.

La *Berliner Zeitung*, journal communiste de Berlin-Est, s'offusque de la rétribution des membres de la Haute Autorité.³⁷ Le journal communiste belge *Le Drapeau rouge* étale des critiques extrêmement dures à l'encontre de la CECA, dans la droite ligne de celles exposées un mois plus tôt à l'occasion de l'installation de la Haute Autorité :

La CECA représenterait un « néo-cartel capitaliste » consacrant la dictature du haut capitalisme. Les grands capitalistes se moqueraient du régime politique prédominant pourvu qu'il serve leurs intérêts.

La CECA et la CED seraient l'œuvre des États-Unis en vue de l'asservissement de l'Europe.

Il y aurait une course pour la prédominance entre la France et l'Allemagne fédérale, que cette dernière va forcément gagner. L'Allemagne sera l'alliée privilégiée des États-Unis. Il y aurait un renforcement de « l'Allemagne revancharde ».

La transparence serait absente de la CECA. Il est fait mention de « conciliabules secrets ».

La CECA serait source de dangers mortels pour l'indépendance et l'économie belges. Les travailleurs perdraient la liberté et le pain. La CECA, suivie d'un plan d'Europe politique, ferait de la Belgique une province soumise à l'Allemagne.³⁸

4. Mise en perspective historique des discours

On l'a vu, les deux discours de Jean Monnet que nous avons étudiés sont très complémentaires et marquent le lancement effectif de la CECA.

On note tout d'abord la présence d'une dimension institutionnelle. Cela est normal étant donné que la CECA lance une organisation d'un type nouveau en Europe. Jean Monnet met l'accent sur l'idéal-type des institutions à leur début. On note ensuite logiquement l'évocation du travail à réaliser pour établir un marché commun du charbon et de l'acier. La dimension extérieure/internationale est aussi très présente avec l'évocation du Royaume-Uni, des États-Unis, du Conseil de l'Europe, de l'OECE et des Nations Unies. Au cœur des discours de Jean Monnet se trouve donc le triptyque 'institutions - marché unique - relations extérieures'.

L'évocation de la CECA faite par Jean Monnet nous rappelle, si besoin en était, que cette première Communauté européenne, formellement dis-

37 *Berliner Zeitung*, 13 septembre 1952.

38 *Le Drapeau rouge*, 11 et 16 septembre 1952.

parue en 2002 à l'expiration du traité de Paris entré en vigueur 50 ans plus tôt, constitue la matrice originelle de l'Union européenne. L'Europe communautaire est bel et bien née le 9 mai 1950.

Le premier discours de Monnet a eu le plus d'échos. Cela apparaît normal car son discours était au cœur de l'installation de la Haute Autorité dont il était le président. Il y avait aussi une ferveur particulière à Luxembourg en ce dimanche 10 août 1952. Le discours à Strasbourg à la première session de l'Assemblée commune est venu un mois et un jour après. Il s'est plus fondu dans le programme de la session qui a duré quatre jours. Par ailleurs, cette session était immédiatement précédée de la réunion du Conseil des ministres.

De larges échos dans la presse sont clairement visibles. La grande majorité des journaux a mis en avant le caractère nouveau et important de ce qui se passait. Comme cela se situait sept ans seulement après la chute de l'Allemagne nazie, il n'est pas surprenant qu'il n'y ait pas eu de thèse d'extrême droite (ou fasciste) qui soit audible. En revanche, la présence d'une thèse communiste, dont nous avons donné quelques échos à travers deux journaux, est frappante. La CECA y est présentée comme une ennemie, tout comme le sont le grand capitalisme, les États-Unis et l'Allemagne dite « revancharde ».

On discerne un paradoxe, mais l'histoire en est remplie. Dans cette vision communiste du début des années 1950, on semble trouver la matrice des critiques récentes et mortelles envers l'Union européenne mises en avant par certains souverainistes.³⁹ Il est étrange de constater comme des mythes fondés sur rien de tangible et les théories du complot peuvent avoir la vie dure et même muter de l'extrême gauche à une droite souverainiste avide de trouver des complots contre les nations.

³⁹ On songe à Philippe de Villiers et à son brûlot de 2019 publié à Paris chez Fayard, « *J'ai tiré sur le fil du mensonge et tout est venu* ». Voir aussi : Michel Onfray, *Vies parallèles : De Gaulle - Mitterrand*, Paris : Robert Laffont, 2020.

Gilles Grin

Annexe : nombre d'occurrences des mots-clés utilisés par Jean Monnet dans ses deux discours, classés en quatre catégories

Valeurs et objectifs

<i>Mots-clés</i>	<i>Nombre d'occurrences dans le discours du 10.08.1952</i>	<i>Nombre d'occurrences dans le discours du 11.09.1952</i>
Paix	1	1
Prospérité	2	0
Liberté	1	2
Unité	3	0
Diversité	0	1
Civilisation	0	1
Construction de l'Europe	1	0
Union	0	2
Unification	0	2
Avantage commun	1	0
Intérêt commun	1	2
Vue commune	1	1
Renaissance	0	1
Transformations	1	0

Méthode d'intégration, droit et institutions

<i>Mots-clés</i>	<i>Nombre d'occurrences dans le discours du 10.08.1952</i>	<i>Nombre d'occurrences dans le discours du 11.09.1952</i>
Communauté (dans le sens de la CECA)	17	29
Communauté (dans un sens général)	1	0
Souveraineté	3	1
Supranational	4	3

Jean Monnet à la présidence de la Haute Autorité de la CECA

<i>Mots-clés</i>	<i>Nombre d'occurrences dans le discours du 10.08.1952</i>	<i>Nombre d'occurrences dans le discours du 11.09.1952</i>
Fédéral	1	0
Droit	1	1
Institutions	4	12

Économie

<i>Mots-clés</i>	<i>Nombre d'occurrences dans le discours du 10.08.1952</i>	<i>Nombre d'occurrences dans le discours du 11.09.1952</i>
Marché commun	0	3
Marché unique	5	3
Concurrence	1	1
Production de masse	1	1
Ressources	3	4
Producteurs	2	1
Consommateurs	3	2
Expansion	1	0
Modernisation	1	0
Progrès	1	1
Conditions de vie	1	1
Niveau de vie	1	1

Autres mots

<i>Mots-clés</i>	<i>Nombre d'occurrences dans le discours du 10.08.1952</i>	<i>Nombre d'occurrences dans le discours du 11.09.1952</i>
Effort	2	1
Règles	0	1
Responsabilité(s)	2	2

CHAPTER II:
CREATING THE FIRST COMMUNITIES:
FOUNDING FATHERS AND PIONEERS IN THE 1950s

The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950: Memory and Legacy of a Founding Speech

Jean-Marie Palayret

In his memoirs, Jean Monnet commented that, at the time of the Schuman Declaration, few journalists had recognised the true “significance of the declaration, the technical aspects of which tended to obscure its political importance”. Nevertheless, it is considered, through the symbolism and depth of its meaning, to be the birth certificate of the European Union.

1 – Place, tone and content of Schuman’s statement.

On 9 May 1950, Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, in a one-and-a-half-minute speech delivered at a press conference held at 6 pm in the *Salon de l’Horloge* (Clock Hall) of the Quai d’Orsay, offered to pool the coal and steel resources of France with those of its European neighbours. It was a complete surprise; the minister having kept his project secret. Even most officials at the Quai d’Orsay had not been made aware of the initiative. Only few journalists based in Paris, who were informed at the last minute, witnessed the event. Consequently, there were no photographers in attendance, nor radio reporters or television cameras to record proceedings. Schuman was obliged to record his famous address shortly afterwards for posterity.

The speech was delivered in a monochord soft tone. All the observers of the time met to stigmatise, sometimes harshly, Schuman’s poor oratory qualities and his physical appearance, which do not fit the image of a top political leader. According to Jacques Fauvet, « il donnait l’impression d’être un orateur qui pèse longuement ses arguments comme un vieux pharmacien ses pilules »¹. For Georges Bidault, Robert Schuman was “un moteur à gaz pauvre”; he had “une frêle silhouette et une voix nasillarde”². We should add that Schuman’s accent was discernibly Germanic, a gift for

1 Jacques Fauvet, *La IVe. République*, Paris, Poche, 1959, p.164.

2 Raymond Poidevin, *Robert Schuman Homme d’État*, Paris : Ed. Beauchesne, 1988, pp.197 and 203.

his political enemies. Discreet, dull, unobtrusive, he did the impossible of keeping a low profile. But beyond these appearances, his biographer Raymond Poidevin highlights how “Robert Schuman did not lack skill in the political game of the IVth. Republic”. He describes him as “subdued, false naïve [...] with a sense of political maneuvering” such as “playing a key role in most ministerial crises with a keen sense of political balance”. He says that Robert Schuman also knew how to “circumvent the intrusive questions of parliamentarians either in committee or in public debate” and that he considered he had to “inform Parliament as late as possible under penalty of compromising a negotiation”³.

The Declaration, delivered in the presence of Jean Monnet, was structured to convey a number of objectives:

- Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single plan. It will be built through practical achievements which will first create real solidarity.
- The age-old opposition between France and Germany must be eliminated; any action taken must, in the first place, concern these two countries, but will be open to any other European nations which share these objectives.
- Action must be taken on one limited but decisive point: Franco-German production of coal and steel must be placed under a common High Authority that would have the power to supervise the production and distribution of heavy industrial goods, and to intervene to prevent national or business disruption of the conditions necessary to ensure fair competition. It will be composed of independent persons and have equal representation. Its decisions will be enforceable and binding on the member countries and coal and steel companies.
- The fusion of these economic interests will help to raise the standard of living and eventually establish a European federation.
- To promote the realisation of the objectives defined, the French Government was ready to open negotiations⁴.

This text has been thoroughly investigated by historians, but, concerning its alleged author, it raises several questions: does the argument set out in this statement, drafted by Jean Monnet and the team of the French “Com-

³ Ibid., p. 196.

⁴ English text of the Declaration in Pascal Fontaine, *A New Idea for Europe. The Schuman Declaration – 1950-2000*. 2nd ed., Luxembourg: OPOCET, 2002, annex. pp.42–43.

missariat au plan de Modernisation et d'Équipement" really correspond to Schuman's deep convictions⁵? What was Robert Schuman's conception of Europe? To what extent did his ideas evolve over his long political career? His thoughts are in fact less well known than Jean Monnet's views, even though they have their own originality.

The book recently published by Philippe de Villiers and the ensuing controversy it provoked, demonstrates how, even today, the memory of Robert Schuman needs to be clarified. The politician paints an uncompromising portrait of Robert Schuman. By collating bits of stories, he portrays him as a collaborator and a spy for the CIA⁶. Other authors, more reliably, have recently reassessed the legacy of Vichy's industrial policies of 1940, revealing them to be a turning point for post-war France and the emerging united Europe. In addition to identifying previously overlooked striking continuities of institutions and of 'epistemic communities', these studies claim to reappraise the delicate question of links and trajectories from Vichy to the ECSC.⁷

2 – The Schuman Plan: Background and preparation.

a – A plan technically drafted by the French "Commissariat au Plan", politically endorsed by Robert Schuman.

Genesis of the Plan.

Read by Robert Schuman, this revolutionary proposal, 'inspired' by Jean Monnet was, in reality, the product of a collective effort. It resulted essentially from the projects conceived by Monnet and his team in Algiers in

5 At the last moment, Schuman wrote by hand the beautiful preamble: "It is no longer a question of empty words, but rather of a bold act, a constructive act. France has acted and the results of her actions can be immense. We hope they will be".

6 , Philippe De Villiers, *J'ai tiré sur le fil du mensonge et tout est venu*, Paris : Artaud, 2019.

7 Antonin Cohen, *De Vichy à la Communauté européenne*, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2012 ; Luc-André Brunet, *Forging Europe : Industrial Organisation in France, 1940–1952 (Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World)* London : Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. For these authors, the ECSC, as initially conceived, seemed more akin to 1930s corporatist attempts to legislate labour and markets in certain strategic sectors than to any laissez-faire doctrine.

1943⁸, before being finalised in the Rue de Martignac by the Planning Commissioner and his advisors, including the lawyer Paul Reuter (Schuman Legal advisor at the Foreign Ministry) and the economist Pierre Uri. Nine versions succeeded each other, during which the federal finality was attenuated. The first draft curiously foresaw two ‘organisations’, one for coal and one for steel; the future High Authority, initially defined as ‘supranational’, which could cause concern, became simply ‘common’⁹.

As Alan Milward rightly argues: “the Schuman proposals [...] far from being a change of economic and political direction, evolved logically from the consistent pursuit of France’s original domestic and foreign reconstruction aims”¹⁰. French steel producers were preoccupied by the possible quick recovery of German steel production and, thus, an upsurge of over-supply. Concerned about the ability of French industry to compete with German *Verbundwirtschaft* if the Allies’ governments lifted all production limits, they were prone to revive pre-war cartels to regulate the European steel industry in the light of the Marshall Plan¹¹. French diplomats were determined to limit the competitive advantages of German heavy industry to prevent future dominance by the Ruhr industrialists, whose unsavoury past was also remembered.

But, on the other hand, the French recovery plan needed German coal. The Ruhr Authority, installed by the Anglo-Saxon powers in September 1949 to decide the division of Germany’s coal output between internal needs and exports to foreign customers, could not guarantee France all the high-quality coking coal from the Ruhr which might be required for the modernisation of the French steel industry, spurred by the Marshall plan¹². From autumn 1949 to spring 1950, French policymakers scurried to

8 In October 1943, Jean Monnet, René Mayer, Hervé Alphand and Robert Marjolin had discussed the project of “an industrial Lothringia”, AMAE (Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères - La Courneuve), Guerre 1939-1945, CFLN-GPRF, 728 « Reconstruction économique de l’Europe », n°s 104–105 ; Raymond Poidevin « René Mayer et la politique extérieure de la France (1943-1953) » *RHDGM*, 134, avril 1984, pp.73–74.

9 Paul Reuter, « Aux origines du plan Schuman », in Pierre-Henri Teitgen, *Mélanges Fernand Dehousse*, 2, *La construction européenne*, Paris: Nathan, 1979, p. 66.

10 Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–1951*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 380.

11 See Françoise Berger, *La France, l’Allemagne et l’acier (1932–1952)* Thèse de doctorat, Université de Paris I, 2000, pp. 924–925; Sylvie Lefèvre, *Les relations économiques franco-allemandes de 1945 à 1955*, Paris: CHEF, 1998.

12 SOLLAC, in Lorraine, and USINOR, in Nord, were the sites of two giant steel mills, which at the time were the largest in Europe. The new American equip-

forge an alternative policy to supervise Ruhr production, guarantee Ruhr coal exports to French industry and create a form of European cooperation that would save the Monnet Plan¹³.

The Schuman Plan: “a jump into uncertainty”?

Drawing up a plan is one thing, making it political is another. Schuman deserves the credit for having had it accepted by the French Government and for having presented it to the other European countries. The initiative taken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs came in a context rendered difficult by the question of the Saar Statute (a first meeting between Schuman and Adenauer in Bonn on 13–15 January 1950 had produced disappointing results—Adenauer even referred to the Saarland as a ‘protectorate’¹⁴) and by the pressure exerted by the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to accelerate the process of FRG integration into the Western bloc. In fact, for Schuman the decision to spring the proposal came on the eve of a meeting of the Atlantic Council, called in London for 10 May 1950, where Germany’s economic issues were to be discussed and the Americans, supported by the British, would consider meeting German demands to increase their steel production to 14 million tonnes and perhaps abolish the IAR. On 18 April, the Quai d’Orsay’s political Directorate adjured: “Don’t let us be cornered on the defensive and take audacious initiatives”¹⁵. In the meantime, Robert Schuman received a project from Jean Monnet, the General Planning Commissioner, transmitted through the director of his private office, Bernard Clappier, for a “European Coal and Steel Community”¹⁶. Schuman’s experience prepared him to seize the opportunity: on 1 May 1950, on his return from a weekend in Chazelles, he told the director of his private office, who was waiting for him at the Gare de

ment for these two firms consumed the majority of the funds available under the Monnet Plan.

13 A.W Lovett, “The United States and the Schuman Plan. A Study in French Diplomacy 1950–1952” in *The Historical Journal*, 39,2 (1996), pp. 425–455.

14 Actually, since 1947, Saar had been attached economically to France because of its mining resources, as part of reparations from the Second World War. However, from 1949, the FRG no longer considered it as such.

15 AMAE, 235 QO/57 Secrétariat général, vol. 57.

16 François Roth, *Robert Schuman. Du Lorrain des frontières au Père de l’Europe*, Paris : Fayard, 2008, pp. 382–385.

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l'Est: "I've read the Monnet paper. And well, It's yes"¹⁷. He had decided to exploit the European factor as it gave France the diplomatic initiative and undercut Anglo-American plans to remove constraints on German industrial production without adequate guarantees for France.

b – The Schuman Plan: a well-kept secret.

Disillusioned with the Council of Europe, which had only deliberative powers and demonstrated that governments were not prepared to surrender their prerogatives, and in order to prevent the predictable opposition of the industrialists, Schuman acted with great discretion. No more than nine people were informed of the character of the Plan between 3 and 9 May, the date on which the project was to be considered at the French cabinet meeting. Two cabinet ministers whom Schuman knew would be sympathetic, René Pleven and René Mayer, the Defence and Justice Ministers respectively, and the Secretary General of The Foreign Ministry, Alexandre Parodi, were brought into the loop. Very few people outside France were aware of the initiative. On 7 May, bypassing diplomatic channels, Schuman discussed the Plan personally with the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and David Bruce, the French Ambassador in Paris, in order to explain to the American officials, the real nature of the pool: not a super-trust but a common market in coal and steel. On 8 May, in the event of an OEEC meeting held in Paris, he gave advance warning to the five Ministers for Economic Affairs from the United Kingdom, the three Benelux countries and Italy¹⁸. On the evening of 8 May, all the working documents were destroyed. On the morning of 9 May, Schuman dispatched his personal envoy, Robert Mischlich, to Bonn, as to inform Konrad Adenauer, who immediately promised his support¹⁹. As soon as Schuman was notified by telephone, he informed the French Cabinet late on the morning of 9 May. The Plan was blandly adopted. Schuman did not expect the British government to be cooperative. He did not want them to know about the plan in advance. The secrecy surrounding the

17 HAEU, INT. 548, Interview of Bernard Clappier by François Duchêne, 1988. Quoted in Eric Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, Paris : Fayard, 1996, p.523.

18 Pierre Gerbet « La genèse du plan Schuman. Des origines à la déclaration du 9 mai 1950 », *Revue française de Science politique*, vol. 6 (3), (1956), pp. 525–553.

19 AMAE, Cabinet du ministre, Robert Schuman, vol. 68, pp. 61–62 : « *Note sur la participation de l'Allemagne à l'Autorité internationale de la Ruhr* » 3 December 1949.

Declaration, and the fact that in the latter stage Dean Acheson was complicit in that secrecy, infuriated the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. There was finally the matter of the French Prime Minister Georges Bidault, who failed to give his attention to the project, which Monnet had originally sent to him, as he was pre-occupied with a different type of plan for an Atlantic project at that time²⁰.

3 – Robert Schuman’s frame of reference.

a – The European engagement of Robert Schuman: a Political Philosophy.

In order to better understand Robert Schuman’s European work, we should start by analysing the cultural wealth of his origins and religiosity.

According to the Schuman Declaration, the unification of Europe was not an end in itself but a means to guarantee peace. The opening sentences of the Schuman Declaration remind us that peace was its overriding aim.

World Peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations.

His convictions led Schuman to advocate for peace very early on, even if he did not do so in the context of organised associations, as he mistrusted “sentimental pacifism” and the lure of outlawing war with a pact.

As a man of the frontiers, he had contacts at an early age in several countries, but he also knew the past conflicts and pain suffered by these regions marked by centuries-old antagonisms and which weighed on his personal destiny.

– Born in Clausen to a Luxembourgian mother and a father from Lorraine, who had become German by virtue of the Treaty of Frankfurt, Robert Schuman was always caught between three languages and two cultures. Before the war, he studied law, economics, political philosophy and theology at the Universities of Bonn, Munich, Berlin, and Strasbourg. After graduation, he set up his own law practice in Metz in 1912. During the First World War, he served the German government in an administrative capacity due to his unfitness for military service (“*nicht wehrpflichtete*”). It

20 Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, London: W. Collins and Son Ltd, 1976, p.323.

seems that his convictions about the outcome of the conflict were characterised by a certain neutrality, which corresponds to his condition as a “political nomad”, a term by which he had, on two occasions, defined his condition as a Lorrainian²¹.

– In 1918 Schuman re-acquired French citizenship and entered political life. Elected as Moselle deputy of the centre-right, in the early 1920s, he favoured the execution of the Treaty of Versailles, but from 1925 he supported the policy of Briand, approved the Locarno agreement and, more generally, cooperation within the framework of the League of Nations. As the dangers increased, his pacifism asserted itself. At the time of Hitler’s remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936, he was obsessed with solving the problems at the SDN, from which Germany had withdrawn. In 1938, he led a delegation of Alsace-Lorraine’s parliamentarians, who asked Daladier, the head of the government, to ensure peace. After the Munich agreements, Schuman was part of the minority movement in the PDP which approved them and in 1940 he was in favour of the armistice.

– As Under-Secretary of State for Refugees in the Paul Reynaud and Pétain governments, Schuman voted with the majority in July 1939 in investing Pétain with full powers to reform the Constitution of France. Schuman was neither an early Resistance fighter nor a Resistance fighter at all; he was a legalist... but in no case may the infamous label of ‘collaborator’ be invoked against him²². On July 12, 1940, he was ousted from the new Laval government and left for Metz, where he was arrested by the Gestapo on 14 September 1940²³. After being placed under house arrest in Neustadt, he escaped to the unoccupied zone in France in August 1942. He was disqualified from public office in 1944 as a pétainist minister, but an intervention by de Gaulle himself secured Schuman’s rehabilitation in February 1945²⁴.

As a militant Catholic, Schuman adopted a neo-Thomistic conception of the state.

– Schuman entered political life as if it were an apostolic mission. In 1904, in Bonn, Schuman joined an association of militant Catholic students,

21 On this period, see François Roth, *Robert Schuman*, Paris: Fayard, 2008, pp. 79–93.

22 Ivi, pp. 230–232.

23 According to François Roth, among the reasons why he travelled to Metz, formally annexed by the Nazis, there was the destruction of compromising documents, especially his correspondence with the former Chancellor Heinrich Brüning.

24 René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman (1886-1963) Père de l'Europe*, Paris : Fayard, 2000, pp.186–188.

Unitas, and after his move to Metz, L'Union Populaire Catholique, the francophone branch of the Volksverein.

After uniting the Catholic forces within the *Union Républicaine Lorraine*, as a deputy for Metz and Secretary and then President of the Alsace-Lorraine Committee in the French Assembly, he took an active part in the protest movement spearheaded by Catholic organisations for the maintenance of separate legislation in Alsace-Moselle against French centralisation and defended the 'Concordat' against the anti-clericalism of the 'Cartel des Gauches'²⁵. In 1932, he joined the Parti Démocrate Populaire, which, after the Second World War, turned into the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP). Unlike other founding fathers of Europe, such as De Gasperi, Adenauer or Van Zeeland, he did not participate in the pro-European Catholic movements in 1948–49, such as the *Nouvelles Équipes Internationales* or *Rencontres de Genève*.

He demonstrated a 'monkish ascetism' in his daily life, such as in 1942–44 during his stay in various monasteries (En-Calcat) whose liturgical hours he followed. In the interwar period, he took one trip to Rome a year, at Easter or Pentecost.

– Christian Democracy constituted the framework of Schuman's European ideal, grounded in the unity of civilisation, a reconciled history, and shared values (such as pluralist democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law)²⁶. He believed that democracy owed its existence to Christianity²⁷. In the third chapter of his work "*Pour l'Europe*", he paid a special

25 The French law on separation of the churches and the state of December 9, 1905, is not applied in Alsace and Moselle. Instead, the Concordat with the Holy See of 1801 and the special laws of 1802 are still in force. As a result, religious education is compulsory in primary and secondary schools, the remuneration of the ministers of the four recognised cults is taken over by the state, the appointments of the Archbishop of Strasbourg and the Bishop of Metz are made by the president of the French Republic. The departments recovered were largely indebted to Robert Schuman for the work he had carried out. With moderation and discretion, he avoided both overly hasty assimilation and tension over a particularism that was no longer relevant.

26 On the spirituality of the declaration, see Gary Wilton, "Christianity and the Founding: the Legacy of Robert Schuman," in Jonathan Chaplin and Gary Wilton (eds.), *God and the EU: Faith in the European Project*, London and New York City: Routledge, 2016, pp.13–32.

27 HAEU, AMG.DOC, 258, *Robert Schuman, L'Europe, c'est la mise en œuvre d'une démocratie généralisée dans le sens chrétien du mot*. pp.12–13.

tribute to the wartime writings of Jacques Maritain, a philosopher²⁸ who envisaged a personalist, communitarian society, rooted in Christian values and founded on the dignity of the human being, and of Pius XII, who introduced the requirement that public authorities be subject to the principles of the Gospel²⁹, and called for a post-war settlement built on a supranational model³⁰.

Maritain our great Christian philosopher [...], has marked the parallel between the development of the Christian idea and the democracy. Christianity has taught the equality in nature of all men, children of the same God, redeemed by the Christ [...] It has recognised the primacy of interior values which alone ennoble man. The universal law of love and charity has made of every man our neighbour, and upon it have rested social relations in the Christian world since then³¹.

This new supranational level, illuminated by a universalist approach, was to be founded on the principles of international cooperation, majority rule freely accepted by the nation states, and the principle of equality of rights among them³².

The community proposes to each partner the same objective as the philosophy of St Thomas has called the Common Good. This is situated outside of all egotistical purposes, the good of each and the good of all and conversely [...] The means of attaining these objectives are agreement, and mutual understanding, without hegemony or privilege or subordination. Such impartial equality must be guaranteed by the authority of an arbiter which ensures the constitutional conformity of laws and regulation³³.

28 On Jacques Maritain, French Christian philosopher, see Bernard Hubert (dir.) *Jacques Maritain en Europe. La réception de sa pensée*, Paris, Beauchesne, 1996, pp.207–219.

29 He placed particular importance on the Acts of the Holy See, the encyclicals of the Popes, which he read and made annotations to, and sometimes had the German version.

30 Margriet Krijtenburg, *Schuman's Europe: His Frame of Reference*, Leiden: Leiden University, 2012, pp.220–225.

31 R. Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, pp. 56–58.

32 Alan Fimister, « Integral Humanism and Re-Unification of Europe » in Sylvain Schirmann (dir.) *Robert Schuman et les Pères de l'Europe. Cultures politiques et années de formation*, Bruxelles : PIE Peter Lang, 2008, p. 34.

33 Robert Schuman, *Ce que signifie la Communauté européenne pour le Chrétien?* Fleury Abbey, August 1958, Archives départementales de Moselle, file 34J38.

The prosaic language of “fusion of economic interest” and “equalization of living conditions” can also be read as a political rendition of the Christian aspiration of ‘solidarity’ that motivated Schuman³⁴.

The law of solidarity between peoples is imposing itself on contemporary minds. We feel solidarity with one another in the preservation of peace, the defence against aggression, the fight against poverty, the respect for treaties, as well as the safeguarding of justice and human dignity. We have gained the conviction through personal experience that [...] the best way of serving one's country is to guarantee it the support of others through reciprocal efforts and the sharing of resources.³⁵

b – The European engagement of Robert Schuman: a form of political realism.

Despite his high ideals, Robert Schuman was deeply realist and prudent in his approaches.

The Declaration states: “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity”.

Schuman shared Monnet's functional approach of slowly transferring limited domains to the jurisdiction of specialised European institutions rather than the scheme of drawing up a fully-fledged European Constitution, as many federalists urged him to do.

He did not show any enthusiasm for the ideal of a European Union mooted by Aristide Briand in 1929–1930 and he was sceptical of the somewhat theoretical enthusiasm that had marked the European Congress in The Hague in May 1948. He did not attend any of the many international gatherings promoting integration (including a significant number of Catholic inspiration), nor did he, like Adenauer, join the Pan-European Union led by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi³⁶. He was particularly insistent on restraining the desire to hurry towards the final goal, which might have meant the premature end of the entire unification project as it could have

34 Jonathan Chaplin, Gary Wilton. *God and the EU*, London: Routledge, 2016, p. 21.

35 R. Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, p.40.

36 René Lejeune, *Robert Schuman (1886-1963) Père de l'Europe*, Paris : Fayard, 2000, pp.14–15.

harmed the human psyche of the majority of citizens not directly involved in the process³⁷.

For Schuman:

The problem of relinquishing sovereignty must not be posed at the start: the essential thing is to build on a solid base³⁸.

We are still at the start of things. We would do well to bridle our impatience. If not, we are likely to make the doubters more distrustful and what is more serious, endanger not only the experiment but also the whole idea of a united Europe³⁹.

With his pronounced anti-communism, Schuman advocated a socio-economic 'third way' which could flexibly be made compatible with a diverse range of economic policies, from liberal concepts of private enterprise and market economy to indicative planning.

But, on the other hand, Schuman's understanding of European integration differed markedly from the Inspirator's views.

For Monnet, the coal-steel pool was to be a first step towards a new organisation of Europe in a global context. For Schuman the pool was above all a means of solving the Franco-German problem. In order to settle the German question, it had to be framed within a broader framework that could only be European. The creation of a large European entity was not excluded, but it could only come later, to such an extent that reference to the accession of third countries to the pool was included only at an advanced stage of the project and at the express request of Jean Monnet.

Another difference in approach was that Jean Monnet, who took inspiration from the model of the independent authorities created by the Roosevelt administration in the US to shield New Deal policies from the attacks of the federated states, felt that priority should be given to autonomous institutions in a position to open the path towards a European Federation. Schuman did not share this optimistic view. He was of the opinion that the "High Authority to be created could not be completely independent" and that its powers "would need to be exercised democratically". He was, in fact, very sensitive to the difficulties he saw ahead, so as to predict that Europe would only move forward in times of crisis⁴⁰.

37 François Roth, *Robert Schuman. Du Lorrain des frontières au Père de l'Europe*, p. 566.

38 Press conference of 2 May 1949 in, René Massigli, *Une Comédie des Erreurs*, Paris: Plon, 1978, p. 167.

39 Robert Schuman, Speech at the Council of Europe, May 1949.

40 HAEU, INT. 548 Interview of Bernard Clappier by François Duchêne, 1988.

Compared to Monnet, whose approach sunk its roots into the experience of the League of Nations, paralysed by the veto power of the member states⁴¹, Schuman was more attentive to national realities. Creating Europe “is to unite that which is divided and separated, but not necessarily to fuse that which remains distinct”⁴². Sceptical about ‘supra-nationality’, he considered that the nation state could not be abolished overnight, but rather should be constrained and ‘tamed’ by new supranational institutions, limited over specific areas of commercial, industrial, and productive concern. In other words, he espoused moderate federalism, enhancing, before the term was coined, the Christian democrat principle of ‘subsidiarity’⁴³.

Although he had turned European late in life, Schuman became no less than one of the most determined architects of post-war European construction. His role was not limited to the ECSC. From 1948–49, he contributed to the foundation of the Council of Europe. Later, he became closely involved with the project for a European Defence Community [EDC]⁴⁴.

41 Monnet reaffirmed this belief during a speech to the National Press Club in Washington, on 30 April 1952: “The institutions created by the Schuman and Pleven Plans have finally breached the citadel of sovereignty that for so long barred the path to a united Europe, an edifice that was never threatened by any of the international agreements we are familiar with”. See Alessandro Isoni, “Jean Monnet, the UN Administrative System and the Creation of the ECSC High Authority”, in Lorenzo Mechi, Francesco Petrini (eds.) *Networks of Global Governance: International Organisations and European Integration in a Historical Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars publishing, 2014, pp. 61–76.

42 Robert Schuman, *Comment le Français d'aujourd'hui peut-il concevoir l'Europe ?* Speech delivered in front of the Conférence des ambassadeurs, Paris, 2 March 1951, p. 6.

43 Developed in the Encyclicals *Rerum novarum* and *Quadragesimo anno*, the principle of subsidiarity is based on a “specifically Catholic matrix ” and aims to valorise the autonomy of individuals and social groups, and place political power and authority in the exclusive service of the individual. More generally, it stands like a bulwark for lower communities against the temptations of interventionism, abusive concentration of power or even authoritarianism of the higher decision-making body, State, Vatican, supranational authority; Eric Roussel, « L’axe Schuman-Monnet » in François Borella, Raphaël Clément, (eds.), *Robert Schuman, Homme d’Etat, citoyen du ciel*, Paris: Ed. François-Xavier de Guibert, 2006, pp.45–56 ; Alan Paul Fimister, *Robert Schuman: Neo-Scholastic humanism and the Reunification of Europe*, Bruxelles: PIE Peter Lang, 2008, p.220.

44 R. Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, cit. p.84.

The project of a European Coal and Steel Community was concluded in order to make war between Germany and France materially impossible:

The pooling of coal and steel production [...] will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Robert Schuman was the only French statesman who had had any direct experience of Germany. He was therefore not weighed down by prejudice but did not suffer from any illusions. His approach to the *Deutsche Frage* was prudent, realistic, and progressive. He said with realism: "My personal experience prevents me from dreaming when Germany is concerned". Until the end of 1948, he was little inclined to support the re-establishment of the German state, even in a federal form. He would no doubt have preferred German sovereignty to have been restored only within a previously defined European framework, with a simple German confederation rather than a relatively centralised state⁴⁵. For a long time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs insisted on a policy of keeping Germany under control. Several public interventions, such as the Poitiers speech of 10 April 1949 as well as that delivered to the National Assembly of 16 June, showed his reticence and reservations. On this question, he agreed with the dominant feeling in both the Quai d'Orsay and French public opinion.

On the other hand, he realistically understood that the Anglo-Saxons had decided to press forward, with or without agreement from Paris. France had to pursue a common Germany policy with its Western allies. On 7 April 1949, he put an end to resistance from the Quai d'Orsay and accepted the merger of the French occupation zone with the Anglo-Saxons' Bizone to form Trizone and allow the emergence of the Federal Republic. Compared to his predecessor, Georges Bidault, who had followed in the footsteps of Poincaré and de Gaulle, Schuman was anxious to show his differences: "M. Bidault a fait une politique allemande, je fais une politique de l'Allemagne". But what policy? It was necessary not to recommit the error of the Treaty of Versailles; it was necessary to associate the young Federal Republic with the economic reconstruction of Europe rather than

45 Robert Rochefort, *Robert Schuman*, Paris : Editions du Cerf, 1968, pp.253–256.

humiliating it through the dismantling of factories and reparations. In other words: reconciliation rather than retaliation policy. This re-foundation of bilateral relations between the two countries was to be accompanied by the reintegration of the Bonn Republic into the European institutions to be created on an equal footing and where it would have partners and obligations.

Schuman did not have a plan or concrete programme to implement, he gave the impression of following an empirical and trial-and-error approach in the pursuit of a wider goal: to guarantee peace and to create a climate of cooperation in Europe.

4 – Reception of the Declaration by the potential stakeholders.

Robert Schuman's proposal for a European Coal and Steel Community was directed principally at Western Germany. It was all the more in tune with Adenauer's objectives since Adenauer had already formulated a similar kind of project: in October 1949, he had suggested "the transformation of the International Ruhr Authority, which had just been born, into a supranational institution covering all the steel industries of Western Europe" to the Allied High Commissioners, who had been stunned⁴⁶. For the West Germans, the Schuman plan was beneficial because they had to give up part of a sovereignty, they did not yet possess⁴⁷. In return, the European Coal and Steel Community was a way for the Federal Republic to achieve *Gleichberechtigung*. In any case, this Community was to replace the International Authority of the Ruhr, which had been in force since the end of the war⁴⁸.

46 AMAE, Cabinet du ministre, Robert Schuman, vol. 68, pp. 61–62 : « *Note sur la participation de l'Allemagne à l'Autorité internationale de la Ruhr* » 3 December 1949.

47 Although the FRG was formally established on 23 May 1949, it was by no means a sovereign state. Allied influence remained enormous, as can be seen in the Occupation Statute, part of the Constitution of the *Bundesrepublik*, which came into effect on 21 September 1949. The Western Allies still controlled the foreign relations of the new West German state, and the Ruhr area. Decartelisation, the dismantling of German industry and reparation payments also remained in Allied hands, although at the end of 1949 Adenauer was able to make claims for West German sovereignty and equal treatment in the advent of the so-called "*Petersberger Agreements*" of November that same year.

48 Hélène Miard-Delacroix; Andreas Wirsching, *Hereditary Enemies? Un dialogue franco-allemand* Divers Histoire, Paris : Fayard, 2020 p. 165.

By proposing, more or less explicitly, the end of limitations, the expansion of production and equal treatment between the participating countries, the French initiative of 9 May only found, at first, a favourable echo among the German industrialists of the *Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen und Stahlindustrie*, especially since the bases of competitiveness of the German steel industry remained intact. The stiffening of their attitude from the autumn of 1950 onwards was due above all to the introduction of anti-trust and anti-concentration provisions in the draft treaty, with direct implications for the traditional structures of the Ruhr area⁴⁹.

Nevertheless, the Chancellor had to face the opposition of the Social Democratic leader Kurt Schumacher, who reproached him for selling out Germany and, by associating himself with anchoring the young Federal Republic in the West, for putting an end to any prospect of reunification.

On 29 May 1950, Italy was the first country to join the coal-steel pool project. For the French ambassador in Rome, Fouques Duparc, "it was above all the political aspect of the plan that won De Gasperi's support"⁵⁰. Although he regretted that the French government had neglected the Italian proposals for 'horizontal' integration and had chosen another path, that of 'sectoral' integration⁵¹, the President of the Italian Council could not but approve the planned unification. It would be a factor for peace, in that it would put a definitive end to the age-old dispute between France and Germany, would represent an essential guarantee against both the re-emergence of nationalism and the revival of totalitarianism, and would promote the consolidation of democratic systems where they had the most fragile foundations. Finally, De Gasperi expected that the Plan would eventually lay the foundations for greater social justice, while strengthening the security of Western Europe at the same time.

There was only one prerequisite: in the face of a project that originally favoured the Franco-German 'tandem', Italy should be afforded equal

49 Andreas Wilkens, « L'industrie allemande et le Plan Schuman », in Andreas Wilkens (ed.) *Le Plan Schuman dans l'histoire. Intérêts nationaux et projet européen*, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2004, pp.271–301.

50 AMAE, S. DE-CE, vol. 519 "Réactions italiennes au Plan Schuman", Note de Fouques Duparc à Direction d'Europe, 29 December 1950.

51 On the Italian side, it would have been preferable to build a political and economic Europe, either within the framework of the Council of Europe (Sforza's proposals of the summer of 1948) whose competence would have been extended, with a certain amount of supranationally, or within the framework of the OEEC, which would have been transformed into a permanent body that was no longer merely technical, but with political attributions (which was basically the substance of the "Pella plan" of the summer of 1950).

rights within the framework of the supranational institutions to be established because, for the government of Rome, membership of the Community should provide an opportunity to reintegrate itself into the concert of Western nations. In this respect, it should be recalled that if one of the major merits of the Schuman Plan in the eyes of De Gasperi was to extinguish the Franco-German conflict “in which Italy could only be torn apart”⁵², nevertheless, the fact remained that it initially appeared to be a death blow delivered to the Franco-Italian customs union—although it was already in agony—and in its early days, the ECSC was sometimes likened, in Italian opinion, to the Franco-German steel super-cartel of 1926, memories of which were sinister⁵³.

While agreeing on the basic principles of the project, Sforza and De Gasperi did not clearly grasp its institutional aspects; on the contrary, they were aware of the fears of their industries. They wondered about the functions of the High Authority: it should be supranational in character and be vested with broad decision-making power⁵⁴; its membership should include one representative from each member country in order to avoid any Franco-German hegemony. They also attached vital importance to the composition and role of the Joint Assembly. The Italian steelmakers, who did not want to lose the advantages that the Sinigaglia Plan promised and who feared dirigisme—many of them saw an international cartel in the pool that was favourable to the European giants, who would share the markets⁵⁵—expressed reservations and sought guarantees on points considered essential: the safeguarding of previous national investment plans and OEEC programmes (in particular the one by FINSINDER for the new Cornigliano plant), a transitional period allowing the delicate restructuring of a steel industry protected from competition by high customs duties and non-discriminatory access to raw materials (coke oven fines, scrap iron and iron ore)⁵⁶. This last question was raised with insistence by the Italian government, which called for the incorporation of the French territories

52 Pierre Guillen, “Les questions européennes dans les rapports franco-italiens de la rencontre de Santa-Margherita (février 1951) au voyage de Pierre Mendes-France à Rome” in Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Enrico Serra, *Italia e Francia 1946-1954*, ISPI, Milan: Franco Angeli, 1988, pp. 28–29.

53 Ibid., pp. 28–29.

54 Paolo Emilio Taviani, “L’Italia e il Piano Schuman”, in *Die Zeit*, 7 October 1950.

55 AMAE, S. DE-CE, vol. 519, «Réactions au traité: Italie», Tel. Raymond Onfroy (Consul général de France in Milan), to Schuman: “L’industrie sidérurgique italienne et le projet de M. Schuman”, 23 May 1950.

56 Ibid.; Ruggero Ranieri, *The Italian Steel Industry and the Schuman Plan Negotiations*, in Klaus Schwabe (ed.) *Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans 1950-51*, pp. 345–356.

of North Africa (Ouenza iron mines) into the ECSC to meet its needs as a processing country⁵⁷.

The official reactions of the Benelux countries to the Schuman Plan were ambivalent. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg had already experienced the difficulties of setting up an economic union: the Finebel project was stillborn. They also feared that the High Authority would be vested with discretionary powers and wanted to flank it with a Council of Ministers representing national interests⁵⁸. Beyond that, in Belgium, there were also the political and social dangers inherent in the rationalisation of a sick coal sector pointed out by trade unions and policymakers⁵⁹. They nevertheless approved the principle of the sectoral plan⁶⁰ and were above all convinced that the political goal was right, even if they were traditionally wary of Franco-German hegemony.

British reactions were soon negative. Schuman had no illusions given the supranational nature of the project, he knew that the British would not be able to accept it; he remembered how, recently, the UK had succeeded in sucking federalism out of early proposals for the Council of Europe and the OEEC. On 14 May, Jean Monnet travelled to London to discuss the Plan with his friend Sir Edwin Plowden. Ambassador Massigli, who had hoped that Great Britain would take part in the talks, had to face the facts: Attlee and Bevin declined the invitation. Refusing any advance commitments on the "working document" presented by Monnet, Great Britain would not take part in the negotiations; however, it would not hinder them⁶¹.

In France, politically, Robert Schuman was supported by the governing coalition parties MRP and SFIO (although the latter regretted the absence of the British) and was fought vehemently and fiercely by the Commu-

57 AMAE, S. DE-CE, vol. 519, « Réactions au traité: Italie », Note from Fouques Duparc on. supply of North Africa iron ore to Italy, 29 décembre 1950.

58 Dirk Spierenburg, Raymond Poidevin, *The history of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994, pp.12–13.

59 Geneviève Duchenne, « Résister pour exister. Aperçu des réticences belges à l'Europe autour des Plans Briand et Schuman », in *Les Cahiers IRICE*, 2009, 2 (n.4), pp. 35–48; HAEU, FD (Fernand Dehousse) 312, Rapport Sueters sur les négociations du Plan Schuman.

60 It seems likely that the economic side of European integration and especially the integration of West Germany in this process was the most important reason for the Netherlands to support the project.

61 Edmund Dell, *The Schuman Plan and the British Abdication of Leadership in Europe*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 145–150.

nists and Gaullists. Among the denunciations of the communists, one will retain this assertion, as classic as it is false: “Schuman, the man of trusts”, based on his alleged allegiance to the great Lorraine steelmaker De Wendel. On another level, the Gaullists denounced the project, which was always presented as “a leap into the unknown” and “a formidable infringement of national sovereignty”.

Within the CNPF⁶², different interpretations of the ECSC project coexisted: its President, Georges Villiers and Jules Aubrun, President of the Steel Trade Union Chamber, feared a new form of dirigisme and the disappearance of customs protection, while others insisted on its usefulness in counterbalancing the power of the French state. The first viewpoint was dominant for a time. It evolved following the appointment of a French employers' representative, R. Daum, to the High Authority. From then on, the CNPF placed greater emphasis on the need to harmonise economic and social legislation among the countries participating in the ECSC⁶³.

5 – The Follow-up to the Declaration: The Paris Negotiations.

Swift action was needed for the French initiative, which quickly became a Franco-German initiative to retain its chances of becoming reality. On 20 June 1950, France convened an intergovernmental conference in Paris, chaired by Jean Monnet, who appears to have operated ‘almost independently’, failing to consult the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for prolonged periods during the negotiations⁶⁴. The steel industry’s representatives were consciously marginalised by the French delegation⁶⁵. Schuman, apparently, had complete faith in the French Planning Commissioner to manage the technical aspects of the negotiation. His personal role was nevertheless crucial: in the course of the difficult negotiations conducted over two

⁶² Conseil National du Patronat Français.

⁶³ Yohann Morival, *Les Europes du Patronat français*, Bruxelles: PIE-Peter Lang, 2019, pp. 37–38 ; Sylvie Lefevre « Les sidérurgistes français face au Plan Schuman » in Andreas Wilkens (dir.) *Le Plan Schuman dans l'Histoire. Intérêts nationaux et projet européen*, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2004, pp.197–217.

⁶⁴ Richard Griffiths, 'The Schuman Plan Negotiation's: The Economic Clauses'. In Klaus Schwabe, *Die Anfänge des Schuman Plans 1950-1951*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988, p. 37.

⁶⁵ Raymond Poidevin, « Le rôle personnel de Robert Schuman dans les négociations C.E.C.A (juin 1950-avril 1951) » in Klaus Schwabe, op. cit. It should be remembered that Robert Schuman, who formally chaired the French delegation, was for the most part absent from the negotiations.

years, Monnet had to appeal to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to break a series of deadlocks, some of them which could have proven to be fatal. This was the case at the Schuman–De Gasperi meeting in Santa Margherita on 13 February 1951, when the two statesmen agreed on a compromise on the thorny issue of the supply of iron ore from North Africa to the Italian steel industry, which was a major problem in Italy⁶⁶.

Jean Monnet's European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was conceived as a way of checking cartels and regulating international competition simultaneously. Restrictive practices were to give way to rationalisation and the expansion of production driven by public institutions. Between October 1950 and March 1951, the initial euphoria of rapid political progress on the institutions of the projected Community gave way to an impasse over the decartelisation of Germany's basic industry, almost causing the conference to collapse. Monnet was determined to eliminate the link between coal and steel (the famous *Verbundwirtschaft*) as a precondition for any further progress. The *Konzerne* or steel trusts had to be dismantled as they had the potential to dictate market conditions. But German Ruhr Barons and German workers were united in their willingness to preserve the *Deutscher Kohlenverkauf*, the single coal sale agency. The upsurge in demand created by the hostilities in Korea gave the Federal Government greater leverage to resist the idea of de-concentration. Monnet had to invoke the help of the American High Commissioner, John McCloy, to negotiate directly with the Germans in order to break the deadlock. On 18 March 1951, Adenauer accepted the division of the old trusts into twenty-seven new companies. They would be permitted to cover 75% of their coal needs from mines under their ownership. In addition, six sales agencies would replace the DKV⁶⁷. To succeed, Schuman had to concede to Adenauer that the treaty would in no way prejudice Saarland's final status. However, German industry demonstrated soon after that it could shrug off any treaty limitations. By 1957, eight new *Konzerne* had appeared to replace the giants of the past, accounting for 79% of the steel produced in the Ruhr. A similar dynamic could be observed for coal: by

66 Raymond Poidevin, « Le rôle personnel de Robert Schuman dans les négociations C.E.C.A. », in Serge Bernstein, Jean-Marie Mayeur, Pierre Milza, *Le MRP et la construction européenne*, Bruxelles : Complexe, 1993, p. 158.

67 FRUS, 1951, IV, pp.102–103. Tel. McCloy to the State Department, 15 March 1951.

1956, the six sales agencies demanded by the Western powers had been reduced to three.⁶⁸

From an institutional point of view, the High Authority wanted by France was solidly framed: the Netherlands, represented by Dirk Spierenburg, obtained the addition of a Council of Ministers representing the national governments, which would have the role of ensuring the link between coal and steel and other economic fields; it would give its assent (*avis conforme*) to the most important decisions of the ECSC. A Joint Assembly could overturn the High Authority by a 2/3 majority when it presented its annual report. A Court of Justice was established to ensure compliance with the Treaty and to settle disputes between the Community, Member States, and companies. This was reinforced by financial independence: the Treaty provided for a tax to be paid directly by coal and steel companies (as a percentage of their turnover).

The importance of the Schuman Plan lay not in its attempt to shackle German heavy industry, a policy which miscarried completely, but rather in the realm of symbolism. A pilot scheme for international cooperation had been established. It appeared to confirm the belief that a supranational agency was workable.

Conclusions: success and legacy of the Schuman Declaration

After a year of negotiations, six Western European states agreed to form the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), an organisation seen as the beginning of the European Union. How can we explain the success of the first venture in European integration? In a speech delivered in 2003 before the Academy of Moral and Political Science, Michel Albert explained it as resulting from the convergence of three factors: “a trend of ideas, the personal inspiration of the founding fathers, and the suitability of circumstances”. The trend of ideas was certainly long-standing and - except for the establishment of the Council of Europe - it had only given rise so far to unrealisable utopias and declarations of intent without any concrete scope. The personal inspiration of the founding fathers (Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman) was essential. They urgently built up a sectoral and

68 Isabelle Warner, *The deconcentration of the West German Steel Industry, 1949–55*, PhD, European University Institute, Florence, 1991, p. 404 ; Jean-Marie Palayret, « Jean Monnet, La Haute Autorité de la CEE face au problème de la déconcentration de la Ruhr (1950-58) » in *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 1991, n° 3-4, pp. 307–348.

concrete project which they knew would run up against vested interests. Finally, circumstances played a significant role. Schuman had to make a proposal in order to move out of the rut in which relations between France and the Federal Republic on the one hand, and between France and her Anglo-Saxon allies on the other, were starting to become mired. It could also be argued that the indirect pressure from the USSR was a factor which played in favour of cohesion⁶⁹.

Schuman said of the ECSC that it was “A step towards further steps”. Actually, it was used as the “matrix for subsequent developments” (Michel Albert). This ‘functionalist’ importance of the ECSC certainly goes beyond its real economic role, about which historians are rather sceptical today⁷⁰. Not to mention the fact that at the end of the 1950s the driving sectors of the economy were no longer coal and steel⁷¹.

Leaving aside the ephemeral, we are left with the method, that of the small steps yet the long-term vision. This is why Robert Schuman remains a model and a reference, as demonstrated by the destiny of the key tenets which were the embryonic form of both the spirit and the Community method:

‘Christian democracy’ has long been recognised as one of the fundamental elements of the European value structure even in countries without a proper Christian democratic political tradition. The respect for these values conditions not only the application of any candidate state seeking to join the Union, but also the maintenance of its rights and prerogatives associated with its membership.

‘Franco-German rapprochement’ remains primordial in European politics. Exemplary for some, annoying because dominant for others, it has never found its substitute. Fueled by the memorial speech of reconciliation, this privileged relationship is also a story of well-understood interests. According to the famous equation by Brzezinski: “In the

69 François Roth, *Robert Schuman. Du Lorrain des frontières au Père de l'Europe*, pp.425–426.

70 The German historian Klaus Schwabe described the ECSC as ‘a kind of supranational investment ruin’. His American colleague John Gillingham went a step further, arguing that the ECSC created the myth of supranational control over German heavy industry—but not the corresponding reality, in Kiran Klaus Patel, *Project Europe*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2020, p.61

71 Georges-Henri Soutou (dir.) *L'Héritage européen de Robert Schuman. Du fédéralisme à la souveraineté*, Paris : MAEF-CHTS, 2020, p. 41.

construction of Europe, France aims at reincarnation and Germany at redemption”⁷²;

‘Effective solidarity through concrete deeds’ is, in fact, one of the stated purposes of the European project. The development of Mezzogiorno, the opening of Iberian isolated economies, and later of communist Eastern and Central Europe, could not have occurred without the mechanisms aiming to reduce the gap in their economic and social situations. Cohesion Policy and Structural funds constituted a vital investment in stability across the continent and the future of its reunification⁷³.

‘The long term aim of a federal Europe’ is challenged. Not only, as Schuman foresaw, is Europe not and will not become a superpower or a super-state, but since the 2009 crisis, we have witnessed the resurgence of intergovernmental practices manifested by the growing importance of the European Council and its President—which has altered the Commission's role as regards initiative—and by the multiplication of international agreements between Member States based on Union law or outside it⁷⁴.

Mysticism infused for some or obsessive reference for others, Schuman’s Europe provides timeless guidelines for those involved in European affairs. As Paul de Groote of the Euratom Commission stated, Schuman was “the leader for our European conscience”⁷⁵.

72 Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'action extérieure de la France* Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2020, p. 370 ; Laurent Warloutzet, “The EEC/EU as an Evolving Compromise between French Dirigism and German Ordo-liberalism (1957–1995)” in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2019 Vol. 57. Nb. 1. pp. 77–93.

73 Pascal Fontaine, *A New Idea for Europe. The Schuman Declaration 1950–2000*, Luxembourg : European Commission, 2002, p. 26.

74 Delphine Dero-Bugny, « La dilution de la méthode communautaire et la diversification des pratiques intergouvernementales », in Christophe Blot, Olivier Rozenberg, Francesco Saraceno, Imola Strehö, *Réformer l'Europe*, Revue de l'OFCE, n°134, Sciences-Po, Paris, 2014, pp. 65–74.

75 Margriet Krijtenburg, *Schuman's Europe. His frame of reference*, pp. 241–245.

Les pierres angulaires du discours européen D'Alcide
De Gasperi: Bruxelles, 20 Novembre 1948; Strasbourg 10
Décembre 1951

Daniela Preda

Pour illustrer l'idée européenne de De Gasperi j'ai choisi deux textes importants: le discours qu'il a prononcé le 20 novembre 1948 au sein des Grandes Conférences Catholiques de Bruxelles et celui qu'il a prononcé le 10 décembre 1951 à Strasbourg. Le premier discours pose les fondements théoriques et idéaux du tournant européen de De Gasperi; le second en constitue le sceau exécutif.

Je pense que ces deux discours constituent les pierres angulaires du choix européen de De Gasperi de caractère fédéraliste¹ et peuvent être considérés comme une sorte de présentation aux gouvernements et au monde entier de la volonté de De Gasperi et du gouvernement italien d'entrer dans l'Europe en formation avec une attitude active constructive.

La réaction au niveau européen à ces discours montre avec éloquence cette thèse. Le discours de 1948 a été défini par l'ambassadeur français à Rome Fouques Duparc la «Conférence fédéraliste»², bien que le mot fédéraliste n'ait jamais été prononcé par De Gasperi. À son tour, l'ambassadeur belge à Rome Motte écrivait à Bruxelles que le gouvernement italien était favorable à une «coopération fédérative» des peuples déjà associés dans la reconstruction économique³.

Au début des années Cinquante les commentaires deviendraient plus explicites.

Depuis hier – écrivait l'ambassadeur de Belgique à Rome Van der Elst en juin 1952 – M. De Gasperi (...) voit enfin la France faire sienne

1 Cfr. Daniela Preda, *Alcide De Gasperi: European Founding Father*, Brussels: Peter Lang, 2017.

2 Tel. di Fouques Duparc a Schuman n. 1138-1140, 20 novembre 1948, in Archives historiques du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de France (A.MAEF), Europe 1944-1960, Italie, vol. 88.

3 Note de Motte à Spaak, 1^o décembre 1948, in A.MAEB, dossier 12077, Rome 1948.

(...) la doctrine de la Fédération européenne dont Gasperi a été l'apôtre convaincu⁴.

M. De Gasperi – peut-on lire dans une note de la direction générale politique du ministère des Affaires Étrangères français du 19 février 1953 – n'a cessé d'affirmer, sans introduire aucune nuance dans ces déclarations, qu'il était fédéraliste⁵.

1 – Le cadre européen et international

Pour encadrer les deux discours de De Gasperi, on doit faire référence d'un côté au contexte européen et international d'après-guerre, de l'autre aux rapports entre De Gasperi et la culture politique européiste du moment.

En 1945, de nombreux États européens pensaient avoir « gagné » la guerre. Cependant dans les mois qui suivirent, il fut vite évident que la grande défaite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale n'était pas l'Allemagne, mais l'Europe. À l'avant-scène, se trouvaient les « quatre Grands », mais le destin du monde a en fait été confié aux deux géants américain et soviétique. Dans les coulisses se déroulait le dernier acte d'une histoire qui avait des origines lointaines : l'abdication de l'Europe au leadership politique mondial. La prise de conscience de la nouvelle situation nationale et internationale ne fut pas immédiate, mais elle était inévitable.

La Seconde Guerre mondiale marque un tournant dans l'histoire de l'Europe. À la transformation lente et progressive du contexte historique opérée par de puissants facteurs d'intégration tels que l'interdépendance économique croissante et la crise du système européen des États, le conflit mondial donne une accélération qui, accentue les faiblesses liées à la division entre États et la crise de l'État-nation du XIXe siècle. L'idéal unitaire cesse ainsi d'appartenir à la sphère pure de l'utopie pour s'incarner dans un projet politique précis capable d'affecter la réalité et de changer profondément le cours des événements. Les changements intervenus dans le contexte européen depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale sont d'une telle importance que les projets d'unification continentale, qui en Europe encore entre les deux guerres auraient pu paraître irréalistes, deviennent

4 Note de Van der Elst à Van Zeeland, 28 juin 1952, in Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères de Belgique (A.MAEB), dossier 12415, Italie 1952.

5 Direction générale politique – Europe. Déclaration d'intentions concernant notre accord sur la politique européenne, 19 février 1953, in AMAEF, Europe 1944-1960, Italie, vol. 222.

concrètement réalisables dans l'immédiat après-guerre, entrant dans la lutte politique, affectant à la fois les objectifs des gouvernements et les espoirs et attentes des peuples.

Si après la Première Guerre mondiale De Gasperi avait clairement identifié les limites de l'État sur la base de l'identification entre l'État et la Nation tout en étant resté ancré à l'idée confédéraliste de la Société des Nations, à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, suite au contact avec la culture laïque, il s'est déplacé avec toujours plus de détermination pour surmonter la division en États-nations souverains, selon une vision fédéraliste.

Cette guerre avait montré non seulement que l'ordre du monde civilisé selon le principe national n'était pas en mesure de garantir la paix et la solidarité universelle, mais également que le système d'équilibre et l'organisation d'une Société des Nations n'étaient pas des instruments suffisants à cet effet. La méthode des arrangements diplomatiques partiels et provisoires devait être remplacée par un système d'intégration stable, avec des organes permanents non seulement d'arbitrage occasionnel, mais dotés de pouvoirs supranationaux délégués par des États disposés à limiter leur souveraineté absolue en fonction de l'intérêt commun, en premier lieu celui de la paix.

Ainsi commença la nouvelle saison politique de De Gasperi, qui dans la demande d'une autorité politique supranationale aurait atteint son point culminant.

Le 10 décembre 1945, De Gasperi constitue son premier gouvernement, avec la participation conjointe des six partis du Comité de Libération Nationale (CLN). Les tâches étaient immenses: restaurer l'État, maintenir les nouvelles forces politiques antifascistes dans le canal démocratique, reprendre une action de politique étrangère, réinsérer l'Italie dans les organismes internationaux avec la même dignité que les autres États, en liquidant une fois pour toutes le lourd héritage de la période fasciste. Il s'agissait aussi d'éviter l'effondrement de l'économie italienne et le chaos monétaire, de commencer la reconstruction matérielle du pays et la reprise économique. L'isolement italien au niveau international était complet.

Si les priorités ne semblaient pas laisser de place aux rêves d'unité européenne et si, d'une certaine manière, De Gasperi continuait à rester lié à l'idée d'une Société des Nations renouvelée – l'ONU – dès les premiers actes de gouvernement, le Premier ministre italien a commencé à fixer les conditions d'un changement qui, avant d'être « politique », était mental.

2. Les influences intellectuelles

Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la culture de De Gasperi a évolué dans un sens fédéraliste à la suite de contacts fréquents avec des collaborateurs proches de la culture fédéraliste – Sforza, Carandini, Einaudi, Lombardo et, au sein de la Démocratie Chrétienne, Benvenuti, Giaccherio, Dominedò, Bastianetto, Taviani –, qui le rapprochent de l'action menée ces années-là par les mouvements pour l'unité européenne et par ses dirigeants – Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paul-Henri Spaak –, dans un échange d'idées fructueuses et dans un enrichissement mutuel entre des hommes engagés à donner une réponse aux problèmes liés aux transformations historiques du monde contemporain.

Parmi les personnalités qui ont exercé une influence sur son choix fédéraliste européen, on doit rappeler, en particulier, Luigi Einaudi, Gouverneur de la Banque d'Italie entre 1945 et 1948, ministre du Budget de juin 1947 à mai 1948, président de la République italienne de 1948 à 1955, et Carlo Sforza, ministre des Affaires étrangères de février 1947 à juillet 1951. Dans les réflexions d'Einaudi et de Sforza, De Gasperi trouve des réponses aux questions qui lui venaient à l'esprit sur les thèmes de la paix et des relations internationales.

Depuis la première guerre mondiale, Einaudi avait préconisé des objectifs fédéralistes clairs, critiquant, en 1918, la Société des Nations, avec deux articles clairvoyants parus dans le *Corriere della Sera*, et indiquant, dans l'unité européenne, une nécessité historique posée par l'interdépendance économique que le continent avait atteinte sur l'impulsion de la révolution industrielle. La « filiation » du fédéralisme italien de ses idées, ainsi que de la pensée des fédéralistes britanniques de l'entre-deux-guerres, est largement reconnue. C'est précisément la lecture des articles qu'Einaudi avait écrits en 1918 qui éclaira Ernesto Rossi et Altiero Spinelli alors que, dans le *confino* de Ventotene, ils cherchaient des réponses adéquates aux problèmes tels que l'établissement de relations pacifiques entre États, l'échec de la Société des Nations, la paix.

Dans le deuxième après-guerre, réfléchissant à la création de l'ONU et remettant en question le pacifisme, Einaudi avait repris le discours interrompu par le fascisme, affirmant que la paix ne dépend pas de la bonne volonté des États, mais d'une structure politique précise, du transfert

d'une partie des souverainetés étatiques à une nouvelle organisation, de l'existence d'un État, donc de la création des États-Unis d'Europe⁶.

Une convergence évidente de la pensée de De Gasperi avec la pensée d'Einaudi apparaît déjà, en référence au Traité de paix, dans un discours à la *Consulta* en janvier 1946⁷, ainsi que dans les déclarations faites lors du voyage du De Gasperi aux États-Unis en janvier 1947. Cette convergence était entière en juillet 1947, lorsque De Gasperi a donné son *imprimatur* au discours prononcé par Einaudi devant l'Assemblée constituante lors du débat pour la ratification du Traité de paix, adhérant avec enthousiasme aux idéaux de politique étrangère prônés par Einaudi. Il convient de s'attarder ici sur cet épisode. À la demande d'Einaudi d'un avis préalable à propos du discours, De Gasperi répondait avec enthousiasme: « il me semble que votre discours est une excellente contribution, un coup de pouce », en espérant que la Chambre puisse se laisser emporter par « l'idéalisme reconstructif sain et réaliste » de l'auteur⁸.

La Première Guerre mondiale – affirmait Einaudi dans ce discours – a été la manifestation sanglante de l'aspiration instinctive de l'Europe à son unification (...). Il n'est pas vrai que les deux grandes guerres mondiales ont été déterminées par des causes économiques (...).C'étaient des guerres civiles, voire des guerres de religion. (...) Partout, la lutte a éclaté entre les adeptes de la liberté et les personnes prêtes à servir. (...) Nous ne pourrions nous sauver de la Troisième Guerre mondiale que si nous brandissons pour le salut et l'unification de l'Europe, au lieu de l'épée de Satan, l'épée de Dieu ; c'est-à-dire, au lieu de l'idée de domination par la force brute, l'idée éternelle de coopération volontaire pour le bien commun⁹.

En voulant proposer concrètement une issue au nationalisme néfaste qui prône la guerre, Einaudi a esquissé dans ce discours les lignes essentielles

6 Luigi Einaudi, *Il mito dello Stato sovrano*, in «Il Risorgimento liberale», 3 janvier 1945; Id., *Chi vuole la bomba atomica? et Chi vuole la pace?*, in «Corriere della Sera», 29 mars et 4 avril 1948, in Luigi Einaudi, *La guerra e l'unità europea*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1986.

7 Discours de De Gasperi à la *Consulta*, 21 janvier 1946, in Enzo Scotto Lavina, *Alcide De Gasperi. Ritorno alla pace*, Rome: Cinque Lune, 1977, pp. 71-97.

8 Lettre de Einaudi à De Gasperi, 26 juillet 1947 et Lettre de De Gasperi à Einaudi, 26 juillet 1947, in *De Gasperi scrive. Corrispondenza con capi di stato, cardinali, uomini politici, giornalisti, diplomatici*, sous la direction de Maria Romana De Gasperi, 2 voll., Brescia: Morcelliana, 1974, p. 244.

9 Discours de Einaudi à l'Assemblée Constituante, 29 juillet 1947, in L. Einaudi, *La guerra e l'unità europea*, pp. 44-51.

d'un nouveau système de relations internationales, fondé non plus sur la souveraineté absolue des États, à laquelle il attribuait la cause réelle du processus de désintégration de la civilisation européenne elle-même, mais sur la limitation de la souveraineté nationale qui aurait permis de donner forme à l'unification de l'Europe.

L'Europe que l'Italie espère, pour la mise en œuvre de laquelle elle doit se battre – poursuivait Einaudi – n'est pas une Europe fermée contre personne, c'est une Europe ouverte à tous, une Europe dans laquelle les hommes peuvent librement affirmer leurs idéaux contradictoires et dans laquelle les majorités respectent les minorités et promeuvent elles-mêmes leurs fins, jusqu'à l'extrême limite dans laquelle elles sont compatibles avec la persévérance de toute la communauté. À la création de cette Europe, l'Italie doit être prête à sacrifier une partie de sa souveraineté¹⁰.

Sur une ligne similaire de pensée fédéraliste se déplace, bien que venant d'une culture politique et d'expériences extrêmement différentes, Carlo Sforza. Le choix de Sforza à diriger le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, malgré l'aversion de Churchill¹¹, l'incrédulité française¹² et l'hostilité d'une grande partie des cercles démocrates-chrétiens italiens, et à un moment où l'Italie se préparait à rentrer parmi les nations libres et où sa nouvelle position au niveau européen et international aurait beaucoup dépendu de ce choix, est très significatif.

Déjà pendant l'exil volontaire dans l'entre-deux-guerres, Sforza avait manifesté une conception audacieuse de la politique étrangère, de nature fédéraliste, qu'il aurait réitérée dans les derniers temps du conflit, lorsqu'il s'agissait de jeter les bases de la paix. En affirmant le lien étroit entre l'intérêt national et la construction européenne, Sforza voyait l'avenir de l'Italie dans un patriotisme réchauffé par la pensée qu'au-dessus de la patrie il y a une super-patrie et il était convaincu que les problèmes italiens devaient être considérés comme des côtés italiens des problèmes européens.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 49.

¹¹ L'aversion de Churchill était due aux idées antimonarchistes exprimées à plusieurs reprises par Sforza. Cfr. *Dal diario del conte Sforza, il periodo postfascista: 25 luglio 1943-2 febbraio 1947*, sous la direction de Maria Grazia Melchionni, in «Rivista di studi politici internazionali», XLIV (1977), n. 4, pp. 401-499.

¹² Cf. Lettre de Georges Balay, au Ministère des Affaires étrangères français, 7 février 1947, in A.MAEF, Série Z, Europe 1944-1960, Italie, vol. 34.

ens¹³. Pour Sforza, l'unification du continent était une priorité absolue. Il croyait que le monde se dirigeait vers une transformation internationale qui diminuerait de plus en plus l'importance des frontières entre les États, mettant fin à l'anarchie internationale de laquelle étaient nées les deux guerres mondiales. Il était convaincu qu'une fédération européenne devait être créée et que les hommes d'État devaient être encouragés à poursuivre ce but¹⁴. Le modèle à suivre devait être le modèle démocratique, celui qui s'était imposé en Amérique du Nord¹⁵ et en Suisse¹⁶. Juste celui que même De Gasperi était en train de découvrir.

L'idéalisme et le pragmatisme coexistent chez Sforza. Son réalisme utopique fournissait au président du Conseil italien un cadre institutionnel dans lequel se situer et des lignes d'action précises.

3. La Conférence de Bruxelles

La première occasion officielle où De Gasperi expose un point de vue fédéraliste est le 20 novembre 1948, lorsqu'il accepte l'invitation à participer aux Grandes Conférences catholiques à Bruxelles.

En janvier 1947, le président du Conseil italien avait effectué un voyage historique aux États-Unis qui avait marqué, au niveau international, le retour officiel de l'Italie à la politique internationale sur un pied d'égalité avec les autres États et, au niveau national, la consolidation de la direction dégaspérienne.

De Gasperi regardait avec beaucoup d'intérêt le système fédéral adopté par les Américains qui avaient développé un système collectif de démocratie capable de concilier et d'harmoniser les droits individuels avec les intérêts de chacun des États fédérés. Dans son dernier discours, prononcé à la Chambre de commerce de New York le 13 janvier, il avait exprimé

13 Carlo Sforza, discours à l'Assemblée constituante, 24 juillet 1947, in *Cinque anni a Palazzo Chigi. La politica estera italiana dal 1947 al 1951*, Rome: Atlante, 1952, p. 25.

14 Carlo Sforza, *Andare avanti, veder lontano* (chapitre I du volume *L'Italia alle soglie dell'Europa*, Milano, Rizzoli, 1947), discours du février 1944, in Id., *O federazione europea o nuove guerre*, Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1948, p. 79.

15 Carlo Sforza, *Gli Stati Uniti d'Europa*, conférence de Sforza à Lugano, 19 février 1930, in Id., *O federazione europea o nuove guerre*, cit., pp. 34-35.

16 Carlo Sforza, *L'avvenire dell'Europa* (dernier chapitre de *Sintesi de l'Europe*, Paris, Gallimard, 1937, traduit en anglais avec le titre: *Europe and Europeans* e in italiano col titolo *Panorama europeo*), in Id., *O federazione o nuove guerre*, p. 54.

publiquement pour la première fois sa volonté de contribuer à la construction des États-Unis d'Europe:

Le voyage à Bruxelles de 1948 a lieu à un moment où l'Italie avait un gouvernement stable depuis les élections d'avril et où les négociations pour le Pacte atlantique s'étaient intensifiées. C'est peut-être pour cette raison que le discours de Bruxelles est resté dans la mémoire collective comme celui avec lequel De Gasperi préparait l'entrée de l'Italie dans le Pacte atlantique et, seulement comme corollaire, dans l'Union européenne. Sur ce discours, par contre, il faut s'arrêter avec attention, si l'on veut saisir son message, dans lequel la morale et la politique sont inséparables.

C'est un discours évocateur, plein de suggestions et de significations.

Le discours s'ouvre sur l'éloge de la Belgique et de sa démocratie, «Modèle de résistance morale contre toutes les formes de violence, où l'insuffisance des armes matérielles est compensée largement par les ressources infinies d'une civilisation supérieure»¹⁷, premier pays sur le continent à «fonder un régime véritablement libre»¹⁸. Les citoyens belges avaient emprunté à l'expérience de la révolution une saine méfiance envers les pouvoirs publics et avaient placé au centre de leur action les mêmes valeurs auxquelles croyaient De Gasperi et les catholiques contemporains: liberté de conscience, liberté de la personnalité humaine, de la famille, des municipalités, de la région, des associations, des syndicats et, surtout, liberté politique et de participation de tous les citoyens au gouvernement.

«Il s'agit avant tout – commenta De Gasperi – d'une sorte de défense contre les excès du pouvoir public et de l'État centralisateur»¹⁹.

Cette méfiance à l'égard de la centralisation de l'État, qui pourrait facilement se transformer en tyrannie, reflète évidemment l'expérience de De Gasperi pendant la période de l'entre-deux guerres sous le Fascisme, mais également l'expérience de la centralisation au tournant du XXe siècle dans l'Empire austro-hongrois.

De manière significative, De Gasperi rapproche de cette expérience celle des pionniers qui ont fondé les États-Unis d'Amérique:

Avec une sagesse politique remarquable, ils avaient décidé de « limiter ce pouvoir à jamais, C' est ce qui explique les multiples institutions de contrôle et la machine politique si compliquée des États-Unis. Il s'agit

17 Alcide De Gasperi, Les bases morales de la démocratie, conférence aux *Grandes Conférences catholiques* de Bruxelles, 20 novembre 1948, in Archives historiques de l'Union Européenne (AHUE), Florence, ADG-96, p. 1.

18 Ibid., p. 2.

19 De Gasperi va même jusqu'à citer un enseignement de Charles Woeste au Congrès jubilaire de la Jeunesse: «Messieurs, méfiez-vous de l'État». Ibid., p. 4.

d'empêcher que, dorénavant, trop de pouvoir soit placé dans une seule main ou dans un seul secteur de la vie nationale »²⁰.

Il est facile de lire dans ces lignes l'éloge du système fédéral américain qui, en divisant la souveraineté, vise à empêcher le totalitarisme. Mais selon De Gasperi l'ordre constitutionnel seul n'apparaît guère capable d'empêcher l'avènement de la tyrannie si une conscience démocratique active n'est pas opérante dans le peuple. De Gasperi revient sur l'exemple américain lorsqu'il trace une ligne unitaire claire entre la liberté et les vertus morales:

les auteurs de la Constitution américaine se soucient surtout de mettre le pouvoir politique dans l'impossibilité d'entraver ces libertés essentielles, qui correspondent à autant de vertus morales dans la vie sociale. Ce courant suppose donc une atmosphère morale, à l'intérieur de laquelle agissent les institutions politiques et il voit dans ces dernières une protection de l'ordre moral. En somme, à la base de tous, il y a la conscience des citoyens²¹.

Le catholique du Trentin ajoute: "Quand il s'agit d'organiser la vie de l'État, il faut avoir un pessimisme sain"²². Seule cette attitude apparemment négative aurait permis, en fait, d'aborder la question la plus délicate et fondamentale: la création d'institutions solides pour garantir la liberté et la démocratie.

L'accent est mis en particulier sur la liberté et la personne humaine, dans la tradition du personnalisme chrétien.

Sur ces mots, la partie philosophique du discours s'arrête et la partie plus nettement politique s'ouvre. De Gasperi réfléchit sur le monde contemporain, le matérialisme, le lien entre les problèmes politiques nationaux et internationaux qui risque d'entraîner avec lui le « terrible danger »²³ de concevoir une sorte de sentiment d'impuissance face à des forces historiques d'une telle grandeur.

Il fallait regarder vers l'avenir, travaillant dans un esprit uni, dans lequel la liberté politique et la justice sociale devenaient deux pôles inséparables. Mais la liberté politique et la justice sociale n'étaient pas concevables à son avis – et nous entrons ici au cœur du discours – en dehors d'un contexte pacifique. Selon De Gasperi, il fallait parler d'un trinôme: « liberté, justice, paix »²⁴.

20 Alcide De Gasperi, *Les bases morales de la démocratie*, cit., p. 5.

21 Ibid., p. 9.

22 Ibid., p. 12.

23 Ibid., p. 15.

24 Ibid., p. 19.

Pour sauver la liberté, – affirme-t-il – il faut sauver la paix, mais le régime de liberté ne se sauve pas sans effectuer la reconstruction économique, qui est la prémisses de la justice sociale. Le cercle est ainsi fermé et cela prouve que toute l'action démocratique doit tendre, pour les raisons mêmes de son existence, vers la paix²⁵.

Toute guerre, dans le monde contemporain, aurait eu un caractère universel et certainement européen, ne s'arrêtant à aucune frontière.

Il était donc clair, selon De Gasperi, que pour résister à un danger commun, pour préserver la paix, et avec elle la liberté politique et la justice sociale, il fallait « faire appel aux forces de reconstruction de tous, à l'énergie unitaire de l'Europe »²⁶, à la civilisation commune, à une « solidarité de la raison et du sentiment, de la liberté et de la justice ».

La première défense de la paix résidait dans l'unité de l'Europe qui devait également inclure l'Allemagne: celle-ci devenait pour De Gasperi la première tâche à remplir. La solidarité de l'Europe aurait vaincu la haine idéologique.

Le discours de De Gasperi à Bruxelles fut commenté par la presse nationale et internationale comme un tournant dans la politique italienne : l'Italie qui entrait dans l'Occident.

Loin de représenter, cependant, le moment de l'acceptation du Pacte Atlantique et encore moins celui de l'adhésion au Pacte de Bruxelles, ce discours contient les fondements de la nouvelle politique étrangère et européenne de l'Italie: il y a le dépassement de l'État national, la nécessité de nouvelles institutions, l'abandon partiel de la souveraineté. Il y a un contexte: le monde interdépendant d'après-guerre. Il y a une valeur: la paix, et avec elle la liberté et la justice. Il existe une stratégie, peut-être pas encore tout à fait claire, mais destinée à être précisée peu après: la requête d'institutions politiques supranationales.

4. Le discours de Strasbourg

En 1951, après le début de la guerre de Corée en juin 1950 et face au problème du réarmement de l'Allemagne, la paix est au centre des préoccupations de De Gasperi, le premier objectif de son action politique, et dans la fédération européenne il identifie un «mythe de paix».

²⁵ Ibid..

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 20-21.

Dans le sillage de la recherche de voies pour construire la paix De Gasperi mûrit une pleine adhésion à la Communauté européenne de défense (CED). Le projet de CED aurait permis de faire sortir des gonds les nationalismes, en les privant d'une de leurs colonnes portantes : construire une armée en commun voulait dire éliminer pour toujours la souveraineté nationale, fondée sur les forces armées, et donc éliminer la possibilité même de guerres fratricides en Europe.

Pour créer une véritable armée européenne, De Gasperi soutenait l'idée de confier un pouvoir constituant à l'Assemblée de la CED d'abord au sein de l'Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l'Europe, le 10 décembre 1951, et puis lors des réunions des ministres des Affaires étrangères des six pays appartenant à la « petite Europe », le 11 décembre à Strasbourg et le 27 décembre à Paris.

Le 10 décembre, à Strasbourg, De Gasperi prononce un discours mémorable et très actuel. Le début a un caractère historique :

La condition essentielle pour une résistance efficace à l'extérieur est en Europe la défense à l'intérieur contre un funeste héritage de guerres civiles – et c'est ainsi qu'il faut considérer les guerres européennes du point de vue de l'histoire universelle – cette alternance d'agressions et de revanches, d'esprit hégémonique, d'avidité de richesse et d'espace, d'anarchie et de tyrannie que nous a légué notre histoire, par ailleurs si glorieuse. (...) Car s'il est vrai que le Pacte Atlantique embrasse le monde, il n'est pas moins vrai que dans ce monde l'Europe garde en elle-même les sources les plus anciennes et les traditions les plus hautes de la civilisation²⁷.

Comment défendre la civilisation européenne, ses institutions, au moment du danger? L'alternative, pour De Gasperi, était entre le mythe de l'État national absolu et la voie de l'intégration supranationale, entre la guerre et la paix. Prendre le parti de la paix signifiait se ranger contre le dogme de l'État-nation souverain, cela signifiait coordonner les forces nationales « vers un but de civilisation supra-nationale ». Mais pour que ces nouvelles formes de vie commune se développent, il fallait créer « une association des souverainetés nationales basée sur des institutions constitutionnelles démocratiques »²⁸. Tel est le but à atteindre.

De Gasperi ne se bornait pas à parler de l'armée, mais il esquissait clairement le cadre dans lequel elle était nécessairement insérée:

27 Discours de De Gasperi à l'Assemblée de Strasbourg, 10 décembre 1951, texte français avec corrections manuscrites et texte italien, in AHUE, dossier ADG-116, pp. 2-3.

28 Ibid., p. 4.

Si nous appelons les forces armées des différents pays à se fondre ensemble dans un organisme permanent et constitutionnel et, le cas échéant, à défendre une patrie plus vaste, il faut que cette patrie soit visible, solide et vivante ; même si toute la construction n'est pas parfaite, il faut que dès maintenant on en voit au moins les murs principaux et qu'une volonté politique commune soit toujours vigilante, afin de résumer les idéaux les plus purs des nations associés et les faire briller à la lumière d'un foyer commun ²⁹.

Le président du Conseil italien exprimait son espoir personnel que l'Italie, « conformément à l'esprit de sa constitution », avec les autres États européens, soit prête à accepter certaines limites à sa souveraineté. Il se disait convaincu que le parlement italien pourrait suivre « l'effort méritoire d'hommes généreux et clairvoyants tendant à créer un pont stable entre des nations souvent séparées dans le passé par un abîme dans lequel toute l'Europe est précipitée ». L'approbation n'aurait pas échoué si ce pont avait été solidement bâti et s'il s'était appuyé sur les piliers du consentement populaire, en devenant le trait d'union entre des nations libres et égales.

De Gasperi était conscient de la limitation des constructions partielles, de caractère fonctionnel. Dans son réalisme d'homme politique mûr, il sentait en même temps qu'il serait impossible d'atteindre la fédération à court terme. Cependant, il était convaincu que l'objectif final devait être mis en lumière, afin de diriger l'action pour la construction de l'unité européenne, sous peine d'involution et de décomposition de la construction en un instrument d'oppression et de gêne.

Si nous ne bâtissons que des administrations communes, sans qu'il y ait une volonté politique supérieure, vivifiée par un organisme central, dans lequel les volontés nationales se rencontrent, se précisent et se réchauffent dans une synthèse supérieure, nous risquons que cette activité européenne, comparée aux vitalités nationales particulières, paraisse sans chaleur, sans vie idéale; elle pourrait même apparaître à certains moments un harnachement superflu et peut-être oppressif³⁰.

Dans la pensée de De Gasperi, le principal pilier de ce pont jeté entre les nations qu'était la Communauté européenne devait être un « corps élu commun et délibérant, même avec des attributions de décision et de contrôle limitées à ce qui est administré en commun et dont dépendrait un organisme exécutif collégial. Le deuxième pilier serait constitué par

²⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

un budget commun, qui tire en partie considérable ses ressources des contributions individuelles, c'est-à-dire du système de taxation »³¹.

À la fin du discours, De Gasperi établissait un lien étroit et clairvoyant entre le secteur choisi pour construire l'Europe et le facteur temps:

Il est vrai que chacun de nous a dans son pays des problèmes qui le serrent de tous les côtés, il est vrai aussi que certains pourraient désirer poursuivre cette œuvre dans d'autres secteurs, plus faciles, mais chacun de nous sent que celle-ci est l'occasion qui passe et qui ne reviendra plus. Il faut la saisir et l'insérer dans la logique de l'histoire³².

5. Conclusion

En conclusion, les deux discours présentés montrent comment De Gasperi percevait les raisons historiques de l'Europe et y voyait l'expansion naturelle du concept de nation. Une dimension, la dimension continentale, qui aurait inclus, pas annulé, les États dans une coexistence fructueuse entre des peuples de langues, de traditions, de confessions religieuses différentes.

Sa position est à la fois idéale et pragmatique, et il en est bien conscient : « En histoire, nous procédons selon deux ailes – affirme-t-il – : l'une est celle de la rationalité, c'est-à-dire la représentation des intérêts ; l'autre est celle de l'idéalisme »³³. Il était convaincu que l'intégration européenne était le nouveau cadre dans lequel les intérêts des différents États pouvaient être le plus efficacement sauvegardés.

Mais surtout, De Gasperi considère la communauté politique comme une condition *sine qua non* de la communauté européenne. Dans son action en faveur d'une Europe unie, il va bien au-delà d'une adhésion générique à l'idéal européen, donnant au processus d'unification européenne un véritable saut de qualité. Il ne se limite pas à l'approche fonctionnaliste, mais s'engage constamment, sans hésitation, pour une Europe fédérée insérée avec des liens forts dans le monde atlantique

31 Ibid., pp. 7-8.

32 Ibid., p. 9.

33 Conférence de presse de Gasperi à Rome, Villa Madama, 6 juillet 1952, conservé à la Discothèque d'État, dans la transcription de Maurizio Gentilini et publié par Gabriele De Rosa dans *Avvenire*, 1er février 2004.

Walter Hallstein au “Parlement Européen” durant sa Première Réunion

Giuliana Laschi

Un orateur fécond, Monsieur Europe

Walter Hallstein occupe un poste de grande importance dans l'histoire de l'intégration européenne, dont il a été l'un des premiers créateurs, en qualité de premier Président de la Commission européenne, de 1958 à 1967¹. Son initiative est à la base du développement de la Communauté à peine créée et a permis de guider les premiers pas du processus d'intégration à travers l'interprétation et la mise en œuvre du traité de Rome. Son action fut déterminée et rigoureuse, guidée par une incroyable confiance dans le processus d'intégration et dans son évolution naturelle vers l'unité et la fédération européenne. Bien qu'il s'agît de la première période d'activité de la Commission, il existait un engouement suscité par la conscience commune, avec les autres membres de la Communauté, d'être les précurseurs d'un grand changement et les activités furent accomplies sur des rythmes soutenus en obtenant des résultats positifs jusqu'en 1965, lorsqu'avec la crise dite de 'la chaise vide'², les objectifs de Hallstein et de la Commission durent faire face à la vision totalement difforme du général

1 Professeur de droit à l'université de Rostock, Recteur de l'Université de Francfort et professeur étranger à l'Université Georgetown. Président fondateur de la Commission allemande de l'UNESCO, il est devenu Chef de la délégation allemande aux négociations sur le plan Schuman (1950), Secrétaire d'État à la Chancellerie fédérale (1950) et au ministère des Affaires étrangères (1951). Président de la Commission de la CEE de 1958 jusqu'au 30 Juin 1967. Membre du Bundestag (1967-1972), il est devenu Président du Mouvement européen (1968-1974).

2 Le début de la crise de la 'chaise vide' a été à cause de la proposition sur le financement de la Politique agricole commune élaborée en 1965 par Hallstein. La Commission propose le développement des ressources propres des Communautés, indépendamment des États; attribue des pouvoirs budgétaires supplémentaires au Parlement européen; prévoit un rôle accru à la Commission. Le passage, au 1er janvier 1966, à la troisième étape de la période transitoire doit s'accompagner de l'application du vote majoritaire au Conseil des ministres. La France n'accepte pas une telle évolution qu'elle considère comme un abandon inacceptable de souveraineté. Le gouvernement français rappelle à Paris son représentant permanent à

de Gaulle. La crise se résolut avec de grandes difficultés et ce fut certainement une victoire pour le Président français, pour différents motifs, mais surtout pour la nature intergouvernementale qui maintint l'architecture institutionnelle, même si le redimensionnement du projet européen de Hallstein ne discrédita pas l'espace très vaste que la Commission parvint à se créer, sur la base d'une lecture la plus supranationale possible du traité. En effet, indépendamment des avis controversés sur son action politique en tant que Président de la Commission³, il accomplit un rôle clé pour la construction et le développement des Communautés. D'ailleurs, le rôle de pionnier lui convenait; il avait été Secrétaire d'État de la République Fédérale et avait donc participé personnellement à la reconstruction des relations internationales de l'Allemagne après le Second Conflit Mondial⁴.

Sa capacité d'organiser les travaux de la Commission, sa fermeté face aux obstacles, sa détermination dans la protection des principes supranationaux face à la vision nationaliste et intergouvernementale du Général de Gaulle, permirent à la Communauté européenne de se développer et à la Commission d'acquérir un espace et une importance que le traité ne lui attribuait pas explicitement. Pourtant, malgré sa force politique, ses capacités évidentes de gouverner et sa réputation qui lui valurent d'être dénommé 'Monsieur Europe', Hallstein reçut une attention très limitée de la part de l'historiographie qui, souvent, s'est limitée à souligner la défaite qui lui fut infligée par de Gaulle⁵. Par contre, l'analyse de son idée d'Europe à travers l'un de ses discours les plus longs et les plus importants, pourrait être très intéressante pour la reconstruction de son projet politique pour l'Europe.

L'Europe fut au centre de sa réflexion politique, car il fit du processus d'intégration l'un des principaux objectifs politiques de sa carrière à partir de 1958, en retenant que l'unité européenne était le but ultime à atteindre. De plus, à l'instar du Recteur du Collège d'Europe Gabriel Fragnière,

Bruxelles et rende publique l'intention de ne plus siéger au Conseil des ministres jusqu'à ce qu'elle obtienne gain de cause.

3 Wilfried Loth, "Walter Hallstein: un européen déterminé", en Michel Dumoulin (ed.): *La Commission européenne 1958-1972. Histoire et mémoires d'une institution*, Luxembourg: Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, 2007, pp. 83-94.

4 Wilhelm G. Grewe, "Hallstein's Conception of German-German Policy and Relations", en Wilfried Loth, William Wallace et Wolfgang Wessels (eds), *Walter Hallstein: the forgotten European?*, Houndmills: Macmillan, 1998, pp. 39-59.

5 Gabriel Fragnière, *Walter Hallstein ou ... une pédagogie politique pour la Fédération européenne*, Bruxelles: Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, 1995, p. 13.

certaines l'ont même défini comme un véritable «pédagogue passionné»⁶, car il a utilisé les nombreuses occasions de s'adresser à un vaste public, comme le démontrent particulièrement ses discours au Parlement européen, pour expliquer et enseigner le processus d'intégration européenne. Il était convaincu, comme d'ailleurs Jean Monnet, qu'il suffisait de parler des succès de la Communauté pour la faire apprécier et pousser les européens à la soutenir et à la renforcer. En effet, lorsqu'il quitta la présidence de la Commission, il n'écrivit pas un mémoire, comme la plupart de ses collègues, mais bien un livre dans lequel, il rédigea:

«Mon propos est d'exposer strictement et avec précision ce qui a été mis en jeu avec l'unification européenne entreprise en 1950: ce que nous avons fait et ce qui nous reste à faire [...] ce qu'elle représente tant dans son existence actuelle que comme organisme dynamique portant un avenir en gestation»⁷.

Le choix d'un seul discours a donc été très difficile; les discours de grand intérêt sont nombreux, plusieurs de ceux-ci sont d'une grande qualité politique, puisqu'il fut un excellent orateur et, en tant que juriste de formation, il était en mesure de comprendre totalement une Communauté fondée sur le droit. De plus, il parlait plusieurs langues européennes⁸; sa connaissance de la langue française était pratiquement parfaite, ce qui lui permit de parler presque partout directement à l'auditoire.

Comme chaque Président de la Commission, Hallstein a fait de nombreux discours publics et institutionnels et continua aussi lorsqu'il devint le Président du Mouvement européen. Les archives historiques de l'Union européenne, tout comme la bibliothèque de la Commission, conservent un nombre tellement élevé de discours, d'interviews, de publications de Hallstein que le choix a été vraiment très complexe. J'ai finalement opté pour un document que je retiens de très grand intérêt pour deux motifs fondamentaux: premièrement, il s'agit du premier discours qu'il effectua face à l'Assemblée parlementaire européenne, réunie pour la première fois le 20 mars 1958⁹. Ce document a une très grande valeur, non seulement pour la reconstruction de la pensée de Hallstein, mais aussi pour

6 Ibid., p. 17.

7 Walter Hallstein, *L'Europe inachevée*, Paris: Laffont, 1970, p.1.

8 Hans von der Groeben, "Walter Hallstein as President of the Commission", en Wilfried Loth, William Wallace et Wolfgang Wessels (eds), p. 97.

9 Commission européenne, Secrétariat générale, Documentation et recherche sur les questions institutionnelles européennes (dorénavant DORIE), *Allocution de Walter Hallstein devant l'Assemblée parlementaire européenne*, DORIE 0338907-00, 20 mars 1958.

l'entière du processus d'intégration européenne. Vu qu'il s'agit de la première réunion du Parlement européen et donc aussi de la première rencontre entre celui-ci et le Président de la Commission européenne, le discours de Hallstein revêt une importance particulière, car il possède les caractéristiques d'un programme politique et il le présente comme tel. Dans un système international rigide bipolaire, lui-même, en tant que secrétaire d'État, avait favorisé et approfondi la guerre froide avec la doctrine qui portait son nom. Au début du parcours communautaire, son discours entend donner un objectif de profonde autonomie et centralité de l'Europe, à travers l'alliance profonde avec les États-Unis. Il s'agit d'un discours très vaste, long et approfondi, qui permet d'aborder les principaux arguments qui furent plusieurs fois repris et développés par le Président de la Commission, même au cours des années suivantes. Bien que je me sois focalisée sur un seul discours, quelques brèves comparaisons avec ses discours successifs et avec certains de ses écrits, m'ont permis de constater une grande continuité dans son idée et sa proposition politique d'unité européenne.

Le discours que j'ai analysé est un discours de pionnier; il nous permet de reconstruire les premiers pas du processus d'intégration et du Président de la Commission, ainsi que de mettre en lumière, déjà dans ce premier discours, la présence de ces objectifs politiques qui furent à la base de l'action de Hallstein en tant que Président de la Commission et politicien européen. L'importance historique de ce document est bien représentée par l'incipit: en prenant la parole, Hallstein souligna qu'il s'agissait du premier jour de travail du Parlement européen, en reconnaissant à cette institution (en l'appelant Parlement et non pas Assemblée parlementaire commune) un rôle politique que le traité ne lui reconnaissait qu'en petite partie. Sa participation à l'inauguration des travaux parlementaires indiquait implicitement la nécessité d'un grand dialogue entre les deux institutions européennes, à travers une méthodologie de travail commune, tout en respectant leur autonomie et leur indépendance, établies par le traité. Il existait une sorte d'identité commune entre les institutions et il souhaitait que les États membres choisissent rapidement un seul lieu, siège de toutes les institutions communes¹⁰. Il est intéressant de constater que ceci fut le premier sujet traité au cours de son premier discours au Parlement européen, lors du premier jour de réunion de cette institution, car il était d'une importance prioritaire. En effet, il retenait que le choix d'un

10 Pour une lecture générale: Daniela Preda, "Hallstein e l'amministrazione pubblica europea (1958-1967)", en *Annale ISAP*, n. 8, 2000, pp. 79-104.

seul siège était nécessaire et urgent, car le maintien de sièges séparés représentait non seulement un gaspillage important d'énergies, mais pouvait aussi influencer négativement les résultats du travail. Les préoccupations de Hallstein en ce qui concerne l'organisation du travail étaient sincères. En effet, il s'agissait de créer la Communauté à partir de rien, choisir le siège, l'organiser, engager des fonctionnaires et les former, sans avoir une période transitoire à disposition pour pouvoir le faire. L'identification du problème des sièges comme l'obstacle principal pour la mise en route des travaux administratifs n'est donc pas surprenante.

Si les premières préoccupations furent de type identitaire et organisationnel, le discours aborde plusieurs thèmes et politiques, aussi bien au niveau de questions internes à la Communauté qu'au niveau international. Il présenta tous les thèmes qu'il estimait cruciaux et, malgré l'impossibilité implicite de la Commission de présenter un rapport complet au Parlement, il ne renonça pas à analyser les principaux problèmes que la Communauté devait aborder et sur lesquels il avait une vision assez claire.

La Communauté comme premier pas vers un État fédéral

L'unité européenne représenta la partie centrale de ce discours, un thème qui devint récurrent lors des interventions qu'il fit au cours des années suivantes, où une large part était dédiée aux «questions constitutionnelles de la Communauté et au problème plus général de l'union politique»¹¹.

En effet, au cours des innombrables discours de Hallstein, la question de l'union politique fut certainement le sujet le plus traité, celui sur lequel il développa une argumentation complexe, ainsi que des objectifs et des attentes politiques remarquables¹². Tant dans les discours plus généraux et peut-être aussi plus idéologiques, présentés à un large public, que dans ceux plus techniques, présentés dans le cadre des réunions des institutions européennes, l'accent est mis sur la certitude que le processus d'intégration aurait connu une évolution vers l'unité politique¹³. La certitude est tellement évidente que, souvent dans ses discours, l'argumentation est

11 Archives Historiques de la Union européenne (dorénavant AHUE), *Introduction au septième rapport général sur l'activité de la Communauté, Allocution de Hallstein au Parlement européen à Strasbourg*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1466, 18 juin 1964, p. 21.

12 AHUE, *L'integrazione economica come fattore di integrazione politica*, EM 260, 28 juin 1961.

13 Corrado Malandrino, *Tut etwas Tapferes: compi un atto di coraggio. L'Europa federale di Walter Hallstein, 1948-1982*, Bologne: Il Mulino, 2005.

presque contraignante, il n'émet aucun doute, même lors de ses derniers discours ou lors de ceux présentés durant la crise de la chaise vide. L'idée que les Communautés représentaient le point de départ d'un processus qui aurait certainement abouti à l'unité politique est un élément – dans ce discours comme dans tant d'autres que j'ai lus – d'une continuité et d'une certitude absolues. Un autre trait important, bien qu'il soit moins présent, est la conscience de l'innovation introduite avec les Communautés et de la révolution produite par le processus d'intégration, ainsi que la confiance totale dans le succès des changements économiques et sociaux introduits¹⁴. La création d'une communauté de personnes qui vivent sur le même territoire, qui possèdent les mêmes droits et qui ont des problèmes et des perspectives identiques.

L'intégration économique n'est pas un phénomène purement économique. Au contraire, il s'agit en réalité d'amalgamer, de cimenter les politiques des pays membres dans les domaines de l'économie et de la vie sociale. La Communauté économique européenne n'est donc pas simplement, comme on l'entend dire souvent, une préparation de l'Union politique; au contraire elle est déjà un élément de sa réalisation. Elle est, si on veut, une «union politique économique et sociale»¹⁵.

Il affirma aussi de n'avoir jamais soutenu que le fonctionnement de la Communauté aurait débouché «automatiquement» à lui seul sur une union politique: «Rien ne se fait automatiquement dans la politique, tout se fait par application d'une volonté politique»¹⁶. Pour Hallstein, l'entiereté de la Commission était concentrée sur l'objectif de la construction d'une union politique et il parlait souvent au pluriel en faisant référence à la Commission, ainsi qu'à lui-même. Il aurait été possible d'atteindre l'unité uniquement grâce au travail conjoint des institutions européennes, en lesquelles Hallstein faisait entièrement confiance. Dans le discours, il anticipa également les objectifs politiques, car il considérait qu'il existait une vision unitaire entre le Parlement et la Commission, et il utilisa très souvent le pronom «nous» pour indiquer la Commission et le Parlement

14 Dans nombreux discours mais particulièrement important: AHUE, *Conférence de Hallstein à Vienne*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1464, 13 juin 1958; AHUE, *Discours devant la Fondation de la Culture*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1464, Milan, 13 décembre 1958, pp. 12-14.

15 AHUE, *Groupe du Porte-parole, traduction de l'interview accordée par Hallstein à Die Welt*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1466, 15 février 1964, pp. 1-2.

16 Ibid., p. 2.

ensemble. «Nous, c'est à dire tout d'abord les responsables dans les institutions des Communautés européennes»¹⁷.

Du reste, «Les éléments constitutionnels de la Communauté sont empruntés à l'expérience fédéraliste de la doctrine politique moderne. Il n'est pas exagéré de dire que nous avons ici à faire une entité quasi-fédérale»¹⁸. L'objectif n'était pas de détruire les différences nationales, qui représentaient le patrimoine principal de l'Europe, parce qu'à la différence des États centralisés unitaires, la Fédération permet aux États membres d'avoir leur propre vie, même s'il admettait que toutes les administrations nationales opposaient une certaine résistance vis-à-vis des nouveautés et du changement. Cependant, les institutions nationales auraient également appris à dialoguer sur la base de la réalité quotidienne – et non sur celle d'une approche théorique –, car les institutions produisaient tous les jours un début d'intégration européenne: «Et ces chantiers, ces institutions sont des organes communautaires, des organes fédéraux»¹⁹. Hallstein fit noter que même les européistes les plus fervents n'auraient jamais imaginé une organisation politique européenne faisant disparaître les États. Le modèle le plus avancé était celui de l'État fédéral, d'une Europe non uniforme et non standardisée, parce que «L'Europe c'est la diversité»²⁰.

La certitude de ses argumentations sur l'unité politique était tellement évidente qu'il estima pouvoir la partager avec le Conseil, pendant son discours lors de la première réunion du Conseil, où il présenta son projet politique à partir de l'Union européenne, en affirmant: «Avoir toujours en vue l'unité plus profonde de l'Europe doit être le but de tous ceux auxquels incubent des responsabilités particulières au sein de nos communautés»²¹. Lors des toutes premières années de vie de la Communauté, il estimait encore que le Conseil était un organisme commun, une partie de la construction supranationale, car il représentait le point d'intersection entre la souveraineté supranationale et nationale. Pendant les années au cours desquelles la divergence d'opinion avec de Gaulle battait son plein, il estima que le Conseil était un organisme qui s'interprétait de manière différente par rapport aux prévisions du traité et qui s'éloignait des objec-

17 AHUE, *L'unité de l'action européenne, Discours de Hallstein au Parlement européen à la VIIème États Généraux des Communes d'Europe à Rome*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1466, 15 octobre 1964, p. 3.

18 Ibid., p. 4.

19 Ibid.

20 AHUE, *Allocution de Hallstein à la première réunion du Conseil*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1464, Bruxelles, 24 janvier 1958, p. 4.

21 Ibid., p. 2.

tifs communs. Il estimait qu'il était nécessaire de réaliser l'union et l'unité politique européenne comme un objectif partagé, qui aurait été atteint en donnant de l'espace à l'unité européenne qui existait déjà et qui était une synthèse de la civilisation européenne et de ses bases morales. L'allusion à la guerre froide et à l'anticommunisme était évidente lorsqu'il rappela les libertés inviolables de l'homme²², surtout celles d'opinion et de croyance, en considérant que l'intégration morale n'aurait pas perdu son attractivité face «aux limites arbitrairement posées par l'occupation militaire»²³.

Bien évidemment, ce qu'il manque dans ce premier discours, que nous pourrions qualifier de fondateur, surtout si nous le comparons avec les autres tenus au Parlement au cours des années qui suivirent, ce sont les argumentations et les réflexions sur le développement des politiques européennes, sur lesquelles il se pencha plutôt à l'occasion de la présentation des rapports annuels de la Commission²⁴.

La divergence de vue entre deux manières d'imaginer l'Europe: l'État fédéral et l'État national

Parmi les premiers éléments qui ressortent du discours, il n'est pas étonnant de trouver la conception de la communauté européenne comme première pierre d'un État européen, qui annonce une union politique globale. Hallstein introduisit ici, pour la première fois, la définition de Communauté en tant qu'«État», en se référant au rôle qu'elle devait jouer sur le plan international. Il affirma que la Communauté était «un être vivant politique, un *zoon politikon*» et qu'elle devait se présenter ainsi, même à l'extérieur, de manière compacte²⁵.

La phrase «L'Europe se présente comme un État» est un signe annonciateur évident d'une conception fédéraliste du processus d'intégration et explique, avant même que celle-ci ne se développe complètement, l'opposition nette et insoluble avec de Gaulle. Les deux visions de l'unité européenne furent totalement opposées, à l'instar de leurs personnalités; la crise de la chaise vide fut également le résultat de l'incompatibilité des positions

22 Voir AHUE, *Exposé de Hallstein à la session plénière du Comité économique et sociale*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1465, Bruxelles, 28 novembre 1962.

23 AHUE, *Allocution de Hallstein à la première réunion du Conseil*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1464, Bruxelles, 24 janvier 1958, p. 3.

24 Voir notamment les quatre volumes des discours contenus dans BAC 118/1986, 1464-1467 des AHUE.

25 Cfr. DORIE, cit.

politiques et des rôles qu'ils revendiquaient pour les États membres, l'Europe et aussi pour eux-mêmes²⁶. Le jugement de de Gaulle sur Hallstein et sur sa manière d'imaginer l'Europe fut sévère et définitif, comme il le soulignera dans ses mémoires: «He enthusiastically adopts the theory of the superstate and uses all his skill to give the Community this form and content»²⁷. De Gaulle était certain que l'État européen de Hallstein était un projet irréalisable; Loth estime que l'idée même de la chaise vide découle de la volonté de «libérer» la nation française de l'usurpateur, personnifié par la Commission européenne et par son Président, à la tête de la 'foreign technocracy'²⁸. D'autre part, pour Hallstein, il n'existait aucune possibilité de médiation par rapport à une idée qu'il avait développée dès le début de sa présidence. Pour ce motif, la crise de la chaise vide fut l'énième tentative de démontrer que l'Europe avait besoin d'un État fédéral afin de surmonter les nationalismes et les divisions internes²⁹. Les deux visions étaient complètement opposées, sans aucune possibilité de médiation³⁰. Cela explique aussi le veto sur le renouvellement de Hallstein à la présidence et sa démission quelques jours avant la fin de son mandat, lorsque le veto devint de notoriété publique. En effet, la rupture fut excessive et ce, principalement à cause des modalités employées par de Gaulle, et non pas à cause des divergences de vue, car il était tellement évident qu'il n'était pas possible d'en choisir une sans renier l'autre³¹.

Hallstein parla plusieurs fois dans ce discours, comme dans tous les autres, de l'Europe politique comme d'un État, une Fédération. Cependant, son idée d'unité européenne était celle d'un parcours, étape par étape, qui renforce les objectifs communs et qui parvienne donc à annihiler les tentatives intergouvernementales du gouvernement français.

26 A propos de crise, le discours très intéressant à la CDU/CSU en AHUE, *Économie européenne et politique européenne*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1466, Düsseldorf, 8 juillet 1965.

27 Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages: Tome IV: Pour l'effort* Paris : Plon, 1970, p. 378, cit. en Wilfried Loth, *Hallstein and De Gaulle : the Disastrous Confrontation*, en Wilfried Loth, William Wallas , Wolfgang Wessels (eds), *Walter Hallstein the forgotten European ?*, New York : Palgrave MacMillan, 1998, p. 135.

28 Ibid., pp. 135-150.

29 Corrado Malandrino, "Oltre il compromesso del Lussemburgo verso l'Europa Federale. Walter Hallstein e la crisi della 'sedia vuota' (1965-66)", en *Working Papers Department of Public Policy and Public Choice "Polis"*, n. 27, mars 2002.

30 Voir: Bino Olivi, *L'Europa difficile*, Bologne: Il Mulino, 2001; Wilfried Loth, "La crise de la chaise vide", en Michel Dumoulin (ed.), pp. 95-113.

31 Hans Herbert Götz, "The crisis of 1965-66", en Wilfried Loth, William Wallace et Wolfgang Wessels (eds), pp. 151-162.

Il ne croyait donc pas en une révolution fédéraliste, mais bien en un parcours qui aurait mené à la fédération, comme l'avait imaginé Jean Monnet et comme le projetaient certains commissaires, parmi lesquels Mansholt. En estimant qu'il était possible de limiter les poussées politiques centrifuges des États membres, il surestima très probablement le rôle et le pouvoir des institutions communautaires, qui ne parvinrent pas à délimiter l'espace que de nombreux partisans de la CEE avaient souhaité. D'ailleurs, tous les membres de la nouvelle Commission européenne vivaient leur mandat comme un grand objectif d'intégration européenne, notamment parce que la Commission «s'était créée toute seule», de sa propre initiative, selon sa propre conception et son interprétation du traité, d'une manière totalement unitaire³². Ceci donna bien évidemment à la Commission l'idée d'avoir un espace d'action très vaste qui, avant même l'idée partagée de supranationalité, guida les commissaires vers une action autonome et une conception surestimée de son rôle³³. Sur cette base, la proposition de la Commission pour l'introduction de ses ressources, dénommée 'Proposition Hallstein' fut aussi avancée et représenta le nœud principal de l'opposition entre le Président de la Commission et le Président français. En partant de l'article 201 du traité de Rome, qui prévoyait des ressources qui auraient remplacé les contributions nationales, Hallstein voulait introduire l'autonomie financière, et donc politique, de la Communauté³⁴. L'historiographie a interprété de différente manière les unités et les oppositions internes à la Commission durant la crise de la chaise vide, en considérant que les commissaires français s'étaient déjà opposés à la vision de leur Président, mais il n'y a aucune trace de cette division dans les discours de Hallstein, qui a toujours présenté la Commission comme un organisme qui exprimait une unité inébranlable³⁵. L'opposition dramatique entre le

32 Cette atmosphère d'enthousiasme qui imprégnait l'action de la première Commission est rapportée par plusieurs de ses membres et de manière très explicite par Emile Noël, secrétaire général de la Commission européenne de 1958 à 1987: «It was an exciting task for a young Euro-official to participate in setting up and continuing the development of this institution, which was to play a key role in the transformation of Western Europe», voir Emile Noël, "Walter Hallstein: a Personal testimony", en Ibidem, p. 131.

33 Karl-Heinz Narjes, "Walter Hallstein and the Early Phase of the EEC", en Ibidem, pp. 109-111.

34 Parlement européen, Commission des affaires institutionnelles, *Selection of texts concerning institutional matters of the Community from 1950 to 1982*, Luxembourg: 1982, pp. 127-128.

35 Voir Corrado Malandrino, 2005.

Conseil et la Commission³⁶, mais davantage entre deux visions d'Europe opposées, fut présentée avec âpreté par Hallstein dans un discours intéressant tenu à l'occasion du Prix Liberté qui lui fut remis en 1971 par la ville de Bruxelles:

«Disturbing signals of degeneration are developing in the traditional Community structure, which pose a serious threat to certain important functions of the institutions as laid down in the Treaties. Remedial action is therefore vital for the Council, whose authority and ability to decide are being dangerously weakened by habituation, in defiance of the Treaty, to unanimity»³⁷.

D'autre part, il avait une confiance fidéiste et totale dans le processus d'intégration: «Les forces qui nous poussent en avant sont: une confiance indestructible de l'Europe en elle-même ; la conscience du fait que, sans une Europe saine, vigoureuse, florissante, participant activement à la politique mondiale, ni les États européens, ni le monde ne pourront vraiment prospérer³⁸». Une confiance qui lui permit de guider la Commission vers des objectifs de grande importance, malgré les attaques de de Gaulle, au niveau du renforcement du processus d'intégration, parmi lesquels il y a lieu de noter l'approbation du rapport Dehousse³⁹ au sujet de la prépondérance du droit communautaire sur celui des États membres⁴⁰.

Ni grande, ni petite, mais seulement l'Europe

Au cours de son argumentation, il se heurta plusieurs fois contre la critique des opposants de la Communauté qui interprétaient l'Europe des Six comme un obstacle à la création d'une grande Europe, en rétorquant que la collaboration européenne avait produit une vaste coopération à travers le Conseil d'Europe et la UEO, et avait maintenu les relations avec la

36 A propos du rôle du Conseil et des questions institutionnelles globales, Hallstein a écrit de manière approfondie dans le volume où il développe entièrement son idée sur le processus d'intégration européen: Walter Hallstein, *L'Europe inachevée*.

37 Commission des Communautés européennes, *W. Hallstein and J. Rey Freemen of the City of Brussels*, Luxembourg: 1971.

38 AHUE, Allocution de Hallstein, EN 1, Strasbourg, 17 juin 1965.

39 Le 22 octobre 1958, un groupe de travail pour les élections européennes a été établi au sein de la commission des Affaires politiques de l'Assemblée parlementaire européenne. Le 30 avril 1960, il soumet le "Rapport Dehousse", sur l'élection de l'Assemblée au suffrage universel direct, adopté le 17 mai 1960.

40 AHUE, *Intervention de Hallstein à la réunion du Parlement européen*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1466, 17 juin 1965.

Grande-Bretagne⁴¹. L'objectif central de son attaque était la théorie de la discrimination, soutenue par les pays membres de l'OECE qui ne faisaient pas partie de la Communauté et qui exigeaient un traitement commercial égal à celui des Six, sans pour autant partager leurs obligations réciproques. Ils estimaient qu'à la place de favoriser l'unification, les institutions de la nouvelle communauté économique des Six étaient un motif de division et de scission de l'Europe. Cette critique attribuait à la Communauté une véritable discrimination envers les pays tiers, qui ne bénéficiaient pas des règles communautaires. Au contraire, Hallstein pensait que le succès principal des grands efforts accomplis par les États membres pour constituer une véritable Communauté économique européenne, digne de ce nom, était le fait d'avoir accepté de faire des sacrifices, jusqu'à renoncer à une partie de leur souveraineté. Il s'agissait donc d'une critique infondée et injuste: «Ces hommes doivent se laisser dire que tout ce qu'ils ont réussi à faire, c'est d'aggraver la division de l'Europe, si ce n'est même de l'avoir pour la première fois consacrée dans les faits»⁴². Hallstein pensait qu'il fallait répondre sans incertitude et sans ambiguïté, en refusant l'idée que le principe de discrimination et la division de l'Europe étaient provoqués par le processus d'intégration, puisque, malgré l'existence incontestable de profondes différences entre la Communauté et le reste du monde, les différenciations n'étaient pas synonymes de discriminations. La Communauté économique européenne ne comportait pas seulement la suppression des droits de douane et des restrictions quantitatives dans les échanges entre les six pays membres, et n'était pas seulement une union douanière munie d'un tarif externe uniforme, mais prévoyait bien une harmonisation et une coordination de la politique économique des six pays⁴³. De plus, en prévoyant l'élargissement⁴⁴, le traité de Rome soulignait indirectement la

41 AHUE, *Conférence de Hallstein à Vienne*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1464, 13 juin 1958; AHUE, *Discours devant l'Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1464, 13 janvier 1959.

42 Ibid. p. 12.

43 En ce qui concerne le lien étroit entre l'intégration économique et politique, il y a lieu de signaler un discours particulièrement important tenu à l'Indian Council for Cultural Relations, en Walter Hallstein, *A New Path to Peaceful Union*, Londres: Asia Publishing House, 1963.

44 A propos de l'élargissement, ainsi que du rôle international de la CEE, il y a lieu de signaler le discours particulièrement intéressant: "L'élargissement de la Communauté économique européenne. Les responsabilités économiques et politiques de l'Europe dans le monde", en AHUE, *Discours de Hallstein à la réunion commune de l'Assemblée consultative du Conseil de l'Europe et du Parlement européen à Strasbourg*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1466, 23 septembre 1966.

volonté d'ouverture de la Communauté, prête à accueillir de nouveaux membres qui auraient partagé ses buts et ses instruments: «Le traité stipule le principe de la porte ouverte. Tous les États européens peuvent solliciter leur adhésion. Dans cette disposition du traité, il existe une véritable clause de non- discrimination»⁴⁵. Par rapport aux critiques reçues, Hallstein trouvait inacceptable que l'on puisse penser être admis au bénéfice de la suppression des droits de douane et de l'ouverture du marché, sans se soumettre aux limites que les États membres avaient acceptées concernant leur politique économique.

Cependant, pour Hallstein, toutes ces critiques avaient comme fragilité principale le manque d'analyse de la teneur politique et constitutionnelle du traité, car l'intégration politique était au centre du processus d'unification européen, un principe contenu dans le traité de Rome⁴⁶. A la suite de la phase transitoire, on aurait abouti à la phase finale de son évolution, à un stade qu'il définit comme 'adulte', dans lequel la Communauté se serait présentée comme une structure fédérative. En définitive, Hallstein considérait l'opposition entre les concepts de petite et de grande Europe comme stérile, car il ne s'agissait pas d'une antithèse ou d'une alternative, mais tout simplement d'une première étape et «les six pays de la Communauté sont fiers de se savoir les pionniers de l'Europe»⁴⁷.

Toujours à propos d'espaces et de géopolitique, dans ce discours, le néoprésident de la Commission européenne mit en évidence la force politique de l'Europe occidentale et revendiqua son choix innovant et de grande envergure, comme du reste, il le souligna ailleurs: «La Communauté européenne est l'une des plus grandes conceptions politiques de l'Occident»⁴⁸. Ici, le sentiment puissant d'anticommunisme, qui avait caractérisé son mandat de Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la nouvelle Allemagne Fédérale, semble prévaloir et que l'auteur de la doctrine Hallstein émerge, l'une des expressions politiques les plus radicales de l'Europe occidentale durant la guerre froide⁴⁹. L'Europe dont parle Hallstein, ici et ailleurs⁵⁰, ne fait qu'un avec l'Occident, élément réellement identitaire, comme, à mon avis,

45 Walter Hallstein, p. 14.

46 Ibid. p. 15.

47 Ibid. p. 16.

48 AHUE Collection des discours des Commissaires 'Walter Hallstein', *L'Amérique et l'Europe : une nouvelle initiative*, Intervention à Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 12 avril 1962, p. 12.

49 Wilhelm G. Grewe, op. cit.

50 Walter Hallstein et Alfred Müller-Armack, *L'integrazione economica come fattore di unificazione politica*, Communauté économique européenne, [lieu]: 1961, pp. 4-5.

cela semble particulièrement clair dans l'un de ses discours à l'occasion de la signature du traité d'association avec la Turquie: «La Turquie fait partie de l'Europe: c'est plutôt avant tout le souvenir de la puissante personnalité d'Ataturk, dont l'action nous est remémorée à chaque pas dans ce pays et le souvenir de la rénovation radicalement européenne qu'il a imprimée à l'État turc dans toutes ses manifestations»⁵¹.

La Communauté au sein du système international

Une importante partie du discours de Hallstein est dédiée à l'espace et au rôle de la jeune Communauté au sein du système international, qui confirme la vision politique, unitaire et globale qu'il avait de la CEE dès le début du processus d'intégration. Il s'agit-là d'une ultérieure confirmation du fait qu'il considérait la Communauté comme une sorte d'État. L'objectif global était celui d'une Europe unie qui aurait fait son entrée «dans le concert du monde politique comme un membre que cette grande famille internationale adopte d'emblée»⁵². Il ne pensait pas spécialement que les États, pris séparément, étaient faibles, mais il était plutôt convaincu que «cette attitude est conforme à la philosophie politique qui est commune à tous ceux qui vivent et agissent au sein de cette Communauté, une philosophie basée sur la liberté, la coopération pacifique, l'universalité et le progrès»⁵³. Il craignait que la Communauté ne soit accueillie avec une sorte de réticence psychologique; il incombait donc aux européens de démontrer que la Communauté n'était pas née dans l'intention de créer des problèmes aux autres, mais seulement pour permettre: «L'exercice de notre droit naturel de choisir librement les formes de notre politique et de notre économie»⁵⁴.

En ce qui concerne les relations extérieures, le rôle fondamental des États-Unis, auxquels il avoue être très reconnaissant, émerge immédiatement. En effet, au cours des premières années durant lesquelles l'intégra-

51 Walter Hallstein, *Discours de Walter Hallstein à l'occasion de la signature de l'accord d'association entre la CEE et la Turquie* (Ankara, 12 septembre 1963), https://www.cvce.eu/obj/discours_de_walter_hallstein_a_l_occasion_de_la_signature_de_l_accord_d_association_entre_la_cee_et_la_turquie_ankara_12_septembre_1963-fr-c79fccb6-6c2e-4d9d-86aa-5e830da3ac9e.html, consulté le 25 octobre 2021.

52 Allocution de M. Walter Hallstein, p. 7.

53 Ibid. p. 7.

54 Ibid. p. 11.

tion européenne s'est affirmée, les européens ont bénéficié du support américain et il aurait été impossible d'atteindre les progrès enregistrés par l'histoire de l'intégration européenne sans leur soutien⁵⁵. Du reste, le gouvernement des États-Unis avait démontré reconnaître en Hallstein les qualités d'un homme politique européen, capable de guider la Commission et la Communauté lors de la première phase de leur développement. Le sous-secrétaire d'État, George Ball, également chargé de la Communication de la CECA de Monnet aux États-Unis et, donc, très impliqué dans le processus d'intégration européen, décrit ainsi l'action et le rôle de Hallstein: «It is to Walter Hallstein's enduring credit that he held the Community on course through his strength of will, his firmness of belief in the destiny of Europe, his clarity of thought and of leadership, and the power of his personality»⁵⁶.

En ce qui concerne les relations extérieures, Hallstein approfondit quelques éléments techniques qu'il jugeait comme fondamentaux et urgents, à commencer notamment par le problème qu'il estimait le plus important, à savoir les relations avec le GATT, et pour lequel il considérait le traité de Rome comme absolument conforme. Sur cette question, il parvint à des explications très techniques dans le but de souligner à quel point les tarifs communs étaient avantageux par rapport à ceux préexistants de type national. Après s'être penché un peu plus en profondeur sur certains problèmes spécifiques, Hallstein proposa une réflexion qui deviendra récurrente au cours de ses discours successifs: l'association des six pays dans un marché commun aurait entraîné une expansion économique remarquable, avec la croissance des importations, surtout de matières premières, en augmentant la demande globale vers les pays tiers, corollaire de la Communauté. Le rayon d'action que le traité conférait à la Commission en matière politique et commerciale était très ample, en tant que politique supranationale où «la Communauté se présente comme un tout»⁵⁷.

Au cours de nombreux discours successifs, Hallstein aborda le thème complexe du rapport entre la politique agricole commune et le commerce international, à partir de la fixation des prix agricoles communs. Surtout au début des années soixante, lorsque la PAC était en pleine phase de définition, il souligna la rapide prédisposition de propositions de la part de la

55 Ibid. p. 8.

56 Cit. par Hans von der Groeben, op. cit., p. 95.

57 AHUE, *La position de la Communauté européenne dans le commerce mondial, Allocution de Hallstein à la réunion commune de l'Assemblée consultative du Conseil de l'Europe et du Parlement européen à Strasbourg*, BAC 118/1986, n. 1466, 12 juin 1964, p. 4.

Commission, soutenues par le Parlement européen qui, malheureusement, étaient ralenties par les divisions internes existant au sein du Conseil, en soulignant qu'il commençait à y avoir des positions souvent éloignées entre les institutions qu'il définissait supranationales, la Commission et le Parlement, et le Conseil. Un éloignement de positions dont on ne trouve, par contre, aucune trace dans le discours de 1958, où le Conseil fut présenté comme l'une des trois institutions communautaires concentrées sur la construction de l'unité européenne⁵⁸.

En revanche, l'association des pays et des territoires d'outre-mer, thème également très discuté dans le cadre de politiques commerciales internationales, était nécessaire à cause des relations étroites (liens post-coloniaux) qui existaient entre ceux-ci et certains États membres. Hallstein proposa à nouveau le ton paternaliste présent dans une multitude de déclarations des institutions communautaires de ces années-là et une vision fortement eurocentrique des relations internationales. Dans ce domaine, auquel il dédia une grande partie de son discours, il n'apporta aucun élément d'innovation politique. Hallstein s'associa à l'idée, reprise notamment du traité de Rome, qu'il était nécessaire que l'Europe prenne en charge ces pays qui avaient, avec certains États membres, ce qu'il cita – à l'instar de la majeure partie des documents européens de l'époque – comme des "liens particuliers". Par liens particuliers, au sein de l'Europe des Six où certains États membres luttèrent pour conserver leur empire colonial (ou de ce qu'il en restait), on entendait des relations coloniales ou post-coloniales. Hallstein ne mit pas ces relations en discussion, mais il les conçut – comme il continuera à le faire au cours des années suivantes – comme un objectif positif et salvateur pour les pays tiers, dans la certitude que ces relations auraient produit seulement des effets positifs pour les états associés. Des thèmes et des concepts qu'il reprit dans le discours pour la signature du traité de Yaoundé, en 1963:

«Il est hautement remarquable et d'une grande valeur politique et humaine que lorsque la plupart de ces pays sont devenus indépendants, ils ont voulu et ils ont pu conclure avec la Communauté, en partenaires égaux, un accord sans précédent au monde, qui crée des liens nouveaux, plus nombreux et plus solides pour une grande œuvre commune»⁵⁹.

58 La mise en évidence de la différence de positions avec le Conseil est particulièrement marquée dans Walter Hallstein, *Progressi e problemi dell'integrazione europea, Verso l'unità politica*, Commission européenne, juillet 1964.

59 Walter Hallstein, *Discours de Walter Hallstein à l'occasion de la signature de la convention de Yaoundé (20 juillet 1963)*,

Un élément important souligné par Hallstein – et qui, en effet, représentait la tentative de rendre les relations avec les anciennes colonies européennes plus paritaires, mais considéré comme secondaire par la majeure partie des autres politiciens – fut le rôle très important que la convention prévoyait pour la coopération entre le Parlement européen et les parlements africains et malgaches. Il estimait qu’il s’agissait-là de l’élément le plus novateur de la convention et des négociations qui l’avaient produite, mais en réalité, uniquement parce que le Parlement européen, expression directe des citoyens, était impliqué. Par conséquent, l’innovation de Hallstein plaçait de toute façon l’Europe au centre, tandis qu’elle maintenait une vision très conservatrice et paternaliste des relations avec les pays tiers, les colonies ou les anciennes colonies des États membres.

Quelques conclusions

L’analyse du premiers discours de Hallstein au Parlement européen dévoile déjà la plupart des éléments qui seront fondamentaux au cours de son action de Président de la Commission et qui seront repris dans beaucoup d’autres discours au cours des années suivantes. L’analyse et la vision politique de Hallstein est empreinte d’une continuité substantielle qui transforme son discours en un élément précurseur de son action politique européenne.

En tenant compte de la diversité naturelle de caractères, de personnalités et de positions politiques, le petit groupe des neuf commissaires qui fondèrent la Commission européenne partagea l’objectif d’une Europe politique et unie, auquel ils travaillèrent avec grande ténacité, comme le rappela Hallstein plusieurs années plus tard:

«There is not act of European policy more important to us than political unity. it's the final objective, The reason behind all European endeavours. The ultimate motives for this project have always been political: peace within these united Europe, it's external security and regaining its role in international politics, a role lost in two world wars. The economic benefit of this final goal, as sensational as it is, was a means to this end, an intermediate goal»⁶⁰.

https://www.cvce.eu/obj/discours_de_walter_hallstein_a_l_occasion_de_la_signature_de_la_convention_de_yaounde_20_juillet_1963-fr-f13579d6-b539-4022-84f4-bd000e4ec140.html, consulté le 25 octobre 2021.

60 Cit. présente dans Thomas Jansen, “Walter Hallstein After the Presidency”, en Wilfried Loth, William Wallace et Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), op. cit., p. 174.

Il n'y avait aucun lien d'amitié particulier entre eux, mais ils étaient unis par la profonde conviction qu'il était nécessaire d'unir le continent européen, une vision commune qui reste certainement l'un des aspects les plus importants de l'histoire européenne de l'époque.

Le discours que j'ai analysé résume et incorpore déjà les problèmes et les objectifs fondamentaux du processus d'intégration, la décision de mettre en œuvre un traité dont Hallstein partageait les fondements et les principes, mais surtout l'idée d'une Communauté qui naissait sur la base du droit, une matière qu'il maîtrisait et qui lui avait permis d'obtenir une chaire alors qu'il n'avait que vingt-huit ans. La Communauté était attentive aux européens, aux citoyens à propos desquels il déclarera plusieurs années plus tard: «Apporte à l'individu une sorte de droit civique européen, qui est garanti par l'interdiction de toute discrimination fondée sur la nationalité»⁶¹.

Le discours est empreint d'une atmosphère de certitude sur le bien-fondé de la tâche de créer une Communauté, sur ses institutions, sur sa capacité technique et politique d'affronter et de résoudre les nombreux problèmes qui se poseront notamment au début du parcours d'intégration. Une certitude qui, à certains moments, semble même prescriptive, voire abstraite, mais toujours centrée sur des propositions pratiques⁶². Dans l'ensemble, il s'agit d'un discours chargé de sens et suggestif, technique et précis, dans tous les cas l'expression d'une Communauté d'hommes qui désiraient construire une Europe nouvelle et unie. Un document historique très intéressant pour la reconstruction de l'histoire de l'Europe contemporaine.

61 AEI, *Allocution de Hallstein, Assemblée des syndicats libres des États membres*, S. 27, Rome, 11 novembre 1966.

62 Tout comme dans son discours lors de la conférence d'ouverture des États membres, dans AEI, S54, 3 juillet 1958.

**CHAPTER III:
IDEALISM AND PRAGMATISM, FEDERALISM
AND REALISM:
ALTERNATIVES, DECISIONS, INITIATIVES,
PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS FROM THE 1960s TO
THE 1980s**

When *Foreign Affairs* met Altiero Spinelli, and vice versa.
Some elements to design the “Men for democratic action”
initiative *Foreign Affairs*

Piero S. Graglia

In 1944, describing to Gaetano Salvemini the personality and activity of his new friend Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi wrote: «to be an effective leader, Altiero needs to improve his eloquence. He does not like to speak in public and he speaks badly. But, it may be that in time he will learn to do this».

In fact, in the following years Spinelli prioritised written articles and essays more than public addresses, which is more characteristic of politicians. He used to define himself as an intellectual more than an agit-prop and, from a certain moment, he also added the definition of «political scientist» to his ideal self-representation, when presenting himself to other people. In particular this happened in 1961, when he started to be involved in the activities of the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University as professor of some courses on the ‘Atlantic Community and European Integration’, thanks to Fabio Luca Cavazza¹, who on behalf of the group Il Mulino—a cultural association linked to a journal (founded in 1951) and to a publishing house (1954)—introduced Spinelli to Grove Haines, director of the Center.

This set of brand new activities—both academic and political—spurred Spinelli to enter a field more or less unknown to him: how to deal not only with the European Economic Community—which the federalist Spinelli defined, since its foundation, as «a false Europe»—but mainly how to deal with the existing ‘Atlantic Community’ represented by the Atlantic Pact and the *de facto* solidarity that it created between the two sides of the Atlantic, and the European integration process.

This theme was central to Spinelli’s thinking and political beliefs until his experience as Commissioner and, later, member of the European

¹ On Fabio Luca Cavazza, see Francesco Bello, *Diplomazia culturale e guerra fredda. Fabio Luca Cavazza dal Mulino al centrosinistra*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2020.

Parliament². In this respect, many elements merged to create an original point of view: the idea of an ‘Empire’ ruled by the USA; the problem of European decadence as an independent system of sovereign entities; the relevant issue of how to present new forms of relations between a more *liberal* America —represented by the Kennedy presidency— and an immobile Europe, represented by the conservative de Gaulle approach. It could also be said, in other words, that since the beginning of the 60s, Spinelli tried to cope with the problem of European relations with the USA, considering the perspective of European integration, as a new framework for the relations between the European States, and between them and the US.

This, of course, transformed the original federalist activist into a theorist of this new possible framework, which was still to be built. My intent is to trace back the sources of this idea in a relevant contribution that Spinelli prepared for the journal *Foreign Affairs* and published in July 1962; it was conceived as a paper—similar to a speech—to be presented at the meeting of an informal group called “Men for Democratic Action”, created after a Colloquium in Bologna organised by the Il Mulino association; then it was modified thanks to the evolution of that initiative. For this reason, it is necessary to say something about the entire initiative itself.

This meeting, which had the indicative title “US International policy and European responsibilities” had been organised by the Il Mulino group as an attempt to create a solid political link between the young Italian centre-leftists and the American administration.

The organisation of the conference started from the idea of showing how international communism did not have the exclusive right to reform ideals in the world, and how the democratic field still had much to say about it. As Spinelli wrote to his friends at Il Mulino, commenting on the conference project, the proposal to the Americans to come to Europe to “straighten out the crooked idea that because of the Eisenhower administration the Europeans have acquired around America”, was excellent; but, again in Spinelli's opinion, it should also be considered that the contribution of the Americans to the conference was insufficient if the Europeans did not also say “what should Western Europe do or become”. Such an answer could not be based only on the perspective of the Italian ‘innovators’ (Spinelli defines them as “socially: modern industrialists, modern trade unionists, modern academics and politically: groups of the democratic

2 For further particulars about Spinelli's activities and personal history, please see Piero S. Graglia, *Altiero Spinelli*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008.

left”), but be able to conceive the ‘responsibility of world politics’. This task, however, was impossible if Europe continued to present a structure based on sovereign states, since the innovators, once in power, would inevitably slide towards positions of conservation because of the structure of interstate relations in Europe that allows only the “preservation of what exists”. The point to be highlighted was therefore to link the message of the Kennedy ‘new frontier’ to the European context, showing that this message could not be picked up by national communities that maintain sovereignty and do not accept political integration:

The people of the European centre-left and left will have no difficulty in using the Kennedy language, which will flatter the American Kenyans, and will give the impression that bringing the spirit of the New Frontier into Europe is essentially about developing the social aspects of the national economy. We may well talk about aid to the third world [sic], but it will be pure rhetoric, because the correlative ‘sacrifici’ cannot be made by national communities that do not have global responsibilities (Italy, Germany) or have a false one (France, England).

A democratic country strongly aimed at improving itself, is relatively indifferent to the rest of the world, and therefore tends to be neutralist.

Kennedy showed intelligence by accepting this neutralism for third world [sic] countries (for which [above] all the first problem is to heal themselves). For Western Europe this is unacceptable because it has a very great material and moral weight in world politics.

But its political structure does not allow this weight to be translated into responsibility and action.

This is the European drama, and it must be said that the height of blindness is normally achieved in national innovative circles (see labour left, Mendès France, Italian radicals and socialists, German social democrats).

The aim of the conference should therefore be to use the Americans as catalysts for clarification in Europe³.

Spinelli's reference to the link between the European structure and the tasks of the progressive left did not go unheeded by the Mill, and the

3 Historical Archives of the European Union (Haeu), Spinelli archive, box nr. 68 (Dep. AS-68), Letter by Spinelli to “cari amici del Mulino” (dear friends of Il Mulino), 7 February 1961.

topics dealt with at the conference actually had the character that Spinelli hoped for. The invitations were essentially the result of a survey conducted by Spinelli (for people to contact in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands) and Cavazza and Victor Sullam (for those in America and Great Britain), and when the conference was inaugurated in Bologna on April 22, 1961, it presented a selection of the highest level, a real *parterre de rois*, perhaps never obtained in Italy in a similar public initiative since the end of the Second World War. From America came the former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson—who was still active within the Department of State as chairman of the advisory committee on NATO problems—and Hans J. Morgenthau of the Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy at the University of Chicago, who would hold the opening report, on the basis of which the subsequent interventions would then be graduated; but from the United States came above all Kennedy's right-hand man, the prototype of the egg-heads that became famous during the thousand days of JFK: Arthur Schlesinger Jr., special assistant to the president⁴. Added to these three names of reference were Edward M. Bernstein, financial advisor, Duna Durand, an expert on the Soviet Union and China and an influential member of the Americans for Democratic Action association (of which Schlesinger was also a member⁵), Gilbert Harrison, director of the influential journal *New Republic*, Herman Kahn, researcher at the Rand Corporation, James King Jr., Paul Rosenstein-Rodan of the Centre for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Outerbridge Horsey, chargé d'affaires of the American Embassy and Alfred V. Boerner and Edmund Schechter of Usis in Rome. On the European side, Jean Delfosse, director of the *Revue nouvelle*, and Georges Goriely, of the University of Antwerp, intervened from Belgium; from France came André Armengaud, Jacques Carat of *Preuves*, Michel Collinet of *Contrat Social*, Paul André Falcoz of the *Cahiers de la République*, Maurice Guernier president of the Société d'Etudes et de Planifications, Georges Gueron, K.A. Kelenski, Pierre Lochac, Henri Mallet, Roger Massip, André

4 On Schlesinger's role inside the Kennedy entourage, see Leopoldo Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra. Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1999, p. 352: Nuti stressed Kennedy's "ironic skepticism" towards his collaborator's political positions, which the President considered too advanced and progressive.

5 According to the sources used by Nuti during his long and accurate research, Dana Durand directed the Soviet Division inside the Directorate of Plans of the CIA; besides this, his relations with Schlesinger had been deep since his Harvard years, when Durand had been Schlesinger's tutor (see L. Nuti, pp. 350–351).

Thiery, Pierre Uri, and Jacques Vernant. Germany was mainly represented by journalists and a single political presence, Helmut Schmidt, then a young SPD deputy; next to him were the director of *Der Monat*, Fritz René Alleman, the director of *Europa-Archives*, Wilhelm Cornides, Walter Dirks and Eugen Kogon, editor and editor of *Frankfurter Hefte* respectively, Maxim Fachler of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and others. There were some Dutch and a dozen Britons, among whom the names of Roy Jenkins and Michael Howard stood out. The EEC's representatives were plentiful, starting with the Vice-President of the European Commission Giuseppe Caron, the Director-General for Economic Affairs of the EEC Franco Bobba, the Director of the Information Service of the European Community in Paris François Fontaine and then a large group of Italians: Senator Giuseppe Medici, Ugo La Malfa, Carlo Donat Cattin, Giorgio La Pira, Franco Maria Malfatti, Gaetano Arfé, Piero Bassetti, Luciano Bolis, Raimondo Craveri, Augusto Del Noce, Leopoldo Elia, Giovanni Spadolini and many others.

It was precisely by writing to the Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities, Giuseppe Caron, that Spinelli outlined the ideal lines of the conference, complaining, moreover, that the Morgenthau report lacked any concrete reference to the European situation. For this reason, Spinelli, in his speech at the conference, promised

To emphasize that the Atlantic Community of which Morgenthau always speaks can only be articulated in a Western European federation next to the United States or otherwise the Atlantic community will continue to have more and more [of] those negative characteristics and that tendency to disintegration that M.[orgenthau] himself emphasizes.

I will reproach the United States for having neglected this prospect for several years. I will say that European governments have now adapted to de Gaulle's confederal (that is, null) prospects, but that there is still a movement for federal unification⁶.

These positions were duly supported by Spinelli during the conference, underlining the need, in terms of relations between the blocs, for a recognition of the German Democratic Republic and China, and for the abandonment of the idea of Berlin as the “symbolic capital of a united Germany that does not exist”, while, in terms of Euro-Atlantic relations, an Atlantic community would make no sense if it were founded on the maintenance of Europe divided into sovereign states. It should be noted

⁶ Haeu, Dep. AS-68, Letter by Spinelli to Giuseppe Caron, 18 April 1961.

that Spinelli's statements on the need for the West to abandon positions of intransigence towards East Germany and China could not have come at a worse time: the attempted invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles armed and supported by America had run aground in the Bay of Pigs just a few days before the start of the Bologna conference (on April 17, 1961), and in fact the discussion and the interventions of the Americans—such as that by Schlesinger—were characterised by a first attempt at analysis and justification of what had happened. Little room remained to deal with the issues that were closest to Spinelli's heart. But in fact, the conference served to re-establish a dialogue between US progressives and Italian innovators and to revive US interest in the Italian situation.

The conference, according to the effective synthesis of Leopoldo Nuti, was a “product of the cultural milieu that revolved around the CCF [Congress for Cultural Freedom], as confirmed by the presence at the conference of some of the most important exponents of that organization”⁷, but it was not only that. Regardless of the practical results of the conference, which were lower than expected, the Mulino conference confirmed the importance of the Bolognese group in relations with the American intellectual and political world, and, in terms of what interests us here, was to be the driver of subsequent initiatives in which Spinelli participated.

From the point of view of political planning, a significant result of the conference, however, was an initiative that arose from two distinct statements made during the work; the first was the one put forward by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. regarding the need to draw up a new declaration of independence for the Western democratic world. The second declaration was made instead by the Italian republican party leader Ugo La Malfa regarding the need to create a sort of “democratic international” approach to define the broad lines of a common policy for Western democracies. A final motion drafted by Spinelli on behalf of the Mulino group and read by Luigi Pedrazzi at the end of the conference came out of these two proposals:

If one particular suggestion can be made to us, taking up what Mr Arthur Schlesinger Jr. told us yesterday about the need for a new declaration of independence of the twentieth century, it is that the democrats should convene a major conference in the United States with the participation of democratic movements and parties from all over the world, in which the principles on which the politics of

7 Leopoldo Nuti, p. 349.

Western countries and relations between countries must be based on debated and established⁸.

As Nuti observes, it was an initiative of a political and cultural nature but in which greater weight was given to the political aspect, at least by the Italian promoters. The proposal made by La Malfa during the conference immediately met the interests of Schlesinger and Dana Durand, grafting itself into the context of the ideological and political challenge that characterised the new phase of relations between the USA and the USSR and the 'competitive coexistence' defined by Khrushchev. In addition, the proposal unknowingly took up similar proposals or suggestions gained both within the American liberal democratic area and settled thanks to the experience of the Congress for Cultural Freedom⁹.

Spinelli, with Cavazza and the others from Il Mulino, was one of the main instigators of the initiative in Italy, which would be defined as a World Convention for Freedom and Democracy. For Altiero, it was in fact a matter of putting to the test his conviction that he increasingly saw the struggle for the European federation as part of a more general battle for the affirmation of the democratic principle in the Western world and, through the West, his victory over the communist model in countries in the process of decolonisation and waiting for development. Moreover, a summary of the fundamental political ideas that Spinelli brought as a dowry to the small group of Italians and Americans interested in the project is contained in a document that Altiero expressly prepared for a trip to the United States in June 1961¹⁰.

In his long paper, Spinelli presented a sort of intellectual history of "The Idea of Democratic Revolution", trying to indicate several points of possible action to unite Europe and America under a common flag of a renewed democratic ideal. The paper was particularly appreciated by the Americans, who replied with another two documents that integrated the main elements proposed by Spinelli: the first reply was a manifesto

8 Haeu, Dep. AS-239, Memorandum of Il Mulino group, (Summer 1961). This memo also contained operative instructions about times and modalities to convene the "Democratic Convention".

9 See Leopoldo Nuti, pp. 384 ss.

10 Haeu, Dep. AS-239, *The idea of Democratic Revolution*, in English, 23 June 1961. As an Introduction Spinelli wrote: "In these pages I have attempted to make an initial summary of the fundamental political ideas on which the 'promoting group' of a World Convention for Democratic Action, then the World Convention itself, and lastly the successive political action of the 'liberal - and international minded' democrats should rest".

entitled *Freedom and Democracy. A Declaration of Principles* and then a more structured *Proposal for the Creation of a World Congress for Freedom and Democracy*¹¹.

Spinelli's trip to the USA, which had been in preparation for some time, had been conceived by Spinelli as a means of gathering sympathy and funding in America for the initiative of the European People's Congress, and in this sense it had found support in Count Carlo Faina, president of Montedison, who had promised to finance the trip¹²; but after the Mill conference and La Malfa's proposal, it also became an opportunity to better probe the ground regarding the possibility of having US support for the idea of the World Convention for the 'democratic revolution'. In his memorandum *The idea of democratic revolution*, Spinelli thus sought to take stock of the value of democracy as a method of social and political organisation in the twentieth century and in the nuclear age, considering four broad categories in which humanity found itself organised and trying to define what the tasks of the 'democrats' could be in each of these categories.

According to Spinelli, in developed countries with forms of advanced democracy, the struggle to achieve ever more complete forms of democracy could be carried out through the normal instruments of political struggle and with the conquest of the consensus of public opinion for the resolution of some macroscopic problems and the achievement of some objectives considered fundamental. These objectives were: a) the overcom-

11 All the documents cited in Haeu, AS-59. For further information about this group, see L. Nuti.

12 See letters by Giuseppe De Varda to Spinelli, 16 February 1961 and by Spinelli to Giuseppe De Varda, 3 June 1961, both in Haeu, Dep. AS-239. Spinelli presented the aims of his June 1961 trip in this way: "To make known to the most influential policy-inspirers and policy-makers of the new administration the existence, projects, and political judgments of the European Federalist Movement, and its propaganda organization (European People's Congress), and to draw their attention to the serious dangers inherent in the current situation in Western Europe, to the possibilities and interest that American politics has to support in Western Europe the currents in favor of the establishment of a European federation; make the first contacts with American men and groups interested in promoting the realization of the idea of a World Convention for Democracy, presented at the recent congress in Bologna on 'The international policy of the USA and the European responsibilities', with the aim of creating a permanent world center composed of men and groups dedicated to the development of democracy in the world, independent of governments, but capable of spurring them on, encouraging them in their action, and promoting actions and initiatives that governments as such could not officially take" (handwritten note, Haeu, Dep. AS-239).

ing of the system of sovereign states in Western Europe to eliminate the tendency of European rulers and peoples to look back to the past rather than forward to the future and to make the partnership with the United States a relationship between equals and not an “absurd protectorate over Europe”; (b) to complete the fight against racial discrimination in the United States; c) to promote Euro-American economic integration to strengthen the West and make it the ‘construction site’ of democratic construction in the world and finally d) to establish the economic policy of the West according to the criteria of social, scientific, cultural and international solidarity. In countries where reactionary regimes existed and survived (Spain, South Africa, Portugal, Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc.) the attitude of the democrats had to be clear and driven by a good dose of idealism: instead of supporting these regimes for purposes related to anti-communism, the West had to find the strength to deny them, destabilise them with its moral authority, stop helping them economically and militarily, and favour their fall.

The most difficult issue for democrats to deal with was that relating to countries of emerging democracy or those in the pre-democracy phase, that is, the developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In these communities the democratic forces were weak; they had seized power from the old European rulers or from the groups that were previously in government but were not yet consolidated and, after an initial phase in which they gathered the consent of the impoverished masses, they found themselves no longer able to control them and turned to positions of defending the power they had just won, perhaps allying themselves with the old rulers. The result could therefore only be to give greater strength to the social demands carried out by the communists and lose the democratic battle. For Spinelli, therefore, in many of these cases, the first thing to do in the countries of the new democracy was to promote those reforms that increased social justice and those that favoured the improvement of the country's economic conditions; on the other hand, reforms for political democracy were not priorities (“often remain[ing] on paper for a long time”) and could even be harmful: the most important thing was not formal democracy, but the strengthening of those intrinsically democratic social forces that would later be responsible for the development of democratic forms that had also evolved in the political field. It goes without saying that the weakest side of this approach was the request made to the West not to care if, during this process of achieving economic and social justice reforms, some of its economic interests were affected or even eliminated, since these are interests which, in a global democratic vision, were founded on reactionary and oppressive foundations too. These interests

could be recovered at a later date, according to a scheme that could be defined in recent words as 'fair trade', and is entirely consistent with the approach of Spinelli's document, which refuses to make room for new and old forms of exploitation by the West towards developing countries.

Finally, there is the policy of the democratic world towards communism, the latter understood as the "totalitarian response to the problem of how to overcome the difficulties that every democratic revolution encounters at the beginning". It is a curious and original definition of communism, which betrays the attention with which Spinelli had reflected on communism since his experience in the thirties, without, however, maintaining towards it those forms of ideological hysteria so common in what Ernesto Rossi called "epileptic anti-communists" (evolution of the visceral anti-communist). For Spinelli, communism was ideologically not so far from democracy: saying "to each according to his needs, to each according to his abilities" was for him equivalent to the "equality of opportunities for all". But precisely because of this inherent similarity in the end—but not, of course, in the means—communism had little to offer to societies where the goal of equality and social justice could be pursued by democratic and non-totalitarian methods. Instead, communists had their greatest chances during the initial phase of democratic revolutions—and to this end Spinelli notes that all genuine communist revolutions, apart from those in Eastern Europe that were imposed from outside, were the result of the failure of democratic revolutions. With all this, the political and social system created by communism was, according to Spinelli, intrinsically weak, because it did not gain the favour of the population—which never shows a deep interest in maintaining the regime—and because communism failed to create internal rules for the choice and succession of rulers in a fluid and painless manner, making each succession a traumatic and risky moment for the stability of the regime. The democratic model could therefore win the competition over communism by highlighting the main contradiction in the totalitarian regime, that is, the fragility of the totalitarian power of the party and the demands for liberalisation that come from the people; and the democratic front can do only this by showing, in fact, the superiority of the democratic revolution over the communist one, as well as by studying communist societies to identify the possible democratic allies within them.

The last point included by Spinelli in his memorandum was that of the nature of democratic policy about the defence of the Western world, but it was also an aspect which, because of the positions it held, had less chance of being taken up on the other side of the Atlantic. According to Spinelli, the policy of opposing communism only on the military level

was, in the long run, a loser. Taking up a reflection already advanced in 1947–48 at the time of the launch of the Marshall Plan, Spinelli affirmed that no society can remain democratic and free for a long time if it is forced to leave ample decision-making and organisational space to the military element. The West therefore cannot continue an arms race but, on the contrary, proceed along two lines: dividing the military effort and ‘accepting events’, that is, accepting the existence of a series of states with a communist regime. Dividing the effort means first involving Europe in the Western defence effort with a ‘full share’ of military responsibilities, an objective that can only be achieved by recovering the strategic value of the political unification of the European continent. To accept events is to acknowledge the existence of Communist China, North Vietnam, North Korea and East Germany, a recognition, including diplomatic recognition, which does not, however, imply renouncing responding with weapons to any aggression by communist countries against other countries. Finally, the West should acknowledge the structural weakness of the developing countries and, precisely so as not to strengthen the dominant military element within them, accept their initial neutrality towards the two blocs (or, in other words, accept their non-alignment).

Spinelli's reflections on the ethical tasks and duties of the democratic world present a strong ideal tension, which, however, was lowered into a reality much more complex than the scheme presented. The reference to the need for the West to present itself as an acceptable and credible model for developing countries was certainly valid, but much less credible was the request that the West accept *sic et simpliciter* recognising Communist China or democratic Germany or North Korea; not to mention the problem of European unification, which was too simplistically presented to the American interlocutors only on the military side, without considering the presence and development of the process of economic integration. Obviously, Spinelli's reflections on the subject of European unification were much more complex and articulated, but in this document they seemed voluntarily limited to a single aspect¹³.

Spinelli's memorandum *The Idea of Democratic Revolution* was the ideal basis for the Italian group involved in the convention project; the operational and organisational base was instead a memorandum signed by the Il Mulino group that addressed the organisational aspects and pointed out

13 When Dana Durand received an amended version of the memorandum, he observed that some passages (those cited in the text) were difficult for an American reader to accept.

the importance of the US origin of any organisational proposal¹⁴. Dana B. Durand was then active in response to these two documents, and in mid-June 1961 drew up a further memorandum that intended to bring together both the ideal and the operational and organisational aspects of the possible conference¹⁵. With this ideal background, Altiero therefore faced his first major US trip, which focused mainly on working for the democratic world conference rather than on propaganda work for the EPC.

The bulk of the work of liaison between Americans and Europeans interested in the initiative was the result, once again, of the Spinelli–Cavazza tandem; when Spinelli left for the United States, on June 11, 1961, he was preceded by a massive advertising hype by Cavazza that procured him an impressive mass of addresses and appointments for his short American stay through the sending of personal letters to half of Washington. Some of the significant names were: first of all Victor Sullam, representative in the United States of the Federconsorzi, who was to be Spinelli's most important advisor during his American stay, then Schlesinger Jr., John Di Sciullo of the State Department, Paul Rosenstein Rodan, Kennedy's other personal advisor, Walter Whitman Rostow, James E. King Jr. of the Institute for Defense Analyses, James B. Moceris of USIA, and Gilbert A. Harrison of *The New Republic*. But Cavazza was not the only source of information on possible names to contact in the United States: Gianni Merlini, contacted by Ursula at the end of May, responded to requests for American names to contact, indicating Furio Colombo, at the time an employee of Underwood in New York (reachable through Arrigo Olivetti), Paolo Maranini, a professor at Michigan State University, and Henry Kissinger, a "foreign policy writer today highly rated and with a huge amount of relationships (but he has the inferiority complex of being a German Jew and makes the American better than any American)"¹⁶.

14 Haeu, Dep. AS-239, Memorandum of Il Mulino group, without date (Summer 1961).

15 Haeu, Dep. AS-239, *Proposal of il Mulino Group for World Conference on Democratic Movements and Parties*.

16 This judgement was contained in a letter by Gianni Merlini to Ursula Hirschmann, the sister of Albert Otto and Spinelli's wife, Ahue, Dep. AS-239. Merlini's judgement on Kissinger continued: "I am with him in rather cordial terms and I could write to him, but I would like some more 'ad personam' arguments: Kissinger is in fact governor Rockefeller's foreign policy advisor: he is also linked to Rockefeller through the foundation. So it is better to avoid—I think—with him the talk about the new democratic administration".

Spinelli's American stay was characterised by many more meetings than the large patrol planned by Cavazza. As soon as he set foot in America, Altiero, on June 12, sent a letter to Sullam in which he described the purposes of his trip¹⁷ and reported the names of the people he already had on the list for a meeting¹⁸. The people Spinelli actually met during his American tour de force were partly different from those planned—this was certainly thanks to a correction of the move shot made by Sullam, and was undoubtedly significant: numerous representatives of the administration (Schlesinger, Dean Rusk's two assistants, Dana Durand and Aldo Raffa; at the State Department he always met Velletri and Di Sciuillo of the Italian affairs section, Samuel Lewis and Stanley Cleveland of the European Affairs Section, Robert Brand and Isaiah Frank of the OECD section), plus a number of foreign policy scholars, journalists and foundation representatives¹⁹.

17 Spinelli wrote to Sullam: "The aims are two: a) the development of the project of a World Convention for Democratic Action (project born at the Congress of Bologna of Il Mulino), b) the creation of public relations of the European Federalist Movement with men of the new administration or close to it and influential within it. The two aims are very much integrated because action for European unity is a chapter of the more general world democratic action, but they are nevertheless parallel and are not fully identified" (letter to Sullam of 12 June 1961, Haeu, Dep. AS-239).

18 At the State Department Spinelli was on the list for a meeting with William Knight, Italian affairs, who was forewarned by Lister from the American embassy in Rome; Samuel Lewis, of Undersecretary Ball's office, who was also forewarned by Lister; Wells Stapler (of the business office between Italy and Austria); Joseph Phillips of USIA; Robert Schaetzel; Richard D. Vine, Edwin C. Pancoast, Roger Hilsman head of the Office of Intelligence Research at the State Department; Foy D. Kohler, Assistant to State Secretary Dean Rusk for European Affairs; John Di Sciuillo, head of the Italian affairs office at the State Department's Office of Intelligence Research; Stanley Cleveland, Rusk's assistant for international organizations; at the White House he planned to meet Schlesinger, Walt W. Rostow, Max Millikan; he also wanted to meet Allen Dulles at the CIA, but left it to Durand to judge whether he should ("I leave it to you to judge if it is worth seeing him, that is, if he is still open to new ideas"). In the Senate and the House of Representatives, Spinelli planned to meet Senator James W. Fullbright, Thomas H. Kuchel and Victor Anfuso. Other personalities on the list are Oscar Cox, who had already been contacted by Giuseppe De Varda on a previous trip by the latter in the late 1960s; Leonard B. Tennyson, director of the European Community Information Service in Washington; Gilbert Harrison, director of *New Republic*; Field Haviland Jr., head of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution; William Chapman Foster.

19 As for academic personalities, Altiero met some professors from Columbia University (Alexander Dallin, Robert Lekashmann, William T. Fox, Samuel Hunting-

Summarising the results of his trip in an information note, Spinelli acknowledged that the problem of European unification was still felt with sympathy in the United States, but clearly the interests of the Washington administration had shifted to other sectors, such as Latin America, considering Europe a 'calm and safe' sector. Spinelli referred to the widespread feeling that he had contrasted the argument that there was still no European political life and that the process of Community integration itself, although it had advanced economic interdependence, had not built a political framework for this interdependence, and that this circumstance was also the responsibility of the Americans, who, with their military presence in Europe, 'took responsibility' away from the European political classes for the need of political unification. Furthermore—here with a clearly forced assessment to further argue his reference to Europe first—it was a mistake for him to consider Europe a calm and safe sector, since there was a risk of falling back into the same error of perspective that had been made in relation to Latin America in the past, with an apparent calm that had produced Castroism.

According to Spinelli, however, American interest was activated not when one spoke in general terms of European unification, but when the process of the economic and political integration of Europe was presented as an essential part of the more general struggle for democracy. In this regard, in the note Spinelli stated that he had presented the idea of the World Convention on Freedom and Democracy during his trip, and that he had taken an interest in the issue by numerous American personalities

ton, Wolfgang Friedman as well as his brother-in-law Alberto Otto Hirschman, who hosted him in New York); Spinelli also contacted numerous journalists: the director of *Newsweek* Osborne Elliot, Robert Clurman, one of the directors of *The New York Times*, the director of *Commonweal* James Finn, the director of *New Leader* Norman Jacobs, the director of *New Republic* Harrison, and Ugo Stille, a correspondent for the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera*. What was fundamental, especially for future realisations, was the knowledge of many representatives of American foundations, from Francis Deak, vice president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to Charles W. Cole, vice president of the Rockefeller Foundation, from Stanley Gordon of the Ford Foundation to August Heckscher and Ben T. Moore of the Twentieth Century Fund, from Joseph Lydford, the director of The Fund for the Republic to Field Haviland, the president of The Brookings Institution. Finally, numerous interviews with personalities are, however, useful in clarifying the ideas on the perception of the European situation in the United States: Theodore Geiger, head of international studies at the National Planning Association, Francis Wilcox Dean of the Institute for Advanced Studies, and Bruno Luzzatto of the International Bank of Reconstruction.

and especially Schlesinger, to whom Spinelli had delivered the document, *The Idea of Democratic Revolution*, learning from Schlesinger that two people from the White House staff had immediately begun to work on it. On this occasion, Spinelli perhaps gives himself excessive credit, since the idea of the convention had already been discussed with Schlesinger himself during a lunch in Bologna between Cavazza, Spinelli, Pedrazzi and Galli during the days of the Mulino conference. Spinelli's contribution was then the preparation of the document already mentioned and which he took to America; Spinelli also presented the note drawn up by Il Mulino on organisational methods for the convention on freedom and democracy, as a personal contribution. In August 1961, Dana Durand had prepared a long note entitled *Freedom and Democracy. A Declaration of Principles* and therefore, almost simultaneously, a *Proposal for the Creation of a World Congress for Freedom and Democracy*, which would probably be the essential basis of any subsequent meeting of the Euro-American group interested in the initiative, incorporating part of the observations contained in Spinelli's note and in that by Il Mulino. Durand's proposal was also to serve Schlesinger in presenting the initiative directly to Kennedy and lead to direct White House support for the initiative. In the organisational terms proposed by Durand—a time scale that was to start in January 1962 with a formal proposal from the White House to all the democratic nations of the world to form a democratic convention, and subsequent phases that would lead, in April or May 1964, to the first World Congress for Freedom and Democracy—the project had little chance of success; When, in December 1961, the group of ten Europeans and two Americans convened a first meeting in Paris to discuss the terms of the project, the institutional political dimension of the proposal was already clearly overwhelmed by the difficulties inherent in the organisational dimension²⁰. Nevertheless, the Paris meeting gave rise to an International Study Group (ISG) on Freedom and Democracy that would work for the next two years, with the active collaboration of Spinelli, organising meetings and conferences and also finding the support of some US foundations as well as the financial support of the CIA. In the latter respect, it should be noted that Allen Dulles became aware of the initiative in October 1961 by sending the documents elaborated by Dana Durand (as remembered,

20 The Paris meeting was attended by nine Europeans and two Americans: Dana Durand, Franklin Ford (Harvard University), Altiero Spinelli, Nicola Matteucci, Fabio Luca Cavazza, Raymond Aron, Eugen Kogon, Roy Jenkins, Harry Cowie, Edgar Morin, Georges Goriely and Ferdinand Hermes.

they were the *Proposal for the Creation of a World Congress on Freedom and Democracy* and the *Freedom and Democracy declaration. A Declaration of Principles*) to his office attached to a request for comments and observations²¹; the CIA's interest is evidenced by the fact that in January 1962 the deputy director of the Intelligence section of the CIA, Robert Amory Jr., issued a memorandum to the agency's Project Review Committee recommending the financing of the initiative for two years by providing at least five conferences to be held on different continents, emphasising that if the results of the meetings had been favourable, "the benefits to the US Government and to the Free World in general would be great. The Agency would profit directly through the emergence of a powerful and dynamic institution of free, democratic action, under whose aegis its own multiform operations would receive added stature, scope, and worth". The CIA would have maintained control over the initiative through the presence of a character who, due to the documentation's current state, cannot be indicated with certainty, but who presumably was precisely Dana Durand²².

Assessing Spinelli's role in preparing the documents underlying the meetings that took place between the Group of Europeans and the Americans is less difficult than it seems: it was Durand and Spinelli who actually worked on the preparatory documents, but it was certainly Spinelli who exposed with greater conceptual clarity the characteristics of the democratic revolution and the tasks of the democrats in the era of competitive coexistence. Durand also recognised this when, on receiving a further contribution from Spinelli in the spring of 1962²³—which took up and deepened the contents of the text *The idea of Democratic Revolution* already analysed—he commented on the contribution by the Italian:

21 National Archives and Record Administration (Nara), Washington D.C., Cia-RD-P80, B01676R, 003400060001-0, Letter of transmission and attached documents directed to Allen Dulles dated October 3, 1961.

22 Nara, CiaRDP80, 01446R, 000100110002-3, Robert Amory Jr., Memorandum for Project Review Committee, Project for exploring the Development of a World Congress for Freedom and Democracy.

23 Ford Foundation Archive (FF), Section s-s2, reel c1447, [A. Spinelli], *Men for Democratic Action*, April–June 1962. The attribution to Spinelli is unmistakable since it is a text which develops, as already pointed out in the text, the document prepared in June 1961 during the trip to the United States. In addition, the Appendix referred to in the following note was attached to the document defined by Durand as the 'Spinelli's paper', which was sent to the top management of the Ford Foundation by Durand for information.

From a political standpoint Spinelli's ideas are, in my opinion, the only ones among those characterized by moderation permitting operating political affiliations to be achieved. To move towards more moderate or more cautiously worded positions would, in my considered judgment, make it impossible for us to start a truly vital initiative²⁴.

The documents relating to the Convention circulated widely in the political environment of Washington and also among the heads of some foundations, among which the Ford Foundation deserves to be remembered. Robert Kennedy was also contacted and showed some interest in the project²⁵. But the project was now made fragile by its own breadth and organisational complexity. Two secretariats were created, one in America (Dana B. Durand, Dan B. Jacobs and David C. Williams) and one in Europe (Fabio Cavazza, Nicola Matteucci and Altiero Spinelli), while the system was being sought to make the ISG a division of the Union for Democratic Action Educational Fund, created in New York in 1944, to give it a stable financial base and make it an institution capable of receiving tax-free funding under US law. The organisation of sectional 'small, informal study groups' was implemented (especially, on the American side, with Latin American study initiatives linked to the contemporary organisation of the 'Alliance for Progress'), and an impressive number of names, institutions, associations, parties and movements that might be interested in the initiative was conducted. But the support hoped for from the Foundations was not there, although there was appreciation for the quality of the preparatory and programmatic documents²⁶. Among the various criticisms addressed to the overall project, that of Ping Ferry of the Ford Foundation stood out for its 'weight', which commented negatively on the absence of Latin American personalities directly involved in it²⁷. So

24 FF, Section S-S2, reel c1447, [Dana Durand], *Appendix*.

25 FF, section L62-774, reel 201-843-7740, Letter by Dana Durand to Joseph Slater, 19 July 1962.

26 "Spinelli's analysis of democratic action in this decade is well done and interesting. I think the first few pages are worth your reading" (letter by Joseph Slater to Shepard Stone, 13 August 1962, FF, section L62-774, reel 201-843-7740); Slater wrote to Cavazza: "I have now had a chance to read the Spinelli memorandum and find it a very useful statement of democratic goals. Please keep us informed" (FF, Section S-S2, reel c1447, letter by Joseph Slater to Fabio Luca Cavazza, 14 August 1962).

27 See FF, section L62-774, reel 201-843-7740, letter by Ping Ferry to Joseph Slater, 5 February 1963. Wilbur H. Ferry, universally known as 'Ping' Ferry' was the person appointed by Henry Ford II to follow the Foundation named after the

the ISG sadly set to its conclusion, hastened even by the untimely death of its main, possible, sponsor: Kennedy; it thus remained an instrument of reflection that found support above all from the CIA, without, however, achieving those results of clarification, on the one hand on Euro-Atlantic relations and on the other on the tasks of the democratic revolution, which the Italians, Spinelli in the lead, had hoped for.

On this basis, however, it is not surprising that Spinelli was invited to write an article entitled *Atlantic Pact or European Unity for Foreign Affairs*²⁸. It was not a private contribution presented by a badly known personage; it was a political act aimed to present the innovative position of one of the most relevant representatives of an underground group of which the Kennedy administration was well aware.

The paper was structured thus:

A definition of the American 'empire', focusing on the point that "The American hegemony, willingly accepted by the European states in the dramatic period after the war, supplied the supranational power which Western Europe needed but did not possess".

The second point aimed to show that purely economic integration was not sufficient to achieve political evolution of the existing form of integration: "European unity is something more than a mere cut in custom duties; it will exist when real supranational political power has been created, capable of deciding and carrying out economic, military and foreign policy".

The third point intended to describe the contributions that Europe could give to a common defence of the 'Free World' was that it could defend itself from a conventional military attack, but "to be able to assume its military responsibilities it must be able to act as a political unit through a real federal government".

And then, there was the crucial presentation of a possible future between a satisfied America and a satisfied Europe:

For the advanced democracies, the temptation is strong to become simply satisfied societies. Ready to do business with the rest of the world, but indifferent to the main currents of what is happening there, they appear mainly anxious to defend their position among the privileged of this earth. Switzerland and Sweden furnish examples of this attitude. It is of little use to moralize from outside; each of the advanced democracies must learn

family of car industrialists. From 1962 he worked at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in California.

28 *Foreign Affairs*, July 1962, vol. 40, pp. 542–552.

of itself to become aware that its own future is linked with that of the entire world and that to a considerable extent the future of all depends on what each will or will not do with its own power. To cease dreaming of restoring situations as they were in the past; to help provide for one's own defense to the full measure of what is possible; to study how to contribute to atomic and possibly to general disarmament; to accept the sacrifices necessary to help the emerging countries progress toward social and economic as well as political democracy; to adopt policies toward the Communist world which foster the liberalizing currents existing there rather than the totalitarian forces which now predominate—these are the new tasks of the advanced democracies. This is their “New Frontier”.

The alternative for Spinelli was clear: only a renewal of the democratic idea could give Western countries the ‘moral commitment’ to act in the indicated progressive way; on the other hand, “it was impossible for Western Europe to assume its share of such a commitment, as long as it remained an irresponsible military and political dependency of the United States”.

This article is structured and organised, as was usual in Spinelli's writings, like a public intervention that is apt to convince and to contend different points of view. It followed several elements presented in the documents prepared for the International Study Group but it was, of course, shorter. Spinelli's main intention was to mobilise any positive orientation in the US towards the European integration process and, in the meanwhile, to create a sort of committed group of *liberals* ready to support this process in fact.

This was a costly process, anyway, mainly when Spinelli presented his personal options as regards “the conscious and farseeing actions” to be followed to consider US hegemony “as temporary and NATO as a provisional structure fulfilling responsibilities which are intrinsically European and which should be returned to the Europeans”. The creation of a constructive political will in Europe and the beginnings of federal institutions would have been the necessary following steps.

This military and political ‘disengagement’ by the US from Europe would have given Europe new responsibilities and tasks: the defence of Western Europe against attack with conventional weapons was entrusted to a European army and not to a coalition of national armies; the necessity of recognising the present frontier between West and East, and thereby of accepting the division of Germany; but “instead of western Germany being abandoned to the unavoidable nationalistic resentments natural to a sovereign state, it would become a vital part of the new European federal democracy”.

Piero S. Graglia

We can see all the dimensions of such a vision: idealistic and politically intended. With this article, a real manifesto, Spinelli ended his undertakings for the 'Men for democratic action' and the International Study Group for freedom and democracy; however, he continued to maintain contact with US circles, in particular with the creation of the Institute of International Affairs (IAI), thanks to a significant grant from the Ford Foundation, an institute that still exists and that, for the next fifty years, was to represent one of the most active forums for the study of foreign policy in Italy.

“We are Citizens of Europe”. Josef Klaus’ Strasbourg Speech to the Council of Europe on 26 January 1965.

Michael Gebler

I. Preliminary Remarks on Josef Klaus and on the Subject

“Civis Europaeus Sum — I am a European citizen”. This was how the Carinthian-born Josef Klaus¹ introduced his speech to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 26 January 1965, which he concluded with the words “We are citizens of Europe”. During his time as head of the Austrian government (1964–1970), the Christian democrat, People’s Party politician, former governor of Salzburg (1949–1961) and Austrian finance minister (1961–1963), he embodied a missionary and administrator in one person².

As Federal Chancellor, he was certainly interested in foreign policy issues and, in his own words, acted rather cautiously in Austria’s European integration policy³, but at the same time emphasised that “European maturity [...] had been the central goal for our economic policy”⁴. Not only were the new policy of objectivity of the aspiring state reformer Klaus and the government policy of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) characterised by ambivalence in the sense of ups and downs⁵, but so was the European integration policy of the 1960s, on which there were different views in

1 Josef Klaus, born on 15 August 1910 in Mauthen/Carinthia; died on 25 July 2001 in Vienna.

2 Interview with Honorary Professor Dr. Heinrich Neisser on 19 September 1998 in Vienna.

3 This is an assessment of the then Federal Chancellor himself. Interview with the former Federal Chancellor Dr. Josef Klaus together with Helmut Wohnout on 19 September 1998 in Vienna, see the printed version of that interview: Josef Klaus: “Ich ging den anderen Weg”, in *Demokratie und Geschichte. Jahrbuch des Karl von Vogelsang-Instituts zur Erforschung der Geschichte der christlichen Demokratie in Österreich*, edited by Helmut Wohnout, 3, Wien – Köln – Weimar: Böhlau 1999, pp.13–62.

4 Josef Klaus: *Macht und Ohnmacht in Österreich. Konfrontationen und Versuche*, Wien – München – Zürich: Molden, 1971, p. 354.

5 Robert Kriechbaumer (eds.): *Die Ära Josef Klaus. Österreich in den „kurzen“ sechziger Jahren*, Vol. 1: *Dokumente*, Wien – Köln – Weimar: Böhlau, 1998; Idem.: *Die Ära Jo-*

Klaus's team⁶. This way of dealing with integrated Europe was to be hesitant and divergent at first, but then steadily intensified and exaggerated to become entrenched. This kind of policy did not ultimately fail because of its maximalist claims, but also because, on the one hand, it did not take note of the considerable obstacles or take them seriously enough, and on the other hand, it could hardly eliminate them in its time. At first, however, it did not seem it would end that way.

After the resignation of Federal Chancellor Alfons Gorbach (ÖVP), it was stated in the Austrian government declaration of the Klaus cabinet on 2 April 1964 that the regulation of “our relationship” with the EEC was “the most urgent task in the field of foreign policy”. The reasons given for this priority were pure economic and foreign trade policy: since about half of Austria's exports went “to the markets of the EEC”, every effort had to be made to eliminate any disadvantage to Austrian exports, as had already occurred through ‘discrimination’ on the part of the EEC. The ‘talks’ with the EEC Commission held until then, had allowed far-reaching clarification of the Austrian position. The Federal Government affirmed the principles of the Treaties of Rome, signed on 25 March 1957 and which entered into force on the 1 January 1958, but attached importance to a number of demands and wishes. These included, firstly, the preservation of contractual sovereignty in trade policy, secondly, the right to terminate the agreement to be reached, thirdly, the creation of common institutions which would have to be in conformity with Austria's position under international law, and fourthly, the securing of a certain degree of independence (treaty-making power with third countries). Klaus justified these requests with the discrimination against Austrian exports and professed his belief in the fundamentals of the Treaties of Rome. Austria's “perpetual” neutrality remained unmentioned by him, but this was meant to indicate “independence”. At the end of the declaration, he assured that as long as the content of the EEC arrangement was not fixed, Austria would “loyally” participate in the further development of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) within the framework of the Stockholm Convention of 1959 (in force in 1960). With the government declaration, Klaus attempted to

sef Klaus. *Österreich in den „kurzen“ sechziger Jahren*, Vol. 2: *Die Sicht der Zeitgenossen*, Wien – Köln – Weimar: Böhlau, 1999.

⁶ See Chapter V From EEC Association Application to “Going It Alone to Brussels” 1961–69, in Michael Gebler: *From St. Germain to Lisbon. Austria's Long Road from Disintegrated to United Europe 1919–2009* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften/Philosophisch Historische Klasse, Internationale Geschichte/International History 5), Wien: Verlag der ÖAW, 2020, pp. 373–475.

soften the undisguised threats by the Kremlin to comply with the prohibition of the Anschluss to Germany enshrined in Article 4 of the State Treaty and the neutrality adopted as a federal constitutional law, and to indicate that Austria would commit itself to the Treaties of Rome, but that in the case of an agreement with the EEC — in consideration of neutrality and the State Treaty — the four conditions mentioned above would have to be fulfilled.⁷ On this basis, negotiations between Brussels and Vienna began a year later⁸.

II. On the Content of the Speech

At the beginning of his much-noticed Strasbourg speech of 26 January 1965, Klaus mentioned the "first great deed" by the Council of Europe, namely the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights signed on 4 November 1950, which he described as "a truly happy beginning for Europe" and the "Magna Charta" of European fundamental rights. Klaus called it a "happy coincidence for the European peoples striving for unity that the first article of the European creed, the confession of the fundamental rights of human beings, is the confession of the inviolable dignity and worth of the human personality". The Austrian Federal Chancellor quoted Wolfgang Johann von Goethe, according to whom right takes precedence over might. In his modest, self-confident manner, Klaus called himself the head of government of "a small, militarily insignificant country", who was aware that commitment to the principle of "right before might" was the best guarantee of the preservation of his country's freedom and that observing this maxim provided the best support for a happy and successful foreign policy. He clarified the need for reform of the catalogue of Austrian fundamental rights and freedoms, which dated back to 1867 in the Habsburg Monarchy, in order to take

7 "Regierungserklärung des Kabinetts Klaus vor dem Nationalrat", in *10 Jahre österreichische Integrationspolitik 1956-1966*, Wien: Bundesministerium für Handel und Wiederaufbau, 1966, p. 187.

8 Reinhard Meier-Walser: *Die Außenpolitik der monocoloren Regierung Klaus in Österreich 1966-1970* (tuduv-Studien, Reihe Politikwissenschaften 27), München: tuduv Verlag, 1988, 212–230, here 221–226; Michael Gehler: "Die österreichische Außenpolitik unter der Alleinregierung Josef Klaus 1966-1970", in: Robert Kriechbaumer/Franz Schausberger/Hubert Weinberger (eds.), *Die Transformation der österreichischen Gesellschaft und die Alleinregierung Klaus* (Veröffentlichung der Dr.-Wilfried Haslauer-Bibliothek, Forschungsinstitut für politisch-historische Studien 1), Salzburg: IT-Verlag, 1995, pp. 251–271, here pp. 255–256.

legal measures that were still outstanding and to make Austria's obligation, as assumed in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of the Council of Europe, applicable⁹.

Austria had joined only the Council of Europe in 1956, signed the ECHR on 13 December 1957 and brought it into force on 3 September 1958, the fifth anniversary of its universal ratification. Austria's position in relation to state law was controversial. It was not until 1964 that the ECHR was given constitutional status in Austria. After then, the Constitutional Court had to apply it, just like the fundamental rights in the Basic Law of the State from the Monarchy on the General Rights of Citizens of 21 December 1867. Austrian Federal Constitutional Law still does not have its own catalogue of fundamental rights. Thus, the ECHR, together with the aforementioned Basic Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (in force as an annex to the Lisbon Treaty in 2009), is the main component of Austrian fundamental rights legislation—thanks to Europe¹⁰.

In fulfilment of that intention, Klaus had convened a commission of jurists and experts under his chairmanship in November 1964 in order to make adjustments and additions to the Austrian fundamental rights that would correspond to progress and the further development of the law. He already had an increasing globalising world in mind when he spoke of the realisation “that the world is becoming smaller, the peoples are moving closer, the continents are losing their old dimensions”. All the more, he said, the European peoples had realised that they had to put an end to bloody feuds and wars “if Europe was to survive in the world of tomorrow”. It was “great progress in civilisation” to seek the unity of this continent and to overcome the “egoisms inherent in national thinking” and —as the draft of the speech went on to say, but which was not printed— to create “a new type of human being”, “the Homo Europaeus”,

9 The following quotations translated into English can be proofed according to the original German versions in “Broschüre Rede von Bundeskanzler Josef Klaus, 'Wir sind Buerger Europas', gehalten am 26. 1. 1965 vor der Konsultativversammlung des Europarates in Strassburg”, Wien: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, without year of appearance. For a German summary of Klaus's speech, see: kvvi InstitutsMitteilungen 1/2021, http://www.vogelsanginstitut.at/at/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/InstitutsMitteilungen_3_21_1.pdf (accessed on 15 November 2021).

10 Michael Gehler: “Dauerauftrag für Staat & Gesellschaft. Vor 65 Jahren, am 3. September 1953, trat die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention in Kraft. Ein Meilenstein des internationalen Rechts”, in *Extra. Die Wochenend-Beilage der Wiener Zeitung*, 1/2 September 2018, pp. 1, 34.

a European human being, "with a pronounced European consciousness", as he, Klaus, had originally called him.

He saw Austria's neutrality and independence as the necessary "foundation of our national existence, the indispensable prerequisite for crisis-free relations with the great powers, the solid basis for good neighbourly relations, the condition for a Central Europe on the Danube free of tensions". It was important for Klaus to continue to hold on to this. He was aware of the debate on European policy between 'federalists' and 'confederalists' and between 'large' and 'small' Europeans, even though he thought in terms of a large Europe that went far beyond the EEC. Thus, in the spirit of his concept of a 'Greater Europe', he appealed to the members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe: "We Austrians know what the great unity of Europe means for everyone, including us". The Austrian's plea to the Council of Europe and all those who think and feel European and want Europe was therefore: "Strive for a European formula that is not too small and too narrow; strive for a European formula in which there are no 'exclusives'; strive for a European formula in which there is a place for all European peoples. Nor do the neutral states wish to see themselves consigned to the role of internal émigrés in Europe. 'Isolation of the neutrals' must not be the watchword when the other Europeans think of creating the 'Europe of tomorrow'". At the same time, however, Klaus tried to convey the following necessity for Austria to the members of the Council of Europe in recognition of the Cold War and the continued existence of the East-West conflict: "Neutrality and independence are today the basis of our state existence, the indispensable prerequisite for crisis-free relations with the great powers, the solid basis for good neighbourly relations, the condition for a Central Europe on the Danube free of tensions"¹¹.

Nevertheless, Klaus did not fail to mention the economic situation in his country. The Austrian economy had undergone a favourable development in the previous decade, as he reported. The reasons for Austria's rapid economic progress were "to be found above all in the high rate of investment, in the restructuring into more productive branches of the economy, in the reallocation of labour from agriculture to industry and, last but not least, in the secured social peace and the avoidance of

11 "Broschüre Rede von Bundeskanzler Josef Klaus, 'Wir sind Bürger Europas', gehalten am 26. 1. 1965 vor der Konsultativversammlung des Europarates in Strassburg", Wien: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, without year of publication, pp. 8–9.

serious internal political crises". Therefore, his conclusion regarding the relationship with Brussels was: "We Austrians believe that the conclusion of a treaty of a special kind with the European Economic Community for industry, trade and agriculture in our country will no longer tolerate much delay".

Klaus also used his speech as an opportunity to refer to Austria's geopolitical neuralgic position and the necessity of the policy of détente with the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe: A glance at the map is enough "to make one realise that lines of intersection run through Austria and that our federal capital Vienna represents a special key point". The emerging changes in Europe, also in the relationship between East and West, could not leave his country untouched, Klaus argued. He referred to a speech by his Foreign Minister, Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ), who had warned against overestimating Austria's possibilities, but at the same time "rightly" emphasised that ties to the Eastern European area "create affinities" and represent "imponderables" that have significance. According to Klaus, the political architects of tomorrow's European construction should therefore not overlook the fact that Eastern Europe is also a part of Europe: "Europe does not end at the eastern borders of my country". The city of Vienna should not, as the deputy mayor of this city, Heinrich Drimmel, correctly put it, be seen "as the terminus" of the West. Klaus continued: "The European House of the Future would have to be perceived by us Austrians as an unfinished, stuck building if there were a central façade and a western wing, but the eastern wing remained undeveloped." He therefore welcomed the Council of Europe's recommendation to "contribute both to the unification of free, democratic Europe and to the détente that is brewing between East and West". But Klaus did not refrain from addressing Vienna's continuing conflict with Italy, which until then had proven unsolvable due to the insufficient granting of autonomy to the South Tyroleans.

III. Reactions, Consequences and Effects

It was a remarkable speech that Klaus gave and met with much applause, although minor objections were also made: "It remains historically one of the great deeds of the Austrian Republic to have given birth to the Pan-European idea and to have carried it out into the world", its founder Richard N. Coudenhove told Klaus during its reorganisation phase in 1965. In his Strasbourg speech, Klaus had not pointed out "that Austria was the cradle of the Paneuropa movement". This had "painfully touched"

its founder Coudenhove-Kalergi. He said that thanks were due, above all, to the former Austrian Federal Chancellors Ignaz Seipel and Karl Renner, who had assumed the highest functions "at a time when this idea was not yet taken seriously anywhere". The founder of the Paneuropa Union argued, as in the interwar period, with an alleged gain in international prestige for the Alpine republic: "Nothing would benefit Austria's prestige in the world more than the identification of this state with the Paneuropa Union."¹² In a later letter to Klaus, he was to put it even more drastically and no less exaggeratedly: "Any other nation would be proud of this fact: the only global-historical achievement of Austria's first republic"¹³.

What did Klaus' speech do for the Austrian People's Party in programmatic terms? In April 1965, its extraordinary federal party congress, chaired by Klaus, adopted the "Klagenfurt Manifesto". Although it was not classified by the ÖVP itself as a party programme, but (only) as a "programmatic guideline"¹⁴, it can be included in the party programme line of the ÖVP. It was one of the first "party programmes" whose original version of 1963 was changed by a questionnaire campaign among party members. A commission chaired by Heinrich Drimmel was responsible for the final editing. The proximity of the 1966 election made the Manifesto short in content. The section "Austria Fatherland in Europe" began with a confession by Austria. As in earlier times, an attempt was made to "link" Austria with the European theme. The value of Austria and Europe within the ÖVP was explained in the agitation and propaganda booklet "Was will die ÖVP? The Klagenfurt Manifesto 1965" explained to ordinary party members as follows: "The ÖVP is an Austrian party, the SPÖ is an internationalist party. For the ÖVP, therefore, the order of precedence is: Austria

12 Letter from Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to Josef Klaus, 17 February 1965. Archiv des Karl von Vogelsang-Instituts, Karton 2380, Mappe Paneuropa-Union, Coudenhove-Kalergi. Klaus regretted in his reply to have "omitted a mention" that the Pan-European movement would have deserved. He referred to the short speaking time and the different thematic approach. The omission was "completely unintentional"; cf. also generally on the foreign policy of this phase: Reinhard Meier-Walser: *Die Außenpolitik der monocoloren Regierung Klaus in Österreich 1966-1970* (tuduv-Studien Reihe Politikwissenschaften Bd. 27), München: tuduv Verlag, 1988.

13 Coudenhove-Kalergi to Klaus, 20 October 1969. Ibid.

14 "ÖVP-Bundespressereferat (Hrsg.), Was will die ÖVP?, Klagenfurter Manifest", Wien: ÖVP, 1965, 3, it also contains the text of the Klagenfurt Manifesto; Archiv des Karl von Vogelsang-Instituts, Wien, Sign. 2553.

— Europe — World. In other words, it sees the world from the Austrian position”¹⁵.

But this time, the commitment to Europe was limited to just one sentence: “Austria’s future as a viable and neutral state must also be ensured within the framework of the economic unity of Europe.” This brief statement on European policy did not mean that the ÖVP wanted to neglect its ideas on Europe, but that the “Klagenfurt Manifesto” saw itself as a supplement to the “Innsbruck Program”, which was similar to what had been the case in the 1980s within the SPÖ with the “Perspectives 90”.

With regard to integration policy of the ÖVP-all-party government, which Klaus followed after 1965 (1966–1970), it should be noted that the policy of creating an arrangement with the EEC/EC led to partial successes, i.e. to two negotiating mandates as well as eight rounds of negotiations, namely from March 1965 to February 1966 and then from December 1966 to February 1967¹⁶, but not to a definitive conclusion. The negotiations between Brussels and Vienna, i.e. between the Council and representatives of the Commission on the one hand and an Austrian delegation on the other, met with objections and reluctance on the part of Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands, because they feared further precedents in the case of a special arrangement with neutral Austria, above all with EFTA states such as Sweden, Switzerland and Finland, and saw the danger of a dilution of the intentions and structures of the European Communities. The EEC was still a young entity and did not seem to be sufficiently consolidated and developed. It even had to solve very contentious intra-Community problems such as agricultural market financing and the question of future decisions by the Council of Ministers, i.e. the transition to majority decisions, which France’s State President Charles de Gaulle successfully resisted with all his might. Not only was France anything but friendly towards Austria’s EEC/ EC association efforts, but so were other Western states, such as Italy and the United States¹⁷.

15 “Bericht des ÖVP-Bundespropagandareferats (ed.), Archiv des Karl von Vogelsang-Instituts Sign. 2553.”

16 “Fünfzehnter Bericht der Bundesregierung über den Stand der wirtschaftlichen Integration Europas für die Zeit vom 1.1.1967 bis 31.8.1967 (Part „Österreichs Verhältnis zur EWG und EGKS“), in Waldemar Hummer/Hans Mayrzedt (eds.): *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik (1955-1975). Dokumentation*, 2 Vols. (Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Außenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen 9), Wien: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1976, Partial Volume I, pp. 414–417.

17 Michael Gebler: “Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und die Integrationsfrage 1955-1972: Die Sicht des Westens”, in Arnold Suppan/Gerald Stourzh/Wolfgang Mueller

The insistent policy of creating an arrangement with the EEC/EC led, under the sole government of Klaus, to the aforementioned rounds of negotiations, but not to the conclusion of negotiations, although towards the end of the legislative period, the federal government had pressed for a transitional solution ("interim agreement") with the two European communities (ESCS and EEC).¹⁸ At least through these efforts it was possible to convince the always impatient circles of export-oriented Austrian industry, business and entrepreneurship of the sincerity of Austria's integration policy on the one hand, but also to stall and reassure them on the other.

Josef Klaus spoke retrospectively of a "dry spell" for Austria's European and integration policy in the 1960s, which had to be traversed, during which there was "no lack of know-it-alls at home, no lack of Soviet warnings, soon milder, soon harsher", "and also criticism from those neutral countries that were not necessarily comfortable with our going it alone".¹⁹ This is undoubtedly true. The country still had to wait 30 years after Klaus's Strasbourg speech to join the EU.²⁰

IV. Analysis of the Speech

1. Context

– Where Does the Material Come From, Who Published it and When?

The German version of the speech was printed in a brochure by the Austrian State Printing Office²¹ and is also available in English via a Council

(eds.): *Der österreichische Staatsvertrag. Internationale Strategie, rechtliche Relevanz, nationale Identität/The Austrian State Treaty. International Legacy, Legal Relevance, National Identity* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften/Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Historische Kommission/Archiv für österreichische Geschichte Bd. 140), Wien: ÖAW-Verlag, 2005, 841–890.

18 Paul Luif: "Der Weg zum 12. Juni: 1955, 1957, 1962, 1972-73", in Anton Pelinka (ed.): *EU-Referendum. Zur Praxis direkter Demokratie in Österreich* (Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für angewandte Politikforschung 6), Wien: Signum, 1994, pp. 23–48, here 40–41.

19 Klaus: *Macht und Ohnmacht in Österreich*, p. 366.

20 Michael Gehler: "Österreichs EU-Beitritt 1995 – Hintergründe, Kontexte, Motive und Perspektiven", in: Thomas Walter Köhler/Christian Mertens/Anton Pelinka (eds.): *Ein Hauch von Welt. Österreich vor und nach Saint Germain*, Wien: Wilhelm Braumüller, 2020, pp. 374–396.

21 The version represents the printed text of the original speech published under the title: "Bundeskanzler Josef Klaus: 'Wir sind Bürger Europas', Rede, gehalten

of Europe link²². Furthermore, a draft of the speech with handwritten additions, corrections and deletions exists in the archives of the Karl von Vogelsang Institute in Vienna.²³

– How Does It Fit into the Overall Picture?

Klaus's speech to this European forum is an exception and can be seen as his chancellorship's personal commitment to the idea of European unification and as an objective of the Austrian federal government's European policy. The Strasbourg speech did not have an exclusive character for a select auditorium, but an official character and was intended for a broader European and international audience. Klaus spoke to this large European forum in his capacity as head of the Austrian government. The speech was subsequently also published in Austria in order to make it known to a wider audience in his own country.

– What Is the Historical Context?

The historical context consists of Austria's efforts to determine and redefine its relationship to the common, institutionalised and organised Europe, above all to promote the opening of negotiations with the EEC for the purpose of a specific contractual relationship between Austria and the European Communities.

– How Is the Social Context to Be Assessed?

Klaus's speech took place before the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, which is made up of parliamentarians from the members of the Council of Europe sent by the countries. They act as communicators and mediators and were thus also able to help the Austrian cause. Klaus emphasised the importance of the Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights, which he hailed as a step forward in civilisation. Accordingly, he expressed his appreciation for this European forum in Strasbourg without specifically singling out the European Court of Human Rights. His speech also referred to neutral Austria, its specific geopolitical position and Vienna as a place of international encounter. Klaus thus also emphasised his country's role as a link between Eastern and Western Europe during the Cold War.

am 26 Jänner 1965 vor der Konsultivversammlung des Europarates in Straßburg, Druck der österreichischen Staatsdruckerei [Vienna 1965].”

22 <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-XML2HTML-EN.asp?SpeechID=113> (accessed 30 August 2021).

23 The original of the draft speech can be found in the archive of the Karl-von-Vogelsang-Institute (KvVI) in Vienna, Druckschriftenarchiv, Sig.-Nr. 2342.

– Which Language Is Used?

Klaus spoke in German. His speech was simultaneously translated into several other European languages for the members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

– Who Wrote the Speech and When?

The text was most likely written by Klaus himself and/or his advisors. It has not been possible to clarify the exact authorship. However, it is quite conceivable that his head of cabinet, Franz Karasek, who had been active since 1964, or Alois Mock may have penned the text. In 1966, Karasek moved to the Federal Ministry of Education as section head. Mock had been assigned to the Federal Chancellery from 1961 as a desk officer for EEC and EFTA issues and had worked for the Austrian OECD representation in Paris from 1962 to 1966. With the start of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) all-party government in 1966, he succeeded Karasek as the Secretary and Head of Cabinet of the Federal Chancellor. Karasek later became Secretary General of the Council of Europe (1979–1984) himself.

– Was the Speech Part of a Wider Debate?

The speech did not become part of a wider public debate because, firstly, it did not trigger any domestic controversies and, secondly, there was a consensus in the Grand Coalition between the ÖVP and the SPÖ on a contractual arrangement between Austria and the European Communities. Klaus also referred to the role of Austria's Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ) to underline the grand coalition consensus in the Austrian government's European and integration policy.

Only the founder of the Pan-European Union, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, made internal criticism because he would have liked to have his Pan-European Union mentioned in Klaus's speech. This could also be interpreted as an expression of his injured vanity, but not as genuine criticism of Klaus's remarks. Moreover, the Paneuropa Union no longer had the prominent status it had in Vienna in the 1920s and 1930s, but was in a process of reorganisation and, in the meantime, had also drifted quite strongly into monarchist waters.

2. Structure of the Text

– How Was the Argumentation of Klaus's Speech Structured?

The argumentation of his speech is structured logically and stringently. The text is structured into different sections. The speaker always introduces

new units of meaning with the salutation “Ladies and Gentlemen!” or with “High Assembly!”. Interspersed throughout the speech are historical flashbacks and political visions of the future for the development of a common Europe that transcends the borders of the Iron Curtain. Klaus did wish for an intensification of Austria's relationship with the European Communities, but not only that: He also expressed his hope for an opening of the centre and east of Europe, i.e. better access to those parts of Europe beyond the Iron Curtain. His speech also represented an attempt to take stock. In some cases, Klaus raised questions, which he then answered, e.g. “Where does Europe stand today?” or “Who has the right to speak in the name of all and for all?”. Klaus began his speech with the words “Civis Europaeus Sum” (“I am a European citizen”) and concluded with the statement “We are citizens of Europe”. He thus issued a slogan that clearly stood out from his own Austrian citizenship and went beyond the nation state principle.

V. Conclusion

The following insights can be derived from Klaus's Strasbourg speech:

1. His address to the Council of Europe can be read as a personal commitment to the idea of European unification and as an expression of his political conviction of the necessity of Austrian participation in European integration.
2. Klaus declared his support for European citizenship, thus anticipating the idea of European citizenship, which was first laid down by the EU Treaty of Maastricht (which came into force in 1993), but which was still to be derived from national citizenship.
3. In his speech, Klaus remained not only a citizen and politician of his country, but also an Austrian patriot, referring both to the history and culture of his country of origin, and in particular to the conditions under which the Second Republic came into being as an independent nation state with the Austrian State Treaty of 15 May 1955 (which provided its closure to Germany, whether economic or political) and the Federal Constitutional Law on ‘perpetual’ neutrality of 26 October of the same year.
4. Nevertheless, Klaus was able to appreciate the importance of the Council of Europe, which stood for a larger Western Europe than the EC, in view of its cultural function and its competence in fundamental and human rights. Although Austria was not a founding member—the consequences of the four-power occupation from 1945 to 1955 imposed

certain restrictions and corresponding restraint on the country—it was able to join the Strasbourg organisation in 1956.

5. Despite his Carinthian origins and his Salzburg provincial governorship, Klaus was also a Danube European, a mighty river that, as we know, flows through Central and South-Eastern Europe and becomes part of the larger socialist-ruled Europe. Klaus made even more clear that it could not remain with a Carolingian-Western European 'Little Europe', but that, looking visionarily into the future, there would still be a Europe beyond the Iron Curtain and that it would have to be shaped in unity, which was also part of the common history and culture of the continent. This led to the conclusion that it was necessary to make these border fences more permeable, which means that Klaus can also be interpreted as a pioneer of the policy of détente in the first half of the 1970s. He finished with the title of the Strasbourg speech "We are citizens of Europe". Once again it became apparent that he was speaking not only as a Danube European and a Great European, but also as a pan-European and a European of culture and human rights.

Edward Heath's 'Greater United Europe': Understanding a very 'special' Form of Europeanism

Ilaria Poggiolini

As shown by recent events which led to Brexit and to the last-minute UK–EU trade deal, at the end of the transition period, on Christmas Eve 2020, Britain and the European Community/Union have a history of non-alignment as partners as well as divorcees. This is hardly new. Strong differences and fundamental disagreements took centre stage in this relationship from the end of Ted Heath's premiership in 1974 onwards.

Even before, since the early '60s, British politicians had remained aloof—except for a cluster of British pro-Europeanists and Federalists—of developing a common political discourse and consequently a common language of European integration that could resonate directly with continental counterparts and audiences and strike a responsive chord. This lack of convergence and empathy, both political and linguistic, explains the communication gap that has long characterized—with a few notable exceptions—British PMs' speeches on EEC/EU themes. Margaret Thatcher ironically acknowledged the apprehensive expectations of her host and audience towards her talk when she introduced it at the College of Europe in 1988: “Mr. Chairman, you have invited me to speak on the subject of Britain and Europe. Perhaps I should congratulate you on your courage. If you believe some of the things said and written about my views on Europe, it must seem rather like inviting Genghis Khan to speak on the virtues of peaceful coexistence!”¹

My choice of speech and setting do not in any way compare with the Bruges case. Edward Heath, the “most communautaire” of British PMs², and perhaps the only one in post WWII British history that saw accession to the EC as the most important international question of his premiership, delivered a speech on ‘A Greater United Europe’ at the ceremony for the signature of the Treaty of UK Accession to the EEC in Brussels on the 22nd

1 Margaret Thatcher, Speech to the College of Europe “The Bruges Speech”, September 20, 1988 <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332>, accessed 6 January 2021

2 Stephen Wall, *Reluctant European*, Oxford: OUP, 2020, p. 111

of January 1972. Expectations of creating a new constructive and collaborative British–European partnership ran high back then and could be felt in the air on that very special day almost half a century ago. The phrasing and contents of Heath’s speech did not disappoint such expectations: he gave substance to the idea of creating a new partnership in the enlarged Europe without erasing the past.

Basing my analysis on what we now know of European and transatlantic relations at the time, of the accession process and Heath’s role in it, I will advance an interpretation of the ‘Greater United Europe’ speech both as the finishing line of the UK’s long accession marathon and as anticipation of the PM’s view on the future of British/EEC relations.

The end goal of this piece is to provide an accurate interpretation of the message that Heath wanted to convey to his audience and of his effectiveness in conveying his convictions, experience and goals.

The speech was not a long one, but it was very significant in several ways: first, in terms of the relevance of the occasion; second, for the strong resonance of each passage with convictions that Heath held very dear before and after that date; and third, for the deep sense of missed opportunities that those words convey to us today.

1) *Another step towards removing divisions in Europe*

Heath’s opening words were: “We mark today, with this ceremony, the conclusion of arduous negotiations over more than ten years which have resulted in another great step forward towards the removal of divisions in Western Europe”³.

Indeed, entry negotiations were arduous and long, considering the entire process of three attempts, including two failures (1963 and 1967)⁴ and one final success (1969–1973)⁵, over ten years. One can argue that accession diplomacy was bound to be hard work as it confronted two fundamental and incompatible barriers: the non-expendable dimension

3 Bulletin of the European Communities. Dir. of publ. Commission of the European Communities. February 1972, n° 2. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. "Speech by Edward Heath (Brussels, 22 January 1972)", pp. 25–27.

4 N. Piers Ludlow, *Dealing with Britain: The Six and the first UK application to the EEC*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 244–9

5 Con O’Neil, *Britain’s Entry into the European Community: Report on the Negotiations of 1970–2*, London: Whitehall Publishing and Frank Cass, 2000

of the *acquis communautaire* on the EEC side, and an equally strong commitment to preventing unconditional surrender of national prerogatives on the UK side. During accession negotiations, successive British governments were confronted with this impossible dilemma: making concessions and achieving entry to the Community with the economic benefits they expected to achieve or making no concession at all and continuing to guarantee full national sovereignty and legislative powers at home. Within this scenario, two vetoes by de Gaulle which abruptly brought to an end the '63 and '67 British bids, added a strong dimension of top-down French national control over the question of British entry, a theme that a very rich traditionalist–revisionist scholarly debate has and is still in the process of reassessing⁶.

In these troubled waters, Ted Heath—not the most popular of British PMs who was born in underprivileged circumstances, yet had an elitist reputation as an almost professional classic musician, as well as a yacht skipper—piloted the third and final successful accession process.

Heath studied at Oxford, having earned a scholarship at Balliol College for playing the organ and since then had devoted himself to politics—relaunching the University Conservative Association as a student—and to music. He moved up rapidly through the party ranks after the war, embracing politics fully and by 1950, he had reached his goal of being elected as an MP to Westminster. Heath joined the government at the end of the 1950s, rising fast within the Conservative Party and obtaining its leadership in 1965. Music and sailing remained an important part of his life as an MP, minister and PM. His colleagues knew Heath as a completely devoted politician, but his peculiar skills, taste and reserved lifestyle as a bachelor did not help him in achieving popularity. Furthermore, his tenure as PM was marked domestically by economic and monetary crises as well as by the major miners' strike of 1972. One can argue that even his Europeanism may have contributed to adding yet another token of non-conformity to his public image at home.

Challenges were expected on the continent as well, but Heath had high hopes of forging a new partnership and, at the core of it, close relations with France and Germany. He took over the third British accession negotiations in 1970 as PM, capitalising on his previous experience of diplomatic leadership at the negotiating table with the Community in the years 1961–1963. In other words, he “had been there before”, at the original accession

6 Andrew Moravcsik, “Charles de Gaulle and Europe: The New revisionism”, in *The Journal of Cold War Studies*, 14. 1 (2012), pp. 55–77

negotiations following the first entry bid. “He had sat at the table, sweated through days and nights in the smoke-filled chamber, haggled with counterparts over pig meat and cashew nuts and the sterling balances (...). From his experience as Macmillan’s negotiator, he was a master of the European scene”⁷.

However, in 1970, the year that brought the Conservatives back to power, a strong wind in public and political circles in the UK blew against it joining the EEC. The new government had to be very cautious, down-playing as ‘non-decision’ the intention of pushing ahead with entry negotiations within a diplomatic process of entry into the EEC that the previous government had previously decided. Formally presenting the UK’s accession bid as pre-existing diplomacy, Heath restarted the accession negotiations, reviving the Foreign Secretary, George Brown’s 1967 approach to negotiations⁸.

Heath’s style in coordinating the diplomacy of accession had a strong centralised dimension, as his previous experience as chief negotiator allowed and prompted him to follow the ups and downs of entry talks very closely. To this end, Heath created the *Europe Unit* in the Cabinet Office and maintained an ongoing dialogue with two key people on the British side: Geoffrey Rippon, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Con O’Neill, the chief official negotiators. As already pointed out, after two vetoes, the limits of negotiating power on the British side had become apparent. O’Neill famously wrote in his account that the UK was expected to “swallow the lot and swallow it now”⁹. British accession, so central to Heath’s foreign policy that he saw it as ‘the jewel in the crown’, motivated him in ‘swallowing’ what was required with no regrets. He did not hold a grudge in doing so, as his successors would¹⁰.

No doubt the success of a public speech depends on numerous variables and on their combination. At the top of the list is the speech’s capacity to resonate with the audience and to make an effective and articulate use

7 Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot. Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair*, London: Macmillan, 1998, p. 220

8 British Application to join European Communities. Statement by the Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at the meeting of the Council of the Western European Union. The Hague, July 4, 1967, Archive of European Integration, <http://aei.pitt.edu/5775/1/5775.pdf>, accessed 24 June 2021

9 Con O’Neill, p. 40; for a comparison with Brexit negotiations see N. Piers Ludlow, *Swallow the lot, and swallow it now: Britain is and was, deluded about its negotiating power with the EU*, November 9th, 2017, LSE blogs blogs.lse.ac.uk

10 Stuart Ball, Anthony Seldon, *The Heath Government. 1970–74*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 259

of specific political language and metaphors¹¹. Heath spoke to his Brussels audience with the reassuring language of a convinced Europeanist of his generation. He avoided confrontational tones even when he ventured into discussing the future of European collaboration, as he believed in a new European wind of change blowing in the direction of enlargement and renovation. Heath shared the experience of being a young man during the era of dictatorships in Europe with the protagonists of European integration of his days and with the 'founding fathers'. This, and his service as an army officer—including his participation in the Normandy landings—shaped his view that peace, security and prosperity on the continent could only flourish once economic and political integration was achieved¹², building on post-war Franco-German reconciliation. Coherently with these views, Heath argued that Britain should be part of the Schuman Plan from the start. However, he was a pragmatist, not a federalist, and he hoped that the Community would evolve gradually 'rather like Britain's own unwritten constitution'¹³. In other words, he envisaged a process of integration progressing by trial and error, punctuated by case-by-case political decision-making, and not progressing mystically in a straight line towards a preordained federal finalité.

All this notwithstanding, Heath's accession speech played on common denominators not on differences. In the following passage, he acknowledged the role played by "the sustained and dedicated work of many people. Their efforts were essential to the success which we are celebrating" (...) "all who have laboured in this great enterprise—not only to those who have negotiated, Ministers and officials, together with the members of the Commission who have contributed so much, but to all who, in their many different ways, have supported and advanced the idea of a united Europe".¹⁴. The words: 'united Europe' and the reference to and recognition of the cause of integrating Europe pursued by ministers, officials and members of the Commission made this speech sound both reassuring and familiar to continental ears. It was in line with the 'language' spoken by the members of the EEC at official gatherings, allowing the PM to blend into the Brussels scene quite smoothly. Indeed, Heath's opening

11 Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive power of Metaphor*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 4–5, 13–15, 31–35

12 See Heath's words on the 'purpose' of the EEC in: Common Market Debate, E. Heath-M. Foot, "People and Politics" 1, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CuZrzwM6CJs>, accessed 06 June 2021

13 Ball and Seldom, p. 261

14 Speech by Edward Heath, Brussels, 22 January 1972, see note 3

went farther than just allowing him to fit in. He meant to give a strong signal that Britain had chosen, willingly, to be part of a common, shared European enterprise.

This was not at all a casual remark: it built on Heath's pro-European stand since his maiden speech in the House of Commons on 26 June, when he spoke in favour of the Schuman Plan¹⁵. Closer to the time of accession, on 28 October 1971, in the course of the parliamentary debate at the House of Commons on the decision to join the European Community, Heath argued that this was a once-in-a-lifetime decision: "Tonight, the world is similarly watching Westminster, waiting to see whether we are going to decide that Western Europe should now move along the path to real unity—or whether the British Parliament, now given the choice, not for the first time but probably for the last time for many years to come, will reject the chance of creating a united Europe"¹⁶.

Heath had pitched his speech at Westminster in 1971 to an audience that either opposed accession or was inclined to welcome the idea of Britain moving into the driving seat of the Community with France and Germany. The PM believed that the opportunity to enter, if not approved, would be frozen for a lifetime. He chose to play the card of the UK in a leading role—as member of the Community and leaving its mark on and controlling 'the path to real unity' at the same time. Indeed, the PM's approach contributed to fomenting the illusion at home that membership would not change and limit, but rather empower, the independent, national decision-making process of the UK vis-à-vis the EEC.

This occasion, among many others, shows how Heath created a 'narrative' of accession, a frame that provided his convictions on the future role of Britain in Europe with both coherency and continuity.

2) "Nothing is inevitable"

The following passage from Heath's accession speech offers us an opportunity to reflect on how he combined sincerely felt Europeanism with

15 Edward Heath Maiden Speech in the House of Commons, 26 June 1950, <https://www.ukpol.co.uk/edward-heath-1950-maiden-speech-in-the-house-of-commons/>

16 Prime Minister Edward Heath's address in the debate in the House of Commons on Britain's application to join the European Community, 28 October, 1971, European Communities SHC, Deb 28 October 1971 vol 823, cc2076-217, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1971/oct/28/european-communities>, accessed 06 June 2021

an equally open denial that the future design of integration should be preordained:

“Just as the achievement we celebrate today was not preordained, so there will be nothing inevitable about the next stages in the construction of Europe”¹⁷.

We now know that since the very beginning of Britain's membership of the EC Heath himself, or Europeanist diplomats, such as Michael Pallister—a permanent representative to the European Communities—, expected a full dimension of reciprocity from the new UK–EC relationship and foresaw a process whereby the Community would take “proper account of British interest and those of the other member states”¹⁸.

This idea of convergence and the perception—openly contested by the significant political, media and public opposition to accession in the UK—that sovereignty would not be affected in a dramatic way by joining the EEC, were a sort of mantra of the Heath government. According to this line of reasoning that became an integral part of the PM's case for Europe, Britain had already pooled her sovereignty in NATO, the United Nations Organisation (UNO), the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the WEU. EEC membership would be no different in creating legal obligations only in the fields covered by the treaty of accession. In response to this argument, Eurosceptics maintained that NATO or the WEU could not affect British parliamentary sovereignty because none of these organisations had been allowed to produce legislation that took legal precedent over UK law¹⁹.

Heath's view of the question of sovereignty was pragmatic. He moved from the assumption that—as he said in his accession speech—the development of the EEC had not been ‘preordained’. He saw the process of integration in Europe advancing by trial and error, rather than towards one fundamental, preordained federal end goal. As Heath made clear in another passage of his accession speech, further progress in advancing the enlarged Community would now involve the UK and “require clear thinking and a strong effort of the imagination”. He believed that clear thinking was needed “to recognise that each of us within the Community will remain proudly attached to our national identity and to the achieve-

17 Speech by Edward Heath, Brussels, 22 January 1972, see note 3

18 TNA, CAB 193/23, Extract from a talk given by Mr Pallister to the Civil Service College, 24 July 1972

19 Nicholas Julian Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945*, London: Routledge, p. 88

ments of our national history and tradition”²⁰. Heath’s accession speech combined his sincerely felt recognition of the values at the origins of the process of integration with an equally, strongly felt belief that national interests would remain vital in shaping the new, enlarged Community.

When Heath delivered his speech at the accession ceremony, traces of both Whiggism and idealism were still detectable in the intellectual and political milieu in Britain²¹. Much less traceable or relegated to the past was the debate on European federalism and on the Anglo- French political union that had involved the British political leadership so deeply in the 1940s²². In the 1950s, the UK had taken an anti-integrationist approach in Europe. By the 1960s, another shift had taken place in the political scene with the choice of pursuing EEC accession. This meant pragmatically adapting to new circumstances and looking at the Community as the place where ‘Britain would have a better chance of influencing world affairs as one of a group of sovereign states rather than as a single sovereign state’²³.

This pragmatic view was reflected in Heath’s conviction that no ‘preordained’ design could be the engine of further European cooperation, even assuming that:

“as the enlargement of the Community makes clear beyond doubt, we have all come to recognize our common European heritage, our mutual interests and our European destiny.” It would require “imagination”, Heath said, “to develop institutions which respect the traditions and the individuality of the Member States, but at the same time have the strength to guide the future course of the enlarged Community”²⁴.

Heath’s words at the accession ceremony reflected the expectation that the original Community of the Six could embrace change and transform itself by opening the door to new members and “meet[ing] their needs, for we are faced with an essentially new situation, though one which was

20 Speech by Edward Heath, Brussels, 22 January 1972, see note 3

21 Dennis Kavanagh, “British Political Science in the inter-War Years: the Emergence of the Founding Fathers”, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 5 issue 4, November 2003, pp. 594–613

22 William Ivor Jennings, *A Federation for Western Union*, Cambridge: Macmillan, 1940; Harold J. Laski, ‘The economic foundations of peace’, in Leonard Woolf (ed.), *The intelligent man's way to prevent war*, London: Gollancz, 1933; Andrea Bosco, *June 1940, Great Britain and the first Attempt to Build a European Union*, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016

23 David Marquand, *Parliament for Europe*, London: Cape, 1979, pp. 4–8

24 Speech by Edward Heath, Brussels, 22 January 1972, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/9/14/45bb74bd-554c-49d4-8212-9144ce2e8c1d/publishable_en.pdf, accessed 26 September 2021

always inherent in the foundation of the Community of the Six". He encouraged his partners "not to be afraid to contemplate new measures to deal with the new situation". The double exhortation to pragmatism and imagination in Heath's speech is likely to have created a certain sense of confusion among the listeners²⁵.

However, Heath was certainly not alone in expecting that enlargement would bring about a 'second Europe': a more cohesive and industrial Community than the original one and capable of reinventing its 'external relations' via the harmonisation of the Nine's approach to foreign policy.

Among the personalities that more explicitly referred to the creation of 'second Europe', I'd like to pay tribute to Ralph Dahrendorf in his double act as a scholar and European Commissioner at the time of British accession. He foresaw the need of a second chapter in the integration process, making possible a fundamental reappraisal of policies and of the role of institutions. A 'third Europe' would have been the expected result of this profound reappraisal, bringing about a stronger group of nations, bound by genuine common interests in a continent without borders²⁶.

3) Europe is more than Western Europe alone

The last part of Heath's accession speech is focused on an extraordinarily relevant theme that has received little attention in existing research literature, particularly in connection with his EEC policies: the pursuit of closer relations with the 'other side', across the Iron Curtain: "There lies also to the east another part of our continent: countries whose history has been closely linked with our own". He made clear that his government "wished for better relations with the states of Eastern Europe" in line with a trend launched by Brand's Ostpolitik and reinterpreted based on the national interests of the European partners—including the UK—during the 1970s.²⁷

If we think of British accession to the EEC not as an event taking place in an international vacuum but rather as part of a process of trans-

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Ralf Dahrendorf, *A Third Europe?* Jean Monnet Lecture, European University Institute, 26 November 1979, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/11346/2/11346.pdf>; Ilaria Poggiolini, "Le tre Europe di Ralf Dahrendorf" *Società MutamentoPolitica* 10(19): 91-99

²⁷ Anne Deighton, "Ostpolitik or Westpolitik? British Foreign Policy, 1968-75", *International Affairs*, Vol. 74, October 1998, pp. 893-901

formation and change both within Western Europe and in East–West relations, Heath’s mention of détente in Europe is a sudden coup de théâtre revealing the tip of the iceberg of British involvement in EPC (European Political Cooperation). EPC had become operational at the end of October 1970, and the decision to bring European preparatory diplomacy for the CSCE into the EPC process in the years 1971–72 meant that the European partners were ‘gradually taking the lead from NATO in hammering out a Western position’.²⁸ The British government and its diplomacy were actively involved in EPC and its first operational challenges. This fundamental interest in broadening the scope of European external relations characterised British accession policy and the ongoing related debate on the transformation of the EEC at the Paris Summit of the Nine in October 1972.²⁹

Within this scenario, Heath’s words signalled to the audience that Britain was ready to be an actor in the process of détente in Europe, but also willing to play this game as a member of the EEC team:

“The European Communities, far from creating barriers, have served to extend east–west trade and other exchanges. Britain has so much to contribute to this process, and as Members of the Community we shall be better able to do so”³⁰.

Dealing with Eastern Europe at a time when Brandt’s Ostpolitik represented a model of European détente and preparatory European diplomacy for the CSCE was on the way meant a balancing act for Heath between his fears that the fragmentation of diplomatic overtures towards the East may weaken the coherence of the West³¹, and the need to cultivate relations with West Germany within the framework of an enhanced role for Britain in the new EPC mechanism of the harmonisation of EEC foreign policies.

Finally, at the global level, Heath reminded his audience that Britain was not ‘standing alone’ facing the new challenges posed by EC membership. He expected the Commonwealth “to contribute to the universal nature of Europe’s responsibilities” and felt it appropriate to point out: “I am not thinking today of the Age of Imperialism, now past: but of the lasting and creating effects of the spread of language and culture, of commerce and of administration by people from Europe across land and

28 Daniel Mockli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War. Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the dream of Political Unity*, London: J.B. Tauris, 2009, p. 37

29 Ilaria Poggiolini, *Alle Origini dell’Europa Allargata. La Gran Bretagna e l’adesione alle CEE (1972-1973)*, Milano: Unicopli, 2004, pp.105–119; 172–194

30 Speech by Edward Heath, Brussels, 22 January 1972

31 D. Mockli, p 59

sea to the other continents of the world"³². One cannot fail to observe that this passage would have been framed very differently in today's world of politics, the media or academia, as the present confrontational debate on colonialism and its past sins would probably not have allowed the PM to refer to the 'good' side of imperialism in an official speech.

Conclusions

Heath's conclusions provide an excellent trace for refocusing on the main points of his speech:

"What design should we seek for the New Europe?" he said. "It must be a Europe in which we shall be working for the progressive relaxation and elimination of East/West tensions"³³. The PM's reference here is to the normative debate on "New Europe" that was going to take place in Paris in October at the first summit of the enlarged Community. Expectations regarding the output of this occasion were very high as the future of political collaboration, of the Community's identity, its place in the world, particularly in East/West relations, and its defence strategies were all major issues to be discussed at the summit³⁴.

Heath's address in January 1972 was framed in the expectation that a 'second Europe' could be launched in Paris by a triumvirate composed of himself, Brandt and Pompidou, and that 'external relations' as well as the new identity of the enlarged Community would emerge from the mediation of national interests and allow for constant adjustment over time. Previously, at Westminster, Heath had publicly acknowledged "the efforts of Chancellor Brandt and the West German Government to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union and with the other Communist countries of Eastern Europe", and added: "The Federal Chancellor has always made clear to me that this task in reaching an accommodation with his neighbours to the East will be much easier once there is a European Community enlarged to include Britain and pledged to work towards a

³² Speech by Edward Heath, Brussels, 22 January 1972 see note 24

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Statement from the Paris Summit (19 to 21 October 1972) Bulletin of the European Communities. October 1972, No 10. Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities. "Statement from the Paris Summit", pp. 14–26, available at https://www.cvce.eu/obj/statement_from_the_paris_summit_19_to_21_october_1972-en-b1dd3d57-5f31-4796-85c3-cfd2210d6901.html, accessed 7 January 2021

common European foreign policy (...) Once we have an enlarged Community and a common foreign policy then the prospects for understanding between the two halves of Europe will be that much greater (...) and the argument runs beyond Europe”³⁵.

The reference to the “elimination of East/West tensions” takes us back to one section in Heath’s accession speech that can be seen as an anticipation of a better-known passage in the 1988 Bruges speech by Margaret Thatcher. Heath and Thatcher (both Conservative Prime Ministers) were not very close, either personally or politically. However, they both felt very strongly about one important political issue: facilitating in the medium/long term the return of openness in Eastern Europe and cultural, economic and diplomatic relations between East and West across the Iron Curtain³⁶.

What kind of Europe could Britain expect to influence from inside the Community at a time of détente? Heath’s words were full of optimism as he foresaw: “A Europe conscious of the interests of its friends and partners. A Europe alive to its great responsibilities in the common struggle of humanity for a better life”³⁷. Here at the end of his accession speech, the PM wraps up his previous arguments following familiar lines in his previous public speaking at Westminster, or on other occasions. He believed that Britain could be comfortable in the EEC: “a kind of body to which we can reasonably belong; the kind of body that, having resolved differences of view, will act responsibly, with full regard to the vital interests of each of his members; the kind of body that will carry out what it has undertaken to do”³⁸. These words described a comfortable political marriage, neither a marriage of convenience, nor a passionate one.

As for “how to build influence in the world”, the Heath way anticipated a “satisfactory working arrangement between the European Community,

35 Address given by Edward Heath to the House of Commons on the ongoing accession negotiations. London, 21 July 1971, Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report. First session of the Forty-Fifth Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Twentieth year of the reign of her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. Dir. of publ. Hansard. 1970–1971, No 821; fifth series. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. "United Kingdom and European Communities", pp. 1542–1460; 1465–1469

36 Margaret Thatcher, Speech to the College of Europe “The Bruges Speech”, 20 September 1988, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/10733>, see note 1

37 Speech by Edward Heath, Brussels, 22 January 1972, see note 24

38 Ibid

the United States and Japan", a policy of association open to Commonwealth countries and of aid within the Community framework³⁹.

Heath concluded his accession address by describing British accession to the Community as "an end and a beginning": the end of being outside and the beginning of a new Europe of the Nine with Britain in a leading role. Heath foresaw a Community that would adapt and change over time, leaving its previous skin behind and playing a new and dynamic role in international relations, having found a 'common identity'.⁴⁰ As Heath said in his last conference speech as leader of the Party before his resignation in 1973: "The whole nature of the Community is that it should constantly change and develop according to the changing needs of its peoples". He also sadly anticipated that the UK's membership was "what the Labour Party would throw away—just like a child discarding a borrowed toy"⁴¹.

From the opening words of his accession speech Heath conveyed a strong message: under his stewardship the UK had turned the tide and finally decided to join and embrace the European 'Community', a complex project of European unity, not simply what his predecessors would refer to as the 'Common Market'. Heath made this decision uncompromisingly clear and the language of Europeanism in which he chose to convey it was instrumental to his political goal and to his desire to blend into the European club. We now know that Heath's position was not generally representative of the British political class, nor of British public opinion⁴². The UK had remained outside the EEC and suspiciously pondered this project for so long exactly because of its fear of signing up to a political design that could go far beyond the creation of a common market.

39 Ibid

40 Declaration on European Identity Copenhagen 14 December 1973, Bulletin of the European Communities. December 1973, No 12. Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities. "Declaration on European Identity", pp. 118–122.

41 Leader's speech, Blackpool 1973, Edward Heath to be found at <http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=120>, accessed 06/06/21

42 It was perhaps a sign of Heath's unpopularity—casting a shadow on the accession ceremony—that upon his arrival at Egmont Palace in Brussels on 22 January 1972, a woman—an opponent of Britain's EEC membership—sprayed ink on his suit and the attack was filmed. It goes without saying that Heath had the opportunity to change his stained clothes before taking part in the delayed ceremony. <https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?hl=it#inbox/QgrcJHsNqLqfbmPrNRqnqJfjRzmSVkzJFRQ?projector=1>
Accessed 26 September 2021

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Heath's words at the accession ceremony were carefully crafted to convey the message that British accession would build on both acceptance and desire to play a constructive role. To paraphrase John Kennedy's very well-known inaugural address in 1961, the other side of the coin of Heath's argument revolved around the idea of what Britain could do for the EEC, not simply of what the Community should do for Britain. This also meant that both sides would have to adapt and adjust in the process of getting closer. With Brandt and Pompidou, Heath cultivated high expectations that they could shape and launch a renovated, stronger and more articulated Community at the first summit of the Nine in Paris the following October⁴³. The rest, unfortunately, is history.

43 Bulletin of the European Communities. October 1972, No 10. Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities. "Statement from the Paris Summit", pp. 14–26, see note 34

A Third Europe? Ralf Dahrendorf and a liberal road to reforming and relaunching the European project

Simone Paoli

Introduction

Five years after its establishment in 1972 and one year after its opening in 1976, the European University Institute (IUE) started to host the annual Jean Monnet Lectures. This initiative, promoted and strongly supported by the Institute's first principal, Max Kohnstamm, saw one distinguished speaker giving a lecture every year on themes related to the European Communities (EC) and European integration¹.

The first speech was delivered by Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission, on 27 October 1977. As is well known, it launched the initiative for the European Monetary System, which was the forerunner of the Economic and Monetary Union².

The second was delivered by Emilio Colombo, President of the European Parliament, on 9 November 1978. This address invited the leaders of the Member States of the EC to take urgent decisions on Mediterranean enlargement, the birth of a directly elected European Parliament and the establishment of an Economic and Monetary Union³.

The third speech, on 26 November 1979, was delivered by neither an institutional representative of the EC nor a professional politician. As highlighted by Kohnstamm in his introductory remarks, however, the

1 Jean-Marie Palayret, *A University for Europe. Prehistory of the European University Institute in Florence (1948–1976)*, Rome: Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 1996, pp. 175–188. See also: Anjo G. Harryvan, Jan van der Harst, *Max Kohnstamm: a European's life and work*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011.

2 Roy Jenkins, *Europe's present challenge and future opportunity*, Florence: European University Institute, 1977.

3 Emilio Colombo, *The decisions facing Europe*, Florence: European University Institute, 1978.

third distinguished speaker did «not need any introduction in university [and Community] circles»⁴.

Born in Hamburg in 1929, Ralf Dahrendorf was the son of Gustav, a German Social Democratic politician and member of the *Reichstag*, who actively opposed the Nazi regime and participated in a plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler. Together with his father, although he was still a schoolboy, Ralf was arrested and sent to concentration camps in Germany and Poland between 1944 and 1945. After his liberation and the end of the war, Ralf Dahrendorf completed his university studies in philosophy at the *Universität Hamburg* in 1952, with a doctoral thesis on Karl Marx's conception of justice⁵. Four years later, in 1956, he completed a second doctoral thesis in sociology under Karl Popper, on unskilled labour in British industry, at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)⁶. In 1957, he completed a *Habilitation* in sociology at the *Universität des Saarlandes* with a thesis on "Soziale Klassen und Klassenkonflikt in der industriellen Gesellschaft"⁷; his *Habilitationsschrift* was translated and published in English under the title of "Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society", which was to become a classic of modern sociology⁸.

Immediately afterwards, Dahrendorf started to teach sociology courses in German and North American universities. He taught at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto from 1957 to 1958, *Universität Hamburg* from 1958 to 1960, *Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen* from 1960 to 1966, and *Universität Konstanz* from 1966 to 1969. In the meantime, he taught courses as a visiting professor at Columbia University, Harvard University and the University of British Columbia.

Meanwhile, he had started his political career. He thus became, as emphasised by Kohnstamm in his introductory remarks, "a most distinguished example of how one can go from academe into politics and

4 Max Kohnstamm, "Introductory Remarks", in Ralf Dahrendorf, *A Third Europe?*, Florence: European University Institute, 1979, p. 1.

5 Ralf Dahrendorf, *Marx in Perspektive. Die Idee des Gerechten im Denken von Karl Marx*, Hannover: Dietz, 1952. See also: Allen W. Wood, "The Marxian Critique of Justice", in *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, N. 1/3, 1972, pp. 244–282; William Leon McBride, "The Concept of Justice in Marx, Engels, and Others", in *Ethics*, N. 85/3, 1975, pp. 204–218.

6 Ralf Dahrendorf, *Unskilled labour in British industry*, London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1956.

7 Ralf Dahrendorf, *Soziale Klassen und Klassenkonflikt in der industriellen Gesellschaft*, Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1957.

8 Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959.

from politics back into academe”⁹. After having been an active member of the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD), he moved to the *Freie Demokratische Partei* (FDP) in 1966. Two years later he was elected as a Free Democrat member of the *Landtag von Baden-Württemberg* and, after one year, of the *Bundestag*. Between 1969 and 1970, he served as a Parliamentary Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealing with European Affairs under Minister Walter Scheel in the SPD–FDP coalition of Willy Brandt.

He left his post in the German Government in 1970 to become a member of the European Commission. Responsible for External Relations and Foreign Trade in Franco Maria Malfatti’s and Sicco Mansholt’s Commissions, he took the Research, Science and Education portfolio in François-Xavier Ortoli’s Commission in 1973¹⁰.

His experience in Brussels, however, was not easy at all. Although he was a sincere Europeanist and maintained good relations with many of his colleagues, he soon entered into conflict with the Community’s bureaucracy¹¹. He went as far as to publish two anonymous articles attacking the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament in the weekly *Die Zeit* under the pseudonym of *Wieland Europa*. He defined the European Economic Community (EEC) as “symptomatically small-minded”; he labelled the Council of Ministers as “growingly inefficient” and the European Parliament as “a farce”¹². His authorship was soon discovered. His criticism of the bureaucratisation and lack of democratic legitimacy of the Community institutions backfired on him. The European Commission asked him for explanations and for a while considered him a *persona non*

9 Max Kohnstamm, “Introductory Remarks”, in Ralf Dahrendorf, *A Third Europe?*, Florence: European University Institute, 1979, p. 1.

10 Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Documentation et Recherche sur les Questions Institutionnelles Européennes (DORIE) 334, *Curriculum Vitae - Ralf Dahrendorf*; HAEU, Emanuele Gazzo (EG) 43, *Curriculum Vitae du Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf*, Bruxelles, 1977. See also: HAEU, Voices on Europe Collection, INTO642, Wolf Gruner, *Interview with Ralf Dahrendorf*, London, 2/9/1998.

11 Ralf Dahrendorf was particularly familiar with Sicco Mansholt, Raymond Barre and Altiero Spinelli. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Der Wiederbeginn der Geschichte: vom Fall der Mauer zum Krieg im Irak. Reden und Aufsätze*, München: Beck, 2004, pp. 147–148.

12 *Wieland Europa* (Ralf Dahrendorf), “Ein neues Ziel für Europa” in *Die Zeit*, 16/7/1971, p. 3. See also: *Wieland Europa* (Ralf Dahrendorf), “Über Brüssel hinaus. Unorthodoxes Plädoyer für ein Zweites Europa” in *Die Zeit*, 9/7/1971, p. 3.

grata. The European Parliament publicly criticised him; given his personal and family's anti-communism, it was paradoxical that his main supporters came from the ranks of the Italian Communist Party. Dahrendorf was very close to resignation¹³.

Colin Crouch, a prominent British sociologist and political scientist, highlighted that, in such a context, the offer of the directorship of the LSE came as a lifeline: according to Crouch, Dahrendorf "was 'rescued' from Brussels"¹⁴. After having agreed to become the first non-British director of the LSE in 1974, Dahrendorf's career became primarily concerned with academe, and shifted from Germany to Britain.

In addition to his academic commitments, he became highly involved in British public life. Dahrendorf gave the annual Reith Lectures on *The New Liberty* in 1974. He also served on the Hansard Society Commission on Electoral Reform between 1975 and 1976. When he was invited to give the annual Jean Monnet Lecture at the EUI, he was serving on the Royal Commission on Legal Services and the Wilson Committee Review on the Functioning of Financial Institutions¹⁵.

In choosing Dahrendorf, therefore, Kohnstamm perfectly knew that he was inviting one of the most brilliant and prestigious exponents of Europeanism, but also one of its most independent, undogmatic and original interpreters¹⁶. The principal of the EUI, however, did not seem preoccupied. On the contrary, while introducing the speaker, he highlighted that:

he has not only published books on many sociological, political, and general subjects under his own name, but also written, while he was a member of the European Commission, a series of articles under the name *Wieland Europa*, articles concerning the institutions of the European Community, the matter which he is going to discuss with us tonight. These

13 Helmut K. Anheier, Gesa Stefanie Brincker, "Setting the Stage: Lord Ralf Dahrendorf and the European Project", in *Global Policy*, N. 3/1, 2012, pp. 6–8.

14 Colin Crouch, "Ralf Gustav Dahrendorf 1929–2009", in British Academy, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 94.

15 Olaf Kühne, Laura Leonardi, *Ralf Dahrendorf. Between Social Theory and Political Practice*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, pp. 9–25; Bryan S. Turner, "Ralf Dahrendorf on citizenship and life chances", in *Citizenship Studies*, N. 14/2, 2010, pp. 237–244; Carlo Rossetti, "Ralf Dahrendorf (1929–2009)", in *Quaderni di Sociologia*, N. 51, 2009, pp. 3–7. See also: William Grimes, "Ralf Dahrendorf, Sociologist, Dies at 80", in *The New York Times*, 22/6/2009; Hella Pick, "Lord Dahrendorf. German sociologist and politician who became director of the LSE and a life peer", in *The Guardian*, 19 June 2009.

16 Helmut K. Anheier, Iain Begg, *Ralf Dahrendorf and the European Union 2030: Looking Back, Looking Forward*, London: LSE Ideas, 2020.

articles were unorthodox, and they caused quite a storm in Brussels when they came out! We are very interested in hearing what he has to say to us tonight—and knowing Professor Dahrendorf, I can assure you already that what he has to say will again not be orthodox¹⁷!

I. A general overview

Dahrendorf gave his speech on Monday, 26 November 1979 at 6:00 pm at the *Badia Fiesolana* in San Domenico di Fiesole, Florence; three years earlier, that monastery had become the main seat of the newly established European University Institute¹⁸. The director of the LSE read the text of his lecture after Kohnstamm's short introduction, standing with his back to the main altar of the Church¹⁹. In front of him, in the central nave, there were more than one hundred people, including staff and scholars of the EUI. On his sides, there were no fewer than one hundred people, carefully selected and invited. They included the managing authorities of the EUI, representatives of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers of the EC, diplomats from Western countries, exponents of all the main Italian parties, and officials in national Ministries and local political, civil, religious, military, economic, social, cultural and academic institutions. The local, national and international press was also present²⁰.

Dahrendorf was there to call for the boat to be rocked and show the way in a period in which the European Communities were facing important challenges and equally important decisions.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States discovery of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and the winds of war blowing in Afghanistan were changing the Cold War dynamics from détente to competitive engagement. The long wave of political and economic tensions accumulated between the late 1960s and mid-1970s was still undermining the transatlantic alliance.

17 Max Kohnstamm, "Introductory Remarks", in Ralf Dahrendorf, *A Third Europe?*, Florence: European University Institute, 1979, p. 2.

18 HAEU, European University Institute (EUI) 724, Istituto Universitario Europeo, *Comunicato stampa*, Firenze, 23/11/1979.

19 HAEU, EUI 653, *III Conferenza Jean Monnet: relatore professor Ralf Dahrendorf. Album Fotografico*, Firenze, 26/11/1979.

20 HAEU, EUI 44, Institut Universitaire Européen, *Liste avec invitation nominative*, Florence, 30 October 1979.

Meanwhile, European economies were still struggling with protectionism, high unemployment, and low growth; the Second Oil Crisis came to further aggravate the situation. In addition, the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had just concluded, showed the new strength of developing countries and the contradictions and shortcomings of the Community's trade strategy: the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), in particular, emerged once again as a crucial obstacle to further liberalisation and international cooperation.

The recent signing of the Treaty of Accession between Greece and the EC and the prospective entry of Spain and Portugal raised concerns about the economic implications of these enlargements.

Despite the establishment of the European Council, the implementation of the European Monetary System, the first direct election of the European Parliament and the achievements of the European Political Cooperation, finally, European integration seemed to stagnate, thereby contributing to negative attitudes towards the EC. In London, the new Conservative Government led by Margaret Thatcher stood out as a wild card for their development. In this context, Britain's demand for a "broad balance" in net benefits from the Community budget, which was to be discussed in the upcoming European Council in Dublin on 29–30 November 1979, risked becoming a paralysing and even potentially destructive issue.

The death of Jean Monnet on 16 March 1979 added a symbolic element to this disquieting picture.

Against this backdrop, Dahrendorf made a speech divided into two parts: a *pars destruens*, which analysed the reasons for and characteristics and outcomes of the crisis of Europe; and a *pars construens*, which suggested possible solutions to that crisis.

The *pars destruens* started from a comparison between three successive generations of founders of European integration, describing differences and similarities with respect to its aims, motivations and performance; special attention was given to the last generation and its main peculiarities. The speech went on to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the 'Second Europe', which was realised by the 'founding sons' between the late 1960s and late 1970s. The lecture critically reviewed the most significant institutional developments in that decade: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe, the EC and intergovernmental cooperation. This part concluded by denouncing and explaining the shortcomings of the first three institutional developments and by providing reasons for and evidence of the success of the fourth.

The *pars construens* called for the rapid transition to a 'Third Europe'. This, in turn, implied a radical change in the EC, which was composed of

three main ingredients: a clear definition of European interests; reform of the European Commission; full acceptance of the principle and practice of differentiated integration. The speech did not hide the difficulties and uncertainties of such a proposal. That plan, however, was presented as viable, necessary and urgent, the cost of inaction being the potential dissolution of the EC.

The speech made extensive use of strong expressions and hyperboles.

Dahrendorf's analysis and evaluation of the EC, in particular, were severe and ruthlessly expressed. According to him, the "European union has been a [...] remarkable institutional failure"²¹; "we have locked ourselves into procedures and institutions which at times do more damage than good"²²; "the institutions of the European Community were not those of a European political union of democratic countries"²³; "the European Communities [...] have drifted into [...] irrelevance"²⁴.

In this context, two Community institutions were the targets of the harshest attacks. The Commission «has been floundering, at worst serving as a secretariat to the Council, at best inventing essentially arbitrary projects of progress which rarely went very far»²⁵; "it was, and continues to be an unhappy administration suspended in mid-air between political pressures which do not reach it and political decisions which it cannot reach"²⁶; "it becomes partly a broker between Member States, partly a somewhat soft-spoken European conscience, and partly a bureaucratic machinery unattached to any transmission belt to decisions"²⁷. Overall, according to Dahrendorf, the Commission "has become an obstacle to European union rather than a motor of progress"²⁸. At the same time, the European Parliamentary Assembly was defined as "an institutional afterthought, a democratic fig leaf"²⁹, and "even though [the European Parliament] is now directly elected, it remains an insult to true democracy, a travelling circus which can neither initiate nor prevent policies outside very circumscribed areas"³⁰.

21 Ralf Dahrendorf, *A Third Europe?*, Florence: European University Institute, 1979, p. 8.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., p. 12.

24 Ibid., p. 13.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., pp. 21–22.

27 Ibid., p. 22.

28 Ibid., p. 21.

29 Ibid., p. 22.

30 Ibid., pp. 13–14.

Similarly, two Community policies were made the subject of special criticism. The budget policy and, in particular, compulsory expenditure were bluntly dismissed: “a budget which is automatically fed and automatically spent is a monstrosity”³¹. The CAP was simply labelled as “virtually incomprehensible”³².

The expressions used in connection with the OECD and the Council of Europe were equally strong. The former was defined as a “Club of the Rich [which] is no longer in any sense an instrument of European integration”³³. The latter was dismissed as “a static second-rateness in limited areas of concern”³⁴.

The speech, too, showed a tendency to dramatise the situation.

The potential risks arising from the continuation of the status quo, in particular, were emphasised and expressed in a powerful way. According to Dahrendorf, “the contradiction between political success and institutional failure has become explosive; [...] it may yet threaten the European construction itself”³⁵. In his opinion, “we may yet experience the ultimate crisis of a break-up of the European Community, and we may see it happen in the next twelve months”³⁶.

The choice of rude and direct expressions against the Communities and the use of an apocalyptic narrative reflected a precise communication strategy. Dahrendorf aimed at stirring the emotions of the audience and making them acutely aware of the urgency to act. As he made blatantly clear,

if I use strong language to describe such failure, this is not meant to criticize those who have given the European construction their thought, energy, and enthusiasm. They deserve the respect and appreciation of all Europeans. But unless one exposes failures clearly, we are not likely to get anywhere³⁷.

The speech also used a careful selection of words and repetitions. Dahrendorf was convinced that the main problem with the EC lay in its institutional shortcomings. As a result, he believed that the solution was to be primarily found in radical institutional reform. It is not a coincidence,

31 Ibid., p. 20.

32 Ibid., p. 13.

33 Ibid., p. 10.

34 Ibid., p. 11.

35 Ibid., p. 10.

36 Ibid., p. 24.

37 Ibid., p. 10.

therefore, that ‘institution’ was the most used word throughout the text: that word, in all its forms, was written and spoken as many as forty times.

The speech, finally, was dominated by an oppositional, Manichean rhetoric, which was functional in impressing the audience and getting the message across clearly and powerfully. On the one hand, there were the ‘forces of progress’: they were essentially composed of the citizens and ‘peoples of Europe’, with their needs, aspirations and legitimate interests³⁸. On the other, there were the ‘forces of conservation’, which were to be fought and possibly defeated: they were essentially made up of bureaucracy and “the vested interests of ultimately insignificant groups”³⁹.

The States, significantly, were neither associated with the ‘forces of conservation’ nor blamed for the paralysis of the Communities. Dahrendorf supported subsidiarity, and stood out against harmonisation, “the economic importance of which is marginal while the psychological damage is considerable”⁴⁰. More importantly, he viewed national interests and actors as vital elements in the process of integration. In his opinion, in the EC “an institutionalized dialectic of European and national interest is necessary”⁴¹. Dahrendorf considered himself a European intellectual and citizen. He was also firmly convinced of the need for European cooperation⁴². At the same time, he strongly believed in the importance of the nation state, which was, in his view, the only entity which could simultaneously secure democracy, freedoms, civil rights, social cohesion, economic stability and cultural identity⁴³.

In this context, Thatcher’s Britain itself, far from being considered a brake to integration, was regarded as a trustworthy and reasonable player. “Britain’s understandable demands” and the difficulties in meeting them,

38 Ibid., p. 8.

39 Ibid., p. 24.

40 Ibid., p. 20.

41 Ibid., p. 22.

42 Gangolf Hübinger, “Ralf Dahrendorf. Europas engagierter Beobachter”, in Richard Faber (ed.), *Was ist ein Intellektueller? Rückblicke und Vorblicke*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012, pp. 193–208. See also: Franziska Meifort, “The Border Crosser: Ralf Dahrendorf as a Public Intellectual between Theory and Practice”, in *Società Mutamento Politica*, N. 10(19), 2019, pp. 67–76.

43 Ralf Dahrendorf, *Auf der Suche nach einer neuen Ordnung. Vorlesungen zur Politik der Freiheit im 21. Jahrhundert*, Munich: C.H. Beck, 2003. See also: Hanne Weisensee, *Demokratie, Staat und Gesellschaft in der Globalisierung*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005; Giuseppe Abbonizio, *Orizzonti in sospensione. Ralf Dahrendorf e la democrazia rappresentativa*, Roma: Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2018.

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in turn, were seen as symptoms of the inertia and contradictions of the EC⁴⁴.

II. The pars destruens

Drawing inspiration from the recent death of Monnet, Dahrendorf started the speech by distinguishing between three generations of founders of the European integration.

The first was that of the ‘founding fathers’, who included Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi, Paul-Henri Spaak and Winston Churchill. Their main aim had been to establish and maintain peace in Europe after the tragedies of the Thirty Years’ European Civil War. Their efforts resulted in complete success.

The second was that of the ‘founding sons’, who included Raymond Barre, Walter Hallstein, Sicco Mansholt and Edward Heath. They focused on economic cooperation and reconstruction. They experienced both successes and failures.

The third, finally, was that of the ‘founding grandsons’, that of Ralf Dahrendorf. This generation or, at least, a significant portion of it was primarily united by a natural sentiment of European belonging, of feeling at home in the European continent⁴⁵. This, in turn, was due to the fact that Europe was becoming a reality in the existence of an increasing number of people. Ideological Europeanism was being increasingly superseded by a sort of ‘Europeanism by practice’. This third generation was committed neither to the end of intra-European war nor to mere economic prosperity; it was not committed to creating a European superpower either. Its aims were less idealistic and more pragmatic. The future ‘Third Europe’, rooted in the experience and aspirations of this third generation of Europeans, was to be based on two new, crucial elements: the irrelevance of borders in solving problems, and the need for common decisions where there were common interests. In order to achieve the full potential of these two elements, European leaders were supposed to radically innovate their categories and practices. All the limits to cooperation across Europe were to be removed. In addition, a new legal and institutional framework was to be established at European level.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 16.

⁴⁵ Ralf Dahrendorf, *Europäisches Tagebuch*, Göttingen: Steidl Verlag, 1995.

According to Dahrendorf, it was not true that the 1970s had been a decade of Eurosclerosis. It was not true, in particular, that there was no political progress. On the contrary, European cooperation and Europeanisation had been growing impressively both within and outside the process of European integration in the strict sense: contact between national political leaders and central bankers had become exceptionally frequent and productive; national economic, monetary and financial policies were becoming more and more convergent; intra-European trade and tourism flows were increasing; there had been a remarkable process of rapprochement in foreign policy; the balance between competition and cooperation with respect to developing countries was shifting towards the latter; there was a growing awareness of the need to cooperate in the energy field; technical, scientific and academic collaboration was producing important results; entertainment, arts and sports, especially football, were assuming an increasingly European dimension. Europe existed. Europe was a tangible and powerful reality for both its citizens and the world outside.

The problem, therefore, was not with the lack of political progress but with the contradiction between political success and institutional failure. The point was that growing cooperation at European level was not matched by similar institutional advancements. This mismatch was not only hampering but also threatening the very existence of the European construction.

One after another, all the main institutional developments, despite their temporary or limited achievements, had resulted in narrowness or irrelevance.

The OECD served useful functions. It was highly active and well-reputed in policy-oriented research and it provided an important forum for coordinating policies, especially in the economic sphere. Due to its heterogeneous composition and lack of resources and powers, however, it could no longer be considered, in any sense, an instrument of European integration.

The Council of Europe was larger in membership than the EC and it had the great merit of including the neutral countries of democratic Europe. Moreover, the Council of Europe's European Convention on Human Rights had played and continued to play an important role in spreading awareness of human rights in the European continent. Also, the European Architectural Heritage Year, launched by the Council of Europe in 1975 and the ensuing European Charter of the Architectural Heritage, adopted by the Council of Europe in the same year, had made a positive impact on the protection of European architectural heritage. The recommendations by the Council for Cultural Cooperation of the Council of Europe, too,

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had left a significant imprint, even though they had failed to significantly encourage mobility. That said, due to its limited resources, powers and scope, the Council of Europe seemed unable to represent a dynamic motor of integration.

The European Communities were by far the most ambitious organisations in the Western half of the continent and, between the late 1950s and late 1960s, the EEC was the most effective too: the establishment of a Customs Union and a Common Agricultural Policy were its most astonishing achievements. However, after the Hague Summit in 1969, when the first phase of development came to an end and the major objective of *approfondissement* was announced, this organisation rapidly drifted into irrelevance. The EEC failed in achieving the Economic and Monetary Union, and all its institutions, to a varied extent, fell into crisis. The Commission boiled down to a bureaucratic and ineffective body. The Council of Ministers was reduced to a technical body. The European Parliament, even when it became directly elected, remained bereft of significant powers and influence.

In this context, surprisingly enough, intergovernmental cooperation proved to be the most successful institutional dynamics. Although it also grew out of the Hague Summit, it did not perfectly coincide with the European Communities and their institutional framework. This form of collaboration, which was a response to the inertia and technocratic degeneration of the EC, included the European Political Cooperation, the European Council and the European Monetary System.

The success of intergovernmental cooperation provided clear evidence of the contradiction between the genuine desire for political cooperation and the ineffectiveness of the Community's institutions. The only way to break this tangle and, in so doing, to save the unification project was to radically change the Communities; this fundamental reappraisal, in turn, was to be composed of three elements.

III. The pars construens

The first ingredient of the review of the Communities, which Dahrendorf regarded as necessary and urgent, was a sober definition and assessment of European interests.

European integration was no longer to be defined only in relation to the Soviet threat as perceived in the context of the Cold War. The process of unification was also to be redefined in relation to a new kind of partnership with the United States. Europe's objectives were similar to those of the US as far as the preservation of freedom was concerned. Europe

and the US, in addition, shared a common set of values and cultural norms⁴⁶. However, European and American conditions and interests were distinct and sometimes divergent. The fact that Europe, unlike the US, was not a superpower put it in a position to potentially capitalise on its relative weakness when it came to relations with outside countries. Europe could establish and maintain international relationships and keep peace by agreement, whereas the superpowers could only do so by domination. This difference implied that it was in the interest of Europe and, in the end, even of the US that the West rested on two distinct and autonomous pillars; also, it was in European interests to realise a real transition from a senior/junior partnership to one of equality between Europe and the US. The fact that Europe was not a superpower, in addition, put it in a position to rethink development assistance and to work on establishing more equitable and collaborative relations with developing countries. The fact that Europe was not a superpower and did not possess enough resources to support its prosperity made it dependent on peaceful and open relations between countries. It also made Europe reliant on international rules and institutions which guaranteed those relations⁴⁷. Europe, in this context, had every interest in pursuing liberal policies both within and outside the GATT and in defining and implementing common policies on natural resources, especially energy supplies. Europe, too, had every interest in creating and applying common rules on monetary, trade and economic relations: These were not only to be intended as a way to establish a regional area of openness and stability, but also as a contribution to wider international action. Europe, in this sense, was to propose itself as a model of international liberalism and cooperation⁴⁸.

46 Since his youth, Dahrendorf had admired the United States as well the United Kingdom as countries of democracy and freedom; later in his life, he even admitted that «I will always be a Westerner before I am a European». Ralf Dahrendorf, *Der Wiederbeginn der Geschichte vom Fall der Mauer zum Krieg im Irak. Reden und Aufsätze*, Munich: C.H. Beck, 2004, p. 325.

47 Dahrendorf had expressed similar ideas in two important speeches he made before the European Parliament in 1971 and 1974 respectively, when he was a Commissioner. HAEU, European Commission (BAC) 25/1980_1893, Développement et coopération (CEUE_DECO-1474), Ralf Dahrendorf, *Discours prononcé devant le Parlement Européen, à Luxembourg, le 19 Janvier 1971*, Bruxelles, 29 January 1971; HAEU, BAC 25/1980_1893, CEUE_DECO-1474, Ralf Dahrendorf, *The economic situation in the Community at the beginning of 1974. Address to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 13 February 1974*, Brussels, 21 February 1974.

48 As Commissioner for External Relations and Foreign Trade, Dahrendorf had the chance to familiarise himself with the main issues in European foreign policy

Defining and assessing the core of European interests also meant determining what was not part of it. Dahrendorf had no doubt that the Common Agricultural Policy was to be excluded from the list of the common essential interests. The CAP had certainly played an important historical role: in areas in which there was no market in the Member States but instead a government policy, the only way to bring about a common market was to adopt a common policy. The CAP, in addition, had significantly contributed to cushioning the massive migration from agriculture to industry, balancing French and German economic interests, and reducing European dependence on imports of foodstuffs. Its mission, however, had been accomplished. According to Dahrendorf, there was no longer one single reason why a Common Agricultural Policy was then indispensable or even useful for advancing European construction.

In addition to a sober definition and assessment of European interests, there was a second necessary ingredient of a reappraisal of European policies: the definitive repudiation of the widespread opposition to any form of *Europe à la carte*, which “illustrates that strange puritanism, not to say masochism which underlies much of Community action”⁴⁹. The idea that differentiated integration threatened the unity of the EC, in fact, was very common. In the upcoming European Council in Dublin on 29–30 November 1979, the Committee of Three, composed of Barend Biesheuvel, a former Dutch Prime Minister, Edmund Dell, a former British Secretary of State for Trade, and Robert Marjolin, a former Vice-President of the European Commission, presented a “Report on European institutions”. They used strong words of condemnation against differentiated integration.

and to form a clear picture of it. HAEU, Franco Maria Malfatti (FMM) 37, Ralf Dahrendorf, *Possibilità e limiti di una politica estera delle Comunità Europee*, Bonn, 25 January 1971; HAEU, FMM, 50, Ralf Dahrendorf, *Quelques principes et points de vue relatifs aux relations extérieures de la Communauté Européenne*, Sand, 13 June 1972; HAEU, EG 252, Ralf Dahrendorf, *Proposte su alcuni importanti problemi delle relazioni estere della CEE al momento del suo allargamento. Bilancio personale*, Bruxelles, 1973. On the basis of this experience, immediately after the end of his tenure, he published a number of scholarly articles dealing with the external relations of the EC. Ralf Dahrendorf, “The Foreign Policy of the EEC”, in *The World Today*, N. 29(2), 1973, pp. 47–57; Ralf Dahrendorf, “International Power: A European Perspective”, in *Foreign Affairs*, N. 56, 1977, pp. 72–88; Ralf Dahrendorf, “Europe and America: A reassessment”, in *West European Politics*, N. 1(1), 1978, pp. 3–10.

49 Ralf Dahrendorf, *A Third Europe?*, Florence: European University Institute, 1979, pp. 19–20.

One possible general approach has been mooted from time to time, and while it has never reached the stage of formal proposals it needs to be brought out into the open for examination now. This would be to introduce a permanent and systematic differentiation in the position of various States within the Community, resulting in an implicit or explicit two-tier system. [...]. We believe this model of development, whether the two-tier effect be deliberate or merely implicit, must be rejected outright⁵⁰.

According to Dahrendorf, such an ideological attitude was not only an unacceptable limitation to the freedom of choice of Member States, but also an obstacle to further European integration. There were, of course, decisions that had to be common. However, above and beyond a short list of common political decisions, there was wide scope for action *à la carte*; as shown by the European Monetary System and the European Political Cooperation, these initiatives could, in the end, even lead to common policies. The general point was that *Europe à la carte*, that is, common policies where there were common interests without any constraint on those who could not or did not want, at a given point of time, to join them, was to become the rule rather than the exception. Generally speaking, “because the Community got increasingly entangled in technicalities which had little to do with either the political concerns of Members or even the European interest, new ways had to be found”⁵¹.

The third ingredient of a review of the EC concerned common institutions, the European Commission in particular. This institution, in fact, had become a problem rather than a solution⁵². This had nothing to do with the quality of individuals and the efforts they put into their work; in this respect, according to Dahrendorf, the last Commissions were even better than the previous ones. The problem, in fact, had to do with the way in which the institutional structure of the EC was conceived. The Commission was meant to be the source of initiative in a Community in which decisions were taken by the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament, though democratically elected, was still far from being a co-legislative actor⁵³. What was wrong about this system was that while the

50 Barend Biesheuvel, Edmund Dell, Robert Marjolin, *Report on European Institutions, Presented by the Committee of Three to the European Council*, Brussels, 1980.

51 Ralf Dahrendorf, *A Third Europe?*, Florence: European University Institute, 1979, p. 14.

52 Ibid., p. 21.

53 Ibid., p. 22.

Council of Ministers had an obvious basis of legitimacy, the Commission did not. Unlike the Commission, at the same time, the European Parliament had been given a basis of legitimacy, though it continued not to have any real function. This was closely connected with the bureaucratic matrix that, according to Dahrendorf, had always characterised the institutions of the Communities. Until the EC had clear political objectives, the Commission occupied its circumscribed but well-defined place: in the context of the “First Europe”, in particular, its influence was in reminding Member States of their own commitments. But when, in the ‘Second Europe’, the Community ran out of its sense of purpose, the Commission ran out of steam⁵⁴.

The only, apparently simple but actually complicated, step to remedy the situation was to give a basis of legitimacy to the Commission and a central role to the European Parliament: the Commission had to be elected by the Parliament⁵⁵. Unless and until that happened, neither the Commission nor the Parliament would have had any significant part to play in European construction. Indeed, the irrelevance of the institutions of the EC would have grown. Dahrendorf, of course, was fully aware of the arguments that could be used against this reform. They ranged from fear of Commission power to fear of Commission political one-sidedness. There was, in addition, a general reluctance to change any article of the Treaty of Rome. Nonetheless, Dahrendorf was convinced that such a change would have given the institutions new vitality and authoritativeness, introduced an element of genuine democracy into the EC, and made the Community’s decision-making process more transparent.

Pessimism of reason was offset by the optimism of spirit.

The ‘First Europe’ was plausible. Its political objectives, of course, were limited: the establishment of a Customs Union and the implementation of a Common Agricultural Policy. Under the circumstances, however, they were both important and realistic. Moreover, the institutions which were set up to implement those objectives were adequate to the task. There was, in this sense, a proper and successful combination of political intentions and institutional instruments. On the other hand, the ‘Second Europe’, which started after the Hague Summit, had been characterised by confusion and uncertainty. There was significant political progress, but

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Six years earlier, Dahrendorf had already advanced the idea of making the European Commission an institution answerable directly to an elected European Parliament. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Plädoyer für die Europäische Union*, Munich; Zurich: Piper, 1973.

this happened largely outside the Community's framework. Community institutions and policies, meanwhile, went their own increasingly irrelevant ways. As they lost relevance, the burden which they imposed on the Member States began to weigh more heavily. The Communities ceased to be an asset and became a liability for their members. In addition, opposition to Community institutions and policies grew stronger, and obscured recognition of both real progress at the margins of these institutions and the existence of a common European interest. In such a context, a serious risk was emerging that the enlargement of the Communities might begin to be coupled by a tendency towards shrinkage. The public could turn against the Communities and even European integration. Member States could react by taking radical measures: refusing to obey decisions of the Court of Justice of the EC; withholding Community resources; and introducing new non-tariff barriers. This could even lead to the ultimate crisis of the EC breaking up in a very short time.

All of this could be avoided only if a totally new beginning was urgently made. The time had come to bridge the gap between Europe's political progress and its institutional failure. The time had come to put into practice the three ingredients of a reappraisal of Europe: an emphasis on European interests, a readiness to accept a *Europe à la carte*, and political legitimacy for the Commission. The time had come to shift to a 'Third Europe'.

Dahrendorf did not hide the difficulties and uncertainties of this course of action. The solutions he was proposing were very general; much technical work was to be done to make them effective. In addition, bureaucratic and political resistance to change was expected to be very strong; there was the need to use exceptional political determination and commitment to achieve goals. However, the aim deserved all these efforts. Europe was too important to let it slide into the hands of lobbies and vested interests⁵⁶. It was still possible to save the European construction from the absurdity of keeping alive policies and institutions that had *lost their raison d'être*.

⁵⁶ Ralf Dahrendorf, *A Third Europe?*, Florence: European University Institute, 1979, p. 24.

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Conclusions

The speech that Ralf Dahrendorf gave at the EUI on 26 November 1979 was important for the author, the European University Institute and the European Communities, later the European Union.

First, it represented the most comprehensive expression of Dahrendorf's reflections on Europe, the EC in particular, until then⁵⁷. Although it was not the first time that he had given his opinion on this topic, it was the first time that he had done so in such a complete, analytical and detailed way. The Jean Monnet Lecture gave him the chance to systematise and unify previously fragmented and disjointed views and analyses. The reasons and characteristics of his particular brand of Europeanism, the motives of his criticism against the 'Second Europe' and the guidelines of a new 'Third Europe' were brought together in a well-structured, cohesive, and coherent text.

Secondly, the speech constituted significant and far from obvious evidence of the scientific and political independence of the newly established European University Institute. The choice of inviting a well-known exponent of unorthodox Europeanism, who was well-reputed in academic circles but notoriously unpopular with Community bureaucrats and mainstream pro-European elites and groups, had great value: it was an indirect but powerful response to all those that feared that the institute in Florence would be too dependent on Brussels. These included political groups in France, West Germany, the Benelux countries, Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark. They included, most importantly, the national conferences of rectors; even though, after long resistance, they had agreed on a European University Institute between the late 1960s and early 1970s, they remained largely sceptical about its autonomy from the Community's institutions and ideology⁵⁸.

57 His ideas on Europe were later reworked and rearranged in the light of the evolution of the international context and European integration. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Why Europe matters: a personal view*, London: Centre for European Reform, 1996.

58 Walter Rüegg, "Division et unité de l'Europe: le rôle des universités", in *Relations internationales*, N. 73, 1993, pp. 27–42. See also: Simone Paoli, *Il sogno di Erasmo. La questione educativa nel processo di integrazione europea*, Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2010.

Third and finally, the speech showed the emergence of a new kind of liberal, critical Europeanism. It also helped to legitimise such an ideology⁵⁹.

Dahrendorf believed in the need for European cooperation and a multi-lateral approach. He also appreciated the outcomes of the early stage of the process of European integration and recognised the importance and positive implications of Europeanisation dynamics. At the same time, he strongly believed in the role and historical necessity of the nation states. As highlighted by Portuguese political scientist João Carlos Espada,

Dahrendorf has always been a committed Europeanist, but a Europeanist of a special kind: sceptical towards the great federalist projects and the underestimation of the deep realities of the Nation-State. Above all, he was a multilateral internationalist⁶⁰.

Dahrendorf was also highly critical of the post-Hague Summit process of integration, which he saw as a missed opportunity to make the European Communities more effective, democratic, modern and internationally influential⁶¹. His Europeanism, in this sense, did not prevent him from seeing and denouncing what he considered serious weaknesses: the EC's inability to identify and pursue common interests; its incapacity to take full advantage of Europe not being a superpower; its overemphasis on the Common Agricultural Policy; the distortions in its budget; its excess of bureaucracy; the complex, slow and cumbersome nature of its legal and institutional framework and procedures; and its lack of democracy, transparency and accountability⁶². Dahrendorf did not consider himself a Eurosceptic but a sceptical Europeanist: he supported the European project, but he was highly critical of its implementation⁶³.

The speech was also one of the first and most influential calls to re-launch the process of integration after one decade of perceived 'Eurosclerosis'. It was also one of the first and most influential calls to radically reform the institutional and legal system created by the Treaty of Paris

59 Mark Gilbert, Daniele Pasquinucci, *Euroscepticisms. The Historical Roots of a Political Challenge*, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020.

60 João Carlos Espada, *The Anglo-American Tradition of Liberty. A View from Europe*, Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2016, p. 36.

61 Ilaria Poggiolini, "Le tre Europe di Ralf Dahrendorf", in *Società Mutamento Politica*, N. 10 (19), 2019, pp. 91–99.

62 Antonio Lastra, "La democrazia in Europa. Una nota sulla *Societas Erasmiana* di Ralf Dahrendorf", in *Scienza & Politica. Per Una Storia Delle Dottrine*, N. 21 (40), 2010, pp. 77–87.

63 Ralf Dahrendorf, "Warum Europa? Nachdenkliche Anmerkungen eines skeptischen Europäers", in *Merkur*, N. 50, 1996, pp. 559–577.

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and the Treaties of Rome. More than one year before the speeches by Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Stuttgart and by Emilio Colombo in Florence and two years before the Genscher-Colombo Plan, Dahrendorf's lecture called for a comprehensive effort to move Europe ahead, thereby helping to pave the way to the process leading to the Single European Act⁶⁴.

The speech indicated the direction as well, putting the redefinition of the Community budget and institutional structure at its centre. The European Communities, of course, were not ready and willing to immediately accept all Dahrendorf's suggestions. In the medium and long term, however, these recommendations were taken into serious account and often implemented. The weight of the Common Agricultural Policy and the proportion of compulsory expense gradually decreased. The role of the European Parliament was strengthened, and the European Commission became more and more accountable to the Parliament. Not without controversy, finally, differentiated integration increasingly became accepted and practised as a mode of European governance.⁶⁵

64 Michael Gehler, Wilfried Loth, *Reshaping Europe. Towards a Political, Economic and Monetary Union, 1984–1989*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020.

65 Kiran Klaus Patel, *Project Europe. A History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. See also: Elena Calandri, Giuliana Laschi, Simone Paoli, *L'Europa adulta. Attori, ragioni e sfide dall'Atto Unico alla Brexit*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2020.

„Per un’Europa dei popoli e dei lavoratori.” Enrico
Berlinguer’s speech at the European Parliament on 11
February 1981

Elena Calandri

Enrico Berlinguer had been a leading member of the Italian Communist Party since the 1950s, when he had headed the FGCI (*Federazione della Gioventù Comunista Italiana*), the Communist Youth organisation. In 1956 he entered the party’s secretariat and in 1972 he became Party Secretary until his death in June 1984. After Palmiro Togliatti, who died in 1962 when European integration was still in embryo, Berlinguer was the most significant personality of the largest communist party in the West. Indeed, he came to personify the post-Togliatti PCI, relegating the other party secretaries, Luigi Longo and Alessandro Natta, to the sidelines. And he overshadowed the many other *dirigenti* of the time in which international détente abroad and ‘historical compromise’ in Italy gave the party unequalled political influence. In the narrative of this period and of Berlinguer himself, the party’s reversal from outspoken hostility to the EEC to ‘Europeanism’¹ is a key factor. Berlinguer is credited first with the political intuition to put forward Eurocommunism to emancipate the communists of the Western European democracies from Soviet control, and secondly with leading a change of attitude and policy regarding European institutions and the integration process. The party, which for more than twenty years opposed European integration for compelling ideological and political reasons, re-evaluated the economic meaning and geopolitical scope of the process and changed its hostility into a pro-integrationist attitude.

His role in European history and this unique U-turn would be enough to justify Berlinguer’s presence in a collection of speeches on Europe. There are other reasons, however. In European integration history, understanding the vision, the reasons and the political strategies on Europe of the forces that were not immediately associated with the "European choice" conveys the complexity of the process of integration. This is espe-

1 Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, Torino: Einaudi, 2006.

cially true when it comes to a party, the PCI, which for forty years won the votes of about one-third of the electorate in a founding member of the EC/EU; and whose political and cultural influence, thanks to its role in the international communist movement and the prestige of some of its leaders, transcended the demise of the Soviet Union and the decline of the global appeal of communism. The PCI's shift in favour of European integration was an offspring of the particular Italian political trajectory of the 1970s, which culminated in the 'national solidarity' governments of 1976–1979. However, it was consolidated during the party's opposition to the so-called *Pentapartito* governments in the 1980s. This offers us the opportunity to analyse the 'European choice' both in a governmental and an opposition political discourse.

The pro-European alignment of the PCI made European integration virtually a 'consensus policy' in Italy. This is even trickier if one thinks that during the 1980s European integration underwent a change in philosophy and methods, taking a more liberal path and competition-led model which contrasted with communists' economic and political *étatisme* and estrangement from market capitalism. This unanimity—together with the 'permissive consensus' that pushed forward integration until the early 1990s—has sometimes been considered a mixed blessing, as it dulled the debate on the goals and forms of integration and laid the foundations for later disenchantment, the cultural broth of Euroscepticism. By looking at how the communist and Europeanist discourses came together and shaped a normative approach to progressive European integration, we can shed light on a new type of European determinism, which has also been singled out as a cultural broth of Euroscepticism.

Berlinguer's style of communication is rich in elements suitable for analysis. Scholars have considered him an excellent communicator and his style 'exemplary' of the Italian Left². In Berlinguer's oratory, some have recognised the model of Togliatti, his way of moving from 'facts' to 'logical deductions' and the pre-eminence of ideological dictation and of pedagogical/normative purposes. He was militant and concrete. He used 'dry, didactic words, with a clear didactic intent', expressions typical of the lexicon of the workers' movement, and terms evocative of the 'high'

2 Alessandro Sanzo, "La retorica comunista nell'Italia repubblicana. Un caso esemplare: Enrico Berlinguer", in Rita Franceschini et al. (eds.) *Retorica: Ordnungen und Brüche Beiträge des Tübinger Italianistentags*, Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen, 2006, pp. 251–264.

values of politics³. In his speeches, the argumentative structure is rich and articulated, while the figures and tropes are scarce and designed to emphasise the former. Yet some of his formulas have defined historical processes and moments: the 'historical compromise', 'Eurocommunism', the 'moral question' and the 'exhaustion of the propulsive thrust of the October revolution'.

Like many communist leaders, Berlinguer used a language rich in resonance and historical sedimentation. Also, thanks to his sober style and a tendency to eclipse himself in the collective identity of 'the Communists'⁴, he gathered a strong emotional consensus. He used an identitarian lexicon. Emotion and an emotional identity were both a feature and a resource of communist politics. Moving from the new approaches on the history of sentiment and emotions and their impact on politics and international politics, we'll also notice how Berlinguer built his discourse on communism and Europe by combining the emotional dimensions of communist identity with a new empathy towards European institutions and 'Europe' as an identity. The shifting attitude and growing investment in European integration also passed through a changing emotional identification and empathy.

The Pci from anti-Europeanism to 'Eurocommunism': concepts and language

Berlinguer's discourse on Europe in the early 1980s can only be understood against the backdrop of the PCI's change of attitude towards European integration during the 1960s and 1970s. From the end of World War II to the boom, the PCI had opposed the integration process on ideological principles and historical contingencies. Among the former was the definition of the political arena as a class conflict, the struggle against capitalist economic and political relations proper to Marxism, and internationalism; among the latter, the affiliation to the Soviet camp and a prestigious position in the international communist movement, opposition to the socio-economic 'bloc' that made Italy part and parcel of the West, and

3 "Parola di Leader. Il linguaggio della leadership politica tra la prima e la seconda repubblica. Analisi statistica e linguistica dei discorsi parlamentari. Luca Giuliano, Il lessico parlamentare di Enrico Berlinguer," <https://www.paroladileader.com/2019/09/il-lessico-parlamentare-di-enrico.html> accessed 20 August 2020

4 Maria Vittoria Dell'Anna, "Enrico Berlinguer: l'oratore che non diceva "io"", https://www.treccani.it/magazine/lingua_italiana/speciali/PCI/Dell_Anna.html, accessed 28 April 2021

to the West, which imposed not only geopolitical belonging, but also a political and economic model on Italy.

Scholars of the PCI's history have detected hints of a thaw at the 1962 conference of the Gramsci Institute "Tendencies of Italian capitalism"⁵. Trade union leaders like Vittorio Foa and Silvio Trentin propounded that the economy of integration could not be liquidated with the pure rhetorical denunciation of class exploitation. Yet, the end of the 'decade of refusal'⁶ was followed by a period in which the PCI had little influence on the techno-political process that shaped the Common Market⁷. While in Italy the PCI's influence grew thanks to its voice in the public sphere and to allied social forces as well as through the Parliament, the absence of a European public sphere made the Parliamentary Assembly (PA) appear as the fundamental space where the party could gain a voice in European politics. When in 1969 PCI and PSI deputies entered the Italian delegation in Strasbourg, Giorgio Amendola, who was the first among the *dirigenti* in the PCI to fully engage in European politics, set forth:

We are preparing to be present today at the Strasbourg Parliament well aware of the basic limits of this institution—also due to the fact that a large part of the democratic and socialist forces of Western Europe is excluded from it—and of the deep crisis in which the whole European policy finds itself...(in order to) carry on in Europe the battle against monopolies, militarism and revanchism, for peace, for the overcoming of blocs, international economic cooperation and deep social and political reforms.⁸

The deputies' arrival in Strasbourg paralleled the new political dialogue with the DC, a hard-fought victory against the "forces of reaction"⁹. International goals were part and parcel of the new engagement in Europe,

5 Mauro Maggiorani, *L'Europa degli altri. Comunisti italiani e integrazione europea 1957-1969*, Roma: Carocci, 1998, 277.

6 Severino Galante, *Il Partito comunista italiano e l'integrazione europea. Il decennio del rifiuto 1947-1957*, Padova: Liviana, 1988.

7 Mauro Maggiorani, *L'Europa degli altri. comunisti italiani e integrazione europea 1957-1969*, 277. See also Maria Serena Adesso, « Il consenso delle sinistre italiane all'integrazione europea (1950-1969) », *Diacronie* [Online], N° 9, 1 | 2012, doc. 14, accessed 21 August 2020. <http://journals.openedition.org/diacronie/3068> ; DOI : <https://doi.org/10.4000/diacronie.3068>

8 «Eletti ieri alla Camera i delegati a Strasburgo», in *l'Unità*, 22 January 1969.

9 Gregorio Sargonà, "Alle origini del "compromesso storico". "Crisi" e "sviluppo" nella cultura politica del Partito comunista italiano", in *Historia Magistra*, a. VIII n. 20/2016, 19-28, DOI:10.3280/HM2016-020005.

however, and a powerful driver of the new policy. As Silvio Pons has written, Europe was to be “a subject of international politics substantially incompatible with the existence of the Atlantic Pact”, following the assumptions of anti-Americanism and anti-Atlanticism and “the dichotomous view of international relations distinctive of Communist political culture in the Cold War”¹⁰.

This was softened in Berlinguer's seminal declaration to the Central Committee of the PCI in 1973, when he put forward the goal of Western Europe as being “neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American”. This linguistic way out of the narrows of the Cold War accompanied his attempt to set up governmental cooperation with the DC, after 1973 the core of his national political strategy. So the acceptance of Italy's existing alliances was above all a consequence of, and a requisite for, domestic contingencies, i.e. the ‘national solidarity’ of 1976–1979, in which the PCI had no ministries, but was de facto a part of the majority of the governments presided over by Giulio Andreotti. The international dimension, that is, the structural bipolarism of the Cold War, retained a crucial importance, and a role in the international communist movement remained Berlinguer's priority, with the twin purpose of strengthening the communist appeal in Western Europe and emancipating Western communists from the Soviet grip. ‘Eurocommunism’ was to be a ‘third way’ between social democracy and Soviet style communism¹¹. While Eurocommunism did not firstly concern European institutions and policies, moving the class conflict to the continental level was also expected to enhance its impact in every country. In spite of the fact that the European integration process had capitalist roots and the political leaders of member countries operated within the context of the Atlantic community, he argued that, once the workers had a say in the process, they would turn it into an instrument for peace, social reform and progress¹². Indeed, “the EEC appeared to be a space within which the forces of the workers' movement must conduct common and coordinated

10 Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, 22, 23; vedi anche Mauro Maggiorani e Paolo Ferrari, *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer: testimonianze e documenti: 1945-1984*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005.

11 Silvio Pons, Michele Di Donato, “Reform Communism”, in Juliane Fürst, Silvio Pons, Mark Selden (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Communism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 178–202.

12 “We know that the process of European integration is led [...] mainly by forces and interests [...] linked to capitalist structures that we want to transform—he says—[...] But we believe that in any case we must push towards Europe and its unity and that the challenge [...] must be accepted, bringing the class struggle [...] to the European level”. Paolo Ciofi e Guido Liguori (eds.) *Enrico Berlinguer, Un'al-*

actions to build a Europe that responds to the needs of the peoples and the workers”¹³.

The PCI’s activism in the Parliamentary Assembly on internal and external policies alike confirmed the party’s achieved ‘Eurorealism’, its commitment to the EP as a relevant political arena and its engagement for a progressive EEC. Its goal in international détente was, with increased emphasis, the neutralisation of Europe. To this end, it propelled a West European foreign policy that was ‘autonomous’ from the USA; hence, the necessity of integration and ‘political unity’¹⁴. A key area of engagement was in North–South relations, with the Algiers Charter of economic rights and duties of states, the Helsinki Final Act and the Lomé Convention, signed in 1975 by the EC and the ACP countries as the three pillars of a new world political architecture¹⁵.

Together with internationalism, the state remained a necessary arena for political action for the Italian communists. In a world dominated by multinationals and US imperialism, national sovereignty protected democracy and the working class. Therefore, calls for ‘political unity’ in Europe remained generic and the communists ignored a key Europeanist *topos*, the federalism/intergovernmentalism debate.

This gap was implicitly, though a bit ambiguously, filled when the PCI renewed bonds with Altiero Spinelli in 1976. As recalled in his diary, Spinelli had resumed looking at the PCI, from which he had been expelled in 1937, at the beginning of the 1970s, after a long preferential relationship with Pietro Nenni and the Socialist Party¹⁶. To advance a “united Europe”, Spinelli saw the absolute need to “conquer the left to Europe”,

tra idea del mondo. Antologia 1969-1984, Roma: Editori Riuniti University Press, 2014, interview with Eugenio Scalfari 1978.

13 Conference of Communist Parties of Western Europe meeting in Brussels on 26 January, 1974.

14 Paolo Ferrari, *In cammino verso Occidente. Berlinguer, il PCI e la Comunità europea negli anni '70*, Bologna: CLUEB, 2007. The preoccupation of Berlinguer with the function of Europe in the international system was also confirmed in his meeting with Tindemans in 1975: see Alexander Hobel, “Enrico Berlinguer parlamentare europeo. Il dialogo con Altiero Spinelli”, in Paolo Ciofi, Gennaro Lopez, *Berlinguer e l'Europa. I fondamenti di un nuovo socialismo*, Roma: Editori riuniti, 2016, 54.

15 Elena Calandri, “Italy, the Developing World and Aid Policy, 1969–1979: the “Historic Compromise” and Italian foreign policy”, CWH, 2/2019.

16 Daniele Pasquinucci, “Altiero Spinelli consigliere del principe. I rapporti politici con Nenni e Berlinguer”, in Id., ed., *Europeismo e democrazia. Altiero Spinelli e la sinistra europea 1950-1986*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2000; see also Piero Graglia, *Altiero Spinelli*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2008.

when “Cheysson was the only authoritative man of the left who meant Europe”¹⁷. He sought a parliamentary seat in Strasbourg, “to end (his) life fighting for Europe” and saw the mutual interest with the PCI in his candidature.¹⁸ Spinelli considered the offer of a candidacy “the proof that the PCI really wants to fight for Europe”¹⁹. He cherished his independence from the PCI, but declared “proudness” for their European development²⁰ and praised the ‘democratic centralism’ and ‘Leninism’ of the PCI. He also urged for a clearer definition of the ‘third way’²¹. Yet his invitation to “the PCI to place itself as a vanguard point in the European struggle” left the communist deputies in Strasbourg “stunned”²².

Spinelli had a very visible role in the national electoral campaign²³, was elected as an ‘independent’ to the Italian Parliament and then went to Strasbourg, where he was the voice of Amendola in the Communist and Allies Group. For Renato Sandri, “Spinelli's candidacy meant a commitment by the PCI to the project he had embodied for decades”, i.e. it was aimed at “guaranteeing the party's Europeanist choice”. According to Silvio Trentin: the candidacy “meant recognising [...] not only that the European Community was by now a reality, but also that it was necessary to reverse the process by aiming decisively at political union”²⁴. Indeed, while Spinelli was only one of the *indipendenti* who ran in the PCI's lists at the 1976 elections, the others were mainly progressive Catholics with a domestic or internationally advanced reformist agenda in the area of the New International Economic Order, he was peculiar in that he brought a European vision and a federalist discourse. In 1977, the PCI submitted a proposal to the Italian Chamber to give the PA the responsibility of draft-

17 Altiero Spinelli, *Diario europeo 1976-1986*, Bologna: il Mulino, 1992, 55.

18 Letter from Spinelli to Berlinguer, 1 March 1979, in Daniele Pasquinucci, *Europeismo e democrazia: Altiero Spinelli e la sinistra europea 1950-1986*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2000, 309.

19 Mauro Maggiorani. Paolo Ferrari, *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer. Testimonianze e documenti 1945-1984*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2005, 57, 64–65, 329–330, quoted in Alexander Hobel, “Enrico Berlinguer parlamentare europeo”.

20 Wolfram Kaiser, *Shaping European Union: The European Parliament and Institutional Reform, 1979–1989*, EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 630.271 – November 2018

21 Alexander Hobel, *Enrico Berlinguer parlamentare europeo*, 56–57; Altiero Spinelli, *PCI, che fare? Riflessioni su strategia e obiettivi della Sinistra*, Torino: Einaudi, 1978.

22 Altiero Spinelli, *Diario europeo 1976-1986*, 180.

23 For example, in the final events of the campaign in Piazza Duomo in Milan and Piazza San Giovanni in Rome.

24 Mauro Maggiorani, Paolo Ferrari, *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer*, 138.

ing a reform. To Calamandrei, détente had given European integration a different meaning, and direct elections would only be relevant if they led to a revision of the relationship between Parliament and the Council:

the necessity, that is, that the meeting and concertation of national interests at the level of supranational decisions, such as may arise from a democratically representative and controlled Parliament, be made to prevail over what has hitherto been in the EEC the superimposition on national interests of decisions taken by the Council, with the predominance in the Council of the economically stronger States of the Community, of their changing groupings or directors, and, through them, the superimposition of interference by multinationals and more general imperialist interests from outside the Community²⁵.

The 18-point programme for the 1979 European elections was Amendola's brainchild; it also reflected his ten-year experience in Strasbourg²⁶. It included 'Spinellian' themes adapted to the PCI's priorities. The PCI asked for "a new plurinational democratic power", which should not threaten the national independence of the member states, but implement the tasks the European states could not perform individually in an international system dominated by the superpowers and international capital, acting through the dominant member states, France and Germany. It proposed economic planning on a continental basis, progress in market integration and advances towards a single currency; "a European community autonomous and peaceloving" that would advance disarmament, strengthen more equal and ethical relations with developing countries, and promote détente and coexistence. It asked for common action against terrorism and on energy, the environment and women, thus reflecting Berlinguer's attention to societal movements and trends. It aimed at "advancing Socialism in a democratic and pluralist Europe"²⁷. The programme combined the

25 Senato, p. 4290. Senato della Repubblica, *Discorsi sull'Europa. La costruzione dell'Unione Europea nell'Aula del Senato, vol.1*, debate on law proposal: «Approvazione ed esecuzione dell'Atto relativo all'elezione dei rappresentanti nell'Assemblea a suffragio universale diretto, firmato a Bruxelles il 20 settembre 1976, allegato alla Decisione del Consiglio delle Comunità europee, adottata a Bruxelles in pari data», Franco Calamandrei speech, p. 287.

26 Doriana Floris, *Europei al voto. Politica, propaganda e partecipazione in Italia, Francia e Regno (...)* A reappraisal of the PCI's ideas on EEC issues in *Rinascita*, No.15, 20 April 1979.

27 "Il programma del PCI per le elezioni del Parlamento europeo", in *l'Unità*, 22 April 1979, https://archivio.unita.news/assets/main/1979/04/22/page_007.pdf, accessed 28 March 2021.

goals of a state-driven socio-economic reform agenda aimed at remedying internal imbalances and at broadening the areas of integration. It promoted Western Europe's autonomy, neutrality and progressive action in the bipolar world.

The direct election accelerated the formation of a European public space and favoured transnational debates²⁸. As in other cases, however, notably the social-democratic area, the European communist parties were unable to agree on a common programme. Unlike the PCF, the PCI emphasised the political importance of the direct elections, and Berlinguer's candidature as the front runner in Central Italy meant his own and the party's full engagement. Yet the electoral campaign, as in other member countries, mainly focused on domestic issues²⁹, and Berlinguer scarcely mentioned European themes in electoral rallies, a key moment in the party liturgy and a show of strength. Spinelli was there to address European themes³⁰. After Berlinguer's death in June 1984, at the end of a rally in Padua for the next European elections, Spinelli noted that Berlinguer was "among communist leaders the only one who understood the meaning and implications of European politics". He wondered if the PCI's "European commitment was only tactical and superficial". Berlinguer's death had left the party "without a compass in European politics as in national politics"³¹.

Speaking to the European Parliament

A rapidly changing discourse

Berlinguer joined the PA as a leading member of the 44-member Communist and Allies Group, which included 24 PCI deputies³², the French Communists, some Italians from smaller left-wing parties and one deputy from

28 Filippo Maria Giordano, "Il Progetto Spinelli e l'Atto Unico Europeo: i gruppi parlamentari europei di fronte alle prime proposte di riforma dei Trattati (1979-1989)", in Paolo Caraffini et al. (eds.), *Il Parlamento europeo e le sue sfide. Dibattiti, proposte e ricerca di consenso*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2020, pp. 40–60

29 Calogero Laneri, "Il Pci di Enrico Berlinguer e le elezioni europee attraverso la lettura della stampa comunista (1979-1984)", in *Diacronie* n.32/4 2017, <https://doi.org/10.4000/diacronie.6983>, accessed 28 March 2021.

30 Altiero Spinelli, *Diario europeo 1976-1986*, passim.

31 Altiero Spinelli, *Diario europeo 1976-1986*, 214.

32 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_members_of_the_European_Parliament_for_Italy,_1979%E2%80%931984

the Danish Socialist People's Party. It was the fourth group in the PA, the Socialist group being the first with 113 MEPs, the Christian Democrats the second with 107 members, and the Conservatives the third with 64. The 1979–1984 legislature brought the expectation of a political breakthrough of the Parliament. In her inaugural speech on 17 July, Simone Veil, not a renowned federalist, named the Assembly “European Parliament” and invited it to use its power on the budget to increase its influence on European politics³³. Indeed the whole legislature witnessed interinstitutional and intergovernmental quarrels, economic difficulties and stalled dossiers, such as the enlargement of the EC to Spain and Portugal, CAP reform, budgetary issues or the institutional reform proposed in the Genscher-Colombo plan and the Spinelli initiative.

In such a critical European juncture, Berlinguer spoke on seven important political occasions and, with one exception, in the name of the Communist and Allies Group. He thus confirmed his ‘high’ conception of politics and the continental perspective of his role as the leader of the Italian Communists.

An analysis of his speeches shows a rapid change in approach, tone and empathy, with some elements of continuity. He framed his speeches in two concepts, which reflected his bonds to Marxist roots and his realist reading of political relations: First, political and economic relations as a terrain of class conflict; second, the international system as dangerous yet necessary and stable bipolarism. Against this twin background, he projected a narrative of socio-economic crisis in the West and at international level. After being a key concept in Marxist analysis of the capitalist economic system and society and of communist political discourse, the crisis of capitalism in Western Europe became the starting point for arguing for political solutions joining communism and European integration. Berlinguer's speeches barely mentioned the transformation of the process, just as they contained no reference to the value of the past process and its results. His reading of the past is usually ungenerous, accusatory and vindictive, and didactic. Europe is not indicated as a tool for the establishment of peace in Europe after the war, because the integration of the early years is dismissed as a tool of the ruling classes and American imperialism.

Indeed, the first speech, at the inauguration session of the directly elected Assembly, had a basic structure and an uncompromising tone: an affirmation of communist political purposes and ethical superiority

33 https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/174d384d-d5c7-4c02-ad78-b1f6efc9740a/publishable_en.pdf, accessed 28 March 2021

as the representative of workers' interests, an act of accusation against 'Western Europe' and EC institutions and policies, a plea for a future 'Europe of the workers and the peoples' and its autonomous and progressist role in the international system. Bringing in the AP the echo of the recent electoral campaign, Berlinguer abounded in didactic tone to propel a binary representation of political relations. The European institutions and policies were instruments of capitalism and of US imperialism, their policy unsuited to solving the state of economic crisis prevailing in the Community, to contrasting unemployment and to promoting détente at the international level. 'Western Europe' and the parties of the workers appeared to side on opposite fronts. The communist parties expressed "the interests and aspirations of the workers and of our peoples, but also the most profound needs of the whole contemporary world"³⁴, a claim relating to the universalism of the communist mission. By promoting a new economic international order, they would defend and develop the "best part of the civilization heritage built up by our peoples". By using one of his typical expressions — "We Communists" — Berlinguer solicited the pride and identity of the militants, yet empathic words designed the Parliament — "our Parliament", "our Assembly": MEPs shared in being representatives of peoples and embodying the only democratic body in the EEC. The democratic election had redeemed the EP of the original sin of the European institutions.

The difficult speech of January 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—with Berlinguer speaking only for the PCI as no common position existed with the PCF that approved the invasion—brought a more explicit endorsement of a shared "European belonging". Against the bipolar system that had the potential to destroy humanity yet remained inevitable and legitimate, "this Europe of ours" had the right and the duty to save détente, playing an "autonomous" role to stop the escalation of rivalry and conflict between the superpowers. Under the name of 'Europe', Western Europe appeared as a unitary geopolitical actor that should act to protect its own security and interests, but it was also an ethical subject, endowed with the goal of promoting disarmament, dialogue and negotiation. Europeanism would only prove authentic if it initiated such an autonomous international initiative.

In the next two speeches held in 1980, Berlinguer softened his confrontational and didactic tones and replaced some terms from the Marx-

34 Enrico Berlinguer, *Discorsi al Parlamento europeo*, edited by Alexander Höbel, Rome: Editori riuniti, 2014, 24.

ist lexicon with less identitary and politically more inclusive concepts — “forze dei lavoratori” rather than “forze operaie”, later “popular forces” — designed to build bridges with the left wings of the Social Democratic and Christian parties. He included the conceptualisation of integration as a solution to the crisis and put forward the association between integration and progress, a key word in the socialist historical lexicon. Responding to Gaston Thorn at the inauguration of the Luxembourg presidency, he criticised the absence of a “perspective of renewal, which necessarily means a bold initiation of common policies in several fields: economy, energy, etcetera”³⁵. This would be possible if the workers and their parties took the lead, as “dominant economic and political groups” were interested in market liberalisation, but were not committed to initiating new common policies aimed at an economic development that would bring a more just social order.

*The speech on 11 February 1981*³⁶

An articulate example of Berlinguer’s evolving discourse on communism and European integration is his response to the inaugural address of Gaston Thorn as President of the European Commission in February 1981³⁷. “An embattled visionary”³⁸, the liberal Thorn had denounced the impasses in European integration, following an economic ‘structural crisis’, and a deteriorated international climate in East–West relations and in regional areas such as the Middle East, but also because of the indifference of EEC citizens, owing to the distance and poor communication of the institutions, a gloomy picture devoid of any triumphalism.

Responding to the European Commission President’s programme for his mandate could be the moment to develop general ideas and political purposes for the rest of the legislature. As in his other speeches, however, Berlinguer did not bring a general view and appreciation of the integration process. However, in the speech on 11 February Berlinguer avoided any accusations and criticisms and focused instead on positive proposals for Community policy. The speech moved from ‘Eurorealism’ to ‘Euro-

35 Enrico Berlinguer, *Discorsi al Parlamento europeo*, 46.

36 Enrico Berlinguer, *Discorsi al Parlamento europeo*, 62–75.

37 http://aei.pitt.edu/30802/1/Thorn_11_Feb_81.pdf, accessed 28 March 2021

38 Piers Ludlow, “Gaston Thorn an Embattled Visionary”, in *The European Commission 1973–1986: History and Memories of an Institution*, Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union, 2014, 201–206.

peanism', in the sense of considering European integration the solution to problems, instead of a problem to be confronted. From a meeting between the forces of the workers and deepening integration, Berlinguer saw the responses to the state of crises.

Crisis was therefore the starting point of Berlinguer's speech, which he adopted as the basic legitimisation of European integration. Berlinguer's analysis of crisis in "our European Community" was as usual twofold: an internal economic crisis and an international political crisis that threatened peace and security, following the deterioration of détente and the escalation in the superpowers' conflict.

Berlinguer adopted a threefold integrationist perspective: in his appreciation of the past, in his explanation of the crisis, and in designing receipts for the future. Making a rare yet significant exception to his usual limited praise for integration, he "acknowledged" the contribution trade liberalisation had made to the rapid economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s, and paying a sober tribute to "those economic and political groups dominant so far" who had created the EEC, Berlinguer included integrationist arguments in his explanation of the internal crisis in the EC. Indeed, he mentioned bad economic data: low production, unemployment, monetary shocks, yet he especially focused on two causes—'regional imbalances' and protectionism. Thereby, he endorsed the regionalist perspective and free trade philosophy of the EEC. 'Regional imbalances' in particular were singled out as the principal cause of the economic impasse in the Community and the first issue to be remedied. Replicating a dualistic approach that resounded with the bipolar scheme of class conflict, regional imbalance in the EEC replicated North–South bipolarism. The cause of both was the functioning of capitalism, whose 'laws' led to a concentration of investments in the most advanced areas, and in a logic of maximising short-term profits. Less developed countries and regions fell into degradation and their underdevelopment also impeded more advanced ones.

In such a situation, the solution would only come from a threefold deepening of integration: the way out of the crisis is "a very deep change in the orientations in foreign and domestic policy as well as in the functioning of the institutions and in their mutual relations". In internal policy, if the origin of the crisis was in regional imbalances, a necessary step forward was regional policy mainstreaming, i.e. the insertion of the goal of reducing regional imbalances not the object of a specific policy, but the principal horizontal preoccupation in all Community policies. This was a 'national' posture, as regional policy was a traditional claim of the Italian governments that he upgraded to become a structural measure, within the denunciation of North–South internal polarisation opposing 'the

Southern and Mediterranean zones' to the North. From the perspective of Greece, Spain and Portugal's accession, Berlinguer defined an internal South that shared lower development and needed specific policies to be embedded in the Community's perspective.

As a North–South paradigm explained the EEC's internal system, it was also the fulcrum of his reading of the international system. Berlinguer echoed the Brandt Report, the manifesto of interdependence published in 1980 by the Committee led by the German social democratic leader Willy Brandt, who became increasingly distant from the pragmatic and liberal views of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. To Berlinguer, the future³⁹ for Europe and its new function in world politics should consist in its “bold autonomous initiative for the improvement⁴⁰ and “productive development” of backward areas of the South, which he saw as committed to freeing themselves from political and economic dependence from foreign powers. While in East–West relations Europe's role was meant to be political and (non-)military, in that it should promote disarmament, in North–South relations Europe had to take the lead in reforming the economic international relations for reasons of justice and economics. By coupling the *ethos* and pragmatism of interdependence, he argued that the southern countries needed to become “a central direction of the economic activities of the Community countries”. Berlinguer projected a geopolitical vision of the role of Europe between the superpowers and an echo of a Euro-African conception of the natural and mutually beneficial bonds between Europe and the Mediterranean and Africa.

The prerequisite for its role in reforming North–South relations was détente. Bipolarism was confirmed as the structural framework in which he located European integration and his political discourse in general. He accepted the bond with the US and the Atlantic Alliance as a defensive alliance with a defined geographical scope. However, he viewed and emphasised the existence of a broad agreement among Europeans of different political areas that distanced themselves from US policies on such different themes as e.g. Namibia, the Central and Southern American dictatorships and Palestine. In his carefully chosen words—such as when he spoke of “the full acknowledgement of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the creation of a proper stable entity”—he showed the search for a common ground on which a European international profile could emerge. On the other hand, he stressed Europe's role in promoting

39 “avvenire”.

40 “sollevamento”.

disarmament, that is, “reduction, control and the balance in armaments”. Through this, Berlinguer put the mass campaign against the Euromissiles deployment in Italy and the FRG, which the PCI was supporting, into a European perspective. He made no reference to contentious concepts such as human rights, nor formulated positions in terms of principles, but consistently conceived European international action from a geopolitical perspective, on which he hoped to build political rapprochement with the social democratic and progressive religious forces.⁴¹

His next response to the state of crisis lay in institutions. If the first goal of the party was to change economic relations within society and had the ‘workers parties’ at the head of the decision-making process, institutional reform was now accepted as a useful step. His discourse on institutions borrowed the Europeanist assumptions that made the Parliament followed by the Commission the bodies designed for the advancement of integration, against a Council that expressed national interests and ‘egoisms’ and slowed down the process of integration. He advocated “shift[ing] as far as possible the political axe toward the bodies whose rate of Europeanist conviction is higher or less low, giving more and more relevance to the Commission vis-à-vis the Council and to the Parliament vis -à-vis both of them”. In this vision the Commission and Parliament were allies; the Parliament was superior for its democratic credentials and for the role all sectors of society could play, namely the workers that had no voice in other institutions. The true novelty and clear change of discourse concerned the role and legitimation—derived from its ‘Europeanism’— of the Commission.

The redistribution of roles and weighting among the institutions in favour of the Parliament and the Commission, together with a stronger voice for a broad alliance of reformist and progressive political forces in Europe, were the twin changes able to lead the European Community out of its crises and to make it able to play its international role. This was the key to the legitimisation of the European integration process.

Conclusion

In later speeches, Berlinguer continued to share in the EP his increasingly severe vision of politics in Western societies, including the workers’ move-

41 Michele Di Donato, *I comunisti italiani e la sinistra europea. Il PCI e i rapporti con le socialdemocrazie (1964-1984)*, Roma: Carocci, 2015.

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ment, where he saw an insufficient understanding of the need for deceleration in terms of well-being and consumerism to the advantage of the rest of the world, to build a “social order based on parsimony and justice”. Also, he deployed an anthropocentric yet humanitarian vision, as he spoke of “rational exploitation of all the world’s resources starting from the most precious one, the intelligence of its inhabitants”. Indeed, Berlinguer increasingly regarded the European Parliament as a place for all-round political confrontation on the very bases of the political visions that nourished European politics. This also means that the European Parliament was the place where a ‘learning process’ and European socialization took place, which was part and parcel of the evolution of Berlinguer and of the PCI’s discourse on Europe.

Margaret Thatcher and Europe: The Bruges Speech (1988)

Eva Garau

Introduction

Margaret Thatcher's legacy towards the growing Euroscepticism which led to Brexit in 2016 is widely acknowledged. The former Prime Minister has often been perceived as the most vociferous critic of the downsides of a federal Europe, held responsible for what she feared would have been an irreversible loss of national sovereignty and a burden for Britain's values, tradition and economic development. This article, based on newly released material, aims at exploring more in depth Thatcher's stand on Europe as it emerged in Bruges in 1988, taking into account the transition over the years from a position of mild support for the European project to a growing concern on the consequence of a British involvement in monetary and economic union. It will look into the Conservative Party's approach to the theme, the internal debate on the opportunity to accept or decline the invitation to Bruges and what it would imply, the role of the Foreign Office and that of Thatcher's closest advisors and as well as the process of speech writing itself. More importantly, it will deal with the content of the speech and the consequences of its delivery, both in terms of Thatcher's political decline and for representing a watershed in the emerging of a British increasingly critical stance on the European project.

Europe as an asset

The relationship between Britain and Europe, it's been a troubled one since securing entry in 1973. As Hugo Young puts it in his account on British attitude towards the EU, throughout the fifty years of debates on the creation of and participation in a united Europe, "Britain struggled to reconcile the past she could not forget with the future she could not avoid"¹, strained between its legacy as a colonial power holding a

¹ Hugo Young, *This blessed plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair*, New York: Overlook Press, 1998, p. 1.

tight connection with the Commonwealth on the one hand and with the ‘Atlantic ally’ on the other and its complex relationship with the continent. Disseminated of cross-party criticism throughout the path towards integration, making the British ‘the awkward party’², ‘reluctant partners’³ or ‘strangers in Europe’⁴, this relationship recently culminated with the so-called Brexit of June 2016. In the forerun to the vote for the referendum, campaigners from both sides, the Leave and the Remain fronts, as well as opinion makers, appealed to the legacy of key political leaders from the past championing either the belief in a united Europe or the rejection of this ideal. The icons of two supposedly opposite stances on the matter, presented as points of reference in the Europhile and Eurosceptic discourses, were, respectively, Conservative ex-prime ministers Winston Churchill and Margaret Thatcher⁵. Leaving aside the fundamental issue – definitely worth discussion – of whether and to what extent it is really possible to place Churchill and Thatcher on the opposite side of what we may call the Eurometer⁶, it is undeniable that the Iron Lady played a pivotal role in the spreading of a ferocious anti-European rhetoric towards the end of her third mandate. However, overlooking her previous ‘sympathy’ for

2 Stephen George, *An Awkward Partner: Britain and the European Community*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990

3 David Growland, *Britain and the European Union*, Abington: Routledge, 2017; John Turner, *The Tories and Europe*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000

4 Stephen Wall, *A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

5 See, among the others, “Maggie, Maggie, Maggie- out, out, out? The battle for Thatcher’s EU legacy”, in *The Guardian*, 19 February 2016; Martin Kettle, “Churchill would have been a committed voter to remain in EU”, in *The Guardian*, 9 May 2016.

6 While Churchill is often presented as one of the ‘fathers of Europe’ and Thatcher is portrayed as its more relentless opponent, both politicians’ stances on the matter are much more nuanced than it appears at a first glance. In the first case, beside the studies, some of which published in the forerun to the referendum, which not question Churchill’s loyalty to the European cause (see Felix Klose, *Churchill on Europe: The Untold Story of Churchill European Project*, London: I B Tauris, 2016) there exists a number of other accounts, which unveil the ambiguity of Churchill’s position on Britain’s role in a united Europe, whose advent the former Prime Minister nonetheless saw as desirable (see Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot*). A position, that of Churchill, best summarized in his famous statement: “We are in Europe but not of Europe. We are linked but not combined. We are interested and associated but not absorbed”. On the issue of misrepresentation of Churchill’s and Thatcher’s position on Europe see also Eva Garau, “The Tories between Europhilia and Euroscepticism: from Churchill and Thatcher”, in Guido Levi and Daniela

the European project would imply neglecting – as it is often the case – a relevant part of her thought and political course. In 1975, in the forerun of another referendum called by Harold Wilson's Labour government, when the British voters were called to decide whether or not to confirm the recently acquired membership to the EEC, the then secretary of the Conservative party was firmly on the side of Remainers. Despite her profound suspicion towards a means – the referendum – which she believed could have had negative implications for parliamentary sovereignty, particularly in a country with no written constitution to regulate its employment⁷, Thatcher stood with Europe then. The diverging views within the party had long been known to its leaders and, while in this case they were dealt with through the decision of allowing a free vote at the referendum⁸, Thatcher was confident that the result would have confirmed the will to remain, as it was the case. Her support for the European project proved coherent with the principles that guided her four years earlier, when, in a written statement, she had advocated the long term advantages for Britain and for the Commonwealth of achieving entry in the EEC⁹. In 1974, as shadow Minister of Environment, she had expressed concern for the temporary suspension in the construction of the Channel Tunnel (or Eurotunnel), a bridge between continents, symbolizing Britain's belonging to the European family¹⁰. In a similar way, just before she was elected party secretary, she had denied allegations about her lack of endorsement of integration, stating that Edward Heath's main success had been that of ending an 'unnatural exclusion', while remarking on the importance of EEC membership in reinforcing the ties between the Commonwealth and the Community and in securing a long-lasting peace. This was a belonging- Thatcher claimed in this *Written statement on Europe* of February 1975 – which would have not diminished but rather strengthen British feeling

Preda (eds.), *Euroscepticism: Resistance and Opposition to the European Community/European Union*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2019, pp. 375-386.

7 *EEC membership referendum*, House of Commons, 11 March 1975, Hansard HC888/304-17.

8 On Thatcher's response to Edward Du Cann anti-Europe speech see *European Referendum – TV Interview for ITN – First Report*, 3 June 1975, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 102700 (All documents from the Margaret Thatcher Foundation archive can be retrieved at margaretthatcher.org).

9 Margaret Thatcher, *Written Statement Urging Entry in the Common Market*, 11 June 1971, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 102118.

10 *Channel Tunnel*, Hansard Archive, House of Commons, 871/1267-73.

of national identity¹¹. The lack of contradiction between European belonging and national sovereignty – later to become more problematic – was a belief Thatcher had already expressed since the idea of joining had started being discussed. In 1961, well before her first ministerial appointment, speaking to her constituency, she had claimed that joining would have in fact been an exercise of sovereignty, not a derogation from it¹². During an official trip to the United States in 1967, when questioned by the press on the possible ‘disastrous consequences’ of joining, she had replied that membership would have been worth beyond the benefits of a Common Market, just to be part of a united and peaceful Europe¹³. The concept was reiterated over time in the following years, for instance in 1976, just before Jenkins inaugurated the British presidency, in a speech delivered to the *Conservative Group for Europe*, when she stated that reconciling national interests with the interests of Europe, a goal defined as “key to the success of our Community”, could only be achieved by “cultivating the habit of partnership”, bargaining hard for national interests while understanding those of other countries and of Europe as a whole¹⁴. On this occasion she concluded her speech by stating that “meanwhile we in the Conservative Party must continue hard to work on policy, on organization, on persuading our fellow citizens to help forward the success of the Community to which under successive leaders the Conservative Party has already made such a substantial contribution”¹⁵. Ironically, a decade later she would have started to put forward her own contribution, which would have been remembered well after her time in government for reversing the trend and irreversibly compromising the ties with Europe that her predecessors had long tried to establish. As late as in February 1977, nonetheless, in an article for the German press¹⁶, Thatcher still saw the European project as a means to secure “a solid alliance between the Christian Democrats and the Conservatives to get a majority against the united Socialists and Com-

11 Margaret Thatcher, *Written Statement on Europe*, 7 February 1975, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 102483.

12 *Speech to Finchley Conservatives*, 14 August 1961, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 101105.

13 Charles Moore, *Margaret Thatcher, The Authorized Biography. Volume One: Not for Turning*, London: Allen Lane, 2013, p. 199.

14 Margaret Thatcher, *Speech to Conservative Group for Europe*, 24 November 1976, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 103147.

15 Ibid.

16 Quoted in Gerhard Mayer-Vorfelder and Hubertus Zuber (eds.), *Welches Europa?*, Stuttgart: Seewald-Verlag, 1977: Full text (*England und der EG*) available at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 103310.

munists". While stressing the fact that "for many years [she had] firmly believed in the European idea and considered it as one of the most hopeful and exciting developments of this century" the future Prime Minister, however, added something which helps to clarify her idea of Europe:

Presently much is spoken in Europe about 'Federalism' [...] each country understands something different by it. In my lifetime, in my opinion, there will be no central Europe an government accountable to a central European parliament with nation states having only powers comparable to those of the states of the USA. On the basis of our history, even in the future the national governments and national parliaments will play a greater role in Europe¹⁷.

This is still a phase in which Thatcher appears to believe that 'pragmatic' and 'visionary' ideas of a united Europe are not in contradiction, since, she claims, "we need both [...] we must all be firmly determined and realistic, without thereby losing the enthusiasm and vision of the European idea"¹⁸. In the same speech, however, some of the future PM's concerns start emerging, particularly in regard to the negotiations over the issues of agriculture, fisheries and energy. Even more importantly she seems convinced that there is "no quick route to economic and monetary union"; a belief that proves to what extent Thatcher did not foresee the begin of the negotiation on economic and monetary union as forthcoming, but rather just as a distant hypothesis, and which would in turn contribute to her feeling betrayed and isolated at the council of European Minister in Rome in 1990, just weeks before the end of her time as Prime Minister.

The road to Bruges

In the light of what came next in Thatcher's attitude towards the Community, some scholars have framed the support for the European project of this first phase as a necessary compromise not to be excluded from the benefits that would result from membership, combined with the fear that being left out would have marginalized the country both in economic and political terms¹⁹. Britain's late entry, the regular postponement and the hesitations in the negotiations to join ERM, the internal division within

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ On this concern see J. Boyd-Carpenter, *Way of Life*, London: Sidwick & Jackson, 1980, p. 133.

the party²⁰, the distance between Thatcher's and Delors' ideas of a united Europe are all factors that account for a certain degree of ambiguity and resentment, which mark the transition towards the future Prime Minister's unveiled criticism of the 1980s²¹.

Looking back at her last two mandates, we find several occasions in which Thatcher expressed either dissatisfaction or impatience with specific aspects of the process of integration and centralization, from the 1984 Fontainebleau sharp critique of the UK budgetary contribution, with the "I want my money back" scream wildly remembered as the highest point of her impatience²², to the equally remarkable "NO NO NO!" to Delors' Europe, to a Community she claimed to have been deceptively been dragged into, as she spelled out at Westminster²³ after the 1990 Council of European Ministers, just two days before the Leader of the House of Commons and Deputy prime minister Geoffrey Howe resigned precisely over disagreement on integration, and particularly over joining the ERM²⁴, leaving her cabinet to crumble and forcing her to resign. Thatcher has often been perceived as the main actor reversing the trend in a conservative party increasingly supportive of the European project up to her prime ministerial tenure, critical in breaking the prevailing view

20 Although Euroscepticism had long been a prerogative of the Labour Party, in the early 1960s two anti-Europe groups were formed by the Tories: the Anti-Common Market League (ACML) funded in 1961 by MP Peter Walker and Keep Britain OUT (KBO) created a year later by Alexander and Oliver Smedley (Anthony Foster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics. Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945*, London: Routledge, 2002). For a detailed account of Conservatives and European integration see Nicholas J. Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945. At the Hearth of Europe?*, London: Routledge, 2007.

21 Thatcher was not the only Tory MP to shift her position from Europhilia to Euroscepticism. Conservative MP Enoch Powell, remembered as the most radical opponent of European integration, before starting his international anti-Europe campaign in the early 1970s had been a supporter of EEC membership (Hugo Yung, *This Blessed Plot*, pp. 240-241).

22 All documents related to the Fontainebleau Council of European Ministers have been released in 2014 and are held at The National Archives (TNA) and at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Archives (FCO). See, among the others, the Cabinet Paper for Margaret Thatcher *Reform of the Community's finances and United Kingdom refunds* (TNA PREM19/1229f97)

23 Margaret Thatcher, *House of commons Statement (Rome European Council)*, Hansard HC 178/869-92.

24 Geoffrey Howe, *Resignation speech*, 13 november 1990, Thatcher MSS, Churchill Archive Centre, THCR 1/9/18A/15 f4 (document released in 2020).

in the Party. As Fontana and Parson²⁵ claim, the dynamic of keeping the ties with Europe would have evolved in less critical terms had Thatcher not inspired this course by her individual action. In an article published in the *Financial Times* in June 2016²⁶ one speech delivered by the Iron Lady is singled out as the turning point, the watershed that marked the departure of Britain from the EU, starting that seemingly irreversible process of separation that resulted in Brexit: the Bruges speech, delivered in 1988. The speech has been defined by scholars as “playing a potent role in the UK collective memory of Thatcher and Thatcherism as well as in elite thinking about Europe”²⁷, “infamous”, “the most notable Thatcher’s speech”²⁸; occupying a pride place in the young “historical lineage of modern Euroscepticism”²⁹, a “template for Euroscepticism”³⁰, the base for the subsequent development of “populist Euroscepticism”³¹

The Conservative Party’s support of the European project was at its highest when Thatcher acquired the leadership: it definitely had become ‘the Party of Europe’. This is reflected in the commitment to inter-governmental cooperation and in the belief that economic growth and the liberalization of the market would out-weight the marginal loss of sovereignty. The majority was therefore keen to engage with EEC, while Thatcher was a ‘willing participant’ to the SEA³², supportive of an open internal market that would make neo-liberalism an hegemonic project at a global level. However, Thatcher considered the SEA as a ‘means per se’, while she

25 Cary Fontana and Caig Parsons, “‘One Woman’s Prejudice’: Did Margaret Thatcher caused Britain’s Anti-Europeanism?, in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2015, vol. 53, pp. 89-105

26 David Willetts, “How Thatcher’s Bruges speech put Britain on the road to Brexit”, in *Financial Times*, 31 august 2018.

27 Tim Oliver, *Understanding Brexit: A Concise Introduction*, Bristol: Policy Press, 2018, p. 44.

28 Andrew Crines, Timothy Heppel and Peter Dorey, *The Political Rhetoric and Oratory of Margaret Thatcher*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2016, p. 51.

29 Andrew Geddes, *The European Union and British Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 195.

30 Michael Kenny and Nick Pearce, *Shadows of Empire: the Anglosphere in British Politics*, Cambridge MA: Polity Press, 2018, p.117.

31 Karine Tournier-Sol, “Reworking the Eurosceptic and Conservative Traditions into a Populist Narrative: UKIP’s Winning Formula?”, in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2015, vol. 53: pp. 140-156.

32 Nicholas Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945: At the Hearth of Europe*, Abington: Routledge, 2007, p. 51.

believed Delors' saw it as a 'means to an end'³³ - that of greater European harmonization and integration, including the promotion of social rights (a subject on which Thatcher's retreatment from her previous commitment is based). The outcomes of the SEA, which Thatcher considered unacceptable, were related to its effect on social policy, but also to its being instrumental to further fiscal and economic and monetary policy³⁴. Moreover, in the final two years of her premiership, a growing concern was that the process of institutional integration and the growing centralization of powers would put parliamentary sovereignty under threat. Bearing this in mind can contribute to understanding how the Bruges speech represented an attempt to put forward an alternative idea of Europe rather than merely withdrawing oneself from the agreements previously taken *tout court*. This attempt, which included the aim of making Thatcherism mainstream in Europe, this meaning forming a block of centre-right parties willing to contain what Thatcher used to define as 'the socialist enemy' and the growing power of the Soviet Union³⁵, ended up backfiring and undermining the Prime Minister political career, considered that an important element in the outlining of the context is that at the time of the Bruges speech Thatcher's leadership was not under question as she had a strong overall majority of 101 seats in Parliament.

The occasion for the speech was an invitation as a guest speaker for the opening ceremony of the academic year 1998 on the part of the College of Europe' Dean, Professor Jerzy Lukaszewski. The recent release of documents related to the approaching of Thatcher's visit to Bruges, aimed at internal circulation within the party and between Cabinet and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, provides a fundamental means to the understanding of Thatcher's own way of preparing for a speech and drafting it as much as it provides an insight of the mechanisms according to which internal discussion works, giving us a clear picture of the 'pre-history of the speech'³⁶. Among the other information it allows us to learn that various advisors had initially suggested Thatcher to decline the invitation:

33 Andrew Geddes, "Europe", in Kevin Hickson (ed.), *The political thought of the conservative party since 1945*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. P. 123.

34 Hugo Young, *This blessed plot*, p. 335.

35 Thatcher put forward this objective for the first time in clear words at the electoral speech given in Finchley on 18 March 1966 (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 101466).

36 Oliver Daddow, Christopher Gifford and Ben Wellings, "The battle of Bruges: Margaret Thatcher, the Foreign Office and the unravelling of British European policy", in *Political Research Exchange*, 2019, vol. 1, issue 1, pp. 1-24.

according to the FCO (particularly in the person of Stephen Wall, Head of the European Community Department) there were no “overriding reasons why the PM should make a speech on Europe now”, and it was necessary “not to try and sell the idea too hard”³⁷. Deputy PM Howe believed that a rejection would have gone unnoticed given the small college it came from, although at the same time he advised to accept as it would have “enabled the Prime Minister to make a major speech setting the seal on the reforms we have secured in Community, looking forward to the Single Market in 1992 and bringing Britain’s economic success to the attention of a wider European audience”³⁸. David Hannay, permanent representative (in other words Ambassador) at the EC, in writing to John Kerr, chief official responsible for the EC within the FCO, supported the idea expressed by Professor Lukaszewski, that this occasion would give Thatcher an opportunity “to spell out her own vision of the future development of Europe rather than leaving the field clear to other who chose to propagate the myth that her attitude was an entirely negative one”³⁹. The Dean’s comment to Hannay clearly refers to the sharp criticism Thatcher had directed towards negotiations on the UK budgetary contribution to the EC, which had already started to build her reputation as a reluctant participant in the European process of integration. As it was decided that Thatcher would give the speech⁴⁰, it became clear that the PM would have gone beyond the soft reference to the economy. The first draft, at that point only a list of the main subjects he thought should have been addressed, came from Stephen Wall of the FCO. Thanks to the recent release of these FCO files it is today possible to outline in detail the complex picture of notes exchanged between Thatcher’s staff and the FCO, for instance with John Kerr, assistant undersecretary at the FCO in charge of EC relations and Stephen Wall. Wall, initially sceptical on the idea of accepting the invitation, later reconsidered, seeing it as an opportunity to challenge the image of Britain as ‘too proud’ of her history – in his version he deleted

37 *Stephen Wall minute to John Kerr (invitation of MT to address College of Europe in Bruges)*, 22 April 1988, FCO document release to Margaret Thatcher Foundation (111773).

38 *FCO letter to Charles Powell, Recommend MT addresses College of Europe in Bruges*, FCO Archive, Foreign and Commonwealth Office files released to Margaret Thatcher Foundation (FOI 0242-09).

39 *David Hannay to John Kerr, (invitation for MT to address College of Europe in Bruges)*, 29 March 1988, FCO file released to Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 11772).

40 *Charles Powell’s letter to FCO (MT agrees to address College of Europe in Bruges)*, FCO files released to Margaret Thatcher Foundation (FOI- 0242-09), document 11775.

all references to European countries being supported against tyranny by Britain - too pragmatic and too insular. He rather suggested to focus more generally on the virtues of the Treaty of Rome in securing “the expansion of liberty against the mighty of the nation states”⁴¹. Much more enthusiastic of the invitation were representatives of the Conservative think tank *Centre for Policy Study*, particularly its Chair Hugh Thomas, who saw it as an opportunity to put forward a different idea of Europe, based around the notion of diversity⁴². Only a couple of weeks away from the Bruges appointment, the FCO and government members such as Howe believed there were fundamental errors in the draft as for instance the remarking of Britain fighting alone against tyranny and the overall language, not constructive enough to make clear the will to be in Europe. Thatcher commented on each draft, scribbling her comments on the paper as usual. She insisted particularly on passages related to what she called “the identikit European identity” which did not leave space to diversity and on the “ossified endless regulations” of the Community. Any direct critical reference to Delors was removed and the President’s name replaced with “the Commission” or “the Community”⁴³. Finally, while the ministry of Fishing and Food suggested making clear the dissatisfaction with the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy), the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) was critical of the patronizing tone of the speech, above all it was suggested that the constant reference to a pragmatic Britain in contrast with the ideological utopian rhetoric of the Europeans was ridiculous and counterproductive⁴⁴.

Finally, impacting on the drafting of the speech were Delors’ declarations, which sounded as an ‘anathema’ for Thatcher⁴⁵: the speech delivered

41 For Kerr’s first full draft of the speech and for a better understanding of the proceedings in the formulation of the speech see *John Kerr’s notes (annotation of No.10 draft of MT Bruges speech)*, FOI 02042-09 released to Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 11783).

42 *Hugh Thomas memo for MT (Notes for discussion with Prime Minister)*, declassified and released in June 2018, Thatcher MSS Churchill Archive Centre: THCR 2/11/3/6 part 2 f18.

43 *Stephen Wall’s minute (Geoffrey Howe’s criticism of No. 10 draft of MT Bruges speech)*, 1 September 1998), (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 111785).

44 Oliver Daddow et al., “The battle for Bruges”, cit; Andrew Roe-Crines and Tim Heppell, “Legitimising Euroscepticism? The construction, delivery and significance of the Bruges speech”, in *Contemporary British History*, vol. 32, issue 2, 2019, pp. 204-227.

45 Charles Moore, *Not for Turning*, p. 392.

at the European Parliament on 6 July 1988⁴⁶ when he foresaw that in 10 years 80% of economic and perhaps social legislation would have come from the European Community⁴⁷ and suggested an acceleration to be imprinted on the process towards economic and monetary union, and the address to the Trade Union Congress in Bournemouth on 8 September 1988. The speech at the Trade Unions conference, where Delors referred to unemployment and to the creation of a new model of European society whereby collective social rights would have been fostered and solidarity and cooperation would have allowed the weakest individuals to conduct a better life through the path leading to 1992 (a process presented as irreversible), contributed to foster a new support for European integration amongst TUC members⁴⁸ and was received by Thatcher as an intolerable political interference. While it had become clear that Thatcher's main concerns related to European integration were Britain's budgetary contribution (particularly in regard to the CAP), joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism and the approaching of EMU, and the address in Bruges can be seen as a response to these worries, nobody – the prime Minister included – thought the outcome of the speech would have been so controversial, as she recalls in her memoirs⁴⁹.

46 Jacques Delors, *Speech at the European Parliament*, 6 July 1988 (Debates of the European Parliament, No. 6-367/137-161).

47 Thatcher, in a radio interview commented on Delors' speech as it follows: "I think he was wrong. I think he went over the top, and I think he should not have said it. I cannot see how I go to the Council of Europe and start to talk with other Heads of Government and saying: "Well, boys! You are not going to have any more powers in the future! And all decisions are not to be taken here – they are going to be taken somewhere else! [...] In the end, any change of treaty has to be agreed by each of our parliaments and when I go to Europe, I am answerable to my own Parliament and therefore to my own people for what I do, and I think it was quite absurd, because it frightens people" (Margaret Thatcher, *Interview for BBC Radio 2, Jimmy young Programme*, 27 July 1988, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 107075). MP Enoch Powell contributed to make Thatcher's remarks against Delors particularly sharp (see *Briefing notes to Thatcher for BBC Radio 2 Jimmy Young Show*, 26 July 1988, Thatcher MSS, Churchill Archive Centre, THCR5/2/307 f47). More in general on Thatcher's relation with Enoch Powell since the beginning of her time in Parliament, see Eva Garau, *Margaret Thatcher. La formazione e l'ascesa*, Roma: Carocci, 2020.

48 The British Trade Union, until the early 1980s one of the most anti-EU union in Europe, reversed its position between 1983 and 1988 (Kristine Mitchell, "From Whitehall to Brussels: Thatcher, Delors and the Europeanisation of the TUC", in *Labor History*, vol. 53, 2012, pp. 25-50).

49 Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, London: Harper Collins, 1993: 746.

The Bruges speech: an alternative to Delors' Europe or no Europe at all?

Thatcher's own sharp rhetoric style and the pride for an abrasive language⁵⁰ clearly emerges in the opening joke of the address, when she congratulates the Dean of the College of Europe for inviting her to speak on Europe; a choice, she states, comparable to that of inviting the Genghis Khan to give his own view of world peace⁵¹. The first two and half pages of the speech focus on the relation between Britain and Europe since the Romans and trans-Atlantic history since the seventeenth century. This is "history with a purpose", which provides a "performative framing of the past"⁵², rather then, as Thatcher herself explained, an "aride chronicle of obscure facts from the dust-filled libraries of history"⁵³. The long digression on a romanticized British history, the remarking on the country's role in fighting against totalitarianisms and granting a lasting peace to the continent and the whole world, is characterized by a sentimental language aimed on the one hand at creating a connection with her British audience⁵⁴, while, on the other hand, at remarking Britain's belonging to the European family.

A crucial passage is that in which Thatcher reassures her host on the fact that "Britain does not dream of an alternative to the European Community or of a cosy, isolated existence on its fringes". While emphasizing that the destiny of the country is in Europe "as part of the Community", the Prime Minister clears the way from misunderstandings by saying that this does no equal to believing that sense of belonging "lies only in Europe". This clarification works as an instrument to introduce and to legitimize the Anglo- American view of the world and represents a persuasion tool to explain the embracing of 'British exceptionalism' and the desirability of Empires and free trade. In this regard Thatcher does not hesitate in

50 On the journey undertaken by Thatcher since the 1979 electoral campaign to modify the tone of her voice and appear more flexible in her public addresses see Eva Garau, *Margaret Thatcher*; Andrew Crines et al., *The Political Rhetoric and Oratory of Margaret Thatcher*. See also Margaret Thatcher, *Bruges speech – late additions in pen*, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 208973 (released in July 2018).

51 Margaret Thatcher, *The speech to the College of Bruges*, 20 July 1988, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 107332.

52 Oliver Daddow, Christopher Gifford and Ben Wellings, "The Battle of Bruges", p. 16.

53 Margaret Thatcher, *The speech to the College of Bruges*, cit.

54 Andrew Roe-Crines and Tim Heppell, "Legitimising Euroscepticism?", cit., p. 15.

openly presenting colonialism has a “civilizing mission”⁵⁵. The speech is structured around five “guiding principles”, each serving as a pillar for the outlining of Thatcher’s idea of Europe and each containing some degree of criticism towards the European project as intended by Delors. Thatcher starts by declaring the belief that a successful European Community can only be brought about through the “willing and active cooperation between independent and sovereign states” and that the “suppression of nationhood” would inevitably jeopardise the aims of the project. This passage- (“We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels”) - is of fundamental importance in making clear Thatcher’s support for an inter-governmental relation between States within the EU, while firmly rejecting the concept of a supranational power. The second principle chosen by Thatcher refers to a value that accompanied her throughout her political career: ‘pragmatism’. The latter, rather than an “abstract federalist blueprint”, should characterize the Community’s attitude towards problem solving and policy making. While praising the decisions on cutting in the agriculture’s share of the budget and introducing tighter budgetary discipline, Thatcher believes that work is still needed on these measures, and particularly that on CAP, far from being completed. The Community Thatcher has in mind is one that encourages enterprise. Economic liberty is the third value mentioned in the speech: a Community open to enterprise, whereby frontiers and barriers are taken down, must be the ultimate aim of the creation of a Single European Market in 1992. As much as in her previous addresses, Thatcher focuses on limiting the influence of States on the economy, while promoting free markets, widening choice and “reducing government”⁵⁶. Deregulating the markets, by removing constraints on trading, and decentralizing power to free private enterprises from the burden of “detailed regulation from the center”, represent objectives long pursued by the Prime Minister in British domestic affairs. The key issue to face, according to Thatcher, is not whether to create an European Central Bank, but rather the need to implement the Community’s commitment to free movement of capital and the abolition of exchange controls. While the Iron Lady seek to abolish frontiers for goods and money, she remarks on the need to preserve borders to protect citizens from the “movements of drugs, of

⁵⁵ Margaret Thatcher, *The speech to the College of Bruges*.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

terrorists and of illegal immigrants”⁵⁷. The last two principles, avoiding protectionism and confirming a common defence strategy through NATO, are only briefly enounced before the closing remarks, which assume particular relevance as Thatcher insists that the process of integration can only be undertaken “one step at a time”⁵⁸. According to this pragmatic strategy, the speaker trusts integration does not need further “documents”, given that regulations are already provided in the North Atlantic Treaty, in the Treaty of Brussels and in the Treaty of Rome. On the contrary, dealing pragmatically with specific issues as they manifest themselves represents in her view the only way not to be distracted by “Utopian goals”⁵⁹.

Looking at the whole process of speechwriting and delivering, the long path towards a final draft seems to be representative of Thatcher’s inner personality. Those who worked with the Prime Minister providing her with criticism and suggestions were well aware of her being keen to reject opinions contrasting with her own, and believed, as Kerr put it in a note meant for internal circulation⁶⁰, that it would have been best that changes in the wording of the text appeared to be “*sua sponte*”⁶¹. The sometimes overlapping attempts to smoothen her claims and soften her language resulted in the general satisfaction with the final draft on the part of the different voices there represented, from the FCO to the several ministries involved, from Transport to Treasury. Ultimately, all the ideas expressed in the Bruges speech, from supporting free trade and limiting the state intervention in the economy to promoting the moral standards typical of what she used to call “the British character” – a mixture of values ranging from personal responsibility and a strict work ethics as the basis for success – had always been pillars of Thatcher’s political thought and action.

Within the Conservative party, the speech triggered the reaction of several frontbenchers holding key roles in the cabinet, from Lawson to Howe. While the first saw it as coherent with Thatcher’s growing distrust of the EEC, the latter perceived it as outlining a caricatural image of Europe, pure “sheer fantasy”, a move deeply contrasting with the Prime Minister’s personal history of support for the process of integration, particularly given her Remain stand at the 1975 referendum⁶². The speech clearly

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 John Kerr to Peter Wright, (*state of play on MT Bruges speech*), 6 September 1988, FOI (FOI 0242-09).

61 Underlined by hand in the original document.

62 Andrew Roe-Crines and Tim Heppell, “Legitimising Euroscepticism?”, p. 20.

made Howe's life as a Foreign secretary negotiating with European leaders much more complicated and marked by a sudden suspicion on the part of international partners. The visit to Bruges inevitably put the seal on the rupture with former Prime Minister Edward Heath, the father of the long struggle to grant Britain access to the EEC, who believed Thatcher to be dangerously turning to an "increasingly emotional public behavior"⁶³. The tone of the address was praised by a considerable number of backbenchers, traditionally more sceptical towards the EU and it definitely served as a sort of ideological ground for the creation of the anti-European *Bruges Group* in 1989. While certainly Thatcher's speech contributed to the resignation of Chancellor Nigel Lawson and later to that of Howe himself, ultimately leading her leadership to collapse, others former Tory MPs such as Enoch Powell, insisted it to be merely a confirmation of the Prime Minister's attempt to put forward an alternative to a federalist Europe she felt Britain had never signed herself in.

Thatcher's main issue with the process of integration as it was developing at the time was related on the one hand with Delors' "socialist view" of the EU as a centralized institution extending its powers beyond the areas of economy and defence and, on the other hand, to the approaching of strict deadlines for economic and monetary union. If globalisation and liberalisation were presented as non-negotiable values, which needed to be supported through a growing deregulation aimed at making trade flexible and competitive, the introduction of the social policies presented by Delors (included the promise of more rights to the Trade unions) was perceived as an obstacle to this vision. As former cabinet member Michael Heseltine put it, the speech was "designed to draw a line in the sand, or to erect a kind of political Maginot line to prevent what she saw as socialist European centralism"⁶⁴. For what concerns the second issue the Prime Minister envisaged with Delors' Europe, it is worth remarking that since the aftermath of the signing of the Single European Act, Thatcher begun to understand that member states were converging towards a closer monetary and political integration and that she was not prepared to make the third phase of the process of integration a reality as yet. In her memoirs Thatcher recalls the feeling of having been mischievously persuaded to sign the

63 Edward Heath, *The Course of my Life. The Autobiography of Edward Heath*, London: Hedder & Stoughton, 1998. p.707.

64 Michael Heseltine, *Life in the Jungle. My Autobiography*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 2000, p. 348.

SEA, without being fully aware of what it meant⁶⁵. As Hugo Young admits, “how this misunderstanding came about – how so diligent a reader of small the print came so thoroughly to misinform herself remains one of the puzzles of the Thatcher’s era”⁶⁶. A partial answer can probably be found in the fact that Thatcher interpreted the creation the Single Market, through whom she believed she could achieve some sort of “Thatcherisation of Europe”, as a project aimed at liberalizing trade and the EEC as working according to a more consensual and corporatist approach than it actually proved to adhere to. While the Prime Minister was willing to benefit from the economic rewards arising from membership but without paying the political price attached to them⁶⁷, she was also turning previous hesitations into a solid strategy aimed at maintaining an ‘opt-in status’ that would maximize Britain’s influence in the negotiations and minimized her commitment to the outcome of the process of integration⁶⁸. Moreover, the whole idea linked to the ‘misunderstanding’ can be explained with the fact that playing a leading role in the creation of a united Europe triggered consensus at domestic level and granted visibility to Britain, a reward that nobody in the Conservative party was ready to give up. As Young puts it, the SEA and being part of the Single Market as well as fully involved in the process of integration was what Thatcher thought she wanted at the time and she was backed by the whole Cabinet. This might be the reason why the Prime Minister, but also her colleagues, started “storing troubles for the day it became inconvenient memory. For their eyes weren’t open” back then and later “they couldn’t really face the consequences of what they had done”⁶⁹. If one looks at the debate in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 referendum, one notices to what extent this attitude resurfaced just after Brexit, with many voters believing that casting their ballots in favour of leaving equaled to a mere protest vote⁷⁰. Finally, regardless of Thatcher’s

65 See, amongst the others, Arthur Cockfield, *The European Union: Creating the Single Market*, Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 1994, p. 135.

66 Hugo Young, *One of Us: Life of Margaret Thatcher*, London: Pan Books, 1993, p. 618. David Williamson, her senior advisor on Europe, recalls Thatcher confirming she had read “every single word of the Single European Act” (Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot*, p. 336).

67 Malcom Skipp, *Europe: more than a market, less than a state: the conflicting visions of Margaret Thatcher and Jacques Delors*, Durham thesis, 1997, p.106 (available at <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4680>, last access 20 July 2021).

68 Stephen Wall, *A stranger in Europe*, pp. 87-107).

69 Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot*, p. 338.

70 “I thought I’d put in a protest vote: the people who regret voting Leave”, in *The Guardian*, 25 November 2017.

intentions in giving the speech, one of the issues causing controversy was also related to her “persona” and her communicative style, in which she took pride, as she remembered in her memoirs when recalling taking pride in being defined by the Russian daily *Red Star* as the ‘Iron Lady’⁷¹. After the signing of the SEA, and dealing with the reactions to her outlining an alternative idea of Europe in Bruges, a third occasion in which Thatcher would have felt a victim of too sudden a process of integration lay ahead: the Council of European ministers in Rome in 1990, two years after the contentious address delivered at the College of Europe. Only then Thatcher fully realized that she had embarked on a journey on “a train that made no stops”, bringing into the open the consequences of the choices previously made and finally paying their price with the largely unexpected end of her prime ministerial tenure⁷².

71 “I stand before you tonight in my Red Star chiffon evening gown, my face softly made up and my fair hair gently waves, the Iron Lady of the Western world. A Cold War warrior [...] yes, if that’s how they wish to interpret my defence of values and freedoms fundamental to our way of life” (*Speech to Finchley Conservatives, Admitting to Being an “Iron Lady”*, 31 January 1976, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 102953).

72 Eva Garau, “La Gran Bretagna alla prova dell’Europa. Dal rapporto Delors al vertice straordinario di Roma (27-28 ottobre 1990)”, in *Ricerche Storiche*, XLIX, numero 2, settembre-dicembre 2019, pp. 113-130.

Giulio Andreotti's Commitment to the European Construction from the European Monetary System to the Project for a Constitutional Treaty

Antonio Varsori

Giulio Andreotti was born in Rome in 1919 to a lower middle-class family of Catholic tradition. His father, an elementary school teacher, died as a consequence of the wounds he suffered during the First World War, when Giulio was two years old. He had one elder brother and an elder sister, all of whom were raised by their mother, Rosa, a strong-willed woman. Giulio attended the Classical High School and attended the Faculty of Law at the University of Rome, where he graduated in 1941. During his university years he became a member of the Catholic University organisation, through which he had the opportunity to get to know Aldo Moro and Giovanni Battista Montini, the future Pope Paul VI. In 1942 he met Alcide De Gasperi and in summer 1944, after the Allied liberation of Rome, he joined the newly founded Christian Democracy Party. It was the beginning of a long political career. In 1946, when he was 27 years old, Andreotti was elected to the Constituent Assembly and in 1948 to the Italian Parliament. He was always re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies, as representative of the constituency of the Lazio region, where he enjoyed strong support. In 1991 he became a member for life of the Italian Senate, where he sat until his death at 94 in 2013. Andreotti was a pillar of the party system of Italy's so-called First Republic. He started his *cursus honorum* in 1947 as undersecretary to the Presidency of the Council and he was one of De Gasperi's closest advisors. In 1956 he became Finance Minister in the first government led by Antonio Segni. This was the starting point of a brilliant ministerial career: during the period between the late 1950s and the early 1970s, he became Minister of Finance, Treasury Minister, Defence Minister, the Minister of Industry and Trade in various cabinets and a representative of the moderate area of the Christian Democracy Party. In 1972 he was appointed Prime Minister and after the general elections he led a conservative coalition government, which was a radical change after a long period which had been characterised by centre-left governments. In spite of that, in 1976 he became the President of the so-called 'no no-confidence' government, that is, with the relevant abstention

of the Italian Communist Party, and in 1978, in the tragic days of Aldo Moro's kidnapping and murder by the Red Brigades, Andreotti was called to lead a government of 'national unity', which was openly supported by all parties, with the fundamental involvement of Berlinguer's Italian Communist Party. With the collapse of the 'national unity' experience in 1979, Andreotti's political career experienced a period of crisis, though he was still regarded as an influential member of Christian Democracy, but in 1983 he was appointed Foreign Minister in the first Craxi cabinet and he maintained such a ministerial role until 1989 in four different governments. In 1989 he was appointed Prime Minister and he maintained such a role until 1992. The collapse of the First Republic meant the end of Andreotti's political career. In 1993 he was charged with serious allegations, especially of contacts with the Mafia and of responsibility in the murder of an ambiguous journalist and blackmailer. Only after long trials in 2004 was Andreotti fully acquitted of such charges. In spite of that, he was regarded as a sort of political saviour, took part in conferences and cultural initiatives and wrote a series of volumes on different topics from politics to history¹. Before his death, he gave his private archives, more than 3500 boxes, to the Luigi Sturzo Institute, which have become a point of reference for any historian interested in the Italian Republic's political history.

Actually from the beginning of his political career until the 1970s, Andreotti was considered a politician mainly interested in domestic issues, although when he was Defence Minister during the first half of the 1960s, he had the opportunity to travel abroad on official diplomatic missions, to meet his foreign colleagues and to develop contacts with the US political and military establishment in the context of the Atlantic Alliance. Obviously, during his years as undersecretary to the Presidency of the Council, he had direct experience of De Gasperi's foreign policy, but we must not forget that in the early 1950s Andreotti was in charge of the frontier areas department that dealt with Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste under Anglo-American occupation, as well as with South Tyrol. In both areas, Andreotti favoured a nationalist policy, and in Trieste his office supported

1 For a biography of Giulio Andreotti, see Massimo Franco, *La vita di un uomo politico. La storia di un'epoca*, Milan: Mondadori, 2010; see also Mario Barone and Ennio Di Nolfo (eds.), *Giulio Andreotti, l'uomo, il cattolico, lo statista*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010.

right-wing nationalist movements through covert operations². When he became Prime Minister of a centre coalition government, his European record appeared to be a mixed one. On one hand he supported the usual Italian goals in the context of the new 'relaunch of Europe' which followed the Hague summit conference. At the Paris European summit in October 1972, Andreotti advocated closer political integration, although the Italian delegation appeared to focus its attention mainly on the strengthening of European social policy and the creation of a European regional policy. In early 1973, Andreotti shared Malagodi and Carli's sceptical attitude towards the early attempts at creating a European monetary system, and as a consequence of his government's decision, the Italian lira left the European 'snake', thus leading to a crisis in the relationship between Rome and Brussels. It was in this period that Italy was labelled as Europe's Cinderella³.

Andreotti's strong political commitment towards the European construction became evident in the second half of the 1970s. Actually, in his speech to the Chamber of Deputies on the occasion of the creation of his third Cabinet in August 1976, when he dealt with the foreign policy goals of his new government, Andreotti focused his attention on one hand on the 'détente' process, mainly as a follow-up to the Helsinki agreements, and on the other on the European Community. As far as European integration was concerned, Andreotti advocated strong progress in the field of political and democratic union and he pointed out the relevance of the decision by the Community to organise the first direct elections to the European Parliament. A few words also dealt with the recovery of the Italian economy and the strengthening of the lira, which would be the main goal of his government. But an interesting aspect in Andreotti's speech was his attention to the role the European Community could play in the Mediterranean through strengthened cooperation with the states of both Northern Africa and the Middle East. Such cooperation could favour

2 On these episodes, see Diego D'Amelio, Andrea Di Michele, Giorgio Mezzalana (eds.), *La difesa dell'italianità. L'Ufficio per le zone di confine a Bolzano, Trento e Trieste (1945-1954)*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2015.

3 See, for example, Antonio Varsori, *La Cenerentola d'Europa? L'Italia e l'integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010, pp. 249–261. For a wider analysis of this period in European integration, see Maria Eleonora Guasconi, *L'Europa tra cambiamento e continuità. Il vertice dell'Aja del 1969 e il rilancio della costruzione europea*, Florence: Polistampa, 2004. A relevant discussion on Italian participation in the "snake" is in the Historical Archives of the Presidency of the Republic (ASPR), Office for diplomatic affairs (UAD), Box No. 844, Report of a meeting at the Quirinale, 4 July 1972.

a peace process—there was a clear reference to the Lebanese situation. Andreotti concluded: “The Mediterranean (...) is destined to have more and more a vital role for the European Community”⁴. We may wonder whether in Andreotti’s view of the EC’s Mediterranean role the main aspect was the European Community or Italy’s interest in stabilising the troubled area, which had always been a major concern in Italy’s foreign policy, through the EC’s economic resources. Actually, between 1976 and early 1978 Andreotti had to focus his energy and skills on domestic issues: from the serious economic situation to the terrorist threat, which reached its climax with the kidnapping and the murder of Aldo Moro⁵. But, just after Moro’s assassination, Andreotti had to face a serious challenge in the European context: the launching of the project for the creation of a European Monetary System. The Italian government joined the negotiations and stated its commitment to the project, but very early serious problems emerged. Italy had hoped to achieve important economic concessions from its European partners and to rely on Britain’s support, but both West Germany and France were only ready to accept a larger fluctuation range for the lira and to offer Italy some loans, but no relevant changes in the European Social and Regional Funds or reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, as requested by Italy. Moreover, at the last minute the British Prime Minister James Callaghan informed Andreotti that the UK would not join the EMS, thus weakening Italy’s negotiating position. In the domestic context, the Italian Communists rejected Italy’s immediate involvement in the EMS, and doubts about such a choice were present in the Socialist Party and the Confindustria. Nevertheless, Andreotti could rely on the support of the majority of the Christian Democracy Party, which wanted to demonstrate its independence from the Communists. The Italian accession to EMS did not only involve Italy’s commitment to the European ideal, but it also became the test case of Italy’s loyalty

4 Biblioteca della Camera dei Deputati, *Giulio Andreotti e la politica estera. Discorsi politici e parlamentari*, Rome, Camera dei Deputati – Segreteria Generale, 2019 (hereafter, *Giulio Andreotti e la politica estera. Discorsi politici e parlamentari*), “Sulla formazione del III Ministero Andreotti” – Chamber of Deputies, 4 August 1976, p. 12.

5 On the Moro case, see Agostino Giovagnoli, *Il caso Moro. Una tragedia repubblicana*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2005. On the international implications of the Italian crisis of the 1970s, see for example Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, *L’Italia sospesa. La crisi degli anni Settanta vista da Washington*, Turin: Einaudi, 2009; Lucrezia Cominelli, *L’Italia sotto tutela. Stati Uniti, Europa crisi italiana degli anni Settanta*, Florence: Le Monnier, 2014 and Ricard Gardner, *Mission: Italy. Gli anni di piombo raccontati dall’ambasciatore americano a Roma 1977-1981*, Milan: Mondadori, 2004.

to the Western bloc⁶. The final choice fell on Andreotti's shoulders and Italy's, as well as the Christian Democracy Party's, traditional European commitment prevailed, though such a choice was to imply a crisis in and the likely downfall of the 'national unity' government. In presenting the decision for Italy to become a founding member of the EMS to the Chamber of Deputies on 12 December 1978, Andreotti gave an important and articulated speech. He opened his statement with an analysis of Italy's coherent European choice, starting from the Rome Treaties, and he pointed out the most important recent developments in the EC, especially its enlargement and the Lomé agreements. Then he pointed out all the political, social and economic advantages which Italy had enjoyed through its participation in European integration. After this sort of introduction, Andreotti focused on the negotiations for the creation of the EMS, giving special attention to Italy's demands, its partners' reactions and the British decision to reject participating in the EMS. The Italian Prime Minister was mildly critical of Britain's decision and he pointed out the concessions Italy had achieved. But besides the economic aspects, Andreotti claimed that Italy, as a founding member of the EC, had some sort of duty towards the European construction and had to confirm its European commitment. He concluded his pleading in favour of his government's choice with some references to the support from Italy's European partners, especially West Germany, and with the optimistic consideration that participation in the EMS would favour the Italian economic recovery⁷. It would be possible to argue that this speech was both a political and rhetorical masterpiece which involved both pride in Italy's role in European integration and the perspective of long-term practical advantages, without forgetting the need to maintain close relations with Italy's major European partners.

When Andreotti came back to governmental responsibilities in 1983, Italy's international position had been radically changed. Now the Italian leadership had recovered its significant role: Italy, due its position on the

6 On Italy's participation in the EMS, see Antonio Varsori, pp. 314–330; Daniela Preda, "Il ruolo di Giulio Andreotti nella nascita del Sistema Monetario Europeo", in Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio e Luca Micheletta (eds.), *Giulio Andreotti e l'Europa*, Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2017, pp. 197–229. In general, on the creation of the EMS, see Peter Ludlow, *The Making of the European Monetary System, A case Study of the Politics of the European Community*, London: Butterworth, 1982; Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, *A Europe Made of Money. The Emergence of the European Monetary System*, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2012.

7 *Giulio Andreotti e la politica estera. Discorsi politici e parlamentari*, pp. 15–24, "Sul Sistema Monetario Europeo", Chamber of Deputies, 12 December 1978.

Euromissiles issue, was regarded by the Reagan administration as a reliable ally, and the experience of participating in the multi-national force in Lebanon in 1982/1983 had demonstrated Italy's will to play an important role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East⁸. As far as the European Community was concerned, the Colombo-Genscher declaration had been one of the few attempts to give new impetus to the integration process⁹. In the early period of Andreotti's role as head of the Farnesina, the French-German rapprochement favoured the solution of the so-called BBQ, the appointment of the Adonnino and Dooge Committees and the appointment of Jacques Delors as chairman of the European Commission¹⁰. In the European Community, there was a growing feeling that the Community was on the eve of some important progress. In such an atmosphere during the first half of 1985, Italy had the presidency of the EC. We have no time to examine in detail the initiatives pursued by Craxi and Andreotti. The main achievements of the Italian leadership were its strong support for the enlargement of the EC to include both Spain and Portugal and the role it played at the Milan European Council, which led to the negotiations whose final outcome was the Single European Act¹¹. The Italian

8 For a general overview of Italy's international role during the 1980s, see Ennio Di Nolfo (ed.), *La politica estera italiana negli anni Ottanta*, Manduria: Lacaita, 2003. As far as Andreotti's policy towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East is concerned, see for example Massimo Bucarelli and Luca Micheletta (eds.), *Andreotti, Gheddafi e le relazioni italo-libiche*, Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2018. On Italy and the Euromissiles, see Leopoldo Nuti (ed.), *The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 2015.

9 On the Genscher-Colombo declaration, see Deborah Cuccia, *There are two German States and two must remain? Italy and the long Path from the German Question to the Re-Unification*, Hildesheim/Zurich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2019, pp. 99–127; Maria Eleonora Guasconi, *Prove di politica estera. La Cooperazione politica europea, l'Atto Unico Europeo e la fine della guerra fredda*, Milan: Mondadori Università, 2020, pp. 80–103.

10 Maria Eleonora Guasconi, *passim*. See also Angela Villani, "Andreotti e l'integrazione politica europea. Dal rapporto Tindemans all'iniziativa Spinelli (1975-1984)", in Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio and Luca Micheletta (eds), pp. 177–196.

11 On the EC's enlargement to Spain and Portugal, see Luca Micheletta, "Giulio Andreotti e l'allargamento delle Comunità europee negli anni Ottanta. Tra europeismo e atlantismo", in *Ventesimo Secolo*, a. XIX, No. 47, December 2020, pp. 30–32. On the Milan European Council, see Antonio Varsori, *La Cenerentola d'Europa?*, pp. 345–352 and Antonio Varsori, "The Relaunching of Europe of the mid-1980s", in Klaus Kiran Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode (eds.), *European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 226–242.

government was critical of the SEA due to its weak supranational implications, especially as far as the European Parliament was concerned. Italy's position has been criticised by commentators and historians as the Italian authorities, bound to an idealistic federal approach, appeared unable to understand the deep implications of the SEA, the budget reform and the structural funds¹². Andreotti's interventions at the Italian Parliament offer some key insights into understanding the Italian position. In early June 1984, Andreotti gave a long speech at the Chamber of Deputies on the Spinelli project. He praised the plan put forward by the European Parliament, but he was critical of some attitudes towards the European construction, especially the attempts by some states to create special bi-lateral relationships. Then he pointed out the usual Italian claims for stronger initiatives in the social and cultural fields and the need for the creation of a sort of European identity, as such a goal would strengthen the Community's international position and its role vis-à-vis both the US and the Eastern bloc. An analysis of Andreotti's speech demonstrates the practical implications of Italy's support for the Spinelli project: a) the concern about the creation of a French–German couple which would limit Italy to a minor role in the Community, b) the hope that a more powerful European Parliament could support Italy's traditional interests, and c) the belief that Italy could play a more influential role in the EP than in the Council or the Commission¹³. In December 1985, in a speech to the Italian Senate, Andreotti sketched out the results of the Italian government's initiatives during the Italian Presidency of the EC. He gave a positive evaluation of the decisions taken at the Milan European Council, especially the conclusion of the negotiations related to Spain and Portugal's full membership and the launching of an intergovernmental conference whose main goal would be to strengthen the supranational character of the European Community; in this connection, he highlighted Italy's hopes for the European Parliament to play a stronger role¹⁴.

12 For an interesting critical view of the Italian attitude, see what was written by Pietro Calamia, the Italian permanent representative in the COREPER, in Archivio Storico Istituto Luigi Sturzo, Archivio Giulio Andreotti, Europa CEE, Box No. 410, tel. No. 367, Calamia (Bruxelles) to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 18 January 1986., confidential.

13 *Giulio Andreotti e la politica estera. Discorsi politici e parlamentari*, pp. 39–53, “Sul progetto di trattato istitutivo dell'Unione Europea”, Chamber of Deputies, 6 June 1984.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 66–80, “Sull'adesione del Regno di Spagna e della Repubblica Portoghese alla Comunità Economica Europea ed alla Comunità Europea dell'Energia Atomica”, Chamber of Deputies, 5 December 1985.

The outcome of the intergovernmental conference and the Single European Act were perceived by the Italian authorities as strong disappointment, especially as far as the powers of the European Parliament were concerned. The SEA was dealt with by Andreotti on several occasions in 1986, both at the Chamber of Deputies and the Italian Senate. Andreotti confirmed the Italian government's critical view of the SEA and he confirmed Italy's loyalty to political integration and to Spinelli's ideals. So Italy would accept the SEA, but such an agreement would be regarded as a mere starting point. It is of some significance, however, that the Italian Foreign Minister did not explain in detail the reasons of Italy's disillusionment. So we have the impression that, besides some obvious concrete Italian interests, Andreotti and the Craxi government were mainly concerned with the confirmation, vis-à-vis Italian public opinion and the Italian political parties, of the country's coherent faithfulness to an idealist and federalist concept of the European construction. It has to be pointed out that the Italian Foreign Minister did not explain the characteristics and future implications of the SEA¹⁵.

During the following years, questions relating to the EC appeared to play a minor role in Andreotti's parliamentary speeches, and his most interesting interventions focused on issues such as the relations between East and West, the Palestinian problem, the disarmament negotiations, etc¹⁶. The future of European integration came back into the limelight in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the prospect of quick German reunification. Andreotti was no longer Foreign Minister and the Farnesina was headed by the Socialist leader Gianni De Michelis, but in his capacity as Prime Minister, Andreotti was still deeply interested in Italy's foreign policy¹⁷. During the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall, Andreotti, who was not too happy about rapid German reunification, explained to his major European partners that Italy would accept a reunified Germany if three conditions were fulfilled: a) the reform of the CSCE, b)

15 See, for example, *ibid.*, pp. 81–93, “Sulla politica comunitaria”, Chamber of Deputies, 29.1.1986 and pp. 127–131, “Sull’esame dei documenti relativi all’attività e alla situazione economica delle Comunità Europee, all’attuazione delle direttive comunitarie e sulla ratifica dell’Atto Unico Europeo”, Senate of the Republic, 1 October 1986.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 132–212.

17 In general, see Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia e la fine della guerra fredda. La politica estera dei governi Andreotti (1989-1992)*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2013.

the survival of NATO, and c) stronger political integration¹⁸. In a speech he delivered to the Institutional Committee of the European Parliament in late January 1990, Andreotti informed the members of the Committee of the Italian project for the launch of an intergovernmental conference on the political reform of the Treaties and the creation of a European Union, a conference which would be added to the one on the Economic and Monetary Union, as in Andreotti's view, the EMU could be successful only on the condition of a deep transformation of the political structure of the European Community¹⁹. In the second half of 1990, Italy had the presidency of the Community and the Italian project was put forward on the occasion of two European Councils, where the Italian plan was approved by the other member states, thus paving the way for the intergovernmental conference on the European Union²⁰. Andreotti dealt with his government's European project in some interventions to both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Once again, Andreotti focused his attention on the goal of strengthened supranational integration and on the creation of new institutional architecture, while few words were devoted to the EMU negotiations²¹. Actually, his parliamentary speeches give the impression that in this period—that is, the second half of 1990 and the first half of 1991—Andreotti was compelled to focus on thornier international questions, which had a strong impact on the domestic scenario: Italy's involvement in the first Gulf War, which was strongly opposed by both the left-wing parties and the significant Catholic milieu, the first wave of immigrants from Albania, and the serious concern about the implosion of the Yugoslav federation²². During the negotiations which led to the

18 On Andreotti's three conditions, see Archives Francois Mitterrand, report of a conversation between Mitterrand and Andreotti, 13 February 1990.

19 *Giulio Andreotti e la politica estera. Discorsi politici e parlamentari*, pp. 213–219, “Intervento alla Commissione Istituzionale del Parlamento Europeo”, Brussels, 24 January 1990.

20 Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio, “Il Trattato di Maastricht e l'unione economica e monetaria” and Umberto Morelli, “Il trattato di Maastricht e l'unione politica”, in Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio and Luca Micheletta (eds.), pp. 231–264; 265–284, Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia e la fine della guerra fredda*, pp. 189–226.

21 *Giulio Andreotti e la politica estera. Discorsi politici e parlamentari*, pp. 220–234, “Sul semestre di Presidenza italiana della CEE”, Chamber of Deputies, 2.7.1990 and “Sulla politica comunitaria”, Senate of the Republic, 3 July 1990.

22 Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia e la fine della guerra fredda, passim*. Such a concern was evident in some of Andreotti's parliamentary interventions; see *Giulio Andreotti e la politica estera. Discorsi politici e parlamentari*, pp. 235–275, “Sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni del Consiglio dei Ministri”, Chamber of Deputies, 23.8.1990.; “Su mozioni concernenti la situazione nel Golfo Persico”,

Maastricht Treaty, Andreotti and De Michelis focused their attention on political issues, especially the powers of the European Parliament, but once again Italy's goals were only partially achieved, although in the Senate Andreotti pointed to Italy's continuous efforts²³. As is well known, the negotiations on the EMU were mainly the responsibility of the Treasury Minister, Carli, and the Governor of the Bank of Italy, Ciampi, who had to accept or perhaps agreed to the so-called five Maastricht parameters, which can be regarded as an example of the well-known 'external bond' concept²⁴. Actually, just after the end of the Maastricht treaty negotiations, Italy's domestic situation experienced a dramatic change that would lead to the collapse of Italy's First Republic, due to the 'Clean Hands' scandal, the crisis in the party system and a serious economic crisis²⁵. It was also the end of Andreotti's world and his political career; in 1993 he was to be charged with serious accusations: involvement in Mafia activities and in a political assassination. In spite of that, Andreotti did not give up his interest in Italy's foreign policy, especially in his interventions to some debates in the Italian Senate. In September 1992, on the occasion of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, Andreotti proudly claimed both his role and Italy's historical role in the progress made in European integration. In September 1997, in a further intervention in the Senate, he pointed out the relevance of the 'peoples' Europe' concept, which in his opinion would not be tied to definite party politics. Moreover, Andreotti argued that, in spite of the relevance of the economic aspects of European integration, especially the creation of the euro, he still believed in the paramount goal of political integration. Nevertheless, he stated his support for the efforts of the Prodi government in favouring a strong economic recovery which would offer Italy the opportunity to be involved in the future economic

Chamber of Deputies 26-27 January 1991.; "Sulla situazione nel Golfo Persico", Chamber of Deputies, 21-22 February 1991.; "Su interrogazioni e interpellanze concernenti la situazione in Jugoslavia", 25 September 1991.

23 Ibid., pp. 286-288, "Sulla ratifica ed esecuzione del Trattato sull'Unione Europea", Senate of the Republic, 16 September 1992.

24 Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio, *Il Trattato di Maastricht, passim.*: Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia e la fine della guerra fredda*, pp. 189-226.

25 On this period of Italy's history, see in general Simona Colarizi, Agostino Giovagnoli, Paolo Pombeni (eds.), *L'Italia contemporanea dagli anni Ottanta a oggi*, III, *Istituzioni e politica*, Rome: Carocci, 2014 and Simona Colarizi e Marco Gervasoni, *La tela di Penelope. Storia della Seconda Repubblica 1989-2011*, Rome/Bari: Laterza, 2012, pp. 3-31.

goals pursued by the European Union²⁶. It is of some significance that in one of his last and brief interventions, in January 2004—he was already 85 years old—Andreotti dealt with the semester of the Italian presidency of the Union. He was a bit sceptical of the strong optimism which surrounded the work of the European Convention and the project for a constitutional treaty and he criticised the tendency of some major European states to develop a common attitude on some relevant foreign policy issues, as in his opinion such a position strongly contrasted with the results of the European Convention. In spite of that, he concluded with the hope that Italy's position “would lose the character of a national position and would acquire the meaning—with our important contribution—of a goal of the European Union”²⁷.

In conclusion, through an analysis of his public interventions, especially his speeches to the Italian Parliament, it is possible to argue that Andreotti's attitude towards the European construction experienced a gradual change. In the early stages of his political career, the European issue did not appear to play a significant role, although there was a traditional allegiance to Italy's European choice, which, however, contrasted with some choices by Andreotti, such as his position towards the European snake in 1973. His commitment to the European ideal became stronger and more evident after the late 1970s, and his role in Italy's decision to join the EMS and in favouring the process of political integration, especially his strong support for a more powerful role for the Italian Parliament, must be pointed out. Such a commitment to political integration did not mean a weak interest in both Italy's international role in the European context and the defence of Italy's national interests: for example, he was always suspicious and openly critical of any special relationship which would influence the European Community, especially of too strong a French–German couple, which would threaten Italy's position in the European construction. Andreotti was always regarded as a realist, sometimes a cynical politician mainly interested in ‘power’. His parliamentary interventions on European issues reveal another character of Andreotti's foreign policy: as far as European integration was concerned, Andreotti's realism was tempered by some form of idealism, an underground belief which linked

26 *Giulio Andreotti e la politica estera. Discorsi politici e parlamentari*, pp. 292–294, “Sulle comunicazioni del Governo sulla Conferenza intergovernativa europea”, Senate of the Republic, 4 June 1997.

27 *Ibid.*, pp. 314–316, “Sulle comunicazioni del Ministro degli affari esteri sugli esiti del vertice conclusivo del semestre di presidenza italiana dell'Unione Europea”, Senate of the Republic, 22 January 2004.

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Andreotti to Alcide De Gasperi, in spite of the different personalities of these two Christian Democrat politicians, who both shaped the main patterns of the history of the Italian Republic, especially Italy's international role.

CHAPTER IV:
BUILDING, CONVEYING AND PROMOTING THE
EUROPEAN UNION IN THE 1980s AND 1990s

“Europe is not a mechanical Process, nor is it an Automatic Fact.” Emilio Colombo’s Vision of European Integration

Maria Eleonora Guasconi

Introduction

Emilio Colombo was one of the prominent statesmen of the so-called First Italian Republic: he belonged to the *Democrazia Cristiana* and played a relevant role in various phases of Italian post-war history, but also in important turning points in European integration, after its origins.

Colombo’s long political career was, in fact, deeply intertwined with his strong commitment to the ideals of European integration, and he is often described by historiography as a skillful negotiator in complex negotiations, such as those concerning the first UK application to the EEC, or during the ‘empty chair’ crisis of 1965, or later as President of the European Parliament¹.

After a short description of Colombo’s political career, this contribution aims at addressing Emilio Colombo’s vision of Europe, through an analysis of two speeches: the first one delivered in Florence in January 1981 and the second at the European Parliament in October 1982. Both these speeches aimed at promoting a revival of the European ideals at the beginning of the 1980s through the drafting of a plan, which Emilio Colombo prepared with the German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, known as the ‘Genscher-Colombo Plan’ of 1981.

It’s impossible to evaluate if Colombo wrote these speeches or if they were written by a ghostwriter; however, from some interviews available on the European Parliament website, it’s clear that both these two public

1 N. Piers Ludlow, *Dealing with Britain: the Six and the First UK Application to the EEC*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Antonio Varsori, *La Cenerentola d’Europa. L’Italia e l’integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, 2010, p.199; Wilfried Loth, “L’Allemagne et l’Italie dans le processus de costruzione européenne: une coopération occasionelle?”, in Piero Craveri and Antonio Varsori (eds), *L’Italia e la costruzione europea. Un bilancio storico (1957-2007)*, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2009, pp. 462–464.

speeches represented his feelings on and ideas, concepts and vision of Europe.

Moving from the historical context of the speeches, this contribution will try to answer the following questions: What key themes were sketched out in these two speeches, which reflected the main challenges of European politics? What kind of vision of Europe did Emilio Colombo aim at conveying?

Emilio Colombo's commitment to European integration

Born in Potenza, in the region of Basilicata, in the South of Italy on 11 April 1920, Emilio Colombo started his political career after the Second World War.

He has been labelled the “enfant prodige”² of Italian politics: in fact in 1946, at the age of 26, he was elected as a member of the Constituent Assembly, which was responsible for drafting the new Italian post-war constitution³.

At first, he worked as Undersecretary for Public Works, then as the Ministers for Agriculture, Foreign Commerce, Industry and the Treasury in several Italian centre and centre-left governments and, from 1970 to 1972, he was also appointed President of the Council of Ministers.

Throughout those years he was always an appreciated member of his party, the DC: he belonged to the moderate wing of the party, called ‘*doro-tea*’, together with Mariano Rumor, Paolo Emilio Tavani, Antonio Segni and Aldo Moro. At the beginning of the 1980’s, he was also appointed Foreign Minister.

The European profile of Colombo is equally interesting. Many can remember him in his capacity as President of the European Parliament; in fact, he was elected in 1977 and chaired it until the first general election of 1979. Still, this was only confirmation of his remarkable diplomatic skills, which he had shown throughout the previous years, for instance during the negotiations which led to the signature of the Treaties of Rome⁴, when

2 Maria Grazia Melchionni, “Emilio Colombo: aspetti del pensiero e momenti dell’azione politica”, in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, vol. 78, no. 3, 2011, pp. 331–445.

3 Interview with Alfonso Bottai in Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence, Voices of Europe, https://archives.eui.eu/oral_history/INT581, last accessed 2 October 2021

4 M. G. Melchionni, pp. 331–445.

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he closely followed the part of the Treaty which dealt with agriculture, or as a skilful negotiator in tricky situations such as the ‘empty chair crisis’ of 1965⁵, in which he played a key role in negotiating the Luxembourg compromise with the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, introducing the ‘veto right’⁶.

In an interview with Arrigo Levi, Colombo, talking about his experience during the negotiations of the Treaties of Rome, reminded that he belonged to a generation of politicians that shared the common ideal of a united Europe, because for them “Europe [was] the natural context in which solutions for [sic] social and economic progress [would] find their true meaning and true value”⁷.

For the Christian Democrat statesman, as well as for an entire generation of Italian Christian Democrats, the European Community was not just a political and economic organisation *per se* or a legal organisation of European states that pursued a solution to concrete problems. In other words, it was not just an instrument of politics, but a “courageous mission” that had its own teleology, its own ineluctable, ultimate goal. The gradual integration of the states would almost fatally lead to the federal unity of Europe sooner or later, the unity that would be the future world of the European nations⁸.

In this vision of European integration, Emilio Colombo, as well as other Christian Democrats of his generation, was clearly influenced by Alcide De Gasperi, whom he often recalled when talking about the legacy of the ‘fathers of Europe’⁹.

It is all too banal, moreover, but no less true, to say that the generation to which De Gasperi and Colombo belonged experienced one or two world wars, political instability and the economic and social crisis of Europe between the two world wars, the Europe of nationalist ideologies, totalitarian states and economic autarky. For their generation, the European project had restored peace in the European continent ravaged by two world wars, through the Franco-German reconciliation, so it’s quite

5 For an overview of Colombo’s political career, see: Emilio Colombo, *Per l’Italia e per l’Europa. Conversazione con Arrigo Levi*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2013.

6 Maurice Couve de Murville, *Une politique étrangère*, Paris: Plon, 1971, pp. 329–339.

7 This quotation is downloaded from the Multimedia Centre of the European Parliament website: <https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu>, last accessed 31 May 2021

8 For these evaluations, see Augusto D’Angelo, “La dimensione europea della DC”, in Francesco Lefebvre D’Ovidio, Luca Micheletta (eds.), *Giulio Andreotti e l’Europa*, Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2017, pp. 1–5.

9 E. Colombo, pp.28–30.

common to find references in his speeches to the concept of peace as the main result achieved by the European integration process.

Colombo gained a substantial international reputation and was widely considered particularly skilled in conducting the complex Community's negotiations. He was one of the stars of the 1961–1963 membership negotiations, when Great Britain first applied to join the EEC, and his name was raised whenever the question arose of who might be the ideal Italian candidate for a Brussels job. However, during the 1960s he was deeply involved in Italian politics and when he was offered that chance to chair the European Commission in 1967, he turned it down because he preferred to remain in his home country¹⁰.

In 1976, Colombo became a deputy of the European Parliament, where he sat until 1992 in the Christian Democratic Group, which later became the European People's Party. Then, in March 1977, he was elected President of the European Parliament and in 1979 he received the Charlemagne Prize in Aachen, being the third Italian politician to receive this honour, after Alcide De Gasperi and Antonio Segni.

The years he spent at the European Parliament, far from the Italian turmoil of the *'anni di piombo'*, represented a turning point in Colombo's political career. In his autobiography, he underlines the importance of those years, reminding the reader of when he delivered a speech in front of the Spanish Courts, underlining the solemnity of the celebration, which expressed the Spanish desire to embark on a path towards the consolidation of democracy and freedom after the death of Francisco Franco; for Spain, the European Community represented a model and a path towards its democratisation and, referring to the Community's enlargement policy, Colombo talked of an "expansive role of the European ideal"¹¹.

At the same time, during the years he spent at the European Parliament, Colombo nurtured the conviction that it was necessary to give fresh impetus to the European project, because he sensed the spreading of a confused feeling of malaise among the governments and people of Europe, who no longer felt sufficiently motivated by the ideals of European integration.

10 Piers Ludlow, *Roy Jenkins and the European Commission Presidency, 1976–1980: At the Heart of Europe*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p.167.

11 Donato Verrastro, Elena Vigilante, *Emilio Colombo l'ultimo dei costituenti*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2017, p. 177.

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Colombo’s speech in Florence on 28 January 1981

Colombo’s efforts to relaunch the European integration project would take shape a few years later, when, after his return to Italian politics, he was appointed Foreign Minister from 1980 to 1983 in the governments chaired by Arnaldo Forlani, Giovanni Spadolini and Amintore Fanfani.

The early 1980s was one of the most difficult periods in the history of the European Community, often labelled as a phase of ‘Eurosclerosis’: the process of European integration found itself stuck in endless discussions about Britain’s financial contribution to the Community budget, agricultural policy reform and the need to increase the Community’s resources.

The fall of the Shah in Iran and the rise to power of Khomeini in 1979 had triggered a second oil crisis, stopping Europe’s fragile economic recovery. The international situation was also tense: the events of 1979, from NATO’s dual track decision to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, had contributed to the return of a climate of tension and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which contrasted sharply with the rhetoric of dialogue typical of the Nixon–Breznev era.

However, financial and economic difficulties were not the only reason for concern for the European countries: meanwhile, the Community had embarked on its third enlargement to Greece, Spain and Portugal, as it was necessary for it to make provisions in order to reinforce its institutional mechanisms and powers.

The first step towards a revival of European integration was taken by the German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, a member of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), who helped to shape West Germany’s rapprochement with East Germany through the German *Ostpolitik* and was to play an important role in the reunification of Germany¹².

In a speech delivered in Stuttgart on 6 January 1981, Genscher argued for wide-ranging political reform of the Community¹³. In particular, he urged greater political cooperation, which could be achieved through the creation of a *European Political Union*, proposing the strengthening of the

12 Hans Dietrich Genscher, *Rebuilding the House Divided: a Memoir by the Architect of Germany’s Reunification*, Portland: Broadway Books, 1998.

13 Deborah Cuccia, “The Genscher-Colombo Plan: a Forgotten Page of European Integration History”, in *Journal of European Integration History*, vol. 24, 2018, p. 62.

mechanism of European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the extension of the Community's powers into new areas, such as defence and justice¹⁴.

If Genscher's initiative received a cold reply from France, where Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, at the end of his Presidency, wasn't interested in strengthening EPC¹⁵, the Italian government immediately perceived the twofold opportunity represented by Genscher's appeal: it could make a contribution to relaunching European integration and, at the same time, strengthen Italy's international profile on the European scene, inserting Italy into the Franco-German couple.

Colombo's reputation in Europe and the role he had played as President of the European Parliament made him a strategic partner for the German Foreign Minister, who considered him "an eminent figure of Italian post-war politics"¹⁶ and "the only person who identified a continuity with the Fathers of Europe"¹⁷.

Barely two weeks after the speech delivered in Stuttgart on 21 January, Genscher travelled to Rome to meet Colombo, with whom he defined a common strategy. The issues at the core of the discussions between the two foreign ministers were the need to reform the mechanism of European Political Cooperation, the belief that the security dimension should become part of a European foreign policy and the wish to relaunch the European integration process¹⁸.

This meeting represented the general background to the speech delivered by Colombo in Florence on 28 January 1981, on the occasion of the inaugural session of the eighth National Congress of the 'Associazione italiana per il consiglio dei comuni d'Europa' (local municipalities).

14 On European Political Cooperation in the 1980s, see: Maria Eleonora Guasconi, *Prove di politica estera. La Cooperazione Politica Europea, l'Atto Unico Europeo e la fine della guerra fredda*, Milano: Mondadori Università, 2020.

15 Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, *Histoire de la construction européenne*, Paris: Editions Complexe, 1996, pp. 224–225; Pierre Gerbet, *La construction de l'Europe*, Paris: Armand Colin, 2007, pp. 339–341, Michelle Weinachter, *Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et l'Allemagne. Le double rêve inachevé*, Paris: l'Harmattan, 2004, pp.77–78.

16 H.D. Genscher, *Rebuilding the House Divided*, p. 133, Wilfried Loth, "L'Allemagne et l'Italie dans le processus d'intégration européenne: une coopération occasionelle?", in P. Craveri and A. Varsori (eds.), *L'Italia nella costruzione europea*, pp. 455–466.

17 Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD), 1981, doc. no. 282, Meeting between the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and the Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo, Rome, 3.10.1981.

18 D. Cuccia, p. 65.

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The choice of the occasion to launch this appeal was not left to chance. The Italian Foreign Minister started, in fact, with a reference to Europe’s ability to enhance local strengths, which was more than a tribute to his hosting institution. Thus, he showed a marked awareness that further European development needed a skilful combination of a top-down and a bottom-up strategy, namely an impetus from above, associated with greater local sensitivity to enhance the quality of the ongoing debate.

Colombo spoke of the need to get back to the ideas and values which originally lay behind the European project.

“The achievements of the past—said the Italian Foreign minister—should serve as a guide and encouragement”¹⁹.

This wish to enhance the “original ideals” on which Europe was based went hand in hand with a clear and realistic approach, fully aware of the obstacles that the majority of Member States would put in the way of a comprehensive reform process.

The Italian Foreign Minister shared, as an ultimate goal, the aim of creating a political union but, given the circumstances, he also believed that “prudence and gradualism” were required. Therefore, he favoured, as a first step, an approach that took full advantage of the existing treaty provisions, before proposing the signing of a new legally binding text.

“Europe—said the Italian Foreign Minister—is not a mechanical process, nor is it an automatic fact. The plans we have made for Europe could not be brought to fruition unless there was a real political will to make them a success and a joint effort to strive for common goals and solutions to our political, economic, social and cultural problems”.

Colombo’s expertise in the Community’s decision-making machine, as a negotiator through his long-term involvement in European dynamics, explains his reference to gradualism, to a step-by-step approach.

“But like nature—said Colombo—Europe cannot move in leaps and bounds. It has to be forged gradually and this is one of the Community’s rules, dictated by the need to find a meeting point mid-way between demands that are sometimes contradictory”²⁰.

Following Genscher’s appeal, Colombo envisioned the implementation of various kinds of reforms for the EC in order to strengthen its role in the international system: in particular, he proposed extending the mechanism

19 Address given by Emilio Colombo (Florence, 28 January 1981), on www.cvce.eu. The speech was delivered by Colombo in French and has been translated into English by the “Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe” at the University of Luxembourg.

20 Ibid.

already experimented with in terms of EPC, which he considered “contagious”²¹, to the fields of defence and security, culture and justice in order to fight terrorism²².

The Italian Foreign Minister emphasised the importance of extending the powers of the Community to the cultural dimension, thus allowing future harmonisation of the different forms of European legislation in the field of education. “This would enable us—said the Italian Foreign Minister—not only to develop a greater awareness of Europe, but also to contribute [...] to stability, peace and justice among our peoples”²³.

As to the question of security, a delicate issue which had divided the European countries since the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954, the plan proposed by Colombo was quite generic, as the Italian Foreign Minister simply made a reference to the fact that “the elements of foreign policy that are vital to a joint security policy must be carefully singled out”. After a reference to the Atlantic Alliance and to the need to maintain strong relations with the United States, Colombo stated: “A common security policy in Europe seems to be fully justified”²⁴.

These proposals were not the sole objective pursued by Italy; in fact, in his address the Italian Foreign Minister argued for the need to improve the Community’s economic performance and its competitive position with other economies, in particular with the United States and Japan and suggested promoting investments and measures aimed at strengthening European competitiveness and technological development and at boosting European employment. In addition, the strengthening of the European Monetary System was conceived as the first step towards the achievement of a common currency, which was considered an “instrument and symbol of a community of fate”²⁵.

However, if economic integration was the condition for developing political union, it was not sufficient in itself, because it had to be supported by a political and institutional plan. In particular, Colombo urged: “We should not be afraid to change the Treaties, if that is what is needed to

21 Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Emilio Colombo Papers, Fund under reorganization, Allocution du Président du Parlement européen, m. Emilio Colombo, Prix Charlemagne 1979, Aix La Chapelle, 24.05.1979.

22 D. Cuccia, p. 66.

23 Address given by Emilio Colombo (Florence, 28 January 1981), on www.cvce.eu, last accessed 10 January 2021

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

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make the institutions work as they should”²⁶. In line with this approach, he suggested that better ties should be established between the national parliaments and the European Parliament, so as to provide an opportunity for EP resolutions to be written straight into national law.

As clearly shown by this address, in January 1981 the Italian Foreign Minister had neither a well-structured plan nor a clear recipe for relaunching the European ideals, but rather a series of ideas which aimed to take a major step forward in reforming the European Community.

Emilio Colombo’s vision of Europe reflected a gradual and moderate plea for the revival of the European ideals, which would take shape in the following months.

Emilio Colombo’s address to the European Parliament on 14 October 1982

The proposal for a European Act was submitted by the Italian and German governments to the European Council on 12 November 1981 and represented a solemn commitment to moving towards the establishment of a European Union.

It underlined the role played by the European Council, as the main source of setting the agenda both of the European Community and EPC and proposed bolstering the EPC’s mechanism, highlighting the importance of Europe’s international role; extending the areas of coordination among the member countries in terms of security, justice and culture; and recommending the establishment of new ministerial councils in these fields.

Furthermore, the Act suggested restricting the practice of the ‘veto right’ and strengthening the watchdog role of the European Parliament, which would be endowed with the right to make recommendations to the European Council, the Council of Ministers and the Commission, would be consulted before the appointment of the President of the Commission and envisaged its involvement in Community decision-making.

The proposal advanced by the European Act reflected a gradual and moderate plea for the revival of the European ideals, which put cultural cooperation and cooperation on security issues into an intergovernmental framework.

The European governments reaction to the Genscher-Colombo plan was quite cold and negative: in particular the United Kingdom, Denmark,

²⁶ Ibid.

Greece, Ireland and, quite surprisingly, France opposed one or more proposals suggested by the Act. If Greece avoided every attempt to reform EPC, Denmark opposed almost every single part of the project²⁷, whereas Ireland feared the possibility of having a European foreign policy that also included security²⁸. Great Britain favoured more pragmatic cooperation, firmly anchored to an intergovernmental framework and would never accept the establishment of a truly common European foreign policy²⁹. France too looked quite sceptically on the extension of European cooperation to the field of security and justice, where it aimed at preserving full sovereignty³⁰. But in particular Paris feared that the European Act would imply a threat to the Luxembourg compromise³¹.

I will not enter into the details of the negotiations, which have been thoroughly investigated by other scholars; instead, I will analyse another important speech given by Emilio Colombo in front of the European Parliament on 14 October 1982, which represented a last attempt to rescue the Genscher-Colombo plan.

The decision to speak in front of the European Parliament looks interesting, because it clearly meant that the two Foreign Ministers were seeking the support of the Assembly for their project, which was generally sensitive towards projects dealing with the political dimension of European integration.

Colombo made careful use of words and phrases; for example, he took pleasure in reminding the deputies that he had been a member of the European People Party until 1980, thus indicating that he was talking to a familiar group of well-known people.

In his solemn speech, he again made reference to the need to move gradually and realistically, but at the same time underlined the effort to implement the Community Treaties fully and to introduce new policies.

“History—said Colombo—has taught us the European Union cannot be attained by moving too fast or trying to force the pace. We must take real-

27 AMAE, La Courneuve, Serie Europe, Cotes 1930, Inva/1981-1985, Note du Ministère des affaires étrangères, Le Denmark et le projet Genscher-Colombo, 19 April 1982.

28 AMAE, La Courneuve, Serie Europe, Cotes 1930, Inva/1981-1985, Note du Ministère des affaires étrangères, L'Irlande et le plan Genscher-Colombo, 13 May 1982.

29 M.E. Guasconi, *Prove di politica estera*, pp. 67–80.

30 AMAE, La Courneuve, Direction Europe, Cote 1930 Inva/1981-1985, f. 4969, Projet Genscher-Colombo.

31 AMAE, La Courneuve, Direction Europe, Cote 1930 Inva/1981-1985, f. 4969, Projet Genscher-Colombo d'Union Européenne, 27 January 1982.

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istic action which will gradually influence all aspects of our civilian life. We must strive on the one hand to implement the Community Treaties fully and, on the other, to introduce new policies not provided for by the Treaties, but which are vital if we are to give Europe an identity and genuine *raison d'être*³².

Then, he made a strong appeal to avoid the decline of the European Community: “We cannot foster illusions about the future role of Europe. We must be aware of the fact that if we let slip the chance of revival, then we run the risk of isolation. The blow of isolation may be softened by misleading illusions of the Community’s sluggish bureaucracy or by rhetoric about the European ideal; however, we could not escape the serious responsibility that history would attribute to us for failing to take political action for the construction of Europe”³³.

In his long statement, Colombo singled out two main concepts, which, from my point of view identified his vision of European integration. First of all, the concept of solidarity: “In a true Community the solidarity between members must be total—said Colombo. [...] It is essential that the member states [...] take account of the effects which their economic policies will inevitably have on their partners and give careful thought to the advantages of a balanced distribution of roles, operating in a fully synchronized manner and giving due weight to the structural characteristics of the individual economies”.

This reference to the concept of solidarity reminded that Colombo was a Demo-Christian and came from a poor region in the South of Italy, Basilicata, so his reference to the need to “correct, in the agricultural sector, the distortions which have widened the gap between the Community’s agricultures—the Mediterranean and the continental” is quite understandable.

Secondarily, it seems quite interesting to point out a concept which had arisen in the talks between the two Foreign Ministers since their first meeting in Rome in October 1981.

The proposal to strengthen EPC and cooperation in the field of culture reflected the ultimate goal of bolstering the international role played by the European Community. “Europe—said Colombo—has its own image in the world” and, commenting about the relations established through

32 Statement by Emilio Colombo to the European Parliament, 14 October 1982, on www.cvce.eu. The speech was delivered by Colombo in French and has been translated into English by the “Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe” at the University of Luxembourg.

33 Ibid.

the Lomé Convention and the agreements with the Mediterranean countries, argued: “This is a unique *fabrique* of relations [...] nevertheless, it is an image that we have not been entirely successful in making [...] other countries tend rather to lack confidence or consideration for the European Community, because it has been unable to bring to fruition its own integration”³⁴.

For these reasons, the Italian Foreign Minister deemed it necessary not to “confine ourselves just to managing what we have already achieved”, suggesting enhancing Europe’s international profile, also through the development of a common cultural policy.

“European culture—said Colombo—is an aspect of Europe’s political role in the world, a role that is characterized by widespread cooperation with all the other peoples. I would add that this is a subject to which we must pay the utmost attention, especially if one considers that our European culture is shared by many countries outside Community Europe, on the other side, in another Europe, with different systems, but with which we must maintain continuous relations [...]”³⁵.

This reference to revitalising Europe’s political role in the international system was not just rhetoric and window dressing, but reflected the international context of the early 1980s, when all the European countries felt uneasy at the deterioration of détente, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the increasing disagreements with the United States on how to manage relations with the Soviet Union.

If Western European countries were to resist US pressure to impose economic and other sanctions on the Soviet Union in response to its invasion of Afghanistan or the declaration of martial law in Poland, and to encourage Washington to resume its dialogue and negotiations with the Soviet leadership, their best chance of doing so appeared to be to maximise their own unity on the issue.

The same could be said for the Middle East, where most West European powers felt similarly disillusioned with US leadership. Here too was an issue where Europe had vital interests—the region was geographically close, had traditionally been a zone of European influence, and provided most of the continent’s energy supplies—and yet it had been largely forced out of the diplomatic debate by US dominance³⁶.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 David Allen and Andrin Hauri, “The Euro-Arab Dialogue, the Venice Declaration and Beyond: the Limits of a Distinct EC Policy”, in Daniel Möckly and Victor

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Once more, therefore, the adoption of a common European stance—ideally backed up by coordinated European diplomacy—might help the Ten to regain a voice on another issue where Europe’s own peace and security were very much at stake. We must not forget that Colombo was one of the authors of the Declaration of Venice of June 1980, which called for acknowledgement of Palestinians’ rights to self-government³⁷.

So, the references to the preservation of peace in Colombo’s statement were not just token references to a facet of European integration overtaken by events. Instead, they reflected a genuine concern about the continent’s stability, and a hope that common action might begin to reduce the dangers.

Colombo’s reference to the Community’s international role involved another feature of Europe which had been discovered during the 1970s: its role as a promoter of democracy and stability in the near abroad, a role that it had experienced in Southern Europe, with Greece, Spain and Portugal, and that now could be extended to Central and Eastern Europe. Although it is still something that we know little about, it’s already clear that the increased interaction between the two halves of Europe, which had been one of the greater gains of détente, played a significant role in weakening the socialist regime and contributing to its downfall.

Although embryonic at the beginning of the 1980s, this goal seemed particularly important to Genscher, who had migrated from Eastern Germany and to Colombo³⁸.

Referring to Poland, the Italian Foreign Minister in fact stated: “These events have strengthened in us the conviction that we should act to ensure that Europe consolidates its strength and through its traditions and sense of awareness, serves as a point of reference in support of dialogue, progress and peace. [...] The very fact of combining people who, although belonging to the same culture, have deeply rooted historical customs and tradi-

Mauer, (eds.) *European–American relations and the Middle East from Suez to Iraq*, London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 93–107.

37 On the Venice Declaration, see also: Luca Riccardi, “Da Colombo ad Andreotti a Craxi: spunti di ricerca sulla politica mediorientale dell’Italia negli anni Ottanta”, in Gianvito Galasso, Federico Imperato, Rosario Milano, Luciano Monzali, (eds.) *Europa e Medio Oriente (1973-1993)*, Bari: Cacucci editore, 2017, pp.19–23.

38 AAPD, 1981, doc. no. 282, Meeting between the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and the Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo, Rome, 3.10.1981; Angela Romano and Federico Romero (eds.), *Pan-Europe. A continental space for cooperation*, in *European Socialist Regimes’ Fateful Engagement with the West*, London: Routledge, 2021, pp. 31–49.

tions that have developed independently alongside each other, amounts to a singular and unique phenomenon in the international community”³⁹.

Conclusions

In spite of the strong efforts deployed by Emilio Colombo and Hans Dietrich Genscher between 1981 and 1982 to implement the European Act, the plan sank in the doldrums of endless discussions and general hostility. The two Foreign Ministers had to wait until June 1983, when Germany held the presidency of the Council, to save at least some parts of their proposals, which were amended in the form of a solemn declaration without any legally binding value.

In June 1983, the member states finally endorsed a watered-down version of the Genscher-Colombo Plan, which was transformed into a declaration of intent. Any reference to the signing of a future treaty, to the establishment of a European Union or to a partial revision of the Luxembourg compromise disappeared. The Stuttgart Declaration, issued by the Ten on 19 June 1983, called for closer cooperation in the fields of foreign policy, security and deeper European integration, but it was only a poor copy of the Genscher-Colombo Plan.

In his memoirs, Genscher defended the plan, defining it as the first of three stages of European revival, the second stage of which was the Single Market and the third the Maastricht Treaty, but most scholars look sceptically on the tangible results of the Italo-German initiative, or on its link with the mid-1980s relaunch⁴⁰. The Stuttgart Declaration was equally devoid of immediate effects.

The Italian Foreign Minister, commenting on the review *Affari Esteri*, the disappointing outcome of the Genscher-Colombo Plan, wrote that, in spite of all its limits, the Stuttgart Declaration deserved the merit of indicating the path for the future European revival: from the political goal of establishing the European Union, to the appeal for better coordination of the European countries’ policies in the fields of defence, culture and justice, all these proposals were to be subsequently realised by the Single European Act and later by the Maastricht Treaty⁴¹.

39 Statement by Emilio Colombo to the European Parliament, 14 October 1982, on www.cvce.eu, last accessed 20 January 2021

40 H.D. Genscher, *Rebuilding a House Divided*, pp. 133–134.

41 Emilio Colombo, “La Dichiarazione solenne sull’Unione Europea”, in *Affari Esteri*, XV, n. 59, luglio 1983.

“Europe is not a Mechanical Process, nor is it an Automatic Fact”

The two speeches delivered by Colombo represented a prudent, inter-governmental, gradual and realistic vision of Europe, which identified Colombo’s expertise and knowledge of the lengthy negotiations which characterised the construction of the Community. They indicated the road to travel along to achieve the goal of enhancing the political dimension of European integration and the international role of the Community.

The Italian Foreign Minister talked about “the expansive role of the European ideal”, and the ideal rooted in the heritage of a common European culture, “a civilization which is not exclusive, which is capable of welcoming useful additions from without, a pluralistic and tolerant civilization in which everyone feels he can participate”⁴².

As shown by the two speeches, Colombo promoted a narrative of Europe rooted in the history of the European civilisation and shaped by the values of ‘tolerance’, ‘solidarity’, ‘stability’ and an enduring faith in European integration as a mechanism for creating and preserving ‘peace’.

42 Emilio Colombo’s statement to the European Parliament, 19 November 1981, on www.cvce.eu.

Jacques Delors et "L'Europe du Possible". Vision et Méthode d'un Leader Européen

Marinella Neri Gualdesi

Introduction

Jacques Delors a joué un rôle essentiel, au niveau national comme au niveau européen, dans la construction de l'Europe d'aujourd'hui.

Pour Dominique Wolton Jacques Delors c'est « un homme politique atypique »¹. En fait, il n'est pas sorti de l'énarchie, mais a suivi un itinéraire intellectuel et politique tout à fait original.

Lorsqu'il est arrivé à la Présidence de la Commission européenne l'Europe lui était familière. Devenu membre en 1979 du premier Parlement européen élu au suffrage universel, il avait été très apprécié à Strasbourg comme président de la Commission économique et monétaire.

Ministre de l'Economie et des Finances de 1981 à 1984 dans les gouvernements Mauroy, Delors avait accordé une grande importance aux questions européennes. La décision prise en 1983, face à l'affaiblissement du franc, de confirmer l'engagement européen de la France et ne pas sortir du Système monétaire européen lui avait gagné une forte réputation et notoriété en faveur de l'intégration européenne.

En vérité, lors de sa nomination à la tête de la Commission européenne il n'était pas encore un militant européen de premier plan. Dans une Europe stagnante et dans un climat où on ne parlait que d'euroscélèrose, sa désignation en juillet 1984, après le Conseil européen de Fontainebleau, à la tête de la Commission, comme l'écrit Pascal Lamy, son chef de cabinet, « tient à la fois, du hasard, des tactiques de François Mitterrand, des rancœurs de Dame Thatcher et des intuitions d'Helmut Kohl »².

Des biographies, des témoignages et des nombreuses publications ont déjà permis de reconstruire et de connaître en profondeur l'action politi-

1 Jacques Delors et Dominique Wolton, *L'unité d'un homme*, Paris: Odile Jacob, 1994.

2 Pascal Lamy, *Les Commissions Delors et leurs secrets de fabrication*, Paris: Institut Delors, 2016.

que de Jacques Delors³. Outre ses *Mémoires* et les travaux qui lui ont été consacrés, ce sont ses propres discours qui aident à comprendre sa pensée et son idée de l'Europe⁴.

Jacques Delors a été capable de parler de l'Europe de manière claire et concrète, sans excès rhétoriques, et il considérait devoir jouer un rôle de pédagogue. En fait, il a essayé de promouvoir une pédagogie de l'Europe, en étant convaincu qu'un manque de communication représentait le talon d'Achille d'une Communauté mal expliquée. D'où son refus d'un débat élitiste et son insistance à promouvoir un débat public autour de l'Europe : il a souvent répété «il faut expliquer, expliquer, expliquer»⁵.

L'ancien président de la Commission européenne a été sans doute un orateur de premier ordre, avec une capacité extraordinaire de se faire comprendre: d'après Pascal Lamy, « de ce point de vue, c'était une artiste, un inventeur de simplicité»⁶. De surcroît, l'efficacité de la communication n'a jamais été achevée au détriment de la profondeur de la pensée.

Delors a écrit lui même la plus grande partie des ses discours⁷. Très souvent il allait aussi au-delà du texte qu'on lui avait préparé⁸.

Dans ce travail-ci l'attention sera portée sur la décennie- 1985-1995- de sa présidence de la Commission européenne. On a choisi les discours prononcés devant le Parlement européen à l'occasion des débats d'investiture de la Commission. Un pour chacun des trois mandats présidentiels.

3 Voir notamment Alain Rollat, *Delors*, Paris: Flammarion, 1993; Charles Grant, *Delors: Inside the House that Jacques Built*, London: N. Brealey, 1994; George Ross, *Jacques Delors and European Integration*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; Gabriel Milesi, *Jacques Delors: l'homme qui dit non*, Paris: Edition 1, 1995; Ken Endo, *The Presidency of the European Commission Under Jacques Delors*, London: Macmillan, 1999; Helen Drake, *Jacques Delors: Perspectives on a European Leader*, London: Routledge, 2000.

4 J. Delors, *Mémoires*, Paris: Plon, 2004.

5 cvce.eu/obj/expose_de_jacques_delors_ou_va_l_union_europeenne_mars_2001

6 P. Lamy, *Les "Commissions Delors" et.*

7 H. Drake, *Jacques Delors: Perspectives*, p. 15.

8 Piers Ludlow, *Jacques Delors (1985-1995): navigating the European stream at full flood*, in Jan van der Harst and Gerrit Voerman (eds), *An Impossible Job? The Presidents of the European Commission, 1958-2014*, London: Harper, 2015, p. 188.

Premier mandat

Le discours du Président de la Commission Jacques Delors devant le Parlement européen le 14 janvier 1985 à l'occasion de sa prise de fonctions

À l'occasion de son premier discours de janvier 1985 devant le Parlement européen Jacques Delors a expliqué son projet de relance du marché intérieur, avec une date 1992. L'achèvement du marché intérieur devait être le lancement d'une dynamique, mais aussi d'une méthode 'pour agir et réussir'. C'était un point essentiel pour gagner en crédibilité, ce qui le conduira à porter l'attention sur le fonctionnement des institutions et le processus de décision. Mieux décider c'était en effet pour Delors la contrepartie institutionnelle du projet de grand marché sans frontières.

En ce qui concerne la méthode, on a parlé souvent d'une méthode Delors: un programme assorti d'un calendrier précis et contraignant. Lui même a décrit la méthode qu'il a utilisée pour son action à la tête de la Commission européenne, ce qu'on a nommé le 'delorisme', fondée autour de trois principes: être au service des gouvernements, défendre l'intérêt européen, recherche de la convergence.⁹

Comme l'a dit Eric Bussière, la réalisation du grand marché unique était inscrite «dans une forte continuité avec les objectifs antérieurs de la Commission»¹⁰. Mais Delors, en s'inspirant de la méthode Monnet, dont il reconnaît la valeur et les limites, dénonce les obstacles qui persistaient à la libre circulation des personnes, des biens, des services et des capitaux. Il se demande si face «à une sorte d'Europe féodale qui n'offre que barrières, douane, formalités, embarras bureaucratiques [...] est-il présomptueux d'annoncer, puis d'exécuter, la décision de supprimer toutes les frontières à l'intérieur de l'Europe d'ici à 1992 »¹¹.

Il avait compris qu'on pouvait profiter d'une conjoncture propice, « des vents favorables » a-t-il dit, à faire avancer la construction européenne. Dans ce discours, Delors a présenté les grandes lignes stratégiques de son action. Il ne s'est toutefois pas borné à envisager l'objectif du grand marché,

9 cvce.eu/obj/interview_de_jacques_delors_paris_16_decembre_2009_extrait_bilan_de_la_commission_delors_et_la_methode_delors-fr

10 Éric Bussière, *Le Livre Blanc sur le marché intérieur objectif et instrument de la relance Delors*, in Michael Gehler and Wilfried Loth (eds), *Reshaping Europe*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020, p. 237.

11 https://ec.europa.eu/historical_archives/archisplus/files/DELORS_1985_01_14_FR.pdf. Par souci de simplicité, toutes les citations sont reprises du texte du discours. Cela s'applique pour chacun des trois discours.

mais a annoncé aussi un grand nombre de politiques communes pour élargir le champ d'activité de la Communauté européenne. Pour réaliser son programme dans les quatre ans de son mandat, le président de la Commission proposait de franchir des pas décisifs dans trois directions: «le grand marché et la coopération industrielle; le renforcement du Système monétaire européen; la convergence des économies comme entraînant plus de croissance et plus d'emplois».

Pour dégager entre les Etats membres des compromis sur les propositions et les actions communes, l'engagement politique des chefs de gouvernement était indispensable. Le président de la Commission prend donc la responsabilité de provoquer, devant le Parlement et devant le Conseil, les discussions qui devaient faire sortir de 'la léthargie de l'Europe'. Il passe en revue les défis qui l'Europe devait saisir, « qu'il s'agisse de maintenir l'Europe au rang de puissance verte, d'assurer notre rang dans les technologies de pointe [...] de partager les responsabilités mondiales en matière monétaire, de défendre nos intérêts commerciaux [...] ».

Sa perspective était de donner à l'Europe « la force économique, technologique, financière, monétaire». C'est important l'accent qu'il met, depuis son arrivée à la tête de la Commission, sur les nouvelles technologies comme moyen pour le renouveau économique de l'Europe. Un aspect essentiel, selon Delors, pour contribuer à enrayer le déclin industriel de la Communauté et sa perte de compétitivité dans certaines domaines face au Japon et aux Etats-Unis¹².

Le président de la Commission proposait de mettre en marche une dynamique fondée sur le tryptique réalisation du grand marché, harmonisation des règles, coopération industrielle, avec l'ambition d'une modernisation des structures de production de l'Europe. Seule la dimension européenne pouvait d'ailleurs à son avis entraîner «un effet de multiplication», en mobilisant les différents acteurs économiques. C'était la nécessité d'une capacité d'action économique et industrielle à l'échelle européenne qu'il évoquait, avec l'objectif de stimuler la promotion de l'emploi, la création de richesse et le développement général économique, social et culturel.

Dans ce discours d'orientation Delors a annoncé son propos d'associer à l'idée du grand marché intégré celle d'un espace social européen, et il a aussi amorcé la lutte pour un espace social européen, en posant la questi-

12 Voir, à ce sujet, l'intervention quelques mois plus tard de Delors "Vers l'Europe de la technologie" au Conseil Affaires générales, Archives Historiques de l'Union Européenne (AHUE), Florence, Fonds Jacques Delors, JD-0002, SEC(85) 1445 10 octobre 1985.

on «à quand la première convention collective européenne? ». Sans oublier de remarquer qu'une bonne partie de la crédibilité de l'Europe se jouait sur le recul du chômage. Il envisageait le développement de la dimension sociale, avec des propositions législatives européennes, comme le moyen pour obtenir l'attachement des citoyens à la construction européenne. Avec le processus de Val Duchesse, en associant les partenaires sociaux aux initiatives de la Commission, il a lancé un mois après le dialogue social, dans la perspective de l'objectif 1992.

Dès le début de sa présidence Delors a exprimé son attachement à la dimension sociale de la construction européenne et son engagement pour un dialogue entre les patrons et les syndicats à l'échelon européen. On peut envisager un fil direct entre les orientations qu'il exprime en 1985 en faveur d'une politique économique plus créatrice d'emplois, et les analyses du Livre blanc de décembre 1993 sur la croissance, la compétitivité et l'emploi¹³.

Sur les questions monétaires le président de la Commission adopte une attitude prudente, sans proposer pour les quatre ans de son mandat l'objectif d'une véritable monnaie européenne. Il admet de connaître très bien «la difficulté de principe et les aridités techniques de la question monétaire» pour formuler une telle promesse, mais il prône «un renforcement substantiel de la coopération monétaire et une extension contrôlée du rôle de l'Ecu», en posant toute une série de questions. En particulier, même si l'objectif n'était pas de remplacer le dollar, Delors invite à considérer la potentialité de l'Ecu en tant que monnaie de réserve.

En fait, tout en se prononçant pour une approche progressive, il a ouvert le débat sur le parcours vers l'Union économique et monétaire, à laquelle il consacra beaucoup d'efforts dans son deuxième mandat.

Delors tient aussi à exprimer l'engagement de la nouvelle Commission à jouer son rôle de proposition pour doter l'Europe de moyens de ses ambitions. Il annonce donc qu'il était indispensable de poser, «en termes réalistes», le problème de l'adaptation des ressources budgétaires et financières de la Communauté aux objectifs du développement de nouveaux champs d'action. Tout en rejetant une conception uniquement budgétaire de la Communauté, il tient à souligner que retrouver un dynamisme nouveau était possible si les États membres comprenaient les vertus de l'interdépendance et de la solidarité. A cet égard, le président de la Commission

13 COM (93) 700 fin, Livre blanc de la Commission, *Croissance, Compétitivité, Emploi: les défis et les pistes pour entrer dans le XXI siècle*, Supplément au Bulletin des Communautés européennes, n. 6, 1993.

s'est demandé: «Est-ce que dix ecus de plus dans le budget communautaire n'auraient pas plus d'effet multiplicateur qu'un ecu de plus dans chacun des dix budgets des pays membres? ».

La Communauté devait aussi récupérer un dynamisme institutionnel, et remédier à ce qu'il appelle « la non prise de décisions». Depuis le Rapport Tindemans plusieurs propositions avaient été faites pour l'amélioration des processus de décision, non suivies d'effets. Pour résoudre la querelle institutionnelle Delors redoute «des oppositions dogmatiques», prétexte pour rien faire, et propose « une méthode simple, distinguer d'une part, les améliorations à réaliser dans le cadre de nos règles actuelles et d'autre part, l'au-delà du Traité de Rome». Le président de la Commission affirme donc clairement qu'il fallait aller au-delà du Traité de Rome, en exprimant la volonté d'aller vers l'Union européenne. Se réfère aussi au projet Spinelli adopté par le Parlement européen le 14 février 1984, mais ce traité, qui a exercé sur lui une influence politique indiscutable, dont il rend compte dans ses Mémoires, était un des projets qui étaient sur la table, ne devient pas son projet.

En concertation avec les autres institutions, il envisage pour la Commission, avec son droit d'initiative et de proposition, le rôle «d'ingénieur de la construction européenne». Delors veut redonner à la Commission son rôle de moteur de la construction européenne et souhaite donc un renforcement de l'autorité de l'exécutif, qu'il veut légitimer en établissant une relation de collaboration étroite avec le Parlement.

Enfin, ce qui est important de retenir de ce discours c'est aussi l'accent mis sur la volonté d'affirmer, dans un monde en profonde mutation, les valeurs européennes, le modèle européen de relations sociales, le patrimoine culturel commun aux Européens. Ses propositions formaient un ensemble cohérent, et avaient pour but de préserver le modèle économique, social, environnemental et culturel de l'Europe. La force de l'Europe pour Delors, qui invite à retrouver confiance dans l'humanisme européen, devait se fonder «sur la démocratie et sur l'équité». Ce qui explique son insistance à répondre au déficit démocratique européen avec le rapprochement entre les citoyens et la Communauté.

Pour Delors le grand marché sans frontières était évidemment le pivot de la relance de l'Europe, mais dans sa vision la réalisation du marché intérieur était inséparable du projet politique.

Deuxième mandat

Discours de Jacques Delors devant le Parlement européen pour la présentation de la nouvelle Commission, le 17 janvier 1989

Devant le Parlement européen, le 17 janvier 1989, à la moitié du chemin vers la réalisation du grand marché sans frontières, le président de la Commission a réaffirmé sa conviction que le projet européen ne pouvait pas se résumer à un marché.

Trois les défis majeur que la Communauté devait affronter. Celui de la méthode, avec le renforcement de l'intégration et la réforme financière, pour donner des possibilités plus larges à l'action communautaire. Ensuite, l'influence de l'Europe à l'extérieur, qui exigeait plus de responsabilités parce que «L'Histoire frappe à notre porte». ¹⁴ Enfin, il fallait relever un défi crucial, celui de la civilisation, car il n'était pas suffisant se borner à la dimension économique du grand marché. Delors reviens sur l'importance d'affirmer les valeurs de l'Europe et de donner « plus de chair à cette Communauté et, pourquoi pas, un supplément d'âme».

Tant du point de vue de l'action que de la méthode à suivre, la nouvelle Commission, souligne Delors, «se place, sans hésitation sous le signe de la continuité». Après quatre ans son président dresse un bilan positif du travail accompli pour réaliser le marché unique. Avec l'entrée en vigueur de l'Acte unique une grande partie des mesures nécessaires à la mise en place de l'objectif 1992 avait été adoptée, grâce à une dynamique de changement qui avait touché l'ensemble des activités communautaires.

Pourtant, «on ne tombe pas amoureux d'un grand marché», estime Delors, qui souligne encore une fois la dimension politique du projet 1992. D'où l'impulsion donnée à la politique de la solidarité. Le dialogue social, qu'il avait relancé en janvier 1985, avait déjà trouvé un élan concret avec la Charte des droits sociaux fondamentaux mise en chantier par la Commission, que le Conseil européen de Strasbourg adoptera en décembre 1989. La solidarité entre les diverses régions de la Communauté devait se traduire dans la mise en œuvre des nouvelles politiques communes proposées par la Commission dans son document du février 1987 «Réussir l'Acte unique»¹⁵. D'où son insistance sur la cohésion et la solidarité pour aider les pays qui

14 www.cvce.eu/obj/discours_de_jacques_delors_devant_le_parlement_europeen_17_janvier_1989.

15 AHUE, JD-56, Réussir l'Acte unique: une nouvelle frontière pour l'Europe. Programme de travail de la Commission 1987.

devaient réaliser le plus grand effort d'adaptation pour réaliser un espace économique et social commun.

En ce qui concerne la recherche, malgré l'adoption du premier programme-cadre pour la période 1987-1991, Delors a observé qu'il fallait assurer une meilleure maîtrise de nouvelles découvertes. C'était un sujet auquel il attachait une grande importance, au nom d'une compétitivité accrue mais, a encore souligné le président de la Commission, «aussi au nom de la défense de notre identité culturelle, la Communauté refuse de laisser le monopole de la technique audio-visuelle aux Japonais et celui des programmes aux Américains».

En matière d'éducation, il a revendiqué le succès des programmes des échanges des jeunes-Comett, Erasmus- qui pouvaient représenter le début d'une «osmose européenne». En effet, avec la multiplication des échanges, les étudiants, les professeurs, les entrepreneurs étaient devenus pour Delors des militants d'une cinquième liberté, non prévue par le traité, «celle de la circulation des idées». Dans sa vision de l'Europe le tryptique éducation, culture, société, pourrait apporter une réponse soit à l'appel des autres Europes, soit à la question du rôle à jouer pour revivifier l'humanisme de la civilisation européenne. La dimension de l'éducation et la dimension culturelle étaient fondamentales pour permettre de défendre l'identité européenne, fondée sur des idéaux communs.

Il a également porté l'attention sur la réforme de la politique agricole commune, et sur la discipline budgétaire, qui avait permis l'adoption sans délais du budget 1989.

En février 1988 le Conseil européen avait accepté la proposition de la Commission de doubler le volume financier des Fonds structurels et de donner un impact économique réel aux autres politiques communautaire. L'un des points clés soulevés par Delors concernait la nécessité pour la Communauté de se doter d'un nouveau système de financement et des ressources propres suffisantes, stables et garanties.

Au début de son second mandat, le président de la Commission veut donner au Parlement un message clair: «la maison est en ordre», le point fort de son discours. Ce qui à son avis signifiait que dans la Communauté «il n'y a plus ni laxisme ni inconséquence».

Dans le contexte de l'économie internationale, le président de la Commission constate que l'Europe était en phase avec les économies les plus dynamiques. Au lendemain du krach d'octobre 1987, il met l'accent sur le résultat positif de l'économie de la Communauté, qui avait «enregistré sa meilleure croissance depuis douze ans, réalisé des investissements record [...], créé 1,6 million d'emplois [...]».

Certes, la question du chômage n'était pas résolue, mais l'échéance de 1992 avait joué un rôle important pour faire retrouver la confiance et pour permettre à l'Europe de profiter de la conjoncture internationale.

Il fait ce constat positif sans vouloir cacher les difficultés, à la fois politiques et techniques, en particulier sur les politiques de l'immigration ou sur la fiscalité. Pour surmonter les difficultés il a réaffirmé l'importance du renforcement de l'efficacité des institutions. De ce point de vue, l'association du Parlement au processus de décision s'était révélée extrêmement positive, tandis qu'en revanche on devait enregistrer les retards du Conseil. Grâce à l'Acte unique le Parlement était sorti d'un rôle purement consultatif, mais le risque de désaffection des citoyens vis-à-vis des élections européennes de juin 1989 était concret. Delors prend l'engagement devant les eurodéputés d'assurer le soutien de la Commission à propos du renforcement des pouvoirs de l'Assemblée, qu'il estime être «l'institution de l'avenir». Les mesures proposées par le Parlement que la Commission avait retenu, parmi lesquelles le droit de vote de tous les ressortissants communautaires aux élections locales, étaient le signe de l'influence de l'Assemblée sur le processus de décision. Ce qui comptait pour Delors était faire comprendre aux citoyens européens que la Communauté n'était pas «une machine technocratique mais bien une aventure humaine».

En ce qui concerne l'Union économique et monétaire, soit du point de vue de nouvelles possibilités de prospérité économique et de création d'emplois, soit du point de vue de la création d'un cadre institutionnel adéquat, le processus était lancé vers une nouvelle étape décisive pour l'Europe. Sur les travaux du Comité ad hoc créé par le Conseil européen de Hanovre, dont il était le président, Delors s'est limité à dire que les chefs de gouvernement auraient reçu un schéma permettant de constituer l'UEM «à un rythme réaliste et raisonnable».

Une longue partie de ce discours est consacrée à la place de l'Europe dans le monde. Des soucis d'ordre géopolitique seront de plus en plus présents dans son analyse au cours de l'année 1989. En janvier, ce sont encore les tensions commerciales avec le Japon et les Etats-Unis qu'il évoque et le protectionnisme montant qu'il dénonce. A la campagne, qui fleurissait aux Etats-Unis et au Japon, sur l'«Europe-forteresse», fermée au reste du monde, il oppose l'image de l'«Europe partenaire».

En particulier, en expliquant la position de la Communauté sur le sujet de subventions agricoles dans les négociations de l'Uruguay Round, qui l'opposait aux Etats-Unis, le président de la Commission a souligné avec fermeté que «l'Europe sera ouverte, mais pas offerte». Avec juste deux mots Delors a résumé de manière très efficace sa pensée et la complexité de la négociation. Les Etats-Unis et l'Europe devaient pouvoir jouer à armes

égales. Le soutien à l'extension du commerce multilatéral ne pouvait se traduire dans l'acceptation des pratiques commerciales déloyales. A ce sujet il a affirmé clairement «l'Europe ne se laissera pas intimider». Dans le cadre des négociations commerciales du GATT les Etats-Unis et l'Europe devaient établir une coopération renouvelée «à la fois dans son esprit et dans ses méthodes».

Face à l'intérêt vers la Communauté témoigné par l'établissement de relations officielles avec le Comecon, ou la conclusion d'accords commerciaux avec la Hongrie et la Tchécoslovaquie, le président de la Commission a regretté que dans le dialogue entre l'Est et l'Ouest la coopération politique de Douze progressait moins vite que la construction économique et n'avait pas réussi à prendre des initiatives communes. En affirmant que c'était de plus en plus difficile de séparer l'économie du politique, il se montre donc inquiet de l'écart entre le progrès de l'Europe économique et les hésitations de l'Europe de la politique étrangère, en déplorant «une certaine timidité de l'Europe». Une observation qui à son avis était valable pour l'ensemble de l'action extérieure de la Communauté. Il plaide pour le renforcement, dans le cadre de la coopération politique, de l'unité et de la capacité de proposition des Douze.

Par contre, il souhaite une Europe forte et une action plus déterminée de la Communauté pour un ordre économique mondial plus juste, avec un engagement pour ranimer le dialogue Nord-Sud et répondre à l'endettement des pays les plus pauvres. Dans la préparation de Lomé IV, et dans le dialogue avec les pays de l'Amérique Latine et d'Amérique centrale, la Communauté pouvait susciter une nouvelle orientation en tant que partenaire commercial capable de prendre les initiatives qui pouvaient permettre de stimuler les potentialités de croissance. Pas seulement pour des raisons commerciales, mais aussi pour consolider les régimes démocratiques, la Commission souhaitait d'approfondir la coopération en Amérique centrale et en Amérique du Sud.

Pour finir, il invite à penser à l'après 1992. Sur la question fondamentale des relations avec ceux qu'il appelle «les autres Europes», il affirme clairement que la Commission avait choisi: priorité à l'approfondissement sur l'élargissement. Tout en facilitant l'émergence de la Grande Europe, il prône pour un approfondissement accéléré de la construction européenne: «l'histoire s'accélère. Nous aussi devons accélérer».

Il évoque la nécessité de répondre aux pays qui frappaient à la porte de la Communauté. Il fallait sortir de l'alternative adhésion ou non adhésion, en introduisant une forme de coopération pragmatique.

Pour encadrer les relations économiques des Douze avec les pays appartenant à l'Association européenne de libre-échange (AELE) le président

de la Commission a proposé la création d'un Espace économique européen. Une nouvelle forme d'intégration, plus structurée sur le plan institutionnel, aurait permis de fonder une entente économique européenne. Cette coopération élargie posait quand même des questions délicates aux partenaires, qui étaient intéressés surtout à l'accès au grand marché sans frontières, mais devaient être prêts à accepter, avec les avantages, aussi toute une série de contraintes.

L'enjeu fondamental soulevé par Delors mettait en cause le fait que la Communauté n'était pas seulement un grand marché, mais aussi un espace social et économique, avec la vocation à se transformer en une union politique. Cela l'a conduit à souligner combien il serait délicat «établir des menus à options».

Dans le nouveau contexte international l'Europe devait se doter d'une vision géopolitique globale. En faisant référence au concept de la 'Maison Europe' évoqué par Gorbatchev, Delors n'hésite pas à mettre en garde contre tout effet d'annonce. Ce qui comptait pour lui, tout en se déclarant favorable à la coopération et à la confiance mutuelle, c'était la présence dans l'Europe de demain d'une «Maison Communauté européenne, dont nous serions les seuls architectes et dont nous conserverions soigneusement les clés». Conformément au choix de privilégier la logique de l'approfondissement de l'intégration, Delors craint que la proposition de Gorbatchev n'aboutisse à la dilution de la construction communautaire dans un ensemble plus vaste.

Quant à la méthode à suivre pour la réussite du projet européen, en conclusion de son allocution le président de la Commission rappelle l'importance du respect dans le processus de décision du principe de subsidiarité, qui était présent aussi dans le projet de traité d'Union européenne que le Parlement avait élaboré sous l'inspiration d'Altiero Spinelli. Un principe qu'il reprend à son compte, parce qu'il permettait de déterminer clairement la distribution des compétences entre les Etats membres et les institutions européennes. Mieux articuler les niveaux nationaux et communautaires était à son avis essentiel, afin d'éviter une centralisation excessive.

Son soutien au principe de subsidiarité découle soit de son idée d'une Europe pluraliste, riche de ses diversités nationales, que du fait qu'il ne contestait pas les réalités nationales.

Malgré les insuffisances ou les contradictions de la construction européenne, au début de son deuxième mandat Delors tient à marquer les progrès réalisés depuis quatre ans.

Marinella Neri Gualdesi

Le dernier mandat

Discours devant le Parlement européen à l'occasion du débat d'investiture de la nouvelle Commission, le 10 février 1993

En 1992 dans des circonstances difficiles, après l'éclatement du Système monétaire européen, Jacques Delors est confirmé pour un mandat de deux ans à la présidence de la Commission. En février 1993, à l'occasion de la présentation du programme de travail pour les années 1993 et 1994, le président de la Commission a d'abord remarqué les circonstances difficiles qui affectaient la construction européenne, et qui à son avis pouvaient mettre en discussion «l'idée même de l'Europe unie». Il capture l'esprit du temps - «le malaise» - dans une définition qui en est la parfaite illustration: «crise économique, crise de la société, atonie de la démocratie»¹⁶.

Trois étaient les raisons de cette crise. D'abord, la crise économique mondiale et le chômage «qui menace l'équilibre de notre société, compromet le financement des systèmes de protection sociale et est à la base d'un phénomène inquiétant de marginalisation et d'exclusion».

Ensuite, les difficultés de ratification du Traité de Maastricht, qui avaient provoqué un changement d'attitude dans l'opinion publique en ce qui concernait la construction européenne: «jusqu'à présent - il observe - [...] elle allait de soi. Aujourd'hui, ce n'est plus le cas et, loin de m'en affliger, je m'en réjouis». L'exigence démocratique devait revenir au premier plan. En effet, Delors avait appelé depuis longtemps au débat public sur l'Europe.

Enfin, les pays membres de l'Union européenne étaient bien divisés par des divergences importantes quant à la conception future de l'Europe. Le traité adopté à Maastricht reposait sur des compromis et des ambiguïtés paralysantes. Le président de la Commission avait surtout critiqué les dispositions concernant la politique extérieure, dont le dispositif institutionnel ne donnait pas toutes les garanties d'efficacité. Dans ce contexte, fidèle à son approche réaliste, il remarque «qu'une réflexion s'impose d'ores et déjà sur les structures institutionnelles et les processus de décision qui, dans l'avenir, devraient permettre à la Communauté de concilier efficacité et diversité».

Dans ce climat d'incertitudes, Delors ne veut pas se borner à l'analyse des difficultés, mais veut aussi s'efforcer «introduire un débat approfondi sur une question centrale: comment surmonter la crise de confiance qui

16 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/SPEECH_93_8.

affecte la Communauté? Comment retrouver la crédibilité économique et sociale, insuffler le dynamisme politique à l'intérieur, accroître notre influence à l'extérieur?». Dans ce discours il utilise à plusieurs reprises le ton d'interrogation.

Il dénonce l'impuissance de la Communauté, malgré le progrès réalisés depuis 1985, à amortir l'impact profond de la crise économique. Plusieurs facteurs à son avis avaient mis en cause la relance de l'économie européenne soutenue par le dynamisme du grand marché sans frontières. Parmi les plus importants figuraient la renationalisation des politiques économiques, le refus du Conseil européen de doter la Communauté «de moyens d'inciter les entreprises européennes à coopérer entre elles pour réussir le pari d'une compétitivité accrue dans un monde dominé par la guerre économique».

Face à une Europe retombée dans la récession, Delors exprime avec force la volonté de la Commission de réagir contre ce qu'il appelle une «dérive du projet communautaire».

Il passe en revue les enjeux qui le Parlement européen aussi devait relever pour «remettre le train européen sur les rails».

Pour sortir de l'impasse, et consolider les acquis de l'objectif 1992, il avance plusieurs propositions. En particulier, l'Initiative européenne de croissance, approuvée par le Conseil européen d'Edimbourg en décembre 1992, pouvait donner une contribution importante à faire retrouver à l'économie européenne le chemin de la croissance, en favorisant le développement des investissements publics, la reprise de l'investissement privé et l'aide aux mutations technologiques à travers des actions de formation et d'adaptation de la main d'oeuvre.

Parallèlement, il fallait consolider le Système monétaire européen, pour affirmer une volonté politique vis-à-vis de la spéculation, poursuivre l'approfondissement du marché intérieur et des politiques communes, lesquelles, après l'adoption en décembre 1992 du 'Paquet Delors II' pour la période 1994-1999, auraient bénéficié d'une solide garantie financière. Ce nouvel accord politique et financier, qui s'ajoutait à celui de février 1988, pouvait donner un impact économique réel aux politiques structurelles. En effet, Delors s'est engagé à défendre la crédibilité politique de la Communauté pas seulement en souhaitant des réformes institutionnelles, mais aussi en demandant la sécurité budgétaire. En donnant au budget communautaire des perspectives pluriannuelles, sa présidence de la Commission a ouvert des possibilités plus larges à l'action de la CE. Le résultat obtenu est de ce point de vue un succès de son approche réaliste et pragmatique.

La contribution des politiques de cohésion économiques et sociales, à travers les moyens du nouveau Fonds créé par le traité d'Union

européenne, était extrêmement important pour donner des réponses aux problèmes du chômage et du sous-emploi. Dans ce discours Delors défend avec vigueur l'Europe sociale, qui courait le risque d'apparaître «une sorte de fantôme insaisissable», et réaffirme son attachement à revitaliser le dialogue social. Il fallait donner un nouvel élan à la dimension sociale, qu'il juge être «une partie constituante de la construction européenne». Le président de la Commission regrette que la Charte communautaire des droits sociaux fondamentaux des travailleurs, adoptée en 1989, n'avait pas donné les résultats escomptés - «demeure au niveau des voeux pieux» dit-il, tandis qu'il espère qu'elle pourra être revitalisée par les nouvelles opportunités offertes par le Protocole sur la politique sociale annexé au Traité de Maastricht.

Malgré les difficultés de la consolidation du projet communautaire, paradoxalement le nombre croissant de candidats à l'adhésion témoignait qu'il y avait à l'extérieur une demande d'Europe pas faiblie. Avec l'Autriche, la Finlande et la Suède les négociations d'élargissement avaient déjà commencé et d'autres demandes d'adhésion avaient été déposées par Malte et Chypre. Après avoir exprimé le souci de maintenir un juste équilibre entre le Nord, l'Est et le Sud dans la Communauté, le président de la Commission a insisté sur l'exigence de subordonner les nouvelles adhésions à l'acceptation de l'acquis communautaire: «tout le traité, rien que le traité d'Union européenne». Les dérogations accordées à la Grande Bretagne et au Danemark étaient pour Delors «une prime d'ancienneté», mais l'acceptation de l'intégralité des objectifs prévus dans le traité d'Union européenne demeurait, et il faisait valoir que « personne ne s'est encore résigné à ce que l'on appelle l'Europe à géométrie variable».

Compte tenu de la complexité du processus, Delors a rappelé la nécessité de tenir les échéances de l'UEM, avec le début en janvier 1994 de la deuxième phase de l'UEM. Il ne s'agissait pas seulement de créer l'Institut monétaire européen mais, dans l'esprit de la Commission, de prouver que l'objectif de doter la Communauté d'une monnaie unique était un aspect essentiel pour tirer tous les avantages d'un grand espace économique commun.

Intervenant lors de la cérémonie de signature du Traité de Maastricht, le président de la Commission avait souligné l'importance de la contrepartie politique et démocratique de l'Union politique par rapport à l'Union économique et monétaire.

Au moment où il constate le malaise de la vie politique, il répète encore une fois l'importance qu'il accordait à la dimension démocratique de la vie communautaire.

«Démocratie, subsidiarité, transparence»: il rappelle que la Commission avait proposé ce triptyque au Conseil Européen de Lisbonne et avait formulé, pour ce qui la concernait, des suggestions qui visaient toutes à rapprocher le dessein communautaire des citoyens, renvoyant au niveau national les actions ou les modalités d'application qui seront mieux traitées ainsi. En prévision de la réforme institutionnelle de 1996, la nouvelle Commission entendait mener «cette entreprise de démocratisation» en étroite concertation avec le Parlement.

Face au désordre mondial Delors a rappelé la responsabilité commune de l'Europe, qu'il a exhorté à reprendre l'initiative pour accroître son influence extérieure. Il critique l'incapacité des grands pays industrialisés à traiter les grands problèmes monétaires, financiers et commerciaux et propose une réunion extraordinaire du G7 pour «briser les barrières du scepticisme». De même, il souhaite la conclusion de l'Uruguay Round pour écarter la menace d'un protectionnisme «destructeur pour tous», en soulignant l'importance de parvenir à un accord global et équilibré¹⁷. Dans sa vision, la puissance économique de la Communauté était l'instrument pour exercer une influence accrue sur les affaires internationales.

La perspective de la Grande Europe devait solliciter la volonté d'accroître l'influence extérieure de la Communauté, car, observait le président de la Commission, « depuis 1989, les cartes sont redistribuées, l'instabilité progresse, l'incertitude grandit». L'impuissance des Douze à arrêter la tragédie yougoslave était sans aucun doute un signe négatif pour les ambitions des européens, contrebalancé par l'action dans les pays de l'Europe de l'Est avec les aides et les prêts financiers du programme Phare.

En conclusion de son discours, le président de la Commission a dénoncé «les menaces qui vont bien au-delà de la remise en cause de notre projet commun: le retour explicite ou insidieux du nationalisme, le cortège menaçant du racisme et de la xénophobie, la mise en cause de nos systèmes sociaux qui forment la base du modèle européen de société». On est frappé par l'actualité de ses analyses.

Dans un contexte politique de plus en plus difficile, il a exprimé ses inquiétudes, appelant à une réaction pour lutter contre l'indifférence, et mobiliser les citoyens pour obtenir leur soutien en soulignant la portée concrète du marché intérieur.

17 Un rapprochement des positions pour surmonter l'impasse des négociations du Gatt a été réalisé lors de deux visites de Delors, en mars et mai 1993, aux Etats-Unis, AHUE, JD-1202, Sommet CE/Etats-Unis; JD-1295, Visite de Jacques Delors aux Etats-Unis.

Face à la ratification difficile du traité de Maastricht, avec le non danois et le ‘petit oui’ en France, Delors semblait prendre conscience des limites du rôle du président de la Commission. En juin 1991, à la réunion de Dresde du Conseil des ministres des Affaires étrangères, dans la discussion sur l’architecture institutionnelle du traité d’Union européenne élaboré par la présidence luxembourgeoise, Delors s’était battu pour l’unité du projet, contre la division en trois ‘piliers’ distincts.¹⁸ Mais entre «l’arbre», qui à son avis aurait permis à l’Union européenne d’avoir tous les atouts dans la même main, et le «temple», à Maastricht on avait choisi ce dernier.¹⁹

Pourtant, devant le Parlement il soulève des questions auxquelles tous étaient confrontés:

«Et si chaque institution ou chaque Etat membre cessait de considérer son nombril, pour décider qu’à défi global et commun ne peut répondre qu’une réponse globale et commune?».

Ce discours illustre bien les priorités du président de la Commission, mais trahit aussi son état d’esprit, dominé par l’inquiétude et par le souci de perdre les acquis de la période 1985-90. C’était à la fois un appel à reprendre la marche en avant du projet européen, dans la continuité de la construction européenne, et une froide analyse des menaces qui pouvait le faire dérailler. On peut en dégager aussi des éléments de réflexion valables encore aujourd’hui.

Enfin, on y retrouve des thèmes qui seront au cœur du *Livre blanc* sur la Croissance, la Compétitivité et l’Emploi de décembre 1993. Sa dernière bataille politique comme président de la Commission.²⁰

Conclusion

Dans la préface à l’ouvrage de Pascal Fontaine “Jean Monnet, l’Inspirateur”, publiée en 1988, Jacques Delors a écrit à propos de Monnet «qu’il

18 AHUE, JD-249, Non Paper sur la structure du traité sur l’Union suite à la réunion de Dresde.

19 Jacques Delors, *Memoires*, pp. 357-361

20 A cause de la résistance des ministres des Finances et surtout de l’Allemagne, le Livre Blanc de 1993, qui pour son financement anticipait des propositions actuelles, comme une taxe sur la CO2 et la possibilité pour la Commission d’emprunter une partie des ressources, n’a pas été appliqué, voir J. Delors, *Memoires*, pp. 416-430. Delors rappelle qu’en 1988 la présidence allemande «avait tout risqué pour que le paquet Delors I soit adopté. Mais en 1993, nous n’étions plus dans la même ambiance. Peut-être les héros étaient-ils fatigués», p. 427.

n'était pas qu'un pragmatique [...] il était aussi un visionnaire», et le définit un visionnaire pragmatique.²¹ Une définition qui peut s'adapter à Jacques Delors aussi.

Dans ses discours autour de l'Europe vision et pragmatisme sont indissociables.

Dans un discours du 20 mai 2003, tout en remarquant l'actualité de la méthode communautaire mise en place par les pères du traité comme moyen pour la construction de l'Europe, il tient à préciser d'avoir toujours suivi dans son action militante pour l'Europe une vision, qui «trascende les difficultés mais ne triomphe qu'au prix du réalisme. D'où mon insistance sur le fait que la vision doit être accompagnée de réalisme».²²

En tant que président de la Commission, Delors a cherché surtout de donner la priorité à des réalisations économiques concrètes, l'Europe du possible, mais s'est toutefois engagé à maintenir le cap vers l'union politique au cœur de sa vision.

Ces trois discours de Jacques Delors devant le Parlement européen ne sont pas seulement l'expression des priorités politiques de la Commission. Ils sont aussi révélateurs du message qu'il veut transmettre, message qui reflète son sentiment face aux défis auxquels était confronté le projet européen. On pourrait les placer sous le signe de la relance en 1985, de la continuité en 1989, du malaise en 1993.

Jacques Delors a donné à la construction communautaire une nouvelle impulsion avec le projet du grand marché sans frontières et la dynamique de l'Acte unique, mais la vision de l'Europe qu'il a livré dans ses discours n'est pas axée uniquement sur l'économie. Il défend avec vigueur une vision humaniste du Vieux Continent, un modèle européen de société, fondé sur des valeurs communes. Un patrimoine commun de l'histoire et de la culture européenne qui est le fondement de l'aventure européenne, qui ne pouvait se résumer «à l'élaboration d'un gigantesque supermarché».²³ Après la chute du mur de Berlin et l'effondrement de l'URSS l'Europe unie c'est aussi un projet géopolitique.

Son charisme et sa personnalité, avec ses qualités intellectuelles et morales, ont fait gagner à la Commission l'autorité politique indispensable pour faire sortir la Communauté européenne de la crise des années 1980, et faire accepter les objectifs et les moyens de la relance de la construction européenne. Comme l'a rappelé Helen Drake, «le Président Delors a su mobiliser,

21 cvce.eu/obj/hommage_de_jacques_delors_a_jean_monnet_1988

22 cvce.eu/obj/discours_de_jacques_delors_bruelles_20_mai_2003

23 D. Wolton, *L'unité d'un homme*, p. 305

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même si ce fut de manière imparfaite, l'influence potentielle que peut exercer une Commission présidée par un visionnaire pragmatique».²⁴

Courte biographie de Jacques Delors

Né à Paris le 20 juillet 1925 Jacques Delors est un homme politique français.

Autodidacte, il mène de front ses études, une activité professionnelle - à la Banque de France et au Commissariat du Plan - et un engagement dans le syndicalisme chrétien (CFTC, Reconstruction). Dans les années soixante, il est l'un des principaux inspirateurs de la seconde gauche et devient le responsable du club 'Citoyens 60' créé par la 'Vie Nouvelle', mouvement d'inspiration personnaliste.

En 1969, il rejoint le cabinet de Jacques Chaban-Delmas. Conseiller en charge des Affaires sociales, il s'occupe des affaires sociales et culturelles puis des questions économiques, financières et sociales. Jacques Delors adhère au Parti socialiste en novembre 1974.

En 1979, il est élu au Parlement européen où il préside la Commission économique et monétaire.

En 1981, il est nommé ministre des Finances, portefeuille qu'il conserve jusqu'en 1984. Face à l'aggravation de la crise économique, il convertit les socialistes français aux politiques de rigueur et de désinflation compétitive.

Après avoir quitté le gouvernement, il assurera, de janvier 1985 à décembre 1994, trois mandats en tant que président de la Commission européenne. Ces derniers seront marqués par une profonde relance de la construction européenne.

Toujours présent dans le débat européen et économique par l'influence de sa personnalité et de ses activités, il crée le think tank *Notre Europe* en octobre 1996, dont il est aujourd'hui le président fondateur.

24 Helen Drake, "Jacques Delors et la Commission européenne. Une leadership unique?", in *Politique européenne*, n. 4, 2002, pp. 131-145.

6 July 1989:
Gorbachev's Common European Home

Lara Piccardo

The speech that Gorbachev gave in front of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 6 July 1989 went down in history under the title of "Common European Home". The proposal for a big Europe including the Soviet Union is well known, but unflattering judgements have often been formulated on the basic idea, defined as utopian rather than revolutionary. Therefore, coming back to that speech appears useful in order to look at the profound and innovative elements hidden in Gorbachev's words. To do this, it is interesting to intertwine history and linguistics, although the author of this paper is not a linguist. However, a methodological intersection between history and linguistics is possible, especially in the analysis of a text, because there is an important theoretical presupposition that unites the two disciplines: that of wanting to look, and trying to see, beyond the text, going in search not only of its explicit meaning, but also of its deeper one. Both of them strive, from their own specific points of view, to bring to light the implicit and even the unconscious aspects of the text. As a communicative unit endowed with meaning, each text is seen, in this common perspective, as the precipitate of the social practices that produce it; and the objects of interest of both disciplines are ultimately those social practices. Linguistics can therefore be a potentially useful tool to help to interpret language in its relationship with social reality, also from a historical perspective¹.

To this premise, a second (and more obvious) one must be added: language is not only a tool for transferring messages, because it is something much wider. It reflects the culture and the identity of the speaker(s),

1 Nancy S. Struever, "The Study of Language and the Study of History", in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol. IV, no. 3, Winter 1974, pp. 401–415; Francesca Socrate, Carlotta Sorba (eds.), "Tra linguistica e storia: incroci metodologici e percorsi di ricerca. Interventi di Jean-Philippe Genet, Michele A. Cortelazzo, Jacques Guilhaumou, Pietro Trifone, Marta Margotti, Rachele Raus, Francesca Socrate", in *Contemporanea*, no. 2, April 2013, pp. 285–333; Erich Kasten, Katja Roller, Joshua Wilbur (eds.), *Oral History Meets Linguistics*, Washington: SEC Publications, 2017.

which means that words cannot simply be translated, but they must also be analysed in a wider framework. Identity and culture are notoriously difficult concepts, linked to philosophy and history as much as to social psychology and politics.

For these reasons, my analysis of Gorbachev's speech also looks at its cultural and linguistic framework and at the speaker's historical framework.

1. *The cultural and linguistic framework*

As all other 'national' speeches, Soviet and Russian discourse on European integration must also be read with two issues in mind: identity on the one hand and culture and geography on the other.

As regards identity², it must be underlined that, linguistically speaking, Russian is one of the languages that is able to distinguish between belonging to the State and the ethnicity of a citizen with the simple use of two words ('russkij' and 'rossijanin'). In Russian, 'russkij' (русский) is not a noun but an adjective, which has been used since the 10th century; it derives from the term *Rus'* and takes on the meaning of 'Russian' in its ethnic and cultural sense. To be more precise, it refers to the Russian people, their language, their culture and their customs and traditions, as well as Russia itself, its territory and its history. The confusion arises by the fact that, in official documents, the nationality is indicated with the term 'russkij'.

The term 'rossijanin' (россиянин) has been part of the lexicon since the 11th century (albeit with some phonetic changes) and derives from the word *Rossija* (Russia)³. It indicates the Russian citizen belonging to the

2 Peter J.S. Duncan, "Contemporary Russian Identity between East and West", in *The Historical Journal*, vol. 48, no. 1, March 2005, pp. 277–294.

3 This is not the place to reconstruct the etymology and meaning of the terms *Rus'* and *Rossija*, but it is important to remember that there were two *Rus'*: the Kievan *Rus'* (9th–13th centuries) and the Moscovian *Rus'* (13th–16th centuries). They were followed by Russia (*Rossija*), which became an empire with Tsar Peter the Great. Omeljan Pritsak, *The Origin of Rus*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981; Pavel M. Dolukhanov, *The Early Slavs: Eastern Europe from the Initial Settlement to the Kievan Rus*, New York: Longman, 1996; Hakon Stang, *The Naming of Russia*, Oslo: Middeløst, 1996; David Christian, *History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia*, vol. 1, *Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire*, Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998; Andrii Danylenko, "The Name *Rus'*: In Search of a New Dimension", in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, no. 52, 2004, pp. 1–32; Roger

Russian Federation, regardless of his/her ethnicity or his/her culture, and for this reason, its meaning is much broader than 'russkij'.

In order to understand a little better the difference between the two terms, which even create confusion among Russian speakers, the example could be that of a Tatar who lives in Russian territory and is consequently 'rossijanij' but not 'russkij', as ethnically he does not belong to this culture.

The real difficulty is that both terms are translated into other languages with a single word: Russian. Therefore, the reader must be aware of their juridical and ethnic meanings.

Soviet is another adjective, which is much easier to understand and translate: it refers to the Soviet Union. As regards the Soviet Union, questions arise as to whether the USSR was an empire, and whether it was a Russian empire. The first question depends ultimately on the impressive comparative study of empires. Among them, the one by Dominic Lieven⁴, who gives a variety of different meanings, is particularly interesting. It seems that a fundamental element is multi-nationality. If this assumption is accepted, it means that the Soviet Union was an empire. Susanne Michele Birgersson⁵ suggests that the core of the definition of 'empire' is the sharp division between the centre and the periphery and that the former dominates the latter. Again, in the Soviet federation, the centre, i.e. the Russian Soviet Republic, dominated the others. Therefore, the conclusion is that the USSR was an empire.

With reference to culture and geography, it must be remembered that Russia (both *Rus'* and *Rossija*) feels itself different from Europe but geographically part of it and linked to it. The nature of this link is explained by the Russian philosophy of the 19th century, which produces two movements: the Westerners and the Slavophiles. The initial assumption is the following one: Russia must renew itself. The question is how. According to the Westerners, friendly relations with the West are fundamental for finding the inspirations, the tools and the methods to renew Russia. On the other side, Slavophiles oppose the modernisation and westernisation begun by Peter the Great and Catherine the Great and advocate a return to

Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; Simon Franklin, Jonathan Shephard, *The Emergence of Rus': 750–1200*, Milton Park: Routledge, 2013; Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Mark D. Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 9th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

4 Dominic Lieven, *Empire. The Russian Empire and Its Rivals*, Yale University Press, London, 2002.

5 Susanne Michele Birgersson, *After the Breakup of a Multi-Ethnic Empire: Russia, Successor States and Eurasian Security*, Westport: Praeger, 2001.

a simple peasant-based society centred on the Orthodox faith. Slavophiles believe that Russia has to be developed upon values and institutions derived from its early Slavic history and roots, which oppose the influences of the West in Russia⁶.

The idea of the West, in any case, is Europe, to which the United States were added only after the beginning of the Cold War.

2. *The speaker's historical framework*

Exponent of the reformist wing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader who, for age reasons, did not build his political career during the Stalinist period, but in the relatively more open one of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev.

Gorbachev gained a classical Party education. He joined the CPSU in 1952 and he was appointed to experiment with innovative agricultural organisations and management systems in his region. He embarked on a rapid political career: in 1970, he was elected deputy to the Supreme Soviet, becoming a member of the Central Committee the following year and entering the CPSU Secretariat in 1978 and the Politburo two years later. Upon Brezhnev's death, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov entrusted him with delicate Party assignments and important missions abroad. After the advent to power of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, Gorbachev became the number two in the regime, standing out by adopting positions in favour of deep internal reforms.

Gorbachev's election as the new General Secretary of the CPSU, which took place on 11 March 1985, just one day after the death of his predecessor, was greeted with joy by Soviet public opinion, because it represented

6 Howard F. Stein, "Russian Nationalism and the Divided Soul of the Westernizers and Slavophiles", in *Ethos*, vol. 4, no. 4, 1976, pp. 403–438; Robin Aizlewood, "Revisiting Russian Identity in Russian Thought: From Chaadaev to the Early Twentieth Century", in *The Slavonic and East European Review*, vol. 78, no. 1, January 2000, pp. 20–43; Guerman Diligensky, Sergei Chugrov, *The West in Russian Mentality*, Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 2000; Sergey Horujy, Patrick Lally Michelson, "Slavophiles, Westernizers, and the Birth of Russian Philosophical Humanism", in Gary M. Hamburg, Randall Allen Poole (eds.), *A History of Russian Philosophy 1830–1930*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 27–51; Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 10, *Russia Philosophy*, London: Continuum, 2011; V.V. Zenkovsy, *History of Russian Philosophy*, vol. 1, Milton Park: Routledge, 2014.

the passage of powers from the old bureaucracy of the Party to a younger and more prepared generation of political leaders.

The choice in support of Gorbachev was well considered. In the CPSU, a new majority was forming that was favourable in terms of foreign policy to a peaceful solution to the difficult international situation in which the USSR had come to find itself—especially *vis-à-vis* the United States because of the question of armaments—and on the domestic level. It was a new attempt at reforming communism, the third attempt after those made by Khrushchev and by the Brezhnev–Kosygin–Podgorny joint management body, all of which had failed⁷. The election of Gorbachev showed that the severe recession in the Soviet economy and the political weakening that resulted for the country on the international scene in a moment of extreme tension could not be ignored⁸. The magnitude of the crisis made a real national effort indispensable. Unlike the previous periods, the reform was no longer the problem of a small group of progressive exponents who tried to improve, in small steps, the functioning of the system. The stakes were now much higher: it was essential to free the economy and society from the aftermath of Stalinism and the weight of the administrative command system established in the 1930s. From this point of view, the challenge could be compared to the great reforms that followed the abolition of serfdom in 1861⁹.

Gorbachev immediately started a process of reconstruction of the political and institutional order, which determined the decisive turning point for the change in Soviet society:

The New Political Thinking of the second half of the 1980s constituted a radical break with this ideological approach. It was built on three assumptions about international relations. First, the world had become increasingly interdependent. Secondly, global problems forced all countries to cooperate. This cooperation had become a matter of survival, because of the threat of nuclear annihilation and common ecological threats. Thirdly, war between capitalist countries was no longer seen as inevitable. Capitalist economies could develop with-

7 A.K. Sokolov, *Kurs Sovetskoi istorii, 1941-1991* [Course of Soviet History 1941–1991], Moscow, Vysshaja shkola, 1999, p. 341; Nicolas Werth, *Storia della Russia nel Novecento*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2000, p. 582.

8 Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; Chris Miller, *The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016.

9 Nicolas Werth, *Storia della Russia nel Novecento*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2000, pp. 582–583.

out militarisation and development could be reached through disarmament. As a result, the Marxist–Leninist theory of imperialism needed to be adjusted¹⁰.

This ‘new thinking’ was presented and accepted during the XXVII Congress of the CPSU (25 February–6 March 1986) in its general policy lines. It was then introduced into the common language of Soviet and international public opinion with the terms *perestroika*¹¹ (restructuring or rebuilding), *glasnost* (transparency) and *uskorenie* (acceleration), which became the slogan of the new management of the Soviet apparatus. The goal was the realisation of “socialism with a human face”.

Perestroika was conceived as a reformist project, which, through *uskorenie*, the early forgotten motto, would initiate Soviet socio-economic development, demolishing what prevented its progress first of all: the Stalinist overstructures. It was no accident that among the areas in which *perestroika* played an important role there was also the Party and the administration of the State: this was done in order to make the USSR efficient and to eliminate the corruption and immobility that damaged its foundations. In short, it was a political praxis that was

the rejection of ideological stereotypes, of the dogmas of the past and [which required] an open and unconstrained outlook on the world and on ourselves, an attention to the challenges of the present and to the tendencies that have already emerged in the third millennium¹².

The principles of *perestroika* were translated into precise political and economic strategies between 1985 and 1989. The first two years were mainly intended for intervention in the economic sector:

Today the primary task of the Party and of all the people is to resolutely interrupt the unfavourable tendencies in the development of the

10 Tom Casier, “Gorbachev’s ‘Common European Home’ and its Relevance for Russian Foreign Policy Today”, in *Debater a Europa*, no. 18, 2018, pp. 17–34, specifically p. 19. See also Marie-Pierre Rey, “‘Europe is our Common Home’: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept”, in *Cold War History*, vol. 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 33–65.

11 The transliteration of the term ‘perestroika’ is taken from the spelling used by Gorbachev in the English translation of his eponymous work, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World*, New York: Harper & Row, 1987.

12 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, *Riflessioni sulla Rivoluzione d'Ottobre. Dal Palazzo d'Inverno alla perestrojka*, Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1997, p. 100. The translation is mine.

economy, to confer on it the due dynamism, to leave space for the initiative and the creativity of the masses, to authentically revolutionary transformations¹³.

The 'rationalisation' of the economic system introduced by the new Kremlin leader had to be the necessary condition through which to reduce the productive apparatus as soon as possible. According to this perspective, the Gosplan (the State Planning Committee) was supposed to achieve three objectives. Firstly, there was the modification of the investment structural policy. Secondly, there was the development of the mechanical industry (global automation of production and computerisation). Finally, there was the creation of two new government bodies such as the agro-industrial State committee, to reduce the bureaucracy that was damaging agricultural production and the industrial inspection service, to favour quality and no longer the quantity of production and the birth of private production units on an exclusively family basis.

On the political level, the actions of the General Secretary aimed at countering the actions of the *apparatchiks* in the CPSU. To do this, Gorbachev considered it appropriate to transfer the power and functions of the Party to the bodies of the State, reorganising the public bodies and favouring the democratisation of the CPSU to transform its role in society.

This process involved two aspects. First of all, it was necessary to reform the 'internal democracy', that is, the control over the politics of cadres. It must not be forgotten that Gorbachev inherited an administrative command system, founded by Stalin in the 1930s, which rested on the *nomenklatura* and was characterised by the centralisation of political decisions and the merging of the bureaucratic apparatus and the Party, which had total control over the economy and society.

Secondly, it was necessary to review the 'external democracy', which indicated the relationship between the CPSU and the institutional bodies. It was a matter of delineating the boundaries between the role of the Party and that of the State, in accordance with the guiding principles of the reform, which provided for a clear distinction between the two centres of power.

This correction of 'external democracy' constituted the most complex and delicate aspect of Gorbachev's policy of renewal, because it presupposed the capacity to reform the CPSU in such a way that it did not

13 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, *Proposte per una svolta. La relazione al 27° Congresso del PCUS e altri documenti con una prefazione-intervista inedita dell'autore*, Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1986, p. 46. The translation is mine.

abuse the other economic and State bodies. It was necessary to identify the mechanisms that had paralysed the entire apparatus and create a new conception of the Party through the introduction of meritocratic criteria that would ensure the proper functioning and coordination of the activities carried out by managers.

The project of renewal of the political and institutional framework had its turning point at the XIX Conference of the CPSU (28 June–1 July 1988). It started the re-elaboration of the 1977 constitutional text. During the work of the twelfth extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of 1 December 1988, modifications were made to 55 articles out of 174. They concerned four themes: the summit of the bodies of State power; the modification of the electoral system; the separation of the State and the Party; and the affirmation of a socialist State of law based on the judicial control of State acts through a clearer hierarchy of law sources.

The stated purpose in the text of the revision law was to develop a socialist democracy and the self-government of the people in order to perfect the electoral system and the structure and activities of the Soviets of People's Deputies and justice bodies¹⁴.

The reform process initiated by *perestroika* could not ignore *glasnost*—that is, transparency in the entire network of public affairs management—, which intended to play a fundamental role in citizens' mobility and participation, as well as in their moral renewal, intended to question past events and re-held institutions responsible for the Great Terror period.

Glasnost presupposed

the freedom of information of citizens and the freedom of expression of their own opinions and political convictions, religious and of another kind, the freedom of criticism in all its fullness¹⁵.

In order to concretise these principles, Gorbachev reduced the control of information censorship, promoted the first forms of economic and commercial liberalisation, and proposed broad historical reflection on the dark and stormy Soviet past. Starting from the years 1986–1987, in fact, the centralised censorship weakened and saw its role reduced in controlling information on “State secrets”—“notion, it is true, not sufficiently broad in

14 Mario Ganino, *La riforma costituzionale in Unione Sovietica. La legge di revisione del 1° dicembre 1988*, Torino: Giappichelli, 1989, p. 16.

15 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, *Riflessioni sulla Rivoluzione d'Ottobre. Dal Palazzo d'Inverno alla perestrojka*, Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1997, p. 104. The translation is mine.

USSR to reduce all censors to unemployment”¹⁶—and the reorganisation of the various unions of filmmakers, writers, press organs, television and theatres helped to liberate cultural life.

For the first time in Soviet history, citizens saw a political leader really draw closer to the problems of the country, which—as he himself wrote—was suffering “moral degradation and [the] erosion of revolutionary ideals and socialist values”¹⁷.

Moreover, the revival of a pure communist ideology was one of the primary objectives of *perestroika* and *glasnost*. Both concepts expressed the attempt of the General Secretary of the CPSU

to “wake up” those people who have “fallen asleep” and make them truly active and concerned, to ensure that everyone feels as [though] he is the master of the country, of his enterprise, office or institute¹⁸.

Therefore, to be able to ensure that the masses, the real protagonists of the 1917 Revolution, became aware of their social importance, Gorbachev sensed the need to bring the USSR towards a democratic solution. Moreover, Lenin himself had affirmed that democracy and socialism were indivisible, since to reach power the popular classes had first to acquire democratic freedoms.

The new political programme was much appreciated by both domestic public opinion, hoping to see its social and economic situation improve, and Western public opinion, which saw the ‘reformer’ as the man who would put an end to the permanent fear of the final clash between the two blocks.

Meanwhile, however, Gorbachev had to face the first crack in the Soviet system. *Perestroika*, while also allowing greater autonomy of the Soviet Republics, had created the conditions for the birth of the pro-independence political movement *Sąjūdis* (meaning ‘movement’) in Vilnius in October 1988, led by Vytautas Landsbergis, who pronounced the self-determination of the Lithuanian Republic on 16 February 1989. The following elections on 26 March brought nationalists to victory, leading even the CPSU Central Committee to accept a programmer document after a few months in which the right to economic sovereignty of the Baltic Republics was sanctioned.

16 Nicolas Werth, *Storia dell’Unione Sovietica. Dall’impero russo alla Comunità degli Stati indipendenti, 1990-1991*, Bologna: il Mulino, 1993, p. 588.

17 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World*, New York: Harper & Row, 1987, p. 24.

18 Ibid., p. 29.

Until then, everything had happened in the political arena. Nevertheless, on 23 August 1989, during the celebrations for the Soviet–German Pact of 1939, massive popular demonstrations took place: a human chain stretching 560 kilometres crossed the three Republics, to remember that their annexation to the USSR of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been an act of strength¹⁹.

Emblematically showing how the ‘new thinking’, by awakening nationalist feelings suffocated by Gorbachev’s predecessors, had a boomerang effect precisely against its creator, on 20 December 1989, the Lithuanian Communist Party broke away from the CPSU, proclaiming itself autonomous. On 11 March 1990, the Vilnius Parliament approved a declaration of independence and elected Landsbergis as President. On 30 April, it was the turn of Estonia, which appointed Edgar Savisaar, an exponent of the National Front, as Prime Minister. On 4 May, Latvia also ratified its Declaration of Independence and on 7 October 1990 elected President Romualdas Rasukas, of the Popular Front, as President of the new independent Republic.

Gorbachev considered the declaration of independence of the Baltic States illegitimate and void and started a real ‘war of nerves’, which led to the decision to impose economic sanctions on the three Republics. As early as in January 1990, it had placed Lithuania under embargo, reducing gas supplies by 80 per cent. Then on 27 November, he authorised the army to use force to defend military targets in the three Republics, until on 2 January 1991, the Red Army troops occupied the Press House in Riga and the Party headquarters in Vilnius. On 7 January, Defence Minister Dmitry Timofeyevich Yazov, a future coup leader in August 1991, also sent paratroopers to enforce the mandatory military service ignored by the citizens of the three Republics.

Nevertheless, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania²⁰ did not withdraw from their intent: they created a common market and resurrected the political cooperation body called the ‘Baltic Council’. On 3 March 1991, the people of Estonia and Latvia voted 77 per cent in favour of the independence manifesto in two secret referenda.

19 Martin McCauley, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union*, London-New York: Routledge, 2013.

20 Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993; Richard Mole, *The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union. Identity, Discourse and Power in the Post-Communist Transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*, London: Taylor & Francis, 2012.

To counteract and control these secessionist breakaways, Gorbachev had already transformed the USSR into a new presidential and multi-party Republic on 13 March 1990. The constitutional revision law approved on 14 March 1990 had introduced a chapter on the 'President of the USSR', i.e. on the head of the Soviet State directly elected by the citizens—for no more than two terms—by secret ballot, both universal and direct. The circumstances of the moment implied the need to put a person at the helm of political, economic and social change who could obtain the support of what remained the most efficient institutional force: the CPSU.

In this way, as the first President of the USSR, Gorbachev was exceptionally elected by the Congress of People's Deputies. This appointment did not calm the tensions within the Party, from which, after the XXVIII Congress of July 1990, the most reformist and democratic wing emerged.

In foreign policy, Gorbachev tried to realise his own doctrine: in order to have money for the reconstruction of a new Soviet Union, Gorbachev needed to cut the military budget. The only way to justify limiting the army's expenses was to remove the idea of a dangerous enemy from Soviet public opinion. And the only way to do that was to begin peaceful and friendly relations with the United States.

Therefore, in order to achieve *détente* with the Western bloc, Gorbachev was ready to make unprecedented concessions. Specifically related to European integration, in 1988 he promoted mutual recognition between the European Community and Comecon, destroying the dogmatic Soviet 'niet' against any step in the Communitarian construction and proposing a new idea of Europe.

His "Common European Home" speech was given within this particular framework, which was characterised by great willingness and huge problems.

3. *The Speech*

On 6 July 1989²¹, Gorbachev chose the Council of Europe (the USSR was a member of CoE) to launch a new proposal for disarmament (the unilateral reduction of short-range nuclear missiles), promoting the idea of a "Common European Home" (abandoning the use of force and

21 The text of the speech is available on the website of the University of Luxembourg's CVCE, https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2002/9/20/4c021687-98f9-4727-9e8b-836e0bc1f6fb/publishable_en.pdf, consulted on 30 December 2020.

the ‘Brezhnev doctrine’, maintaining socialism) and dealing with human rights (however, without mentioning the European Convention on Human Rights).

The context he chose is definitely interesting. Gorbachev spoke for 45 minutes to 177 representatives from 23 Western European countries. He opted for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe because that assembly was able to represent the part of the continent that up to five years earlier was considered an enemy. However, in that moment, Western Europe was changing its location for the Soviet Union: it was becoming part of a process, which, according to Gorbachev, could have led to the gradual abolition of all the barriers inherited from the Cold War: military, political and economic.

In December 1988, Gorbachev gave a similar speech, even if it was milder in content, to the United Nations General Assembly²², but in July 1989, he presented himself as politically stronger: he had received the consent of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR. Moreover, as already explained, this Congress was an achievement of *perestroika*: it was born in 1989 as a new superior body and made the Supreme Soviet an indirectly elected body operated by the same Congress, which also elected its President. Certainly, however, the Hungarian and Polish situations were also determining radical changes in the Soviet bloc, which was about to disintegrate.

When reading the speech, the first aspect that could emerge, at least for an audience of Europeans, is its lack of originality. Projects of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals had already been proposed since the modern era, but an assessment here must be made starting from the speaker, who is ‘russkij’, ‘rossiskij’ and ‘sovietskij’. Moreover, taking into consideration the cultural framework, whatever adjective is chosen, from Moscow to Kiev no leader had ever thought of the USSR being part of Europe, either geographically or culturally and probably economically and politically as well. This is why the speech was original and new.

22 The “Address by Mikhail Gorbachev at the UN General Assembly Session”, 7 December 1988, can be listened to on the following webpage: <https://www.c-span.org/video/?5292-1/gorbachev-united-nations>, consulted on 31 May 2021, while the text is available in the History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWHIP Archive, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116224>, consulted on 12 June 2021. André Gunder Frank, “Gorbachev’s United Nations Initiatives: Steps in the Right Direction”, in Frank Barnaby (ed.), *Building a More Democratic United Nations*, London: Routledge, 1991.

Gorbachev was aware of the fact that the audience was from the West: for this reason, he never used the adjective 'Russian'. He always referred to 'Soviet'. No confusion must arise, both outside and inside the USSR.

On the other hand, he talked to 'Europeans': he never used French, Italians, Germans, etc. He talked to Europe as if he recognised it as whole, not as a sum of countries. In this sense, he abandoned the idea of his predecessors, who intended to split Europe using manoeuvrable foreign politics. Gorbachev used the word 'West' only 14 times and he did it in a very specific way: West is the counterpart of East in West–East relations, so the word is never alone, but it is used in the idiomatic expression 'West–East relations'. And he adopted the Western expression of 'West–East relations' and not 'East–West relations', as Eastern leaders did until that moment.

The use of some words makes the speech almost religious: 'spiritual parameters', 'mankind', 'community', 'destiny', 'spirit', 'humanism' and 'Man', which, in the written speech, is written with a capital letter. However, on the other hand, he pronounced heavy words to make his message stronger: he came to Strasbourg to give a concrete shape to his new foreign policy in the relations with Western countries, but the West would have to adopt a new attitude as well. He did not adopt any *aut aut*, but he strongly asked for compromises. Moreover, it is clear that for Gorbachev Europe had to accept compromises because relations could be modified if the two parties agreed on it and on the way toward it. Talking as a politician that had already denounced and tried to solve Soviet mistakes, in Strasbourg he recalled Europe to its historical responsibility: "The metastases of colonial slavery spread around the world from Europe. It was here that fascism came into being. It was here that the most destructive wars started"²³.

So Europe also needed a new, wider project, that is, a "Common European Home", which the Soviet Union was part of.

Gorbachev anticipated a question that was surely to be addressed to him: How would such a project be possible with two different political, economic and social systems? He answered:

I know that many people in the West perceive that the main difficulty lies in the existence of two social systems. Yet the difficulty lies elsewhere—it lies in the rather widespread belief (or even in the political objective) that what is meant by overcoming the division of Europe is actually overcoming socialism. But this is a course for confrontation, if not something worse. There will be no European unity along these lines. The

23 "Common European Home" on CVCE, p. 4.

fact that the states of Europe belong to different social systems is a reality. The recognition of this historical fact and respect for the sovereign right of each people to choose their social system at their own discretion are the most important prerequisite for a normal European process²⁴.

This is a key passage. It could be said that this is the Gorbachev version of Andrei Sakharov's theory on the 'convergence' of the two systems. Gorbachev was to reject this definition; indeed, at several points in his speech, he reiterated the diversity of values and structures that remain, indicating a vast series of interactions between the two social systems. Gorbachev added that at the end of this process the parts would all find themselves different. This is a proud view, and Gorbachev said he knew that this view would not please those in the West who looked at future integration simply in terms of "vercoming socialism"²⁵.

Gorbachev left the question of the final destination largely open, but invited realism: "In today's interdependent world the geopolitical notions, brought forth by a different epoch, turn out to be just as helpless in real politics as the laws of classical mechanics in the quantum theory"²⁶.

Coming to the contents of the project, Gorbachev insisted on the fact that governments and peoples of Europe would have to deal, from that moment on, with a socialist State completely different from what it was in the past. The USSR, in the midst of its dramatic yet superpower crisis, had understood the impossibility of autarchy. In contrast, "the Soviet Union and the United States are a natural part of the European international and political structure"²⁷.

Gorbachev tackled this issue several times and the need to put the house in order. However, in overcoming the old conceptions, on 6 July 1989 he took a leap longer than that of the West and drew a perspective of interdependence that was to put even the proud autarchic conceptions of the West to a severe test.

The transforming USSR needed Europe, but neither to crush it with colossal dimensions, because—Gorbachev says—it would not serve the USSR in the first place, nor to separate it from the United States, since that would be unrealistic.

These were the general premises. Then the Soviet leader declared a real avalanche of concrete operational proposals, in terms of security, econo-

24 Ibid., p. 3.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

mic and technical and scientific cooperation, plus legal and institutional changes.

Gorbachev said that, in short, Europe was facing a historic opportunity to give the building of the new world contents worthy of its past. Its interaction with its other part would thus certainly involve the renunciation of old barriers, among which were the CoCom²⁸ constraints on technology transfers. However, even the USSR had too many things that seemed secret. Here, Gorbachev's self-criticism became harsh: "Of course, we, too, are often excessively closed. However, we have begun to straighten this out. We have started to take down our 'domestic CoCom'—the wall separating military and civilian production—in particular, in connection with conversion"²⁹. Therefore, only what was reasonable for defensive purposes would remain secret, the rest was to be part of the great opening to the outside world.

The same idea of security would now find a new place:

A world where military arsenals would be reduced but where human rights would be violated would not be a safe place. We have come to this conclusion ourselves once and for all. The decisions made by the Vienna meeting represent a real breakthrough in this respect. It laid down a programme of joint actions by European countries, made up of all kinds of activities. Understanding was reached on many issues, which until very recently had been stumbling blocks in East–West relations. We are convinced that the all-European process should rest on a solid legal ground. We are thinking of an all-European home as a community rooted in law. And for our part we have begun to move in that direction³⁰.

It is here that the most convincing and exhaustive obituary of the Brezhnev doctrine is written: all people must not only be able to decide, but must be protected by rules that no one can violate. Gorbachev had reserved this high point precisely for Strasbourg.

28 The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) is the informal multilateral organisation through which the United States and its allies attempt to coordinate the national controls they apply over the export of strategic materials and technology to the Communist world. Yoko Yasuhara, "The Myth of Free Trade: The Origins of COCOM 1945–1950", in *The Japanese Journal of American Studies*, vol. 4, 1991, pp. 127–148; Tor Egil Førland, *Cold Economic Warfare: CoCom and the Forging of Strategic Export Controls, 1948–1954*, Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing BV, 2009.

29 "Common European Home" on CVCE, p. 8.

30 Ibid., p. 10.

The common Europe, of which the USSR claims to be already a part, became one of the pillars of this new multipolar order, which had been unprecedented, unthinkable even, just five years before. For this to become full reality, *perestroika* had to reach full realisation, travelling in the big storm it created. Gorbachev did not come to Strasbourg to hide his difficulties, but to make commitments to overcoming them in the only direction possible and advantageously for everyone. Then, the last paradox was that the representative of planned socialism came to urge the Europe of business and trade to “take justified risks”³¹, to look far ahead.

Among the innovative proposals, four should be underlined here: security, multilateral cooperation, ecology and humanitarian issues.

One of Gorbachev’s most relevant statements was about security. The USSR was to stand firm on the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the old continent by the end of the century and urged the start of negotiations to liquidate tactical nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, taking into account that the positions of NATO are opposite to that, he proposed going through some stages together, with each maintaining their own positions. How could this be done? The NATO concept of ‘minimum nuclear deterrence’ had to be clarified³². Therefore, the experts of the four countries that had these weapons (USA, USSR, Great Britain and France) had to meet with the technicians of the other countries that hosted them on their territory. If, at this point, the NATO countries showed a willingness to start negotiations, the USSR would immediately continue the unilateral reduction of its tactical nuclear missiles in Europe. This would happen while the USSR was carrying out the structural change of its conventional forces so as to exclude the physical possibility of launching an offensive (the so-called ‘sufficient defence’).

In terms of multilateral cooperation, the USSR was ready to adhere to numerous international conventions in the Council of Europe (ecology, culture, education, broadcasting). It was willing to open a consulate general at the EU institutions in Strasbourg. It intended to multiply its inter-parliamentary contacts. Gorbachev proposed calling a “second Helsinki” quickly. He wanted to proceed with the strengthening of “economic interdependence”³³ in all possible forms between the two economic Communities (Comecon and the European Community), especially in the sectors of advanced technologies. His concrete projects were various: a trans-Euro-

31 Ibid., p. 8.

32 Ibid., p. 6.

33 Ibid., p. 7.

pean high-speed railway line; the use of solar energy; the treatment of nuclear waste; the safety of nuclear power plants; computer systems using optical fibres; a European satellite transmission system; and intensive development of the joint project of an international thermonuclear reactor.

Coming to ecology, Gorbachev declared that the "Common European Home" would have to be "environmentally clean as well"³⁴. Gorbachev devoted a large part of his speech to this aspect. A regional ecological security system needed to be created and he envisaged the creation of a European ecological research institute. It would also be possible to pool research and techniques for the prevention of natural disasters.

Finally, as regards humanitarian issues, the USSR intended to be part of the world community of states of law. Gorbachev considered it useful to compare laws on human rights, perhaps by founding a European institute for comparative human law. He proposed the creation of a common European legal space according to the joint Franco-Soviet proposal at the Paris forum. Cultural and information exchanges would have to proceed unhindered, including television exchanges.

This was the project for a "furnished"³⁵ "Common European Home". However, time would be Gorbachev's worst enemy and the Soviet Union would implode two and a half years later.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 9.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 4.

“European Community – Towards the European Union. The Whole of Europe – on the Way on Itself”. A Speech Held by Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Vienna on 14 September 1989

Michael Gebler

I. The Speaker

Hans-Dietrich Genscher (born on 21 March 1927 in Reideburg-Halle; died on 31 March 2016 in Pech, in the municipality of Wachtberg close to Bonn) was, as a German politician of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Federal Minister of the Interior from 1969 to 1974 and Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs almost continuously from 1974 to 1992, as well as Vice-Chancellor of the Federal Republic from 1974 to 1982 under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) and, after the change of government, from 1982 to 1992 under Helmut Kohl (CDU).¹ From 1974 to 1992, he was thus the longest serving Federal Minister in both the Federal Republic and Europe, as well as Federal Chairman of the FDP from 1974 to 1985.²

1 Tim Geiger, “Die deutsche Einheit als Beitrag zu einem System gesamteuropäischer Sicherheit. Hans-Dietrich Genschers Handschrift im Prozess der deutschen Einigung 1989/90”. Teil 1, in: *Jahrbuch zur Liberalismus-Forschung* Baden-Baden: Nomos 33, 2021, pp. 139–167.

Victor Jaeschke: “Die FDP, Europa und das Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts 1987-1992,” in: *Jahrbuch zur Liberalismus-Forschung* 33 (2021), 117–138, Jürgen Frölich, “Taktisch versierter Pragmatiker und Visionär zugleich. Zum politischen Wirken von Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1927-2016)”, in *Deutschland Archiv*, 19 May 2017, www.bpb.de/248082.

2 Hans-Dieter Heumann: *Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Die Biografie*, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2012.

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Hans-Dietrich Genscher autograph card




Source: Private Property (mine)

In the late 1980s, Genscher can be considered a key historical figure as he purposefully advocated the overcoming of the Cold War as well as the end of the division of Germany and Europe with diplomatic skills. His unfinished speech from the balcony of the German Embassy in Prague on 30 September 1989 became famous when, in the presence of the head of the Federal Chancellery, Rudolf Seiters (CDU), he announced to thousands of GDR citizens who had fled from there that they could leave the country by special trains, which he had achieved in long negotiations with the Soviet Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze. He said to the refugees: “We have come to you to inform you that today your departure ...” (the following words were lost in the general jubilations).³

3 Hans-Dietrich Genscher/Karel Vodička: *Zündfunke aus Prag. Wie 1989 der Mut zur Freiheit die Geschichte veränderte*, München: dtv, 2014, see also Michael Gebler: “The End of the Communist Regime in the GDR”, in Florin Abraham (ed.),

On the evening of 30 September 1989, Hans-Dietrich Genscher spoke to GDR refugees on the balcony of the German Embassy in Prague.



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II. The Speech

Genscher's Vienna speech of 14 September 1989 served, among other things, to prepare this famous act. The following historical data are worth knowing about the immediate prehistory of the speech:

On 27 June 1989, it was Austria's Foreign Minister, Alois Mock, and his Hungarian counterpart, Gyula Horn, who cut open the last remnants of the border fence to underline Hungary's dismantling of the surveillance installations, which began on 2 May 1989 by the Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Németh. In the eroding People's Republic, a process of social and domestic transformation had already been underway since 1987,⁴ which was followed with interest and supported by Bonn.⁵

Annus Mirabilis. Three decades After. Desires, Achievements, Future, București: Editura Comunicare, 2020, 165–190.

4 Andreas Schmidt-Schweizer: »Verhandelte Revolution« oder »Transformation von innen«? Charakteristika und Hintergründe des politischen Systemwechsels in Ungarn 1987–1990, Hamburg: Tredition, 2020.

5 Michael Gehler: "Bonn – Budapest – Wien. Das deutsch-österreichisch-ungarische Zusammenspiel als Katalysator für die Erosion des SED-Regimes 1989/90", in Andrea Brait/Michael Gehler (eds.): *Grenzöffnung 1989. Innen- und Außenperspekti-*

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27 June 1989 June: Cutting off the last remains of the Iron Curtain by Alois Mock (Austria) and Gyula Horn (Hungary)



Source: Fotoservice HOPI-Media



Source: Imagno Votava

On 19 August, a 'Pan-European Picnic' took place at the Austro-Hungarian border near the town of Sopron (Ödenburg), when 661 GDR residents,

ven und die Folgen für Österreich (Schriftenreihe des Forschungsinstitutes für politisch-historische Studien der Dr.-Wilfried-Haslauer-Bibliothek Salzburg 49), Wien – Köln – Weimar: Böhlau, 2014, 135–162.

who had been on holiday in Hungary, crossed the border into Austria through a briefly open border gate. Never in the previous weeks had there been such a large number of people who had fled from the GDR via Hungary to Austria and travelled to the Federal Republic in one day⁶.

In the night from 10 to 11 September 1989, Hungary opened the border and allowed all GDR refugees to leave—without consulting the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). GDR refugees who were in Hungary were no longer expelled to East Germany. They were allowed to travel via Austria to the Federal Republic. By the end of November, 60,000–70,000 GDR citizens had reached the West via Hungary⁷.

On 13 September, a new Polish government was formed under the Catholic publicist Tadeusz Mazowiecki. These events in Poland, which were supported by Gorbachev, are part of the prehistory of the opening of the border-crossing points at the eastern sector borders of Berlin on 9 November 1989 and heralded the end of socialism in the centre and east of Europe.

Three days after the Hungarian border to Austria had been opened, Genscher gave this memorable, even historic speech at the Austrian National Library in Vienna. It was entitled “European Community —Towards the European Union. The whole of Europe — On the way to itself”, which has gone completely unnoticed by contemporary history research so far.⁸

It was an obvious topical occasion: Genscher expressed his gratitude at being able to speak “here in Vienna, in this thoroughly European city” and thanked “the Austrian Federal Government and all Austrians [...] for the understanding and for the helpfulness with which they have received our German fellow citizens from the GDR”. He praised the host country beyond measure: “Austria thus expresses an attitude that has its roots

6 Maximilian Graf: “Das Paneuropäische Picknick im Kontext. Wie Österreich zum Tor in die Freiheit werden konnte und welche Folgen dies hatte”, in Stefan Karner/Philipp Lesiak (eds.): *Der erste Stein aus der Berliner Mauer. Das paneuropäische Picknick 1989* (Veröffentlichungen des Ludwig-Boltzmann-Instituts für Kriegsfolgenforschung, Graz – Wien – Raabs 30), Graz: Leykam 2019, 33–59.

7 Andreas Oplatka: *Der erste Riss in der Mauer. September 1989 – Ungarn öffnet die Grenze*, Wien: Paul Zsolnay, 2009.

8 “Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen in der National-Bibliothek in Wien, Bonn 14. November 1989, Sperrfrist, 17 h”, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Europäische Gemeinschaft – Auf dem Weg zur Europäischen Union. Das ganze Europa – Auf dem Weg zu sich selbst.” Es gilt das gesprochene Wort.” Prints of the speech’s notes contain handwritten additions by Brühl concerning deviations by Genscher from the present speech text, private estate Dietrich Graf von Brühl, Rettenschöß.

in the best traditions of European cultural and intellectual history.” In the same breath, he also conveyed gratitude “across [...] Hungary to the Hungarian people and their government, who, with their decision, were as humane as they were courageous, have committed themselves to the great traditions of Hungarian history and to Europe. We will never forget this. Those of us who [*time and again*⁹] call for deeds rather than words when it comes to reforms in Central and Eastern Europe should realise that this was an act, an act of humanity. Europe is reflecting on itself; the European house is being built. How it comes into being and when it is completed is also in our hands [*moving images/historical development*¹⁰]¹¹.

At this point, Genscher mentions the moving television images of the historical development. His remarks testify to a noteworthy optimism and an astonishing far-sightedness, whereby he promised a new and peaceful Europe on the not too distant horizon, made possible by the envisaged internal market and the Economic and Monetary Union within the framework of the European Communities (EC) at that time. We live “in a time in which the global economic and political conditions for the coming century are being permanently shaped”. Traditional economic power spaces would lose weight “in favour of new regional growth centres” and traditional structures of the international division of labour would change their regional and sectoral profile, he said:

“Geopolitical spheres of power and influence are beginning to break free from their rigidity. In Europe, we are facing new and realistic opportunities for shaping a common future. The new dynamics of the European unification process in the European Community, the breathtaking reforms in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states, the rapprochement in West–East relations — all these are developments of historic dimension. The European Community is a core element of the present and future structure of Europe.

It is an example of a European peace order that has already been realised. It is the greatest and most beautiful victory in European history, it is the victory over national egoism, it is a victory that costs no human life and not a drop of blood. The dynamism and the attraction of the European Community are unfolding more and more¹².

9 Handwritten Comment by Dietrich Count von Brühl

10 Handwritten Comment by Dietrich Count von Brühl

11 “Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen in der National-Bibliothek in Wien, Bonn 14. November 1989.”

12 Ibid.

As we historians know today, the D-Mark was not sacrificed on the altar of German unity for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the later founded EU. As Genscher made clear in Vienna, this project had long been agreed upon. For him, the planned European single currency was in line with “the imperative of political and economic consistency and credibility”. He referred to February 1988, when he had presented a memorandum on the creation of a single European currency area and a European central bank in order to “get a substantial discussion going”. He admitted that he had not been sure “that it would be possible in such a short time to bring about such far-reaching decisions by the European Council [in Hanover, MG]”¹³.

In June 1989, the European Council finally decided unanimously in Madrid to start the first stage of the gradual realisation of economic and monetary union on the 1 July 1990 and to have an intergovernmental conference meeting to determine the subsequent stages as soon as the first stage had begun. The 12 EC Finance Ministers had reached agreement in principle a few days earlier in Antibes on strengthening the role of the Committee of EC Central Bank Governors. Genscher stated this in his speech. He also said that this Committee “could become a nucleus for a European central banking system”. There was broad agreement “on the need for increased economic policy coordination between the member states”. After further remarks on the realisation of monetary union, Genscher turned his attention to Austria's application for EC membership, which was submitted in Brussels on 17 July 1989 during the French Council Presidency¹⁴. At the same time, Genscher took the opportunity to give a presentation on the state of affairs in relation to the development of the European Communities:

We strongly support the Austrian application for membership. We will be firm opponents within the European Community of excluding new members, we will be firm advocates of a European Community open to enlargement. [*We cannot agree with those who have reservations.*]¹⁵ Austria is one of the countries that are well prepared for

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Michael Gehler: “Austria's application as Precursor of EFTA Member States in Times of Reshaping Europe 1984/85–1989”, in Idem/Wilfried Loth (eds.): *Reshaping Europe. Towards a Political, Economic and Monetary Union, 1984–1989* (Veröffentlichungen der Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften/ Publications of the European Union Liaison Committee of Historians Band 20 | Volume 20), Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020, 393–419.

¹⁵ Handwritten Comment by Dietrich Count von Brühl

accession. The European spirit of its citizens need not fear comparison with anyone in the Community. Not the European Community or individual members of it as guardians, but sovereign Austria itself must decide whether its status permits membership with all rights and obligations, even in the perspective of the European Union¹⁶.

In the last part of his speech, Genscher devoted himself entirely to the current development of the East German refugee movement, emphasising that it was in the well-understood political and economic interests of the Federal Republic to successfully continue the reform policy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which he understood as a policy that had to be based on freedom and respect for human rights. The reformers needed economic and financial cooperation. They should not be made to pay for the mistakes of their predecessors. The reform policy in Central and Eastern Europe was also a challenge to the West. History would judge whether this challenge is met and whether “we recognise the opportunities that lie in this development for us as well”. This required “that we also recognise our German responsibility”:

“Everything that brings Europe together in West and East also brings the people of the indivisible German nation together. Everything that separates Europeans from one another separates only one nation, the German nation. We act in the awareness that even decades of separation have not made two Europeans out of one Europe, nor two German nations out of one German nation. Nations are not founded on ideologies. There is neither a capitalist nor a socialist German nation. The one German nation is one of the realities on which the construction of the European house must be based. This reality finds its confirmation in the consciousness of the people in both German states”¹⁷.

Genscher addressed urgent words to East Berlin:

The leadership of the GDR should realise that the refusal of the reform policy is the real cause of the great urge to leave, especially of young people. These young people are looking for a perspective, a perspective of humanity, freedom and individuality. We do not want to depopulate the GDR, but we cannot eliminate the causes, only those responsible in the GDR can do that. However, refusal to reform in the GDR also brings with it the danger of instability and isolation of the GDR in an ever broader reform movement in Europe.

16 “Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen in der National-Bibliothek in Wien, Bonn 14. November 1989.”

17 Ibid. (Original Emphasis)

We don't want that, we want better cooperation with the GDR, cooperation that in the past has brought good progress for Germans in both German states and for Europe¹⁸.

Moreover, Genscher referred to the historical task of Germans to “make a special contribution to overcoming the division of Europe” and invoked France's President François Mitterrand, who had recently expressed that this was all too understandable due to Germany's geographical location and history. Genscher recalled the treaties signed by the Federal Republic in the 1970s with Moscow, Warsaw and Prague, and the Basic Treaty with the GDR, which had made the Helsinki Final Act and the CSCE process possible in the first place. For him, these were starting points for the development “which today make it seem possible for Europe to come together again”¹⁹.

It is interesting to note that Genscher's Vienna speech is not found in the printed edition of his speeches and addresses²⁰. In his memoirs, Genscher only referred to it briefly:

On the evening of 14 September 1989, I flew to the Austrian capital to address a business circle at the National Library. In Vienna, the hub between East and West, I communicated two messages unambiguously. Firstly, the German question will not be ‘de-Europeanised’, and secondly, the European Union is urgent and necessary — politically as well as economically, financially as well as in terms of monetary policy. Turning to those present, I remarked that if Austria wanted to, it was welcome in the European Community. The speech provoked a lasting reaction.

The following day, the British Ambassador Mallaby addressed my confidant and colleague Elbe. He referred to my Vienna speech of the previous evening and wanted to know whether my energetic advocacy of the European Union, especially monetary union, was to be understood against the background of the new topicality of the German question. Indeed, it was²¹.

Years later, I was able to exchange letters with Genscher about his Vienna speech. In one letter he told me: The most obvious motive for his speech was to prepare the ground for the solution of the East German refugee problem in Czechoslovakia, after which it had already been settled in Hungary. Genscher's remarks are thus to be seen against the immediate

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid. With regard to Mitterrand see the contribution by Frédéric Bozo in this volume.

20 Hans-Dietrich Genscher: *Unterwegs zur Einheit. Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, Berlin: Siedler, 1991.

21 Hans-Dietrich Genscher: *Erinnerungen*, Berlin: Siedler, 1995, 647.

background of the intensive efforts to open the embassy in Prague. On 23 September, he was also scheduled to travel to New York to attend the United Nations General Assembly. Immediately before that, he had spoken in Kaiserslautern, the partner city of the refugees from his hometown Halle an der Saale, before their annual meeting and gave interviews with the Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor (RIAS) and the Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF). The message of the speech in Vienna was to “prepare the public for significant developments without negatively influencing the talks on opening the Prague embassy”. Vienna seemed to Genscher “a particularly suitable place” for this. Austria, together with Switzerland and Finland, had “played an extraordinarily constructive role in the negotiations on the Helsinki Final Act and in the CSCE policy that followed”. Genscher recalled a conversation with the British ambassador in Bonn, who described the speech a few days later as “remarkable”²².

III. Analysis of the Speech

Genscher's speech was not public. It was held in a selected circle of business people, including representatives of the Austrian Trade Association and the Economic Association, which represented the interests of entrepreneurs. Its long-standing chairman was Rudolf Sallinger, who was succeeded by Leopold Maderthaner on 30 September 1989. Genscher addressed the audience present by raising issues relating to small and medium-sized businesses, entrepreneurs and business people in connection with the EC Single Market project.

Since there are no film or audio recordings of the lecture, we cannot determine questions of non-verbal communication, body language, emphasis, and accentuation of words or audience reactions. We also no longer know how large the audience was. It is almost certain that Foreign Minister Mock was among those present, because there is a photo in the picture archive of the Austrian National Library showing Genscher with Mock in Vienna on 14 September 1989. It must be from this event because the German ambassador Dietrich Graf von Brühl can be seen in the background between them²³.

²² Personal letter from Hans-Dietrich Genscher to the author, 4 February 2009.

²³ “Österreichs Außenminister Alois Mock begrüßt am 14.09.1989 seinen westdeutschen Amtskollegen Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Wien.” – 19890914_PD0004, <https://onb.digital/result/113AAFB3> (called up 25 January 2021).

Hans-Dietrich Genscher together with Alois Mock on the occasion of his speech in Vienna



Source: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Bildarchiv, Austria Presse Agentur

In a letter dated 13 September 2008, Brühl wrote to me in response to my enquiry about the content of Genscher's speech, summarising:

Starting with the completion of the internal market, Genscher develops in it the need for close coordination of the economic and monetary policies of the members of the (then) European Community. In doing so, he draws on the decisions of the European Council in Madrid and then, referring to the Delors Report, logically leads the audience towards monetary union with a European central banking system. He explains the conditions for monetary union (including a common monetary policy, a commitment to stability) and then comes to the need for a common currency of the Twelve.

In the concluding chapter of his remarks, he links the development of European unification, which he outlines primarily in terms of monetary policy, with the reform movements in Eastern Europe. 'We have our fate

inextricably bound up with that of the whole of Europe, we must therefore not de-europeanise our foreign and German policy'²⁴.

I will now try to work through the criteria for analysing the speech.

1. Criteria

– *Where does the material come from?* The text of the speech comes from the private estate of the German Ambassador to Vienna (1986–1990), Count Dietrich von Brühl. It is an A5-sized handout with additional handwritten notes as well as deletions of some passages by the ambassador, who was present in the auditorium when Genscher spoke. From these brief marginal notes and few deletions, however, it is clear that Genscher did not read the text of his speech, but rather delivered it freely. On the cover of the handout it says “The spoken word counts!” The text has been authorised by the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs and comes from Genscher's cabinet.

– *How does it fit into the overall picture?* Genscher made a large number of public speeches in 1989/90, especially in the context of the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the upcoming elections in Germany in 1990. The Vienna speech, however, had an exclusive character for a selected audience because he was able to link contemporary history, the present and the future.

– *What is the historical context to be assessed?* The historical context is the successfully concluded follow-up conference of the CSCE in Vienna in January 1989²⁵, which Genscher had attended several times since 1986, the opening of the Hungarian border with Austria and the imminent permission for East German refugees to leave the GDR via the German embassy in Prague.

– *What is the social context?* Genscher's speech takes place in front of a “private circle”, as Ambassador von Brühl confirmed afterwards²⁶. Among them were probably selected Austrian diplomats, politicians, entrepreneurs and businessmen, to whom the development possibilities and

24 Letter from Dietrich Graf von Brühl to the author, 13 September 2008.

25 Andrea Brait/Michael Gehler: “The CSCE Vienna Follow-up Meeting and Alois Mock, 1986–1989”, in Michael Gehler/Piotr H. Kosicki/Helmut Wohnout (eds.): *Christian Democracy and the Fall of Communism* (Civitas series 1), Leuven: Leuven University Press 2019, 75–91.

26 Letter from Dietrich Graf von Brühl to the author, 15 October 2008.

future prospects of the EU envisaged by Genscher could be confidentially conveyed without encountering major opposition.

In this context, Genscher speaks as a matter of course about the future European currency in the internal market as the core element of a Political Union for Europe. In his speech, the future EU appears to be a long-term project, which he had already pursued with Emilio Colombo in 1982²⁷ and which was a precursor of the Stuttgart Declaration of 1983 and the Single European Act of 1986, which came into force in 1987²⁸.

– *What language is used?* Genscher speaks in German and is easily understood by the audience.

– *What is the country?* The speech takes place in Vienna in neutral Austria, a city of international meetings and the third seat of the United Nations. Through meetings, such as that between Khrushchev and Kennedy in 1961, the metropolis on the Danube is known as a place of mediation and the “spirit of Vienna” is widespread. Genscher also emphasises the Austrian capital as a hub between East and West during the Cold War.

– *What is the location?* The Austrian National Library is an unusual venue for a politician's speech. It is a neutral and non-partisan place that stands for art, culture and science.

– *Who wrote the speech and when?* The text was written by Genscher or his advisors. It contains very topical references, so it seems to have been written at relatively short notice and in a timely manner.

– *Who published it and when?* The print media were pre-informed by “Mitteilung für die Presse Nr. 1134/89”. There was a cut-off time for editors until 5 p.m. on 14 September.

According to this, the speech was probably given in the (early) evening. The text has been released by the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) in Bonn. The speech has not yet been printed in full. However, it was known in the Austrian Foreign Ministry, because there is a reference in a speech by Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik entitled “Divided—United, 1989–2009: Towards a New Europe” at the launch event at the Metropol in

27 Deborah Cuccia: “The Genscher-Colombo Plan: A forgotten Page in the European Integration History”, in: *Journal of European Integration History* 1, 24 (2018), 59–78.

28 See the volume by Michael Gehler/Wilfried Loth (eds. with the collaboration of Deborah Cuccia): *Reshaping Europe. Towards a Political, Economic and Monetary Union, 1984–1989* (Publications of the European Liaison Committee of Historians, Volume 20), Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020.

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Vienna on 22 September 2008²⁹, which was held at a time when everything Genscher had spoken of had been realized 20 years before.

– *Is the source a reaction to an important event?* Shortly before, the opening of the Hungarian border had taken place with the mass transfer of GDR refugees via Austria to Germany.

– *Is it part of a wider debate?* The speech did not become part of a wider public debate.

– *How was it received at the time of publication?* As far as I know, the speech has not been published up to now.

2. Production Process

– *Can you provide additional information about the producer and his institutional and personal background?* The text of the speech was written by Genscher or by his ministerial advisory entourage.

– *What is the medium?* It is a press release printed on paper.

– *What is the genre?* It is an official announcement by the German Foreign Minister.

3. Structure of the Text

– *How is the argumentation structured?* The argumentation is stringent and logically presented. The text is divided into sections. The speaker always introduces new units of meaning with the salutation “Ladies and Gentlemen!”

It begins and ends with the current situation.

Interspersed are historical flashbacks and political visions of the future for the development of the European Communities into the European Union.

– *Does the text go through several topics one after the other?*

29 In it, Plassnik stated: “Hans Dietrich Genscher, on 14 September 1989—a few days after the official opening of the Austro-Hungarian border—in a speech at the Austrian National Library on the subject of ‘European Community on the way to European Union, the whole of Europe on the way to itself’, coined a word that has been with us again and again: ‘Europe is our destiny and it is our opportunity’.”, see <https://www.bmeia.gv.at/das-ministerium/presse/reden/2008/geteilt-geeint-1989-2009-aufbruch-in-ein-neues-europa/> (called up 25 February 2021).

The text goes through several themes one after the other:

- the radical changes in Central and Eastern Europe;
- the departure of citizens from the GDR;
- Genscher understands the internal market, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and political union as a triad;
- He judges Austria as a possible future EU member;
- Genscher appeals to the GDR leadership to analyse the causes of the East German crisis;
- He emphasises the inviolability of borders in Europe, especially with regard to Germany's Eastern border and Poland's sensitivities in this respect.

4. Main Messages of the Speech

Genscher refers to Gorbachev and his idea of a “Common European House”³⁰;

- For him, the Internal Market, Economic and Monetary Union, and Political Union of the European Communities represent a triad. Not only does the European rocket Ariane bear witness to Europe’s capabilities, but the ‘three-stage rocket’ of the Internal Market, Economic and Monetary Union and Political Union has long since been successfully ignited;
- He sees the Single Market as an opportunity to open up new possibilities and challenges for dynamic and creative entrepreneurial thinking and action;
- The speaker refers to his own memorandum of February 1988 on the creation of a European Monetary Area and a European Central Bank and relates to the positive decision of the European Council in Madrid in June 1989 with a step-by-step plan;
- Genscher has the transformation of the totality of all relations of the EC members into a future EU in mind. For him, this is an answer to the question of finality, which he understands as a historical task to be fulfilled with a sense of proportion and passion;
- The speaker therefore sees the preservation of the dynamics of the European integration process as a condition and necessity for this;
- He makes a plea for a stable European currency;

30 Deborah Cuccia: “The European Common House: The Soviet Prescription for Reshaping Europe”, in Gehler/Loth (eds.), *Reshaping Europe*, 443–459.

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- The Internal Market and Economic and Monetary Union will increase the political weight of the EC;
- He describes the European Community as a realised peace order;
- He understands the reform policy in Central and Eastern Europe as a challenge;
- Germany has a responsibility to Europe;
- He argues that the GDR leadership's refusal to reform is the cause of young people leaving the country
- He defines Germany's task in Europe: “Be good Germans as good Europeans!”

5. First Assessment

Genscher's Vienna speech had several functions:

- a) It takes stock and assesses the situation of the European Communities.
- b) It creates positive prospects for the enlargement of the EC to include the EFTA states.
- c) It sets targets and conveys a promise for the future of an EU with a single market and a single currency for a political union.
- d) The speech also emphasises its own efforts with regard to the Memorandum Tandem for Economic and Monetary Union.
- e) Genscher points out Germany's European responsibilities:
“The Federal Republic of Germany already made indispensable contributions to a better future for Europe in the 1970s. The treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, the treaty with Czechoslovakia and the Basic Treaty with the GDR—they made the Helsinki Final Act and the CSCE process possible in the first place”³¹.

He underlines the interconnections between German European policy and the future EU:

Our Basic Law has given us a European peace mandate. The departure from the power politics of the past follows from the spirit and letter of our constitution; we have taken the step towards a policy of responsibility.

31 “Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen in der National-Bibliothek in Wien, Bonn 14. November 1989.”

This also means that we want to strive for the Germans' right to self-determination in agreement with our neighbours and not against them.

The more our neighbours recognise the development of our state and our society, the more they also recognise our policy internally and externally as their advantage, the more we can also serve the interests of our own nation.

Just as European unification in the European Community is the most beautiful and greatest victory in European history, it is the biggest success of German policy if it is not feared by any of our neighbours³².

Genscher ends with a quote by Arnold Duckwitz, one of Bremen's well-known mayors of the 19th century, who wrote the following sentence in his "Memories from my public life":

A small state like Bremen [...] must never appear as an obstacle to the well-being of the nation as a whole; on the contrary, it should take its position in such a way that its independence is regarded as a happiness for the whole, its existence as a necessity. Therein lies the surest guarantee of its existence³³.

Genscher says that he will never forget his words, so wise and so great they are, in ending his speech with the following sentences:

What would we Germans have been spared, what would Europe have been spared, if this had been German state policy over the centuries:

A nation like that of the Germans, in the heart of Europe, must never appear as an obstacle to the well-being of the totality of European peoples; rather, it should arrange its behaviour in such a way that its existence is seen as a happiness for the whole, as a necessity.

Therein lies the surest guarantee of its existence.

As good Europeans, we want to be good Germans³⁴.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

6. Final Assessment

There were differences in German policy approaches between the Chancellery and the Foreign Office.³⁵ Genscher preferred greater consideration of Soviet security interests in the sense of a continued policy of détente in the course of German unification and therefore did not want the transatlantic alliance to expand eastwards. Unlike Kohl, he was also in favour of early recognition of the border with Poland (Oder-Neisse). Despite all this, there was consensus between the Foreign Minister and the Chancellor on the fundamental question of achieving German unity.

Genscher, like Kohl, was both a German and a European politician.³⁶ Like the Chancellor, Genscher was not only a foreign and state politician, but also a domestic and party politician. They both agreed on a quick solution of German unity, while there was disagreement among older and younger comrades in the SPD leadership. Oskar Lafontaine was against a quick and hasty agreement, while Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr were of different opinions³⁷, which Genscher knew and used for his internal political position and to stabilise the coalition with the CDU/CSU.

35 Horst Teltschik: “Anfang Februar 1990 waren wir in Moskau und es kam die erlösende Botschaft von Gorbatschow: Ihr könnt Euch einigen”, in Michael Gebler/Oliver Dürkop (eds.): *Deutsche Einigung. Zeitzeugen aus Ost und West im Gespräch 1989/90*, Reinbek: Lau, 2021, 1177–1211, here 1199, 1201–1203, see also Gerhard A. Ritter: *Hans-Dietrich Genscher, das Auswärtige Amt und die deutsche Vereinigung*, München; Beck 2013.

36 Hans-Dieter Lucas (ed.): *Genscher, Deutschland und Europa*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002.

37 Daniel Friedrich Sturm: *Uneinig in die Einheit. Die Sozialdemokratie und die Vereinigung Deutschlands 1989/90* (Willy Brandt-Studien), Bonn: Dietz, 2006.

La vision européenne de François Mitterrand à travers ses vœux du Nouvel An aux Français (1981-1995)

Frédéric Bozo

François Mitterrand compte, avec Charles de Gaulle, Jean Monnet et Robert Schuman parmi les Français qui ont le plus influencé la construction européenne au second vingtième siècle. Sa carrière politique s'étend sur près de cinq décennies, depuis sa première élection comme député en 1946 jusqu'à la fin de son second septennat présidentiel en 1995. Jeune ministre sous la quatrième République, il accède rapidement aux fonctions gouvernementales les plus en vue (Intérieur, Justice) puis entame à partir de 1958 une longue période dans l'opposition à de Gaulle (1958/59-1969) et à ses successeurs, Georges Pompidou (1969-1974) puis Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974-1981). Sa mise en ballotage de De Gaulle à l'élection présidentielle de 1965 puis son affrontement avec Giscard lors de celle de 1974, son rôle dans la reconstruction de la gauche et dans la refondation du parti socialiste, en font, pendant une quinzaine d'années, le principal opposant au « régime » avant d'être élu en mai 1981 face à Giscard, puis réélu en 1988 face à Jacques Chirac. Comme tous les hommes politiques de sa génération, Mitterrand a été façonné par les drames de l'histoire européenne. Né en 1916, arrivé à l'âge d'homme à l'heure de la montée des périls avant d'être pris dans la tourmente de la seconde guerre mondiale, tour à tour comme combattant puis prisonnier de guerre avant de réussir à s'évader d'Allemagne en décembre 1941, puis, après un passage par Vichy, de s'engager dans la résistance, il rencontre l'idéal européen en mai 1948 au congrès de La Haye, un événement fondateur sur lequel il reviendra souvent. Ayant construit son parcours politique dans l'opposition à de Gaulle sans pour autant se revendiquer de l'approche Monnet/ Schuman, Mitterrand fait pourtant figure d'Européen inclassable. C'est donc avant tout dans son action comme président de la République entre 1981 et 1995 qu'il faut chercher la vérité de son engagement européen, un engagement qui en fait, avec Helmut Kohl et Jacques Delors, l'un des principaux architectes de l'Union européenne.

Homme de l'écrit, Mitterrand a, tout au long de sa carrière politique, publié de nombreux ouvrages et d'innombrables articles. Il a prononcé, avant comme après 1981, des milliers de discours. Nous nous intéressons

ici aux vœux du Nouvel An aux Français, un rituel bien établi depuis les débuts de la cinquième République : chaque année, le 31 décembre à 20 heures précises, le président de la République s'adresse à ses concitoyens à la télévision en un moment festif pour leur souhaiter ses vœux tout en revenant brièvement sur les événements intervenus pendant l'année écoulée et en traçant des orientations pour les mois qui suivent. L'allocution dure une dizaine de minutes en moyenne¹. Le format est presque immuable. Sauf rares exceptions, le chef de l'Etat s'exprime depuis son bureau de l'Élysée (Giscard, en décembre 1975, avait voulu « innover » en prononçant ses vœux au coin du feu en compagnie de son épouse ; Mitterrand fera lui aussi une exception—motivée, on va le voir, par le thème européen—en s'exprimant depuis Strasbourg à l'occasion de ses vœux pour 1989).

Pourquoi privilégier ces quatorze brèves allocutions ? Du fait de la nature même de ce corpus. Le rituel des vœux exprime au plus haut point ce qu'est l'institution—si ce n'est la monarchie—présidentielle. Il permet à son titulaire d'incarner la fonction devant les Français et d'établir ce rapport direct à la Nation qui est la marque de la cinquième République du fait de la personnalité de son fondateur et, à compter de 1965, de l'élection du président au suffrage universel direct. Il lui permet aussi, en maniant le verbe et les symboles dans un format réduit mais riche en contenu, de construire son image présidentielle et, surtout, de « mettre en récit » la vie nationale. Bref, loin de n'être qu'un événement protocolaire, le rituel des vœux—très apprécié des Français, qui sont chaque année des millions voire des dizaines de millions à le suivre—est également l'occasion de délivrer un message qui n'est ni anodin ni convenu malgré les formules d'usage que commandent les circonstances sur la santé et le bonheur des Français, la grandeur et la prospérité du pays ou encore les valeurs de la République. Les spécialistes en communication y voient, à juste titre, non pas un simple cérémonial jouant un rôle « secondaire », mais bien « un élément fondamental de la stratégie de communication des présidents »² voire « un moyen, au-delà de l'action politique, de façonner par le discours l'histoire nationale et la trace laissée par le dirigeant politique »³.

1 Une étude portant sur les quatre premiers présidents de la cinquième république situe la longueur des discours entre 500 et 1500 mots : cf. Françoise Finnis-Boursin, *Les discours de vœux des présidents de la République. La France au fond des yeux*, Paris: LGDJ, 1992, p. 53.

2 Finnis-Boursin, *Les discours*, p. 55.

3 Jean-Marc Leblanc, « Phraséologie et formules rituelles dans le discours politique », in *Revue de linguistique et de didactique des langues*, N°53 (2016), pp. 43-69. Pour une

En dépit de sa dénonciation initiale des institutions gaulliennes, la marche vers le pouvoir de François Mitterrand est, on le sait, allée de pair avec son appropriation desdites institutions. Mitterrand, dès lors, excellera dès 1981 dans ce même exercice, au service duquel il mettra tout son talent discursif ainsi que son goût des symboles. Comme pour tous ses discours importants, il est bien de bout en bout l'auteur de ces textes, qui excluaient tout recours à d'autres « plumes »⁴. Sa patte est reconnaissable dans leur texture même ou dans des formules dont certaines sont restées à la postérité, telle l'énigmatique « Je crois aux forces de l'esprit » lors de ses derniers vœux présidentiels en décembre 1994. Parmi les formules marquantes que recèlent ces quatorze discours, d'aucunes concernent particulièrement l'enjeu étudié ici : ainsi du mot d'ordre européen lancé le 31 décembre 1986 (« La France est notre patrie et l'Europe est notre avenir »), dont le sens est repris sous un autre énoncé dans le « testament » européen que délivre Mitterrand le 31 décembre 1994 (« ne séparez jamais la grandeur de la France de la construction de l'Europe »⁵). Au-delà des formules, ces textes sont parfois aussi l'occasion d'annonces importantes, à l'instar du lancement, le 31 décembre 1989, du projet de confédération européenne dont Mitterrand n'avait prévenu personne⁶. Quant aux symboles, l'apparition du drapeau européen en arrière-plan à partir du 31 décembre 1988

approche linguistique et lexicométrique, voir aussi Jean-Marc Leblanc, *Les vœux présidentiels sous la Cinquième République (1959-2001). Recherches et expérimentations lexicométriques à propos de l'ethos dans un genre discursif rituel*, thèse de doctorat : Université de Créteil, 2005. Pour une présentation « grand public » des vœux présidentiels, voir *Bonne année, la France ! Les vœux présidentiels sous la Ve République*, Paris : La Documentation française, 2011. Pour une approche lexicale du discours miterrandien, voir Dominique Labbé, *Le Vocabulaire de François Mitterrand*, Paris : Presses de la FNSP, 1990.

4 Mél de Jean-Louis Bianco à l'auteur, 9 juin 2020. Secrétaire général de l'Élysée de 1982 à 1991 et à ce titre collaborateur le plus proche du président, Jean-Louis Bianco précise que ce dernier ne demandait que très rarement des « éléments » à ses conseillers pour préparer ses vœux même s'il pouvait lui arriver d'échanger ou de « tester » avec eux certaines formules.

5 La retranscription de chacun des quatorze discours de vœux du Nouvel An de François Mitterrand est disponible en ligne sur le site <https://www.vie-publique.fr/>. Sauf mention autre, cette source vaut pour toutes les citations ou extraits auxquels il est fait référence dans cette contribution et pour lesquels nous nous contentons de mentionner la date ou le millésime. En outre, plusieurs millésimes des vœux miterrandiens sont disponibles sous forme audiovisuelle sur le site de l'Institut national de l'audiovisuel : <https://fresques.ina.fr/miterrand/accueil>

6 Cf. Frédéric Bozo, « The Failure of a Grand Design: Mitterrand's European Confederation (1989-1991) », in *Contemporary European History*, N°17, 3 (2008), pp. 391-412.

ou la mise en scène strasbourgeoise de cette année-là montrent assez leur importance⁷.

Or ce corpus—14 discours contenant un peu plus de 11 000 mots, soit environ 800 mots en moyenne⁸—est loin d'être anodin dans le registre européen. Bien sûr, le président consacre selon les années l'essentiel de son allocution (entre un peu moins de 40% et près de 75%) aux vœux proprement dits et à l'évocation des défis auxquels le pays fait face. Quant à l'évocation de la situation internationale—défense du « rang » oblige—, elle fait aussi l'objet d'une présence quasi-incompressible dans les vœux mitterrands. Reste que le thème européen s'impose, qualitativement et quantitativement, comme un élément significatif: qu'il s'agisse de l'évocation du continent en général ou de la construction européenne en particulier, l'Europe y occupe une place importante, un pic d'environ 60% étant même atteint pour le Nouvel An 1989 puis 1990, soit les deux années où la fin de la guerre froide écrase les autres sujets. Pour toutes ces raisons, le corpus choisi nous paraît judicieux pour étudier la vision européenne de Mitterrand, du moins telle qu'il entend la présenter et la faire partager aux Français dans l'espoir d'obtenir leur adhésion à un projet européen qui devient, dans cette période et sous sa conduite, une dimension proprement essentielle de la vie nationale⁹.

Quatorze ans d'histoire européenne

Les deux septennats coïncident en effet avec des évolutions européennes majeures, et ce dans deux dimensions étroitement emboîtées. Dans la dimension communautaire, le premier septennat (1981-1988) correspond,

7 Finnis-Boursin, *Les discours*, pp. 320-321.

8 L'analyse lexicographique effectuée dans le cadre de cette contribution fait état d'un corpus de 11 136 mots au total pour 14 discours, soit 795 en moyenne (cf. le graphique en annexe).

9 Outre les biographies telles celles d'Eric Roussel, *François Mitterrand. De l'intime au politique*, Paris: Robert Laffont, 2015 ou de Michel Winock, *François Mitterrand*, Paris: Gallimard, 2015, on renverra à Jean Musitelli, « François Mitterrand, l'Européen », in *Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi*, XXXIII- 1999, pp. 307-321 (notre étude du corpus retenu pour cette contribution rejoint très souvent l'excellente analyse de l'auteur). Parmi les autres discours de Mitterrand qui éclairent sa vision européenne (outre ceux évoqués dans cette contribution), on mentionnera notamment ses discours au Bundestag (Bonn, 20 janvier 1983), au Parlement européen (Strasbourg, 24 mai 1984), au Collège d'Europe (Bruges, 13 octobre 1987) ou encore devant les Assises de la Confédération européenne (Prague, 14 juin 1991).

dans un premier temps (1981-1984), à l'apogée et à la fin de la longue crise qui a débuté au milieu des années soixante-dix sur fond de stagnation du projet européen et, dans un second temps (1984-1988), à l'aboutissement de la relance voulue par Mitterrand; celle-ci culmine avec la signature de l'Acte unique en 1986, la présidence française du premier semestre et le Conseil européen de Fontainebleau en juin 1984 servant de pivot entre ces deux temps. Le second septennat (1988-1995) s'ouvre sur une nouvelle relance centrée en particulier sur le projet monétaire, inscrit quatre ans plus tard dans le traité de Maastricht ; il coïncide donc avec la dynamique qui conduit à la création de l'Union européenne (1988-1992) avant d'être placé sous le signe de crises nouvelles (1992-1995), en particulier monétaires (crise du SME en 1992-1993). Dans la dimension Est-Ouest, le premier septennat coïncide avec le dernier chapitre de la confrontation bipolaire qui voit s'installer successivement la 'nouvelle guerre froide' (1981-1984) sur fond d'invasion soviétique de l'Afghanistan, d'état de siège en Pologne et de crise des euromissiles, puis avec la 'nouvelle détente' (1984/5-1988), rendue possible par l'arrivée au pouvoir de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev en mars 1985 et la 'nouvelle pensée', qui permet des avancées majeures dans le domaine du désarmement (traité sur les Forces nucléaires intermédiaires signé à Washington en décembre 1987, discours de Gorbatchev à l'ONU en décembre 1988). Le second septennat s'ouvre quant à lui sur les prémices de la fin de 'Yalta'. Avec la chute du mur de Berlin et le renversement des régimes communistes en Europe de l'Est en 1989, la réunification allemande en 1990 puis la fin de l'URSS en 1991, sa première partie coïncide avec la fin effective de la guerre froide (1988-1991) ; la seconde, par contraste, est placée sous le signe d'un difficile après-guerre froide sur fond en particulier de crise yougoslave (1992-1995).

Cette périodisation se retrouve dans l'analyse quantitative qui mesure, pour chaque discours, la proportion du texte consacrée à l'Europe, en distinguant l'Europe communautaire et l'Europe géographique (voir tableau). Ce décompte fait apparaître un crescendo tout au long du premier septennat s'agissant de l'Europe des Dix puis des Douze, pour laquelle on passe d'une mention furtive en 1981 à une proportion de 17,5% en 1987. Le second septennat est comme le miroir du premier puisque les vœux de décembre 1988 sont consacrés à 61% à l'Europe des Douze, proportion qui chute à 7% l'avant dernière année, en 1993 (cette proportion remontera en 1994 sur fond de 'testament' européen). Les textes étudiés reflètent donc bien l'importance croissante du thème européen puis son reflux après un apogée que l'on peut situer au pivot des deux septennats, soit autour des années 1988-1989, période qui coïncide avec l'intensité maximale du discours européen sur fond d'accélération du 'tandem' franco-allemand

(présidence allemande au premier semestre 1988, présidence française au second semestre 1989). Il en va de même si l'on considère les occurrences 'paneuropéennes', qui renvoient à l'Europe géographique. Elles dominent les deux premières années (1981-1982), ce qui correspond au renouveau des tensions Est-Ouest sur fond de crise des euromissiles; après quoi le discours miterrandien est dominé pendant le restant du premier septennat par la relance communautaire. Le second septennat suit un même profil: le propos est d'abord dominé par les bouleversements à l'Est et par l'avenir du continent dans son ensemble (auxquels le président français consacre jusqu'à 48% de ses vœux le 31 décembre 1989) et il reste consacré en priorité à l'Europe géographique pendant les trois années qui suivent, sur fond d'une fin de guerre froide pacifique puis d'une entrée dans un après-guerre froide plus incertain (fin de l'URSS, conflits en ex-Yougoslavie). Les deux dernières années voient le thème communautaire à nouveau l'emporter sur celui de l'Europe géographique, ce qui reflète la volonté de Mitterrand d'imprimer en ce domaine sa marque dans l'histoire. Il est du reste clair à partir du conseil européen de Copenhague en juin 1993 que l'Union a vocation à s'étendre, à terme, à l'ensemble du continent, ce qui tend à atténuer la distinction entre la dimension communautaire et la dimension paneuropéenne.

Ces évolutions se retrouvent également dans l'analyse qualitative. Dans la dimension paneuropéenne, le nécessaire dépassement du statu quo Est-Ouest est très présent tout au long des deux septennats. D'emblée, le président français place son mandat sous le signe gaullien de la contestation des blocs: «Tout ce qui permettra de sortir de Yalta sera bon», déclare-t-il lors de ses premiers vœux le 31 décembre 1981. Ce thème est ensuite repris en sourdine, par exemple en 1982 lorsque Mitterrand déclare, en référence aux euromissiles, que «1983 verra, sur le sol de l'Europe, les deux superpuissances s'arranger ou surarmer», manière de rappeler le «condominium» dénoncé par ses prédécesseurs, ou en décembre 1984, lorsqu'il évoque la prochaine reprise des négociations soviéto-américaines, puis en décembre 1985, lorsqu'il fait allusion à la visite récente de Gorbatchev (la première du nouveau dirigeant soviétique à l'Ouest) en soulignant que «la France et Paris [se sont] trouvées, une fois de plus, sur la route qui conduit à la détente et à la paix». Sans surprise, c'est en décembre 1989 que ce thème trouve un écho majeur: en déclarant que l'Europe «va, comme on rentre chez soi, rentrer dans son histoire et sa géographie», Mitterrand déclare accompli l'objectif du dépassement des blocs. La boucle est bouclée en décembre 1990: rappelant qu'il avait évoqué au début de sa présidence la nécessité de «sortir de Yalta» (ce qui, précise-t-il, signifiait «en finir avec la division mortelle de l'Europe»), il peut s'exclamer: «Eh bien ! C'est fait».

Les années suivantes sont placées sous le signe des dangers qu'il avait anticipés dès décembre 1989 en pointant la possible «tendance à l'éclatement» ou à «l'émiettement» de l'Europe: ainsi, sur fond de guerre dans l'ex-Yougoslavie, évoque-t-il en décembre 1991 «l'anarchie des tribus» puis, en décembre 1992, les «anciennes rivalités» et «parfois [les] vieilles haines qu'on croyait oubliées» et, en décembre 1993, les «images de sang et de mort» que symbolise le martyr de Sarajevo. Mais les derniers vœux, en 1994, sont l'occasion d'affirmer que «l'élargissement progressif» de l'Union apportera un jour la stabilité à l'Europe de l'après-Yalta. La cohérence du propos, sur la durée des deux septennats, est incontestable.

Il en va de même dans la dimension communautaire, dans laquelle les vœux de Mitterrand sont autant de marqueurs de son action et de révélateurs de sa pensée européennes. La Communauté des Dix n'est que brièvement mentionnée en décembre 1981 et réduite en 1982 à une simple intention («cette Europe qu'il faut construire»), reflétant à la fois la crise persistante au sein de la CEE et l'impasse dans laquelle se trouve la politique européenne de la France sur fond de difficultés économiques et monétaires. L'année 1983, marquée par le 'tournant européen' consécutif au choix du maintien du franc dans le SME, se conclut au contraire par un message fort: au moment où, par ailleurs, la France s'apprête à prendre la présidence semestrielle de la Communauté (pendant laquelle se tiendront, en juin, les élections au parlement européen), Mitterrand, soucieux de sensibiliser activement les Français à cette cause, déclare que «1984 sera l'année de l'Europe pour le meilleur ou pour le pire».

A partir de ce moment, le projet européen est constamment présent, avec plus ou moins d'intensité. Le succès de la présidence française au premier semestre 1984 se lit en filigrane dans le bref «Bonne année pour l'Europe !» que lance Mitterrand, à deux reprises, dans ses vœux du 31 décembre 1984. S'ouvre alors la période de relance qui débouche sur l'Acte unique, mis au point dans les dernières semaines de 1985 et les premières de 1986. Mitterrand, qui y voit davantage un «compromis de progrès» qu'un véritable aboutissement, ne mentionne pas explicitement ce dernier dans ses vœux de 1985 et 1986, se contentant de rappeler en 1985 que le pays «est engagé à fond dans la construction de l'Europe» et, en 1986, que «l'Europe ne se fera pas toute seule» et qu'«elle subira, dans les mois qui viennent, de rudes assauts», référence implicite au défi du grand marché et aux difficultés persistantes, budgétaires, notamment, qui entravent la bonne marche de la Communauté mais aussi aux différences d'approche qui l'opposent au gouvernement de cohabitation issu des élections de mars 1986, face auquel il entend incarner l'ambition européenne. D'où, ce même 31 décembre 1986, la formule marquante qu'il lance comme pour

mieux affirmer son profil de visionnaire européen : «La France est notre patrie et l'Europe est notre avenir». Alors qu'approche l'élection présidentielle dont on ne peut douter qu'elle l'opposera à Chirac, Mitterrand, le 31 décembre 1987, mentionne cette fois-ci explicitement le défi de 1992, date prévue pour l'achèvement du «grand marché», et dénonce le «manque d'ardeur» des dirigeants européens—visant sans doute son premier ministre—tout en ajoutant «souhaite[r] ardemment qu'ils se reprennent et que la France, une fois de plus, donne l'élan».

Mitterrand étant réélu confortablement face à Chirac en mai 1988—un succès dans lequel a joué son profil européen—la première partie du second septennat est plus que jamais placée sous le signe de l'ambition européenne. Les vœux du 31 décembre 1988 marquent de ce point de vue un point haut rhétorique : près de la moitié du discours y est consacré, et ce dans un esprit de mobilisation des Français en vue de 1992. Mais ils marquent surtout un apogée symbolique: pour la première fois, le drapeau européen figure au côté du drapeau tricolore tandis que les vœux présidentiels sont prononcés exceptionnellement non depuis l'Élysée, mais depuis Strasbourg. Un choix dont s'explique Mitterrand en qualifiant la cité alsacienne tout à la fois de «capitale de l'Europe» et—Rouget de l'Isle y ayant composé la *Marseillaise*—de berceau des idéaux que la France s'apprête à fêter à l'occasion du bicentenaire de la Révolution ; en déclarant que «nul ne part mieux qu'ici, on ne se sent à la fois Français et Européen, Européen et Français», il entend illustrer le thème, introduit deux ans plus tôt, du lien indissociable entre «patrie» et «avenir» européen¹⁰. Les événements de 1989 lui permettent de poursuivre sur cette lancée en plaçant le projet européen au cœur des transformations en cours à l'échelle du continent dans son ensemble: ainsi présente-t-il, le 31 décembre de cette année, les «révolutions» à l'Est à la fois comme une réplique de la prise de la Bastille à deux siècles de distance et comme une conséquence de la construction européenne qui «par sa seule existence» a «contribué au sursaut des peuples de l'Est en leur servant de référence et de pôle d'attraction». Ce message sur la place centrale du projet européen dans l'après-guerre froide, Mitterrand le

10 La défense du rôle européen de la cité alsacienne est de toute évidence une autre motivation de cette mise en scène strasbourgeoise (elle conduira le président français à en faire le lieu du conseil européen un an plus tard) : face à la tentation des parlementaires européens de tenir un nombre croissant de sessions à Bruxelles, Mitterrand veut en effet obtenir que le siège du parlement soit définitivement fixé à Strasbourg ; cf. notes manuscrites d'Elisabeth Guigou, Sommet de Rhodes 3/12/88 Petit déjeuner Chancelier Kohl-Président Mitterrand, Archives Nationales, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, AG/5(4)/EG/56/2.

prolonge un an plus tard en évoquant, le 31 décembre 1990, une «solidarité accrue à l'égard des pays de l'Est» et, bien sûr, l'année suivante en évoquant, le 31 décembre 1991, peu après le Conseil européen de Maastricht, «un grand dessein, capable d'enthousiasmer, de rassembler et de justifier l'espérance».

Après l'apogée maastrichtien, les vœux des dernières années se font le reflet des crises européennes. L'heure n'est plus aux déclarations lyriques : le 31 décembre 1992, date butoir pour la mise en place d'une Europe sans frontières, alors que les Français ont ratifié en septembre, de justesse, le traité de Maastricht, Mitterrand s'en tient à un constat : rappelant combien il avait parlé depuis des années de cette «espérance», il déclare sobrement : «Eh bien, demain, ce sera fait». Le 31 décembre 1993, au terme de l'année qui a vu la naissance de l'Union européenne et face aux désordres géopolitiques qui se multiplient («l'Algérie déchirée, la Russie incertaine, les Balkans en feu»), le président cherche d'abord à rassurer: «il y a l'Europe des Douze, c'est notre meilleur rempart». Dans ce contexte, les derniers vœux, le 31 décembre 1994, prennent l'aspect d'un testament européen. François Mitterrand adresse à ses compatriotes une double recommandation : «ne dissociez jamais la liberté et l'égalité» et «ne séparez jamais la grandeur de la France de la construction de l'Europe». La boucle, ouverte en 1986 avec la formule sur la patrie et l'avenir européen, est bouclée.

Les Europe de François Mitterrand

Que nous dit ce corpus des conceptions mitterrandiennes de l'Europe et, surtout, de la manière dont le président français entend persuader ses compatriotes de leur bienfondé à un moment décisif pour la construction de l'Europe? Quelles en sont les idées forces et comment sont-elles argumentées? Bref, comment caractériser le message européen ainsi adressé aux Français? Ces conceptions peuvent s'appréhender selon quatre grandes catégories.

Le « passage » à l'Europe, une nécessité historique

La première, sans doute la plus prégnante, relève de la nature même de la construction européenne. L'Europe, pour Mitterrand, est avant tout un *processus* historique : unifier 320 millions d'Européens, dit-il le 31 décem-

bre 1987, c'est faire d'«un peuple en marche» un «acteur de l'histoire». C'est même en termes de *nécessité* historique que le président français tend, au moins implicitement, à évoquer l'Europe. N'est-ce pas le sens de sa formule de 1986 sur la patrie et l'avenir européen, qui postule ipso facto le passage nécessaire de l'une à l'autre? En ajoutant qu'il ne faut pas manquer «ce rendez-vous», ne sous-entend-il pas : avec l'Histoire? La tentation de la fresque n'est jamais éloignée lorsqu'il aborde le sujet, au risque de forcer le trait; ainsi, au seuil de l'année 1992, n'hésite-t-il pas à comparer la naissance de l'Union européenne à ... la découverte de l'Amérique: «cinq siècles» après cette dernière, dit-il le 31 décembre 1991, le traité de Maastricht sera une manière «de découvrir l'Europe, celle du troisième millénaire». Quoi qu'il en soit, lorsqu'il déclare le 31 décembre 1994 que l'Europe «est notre nouvelle dimension, et notre ambition pour le siècle prochain», c'est bien d'une sorte de «passage» obligé à l'Europe qu'il est question¹¹.

Mais de quelle nature est cette «nouvelle dimension»? Il faut d'abord constater que ce n'est en rien un effacement de l'Etat-nation qui est ainsi prophétisé. Déclarer que «La France est notre patrie et l'Europe est notre avenir» ne signifie pas—comme le sous-entend l'emploi du présent—annoncer la disparition de la première au profit du second. De même, demander aux Français de ne jamais «séparer la grandeur de la France de la construction de l'Europe» suggère bien que la France a vocation à persévérer dans son être dans une Europe unie. L'idée implicite est donc plutôt celle d'un prolongement, si ce n'est d'un dépassement, de l'Etat-nation par l'Europe. Bien sûr, la formule est floue, impressionniste. Mais outre qu'il aurait été incongru d'annoncer, dans ses vœux aux Français, la fin de leur Etat-nation, le corpus étudié confirme que Mitterrand ne se reconnaissait ni dans l'Europe supranationale de Schuman et Monnet ni dans l'Europe intergouvernementale de De Gaulle et qu'il avait de la construction européenne une conception à la fois pragmatique et évolutive, se gardant bien de prendre parti dans le débat sur les fins ultimes dans lequel il voyait une querelle théologique: trancher la question de l'aboutissement du processus relevait sans doute à ses yeux d'une démarche vaine d'un point de vue philosophique en plus d'être inopportune d'un point de vue politique au regard, notamment, de la construction d'un nécessaire consensus national sur l'Europe. Bref, Mitterrand ne veut de toute évidence pas s'enfermer

11 Pour reprendre la formule juste de Luuk van Middelaar, *The Passage to Europe: How a Continent Became a Union*, New Haven: Yale University Press, Yale UP, 2013.

dans une formule figée et il entend bien laisser ouverte la question de la relation entre l'Europe et l'Etat-nation¹².

C'est donc un terrain moins théorique que le président français privilégie pour parler d'Europe aux Français, en évoquant un objectif tangible et qui peut leur parler: la fin prochaine des frontières. Il résume ainsi, fin 1987, les acquis de l'Acte unique et du grand marché: «le 31 décembre 1992 [...] les frontières qui s'élèvent encore entre les douze Etats de la Communauté tomberont». Il se fait encore plus concret l'année suivante, dans le souci manifeste de donner corps à cette Europe des citoyens qu'il appelle de ses vœux: «320 millions d'Européens», dit-il le 31 décembre 1988, «auront à vivre ensemble [...], libres d'échanger leurs biens et leurs services, de circuler, de s'installer, de travailler où ils voudront». Arrivé au terme prévu, il peut célébrer l'objectif atteint: «demain (...), les frontières disparaîtront entre les douze pays de la communauté», déclare-t-il le 31 décembre 1992, en précisant que «[l]es marchandises et les capitaux, tout de suite, les hommes bientôt, circuleront sans obstacle du nord de l'Allemagne au sud de l'Italie, de Londres à Athènes ou de Rome à Lisbonne». L'intention est claire: convaincre des bienfaits d'une Europe qui permet d'élargir les horizons de chacun en mettant fin au confinement des vies nationales.

Reste que tout en se plaçant sur le terrain des réalisations concrètes, Mitterrand, dans ses vœux aux Français, ne minimise pas la portée de ce qu'il présente toujours comme un processus exigeant et qui nécessite, déclare-t-il le 31 décembre 1987, «une formidable volonté politique». Faire l'Europe, c'est pour lui un acte de courage, comme il le souligne le 31 décembre 1992 en célébrant «l'audace [qui] est celle de l'Europe». Mais c'est aussi un motif d'espoir: «Je vous en parlais ces dernières années comme on parle d'une espérance», déclare-t-il ce même jour à propos de l'abolition des frontières, ajoutant: «Eh bien, demain, ce sera fait». Volonté, audace, espoir: autant de mots qui renvoient à la fois à la nécessité et à la difficulté du projet européen. Un projet que Mitterrand aime à décrire comme un chantier aux dimensions historiques—voire héroïques—et dans lequel, assure-t-il le 31 décembre 1985, la France est désormais «engagée à fond»: de toute évidence, la construction de l'Europe remplace bel et bien l'édification d'une France socialiste dans le «récit» national.

12 Cf. Musitelli, «François Mitterrand», art. cit.

La France au cœur de l'Europe

De fait, le thème de l'engagement européen de la France est, sans surprise, très prégnant dans les vœux mitterrandiens. Présenter la France comme centrale dans la construction européenne permet de légitimer celle-ci aux yeux de ses concitoyens. C'est vrai en termes de géographie : «par bonheur, [cette dernière] a placé la France au centre de [...] l'Europe des Douze», se félicite-t-il le 31 décembre 1992. C'est vrai, également, en termes d'histoire: l'idée européenne, rappelle-t-il, est à l'origine une idée française: «Ce sont deux des nôtres qui, voici trente-cinq ans, ont inventé l'Europe de la Communauté», souligne-t-il le 31 décembre 1984 en une allusion à Schuman et Monnet (qui semble elle-même faire écho à l'exorde de la déclaration du 9 mai 1950: «En se faisant depuis plus de 20 ans le champion d'une Europe unie, la France [...])). C'est vrai, enfin, en termes de leadership politique: «c'est encore chez nous, à Fontainebleau, au mois de juin dernier, [que la Communauté] a repris conscience d'elle-même», ajoute-t-il le même jour, soulignant le rôle décisif de la présidence française au premier semestre 1984. «Je souhaite [...] que la France, une fois de plus, donne l'élan», martèle-t-il en décembre 1987, dénonçant en creux la tiédeur de l'engagement européen du gouvernement. La situation est différente lors de la deuxième cohabitation (1993-1995); la politique européenne est désormais plus consensuelle, ce dont Mitterrand se félicite le 31 décembre 1994, non sans rappeler au passage le leadership européen de la France: «dès demain, et pour six mois, c'est la France qui présidera l'Union», rappelle-t-il, en précisant que «le gouvernement a préparé avec moi les grandes lignes de cette présidence». Et d'ajouter: «l'avenir de la France passe par l'Europe. En servant l'une, nous servons l'autre».

Cette dernière formule identifie littéralement la France au projet européen, ce qui constitue un autre leitmotiv mitterrandien. La France «est européenne», Mitterrand avait-il dit à la veille de la présidence française en décembre 1983; mais ne s'agit-il pas de suggérer, en miroir, que l'Europe est «française», et ce dans l'espoir de rassurer ses concitoyens sur le bienfondé du choix européen? S'il se garde de l'affirmer explicitement, il est permis de penser que tel est bien le message subliminal que François Mitterrand veut faire passer sur fond d'approfondissement et d'élargissement à partir du mitan des années quatre-vingt. Quoi qu'il en soit, cette identification entre idée nationale et projet européen atteint un apogée en décembre 1988 lorsque Mitterrand—au seuil de l'année du bicentenaire de la Révolution et à l'approche d'un nouveau semestre de présidence française de la Communauté—choisit, on l'a dit, de prononcer ses vœux depuis Strasbourg: drapeaux européen et français en arrière-plan, jl met

ainsi symboliquement sur un même plan la construction européenne et le projet national, ce que le «testament» de 1994 ne fera que confirmer.

Que la rhétorique mitterrandienne, au-delà d'une profession foi sincère, serve aussi un impératif plus politique n'est guère douteux: il s'agit bien d'entretenir ou de conforter un consensus européen que le président entend de plus en plus incarner à partir du milieu de la décennie. Ainsi se félicite-t-il en décembre 1986—sur fond d'une cohabitation tendue, y compris sur ces questions—du «vaste consentement» sur lequel peut s'appuyer la politique extérieure et de sécurité de la France et, en particulier, sa politique européenne. Une fois réélu en 1988—grâce notamment à ce même consensus qu'il a su utiliser face à Chirac—il peut d'autant mieux appeler les Français à la mobilisation européenne: «plus nous serons unis autour des idéaux qui ont fondé la République et mieux la France se portera et plus grande seront ses chances de tenir sa place dans l'Europe de demain», dit-il le 31 décembre de cette année en jouant une nouvelle fois sur la proximité du registre national et du registre européen.

Certes, dès lors que le soutien au projet européen commence à reculer dans l'opinion au début des années quatre-vingt-dix, Mitterrand en vient à manier ce thème défensivement : ainsi, sur fond d'une réunification allemande qui alimente certaines angoisses, le président tente-t-il, le 31 décembre 1990, d'exorciser la «peur» d'une Europe «qui nous priverait de notre identité». Mais dès l'année suivante, le 31 décembre 1991, il remet en avant la nécessité du consensus en soulignant que «l'Europe qui se fait» est de nature à «rassembler» les Français. Et au lendemain du petit «oui» à Maastricht lors du référendum de septembre 1992, il choisit une nouvelle fois de positiver: «vous avez donné à l'Europe l'élan qui lui manquait», se félicite-t-il le 31 décembre 1992. S'il n'en est plus guère question un an plus tard, il termine sa présidence sur l'exhortation que l'on sait à ne pas séparer «la grandeur de la France» et la «construction de l'Europe»: même si son rôle politique s'achève, il tient à installer son héritage européen dans la vision consensuelle qu'il cherche à promouvoir depuis une dizaine d'années et qui repose sur l'identification du sort de la France à celui de l'Europe.

Europe politique, Europe économique

C'est donc bien avant tout dans son rapport à la France que Mitterrand aborde l'Europe en s'adressant à ses concitoyens. Du fait des circonstances et de leur brièveté, ses vœux annuels ne peuvent servir à débattre des caractéristiques spécifiques du projet européen ni à entrer dans les détails

de sa mise en œuvre. Au-delà de la fresque historique, ils sont néanmoins révélateurs de la conception que Mitterrand se fait de la construction européenne ou, du moins, des lignes de force qu'il entend lui donner. Ces lignes de force concernent tant la nature du projet européen que ses limites, et elles peuvent se résumer à deux couples de notions: Europe politique/Europe économique, d'abord, petite Europe/grande Europe ensuite.

Sans surprise, c'est d'abord de l'Europe politique que Mitterrand parle à ses concitoyens; s'il ne néglige pas l'Europe économique, on sent bien que celle-ci, à ses yeux, est d'abord l'instrument de celle-là. Pour lui comme pour de Gaulle, l'Europe est, en effet, d'abord un projet politique¹³. Il l'énonce clairement dès le 31 décembre 1981: il s'agit «de donner à la Communauté européenne des Dix une volonté politique»; il y revient deux ans après à la veille de la présidence française: «il manque à l'Europe une volonté politique», répète-t-il le 31 décembre 1983, pour constater un an plus tard, le 31 décembre 1984 que l'Europe, à Fontainebleau, «a repris conscience d'elle-même» puis, en 1987, réclamer une «mobilisation [...] autour d'une formidable volonté politique».

Cette Europe politique, Mitterrand la conçoit d'abord dans sa dimension extérieure, autrement dit en termes géopolitiques. Il s'agit, grâce à la construction de l'Europe (y compris, bien sûr, dans sa dimension économique), de permettre aux Européens de continuer à exister sur la scène mondiale, une vision dans la continuité de l'«Europe européenne» gaullienne: «Seule l'Europe technologique, économique et monétaire aura la dimension suffisante pour rivaliser avec le Japon et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique», martèle-t-il le 31 décembre 1988, ajoutant: «Seule l'Europe politique sera capable de tenir tête aux puissances qui dominent le monde». Sans qu'il utilise l'expression, c'est bien d'une «Europe puissance» que parle Mitterrand—comme son prédécesseur—, une Europe capable de s'affirmer face aux puissances établies mais aussi de relever les grands défis comme celui de l'environnement ou du développement. C'est bien ainsi qu'il choisit, le 31 décembre 1991, de présenter l'acquis de Maastricht, dont il énumère les grandes avancées en mettant l'accent sur les instruments de la puissance sur lesquels la future Union européenne pourra s'appuyer: «Une monnaie commune, l'amorce d'une diplomatie, d'une défense et d'une armée commune à l'Europe des Douze»: tels sont les moyens, se félicite-t-il, dont disposeront bientôt «350 à 360 millions d'Européens» pour exister «sur la scène du monde».

13 Voir sur ce sujet Musitelli, art.cit.

L'Europe politique, Mitterrand l'évoque aussi dans la dimension interne. Elle implique avant tout, pour lui, de bâtir une «Europe des citoyens», thème auquel il se montre attaché dès la relance de 1984, comme en témoigne le mandat confié au Conseil européen de Fontainebleau au comité que présidera Pietro Adonnino. Et l'Europe des citoyens, c'est d'abord, pour lui, celle de la jeunesse, comme il l'énonce le 31 décembre de cette même année en appelant à l'Europe pour que «la jeunesse d'aujourd'hui puisse entrer de plain-pied dans le siècle prochain». Au total, l'Europe politique est, pour Mitterrand, la condition même de la légitimité du projet européen: l'Europe «a besoin qu'on l'aide et que l'on y croie, elle a besoin que les peuples s'en mêlent», martèle-t-il le 31 décembre 1986. D'où, aussi, son insistance sur les dimensions sociale et culturelle, qui relèvent également d'une volonté de légitimation du projet européen, aux antipodes d'une Europe technocratique avec laquelle Mitterrand—c'est chez lui une constante—ne cache pas son manque d'affinités: «sans politique sociale et sans espace culturel, [l'Europe] ne sera pas», lance-t-il le 31 décembre 1988 à l'approche de la présidence française du second semestre 1989, pendant laquelle il espère faire avancer ces deux dimensions qu'il met en avant depuis longtemps.

Qu'en est-il, dès lors, de l'Europe économique? Comment le président français, socialiste—qui a déjà fait le choix, en mars 1983, du maintien du franc dans le système monétaire européen—présente-t-il une relance européenne qui s'articule autour du grand marché? On l'a dit : c'est avant tout en termes de dépassement des frontières—un thème qui parle à l'homme de la rue—qu'il présente l'objectif de 1992, comme il le fait le 31 décembre 1987 en résumant l'Acte unique au fait que ces frontières «tomberont». Même chose à la veille de l'échéance: «demain [...] les frontières disparaîtront», répète-t-il le 31 décembre 1992, rappelant en passant les «quatre libertés» de circulation (des biens, des services, des capitaux et des personnes) que le traité de Maastricht consacre. L'intention est évidente: il s'agit de «positiver» le grand marché en mettant l'accent sur les libertés nouvelles qu'il apporte aux Européens. Et comme la récession pointe en cette fin de 1992, le discours sur l'Europe économique se veut rassurant, comme pour exorciser les dangers du grand marché: ainsi Mitterrand mentionne-t-il ce même jour le rôle nécessaire de la Communauté pour «défendre» l'agriculture européenne, «organiser la croissance» industrielle, «relancer l'investissement» et «multiplier les travaux d'intérêt général», non sans mettre en garde le probable futur gouvernement de cohabitation qui résultera des élections de mars 1993: «J'espère que personne ne songe à s'attaquer à nos acquis sociaux». C'est bien une Europe économiquement protectrice—

mais non pas protectionniste—face aux excès de la mondialisation en marche que Mitterrand entend promouvoir aux yeux des Français.

Petite Europe, grande Europe

Un dernier trait saillant des conceptions mitterrandiennes se dégage des discours du Nouvel An: il s'agit du rapport qu'entretiennent la «petite» Europe, communautaire, d'une part, et la «grande» Europe, élargie à l'ensemble du continent, d'autre part, question centrale dans la politique de la France depuis les années soixante et la «grande politique» de De Gaulle. Jusqu'à 1989, cette problématique est, logiquement, peu présente: même si, on l'a vu, Mitterrand met en avant dès 1981 la fin de «Yalta», l'inclusion dans la construction européenne au sens large de ce qui fait encore figure d'«Europe de l'Est» est une perspective suffisamment lointaine pour qu'il ne sente pas la nécessité de l'aborder à l'occasion de ses vœux annuels. Preuve qu'il s'agit d'un enjeu majeur à ses yeux, il l'évoque néanmoins à d'autres occasions, en particulier dans son introduction à vingt-cinq discours de politique étrangère, parue en janvier 1986, dans laquelle il donne sa vision d'une Europe de l'Est appelée à se rapprocher de celle de l'Ouest à mesure que celle-ci affirmera sa personnalité propre, ce qui «aiguillera» chez les Européens de l'Est «la conscience, après un demi-siècle d'ignorance mutuelle, d'appartenir au même continent, d'exprimer la même civilisation», hâtant ainsi le retour de l'Europe «de l'histoire et de la géographie»¹⁴.

Il n'est donc guère surprenant que Mitterrand reprenne cette dernière formule lors de ses vœux du 31 décembre 1989 —alors que les révolutions à l'Est viennent de balayer les régimes communistes—, qui tournent autour de l'idée que l'Europe «ne sera plus celle que nous connaissons depuis un demi-siècle». Présente jusqu'ici en filigrane, la nécessaire articulation entre «petite» Europe et «grande» Europe est désormais au cœur du discours européen de François Mitterrand. La confédération, dont il lance ce jour-là l'idée, est précisément conçue à cette fin: en avançant que l'Europe des Douze «a, par sa seule existence, puissamment contribué au sursaut des peuples de l'Est en leur servant de référence et de pôle d'attraction» et en

14 François Mitterrand, *Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France. Introduction à vingt-cinq discours (1981-1985)*, Paris: Fayard, 1986, pp. 70-71 (voir également la réédition de l'ouvrage, annoté et préfacé par Frédéric Bozo, dans François Mitterrand, *Œuvres*, Vol. IV, Paris : Les Belles Lettres, 2018).

précisant que cette nouvelle institution (une «confédération au vrai sens du terme, dit-il») associera «tous les Etats de notre continent dans une grande organisation commune et permanente d'échanges, de paix et de sécurité», Mitterrand résume sa conception d'une «grande» Europe confédérale qui s'organiserait autour d'une «petite» Europe à vocation fédérale. La vision mitterrandienne est claire: il s'agit de donner priorité au renforcement de celle-ci pour mieux rendre possible l'émergence de celle-là «dans une deuxième étape». Il y revient l'année suivante: rappelant avoir dès 1981 envisagé la sortie de «Yalta», il précise ce 31 décembre 1990 qu'il s'agissait alors d'en appeler à la fin de «la division mortelle de l'Europe», ajoutant: «On doit maintenant aller plus loin grâce à la Communauté des Douze, attelée à son unité politique, économique et monétaire, grâce à la Confédération européenne dont on jettera les bases dès le printemps prochain, grâce à la solidarité accrue à l'égard des pays de l'Est»; «tout cela va dans le même sens», souligne-t-il en défense de sa vision de l'«architecture» européenne post-guerre froide¹⁵.

Sans surprise, Mitterrand choisit de voir dans les crises qui secouent Europe de l'Est à partir de 1991— à commencer par l'éclatement de la Yougoslavie et la fin de l'URSS — une confirmation de sa vision de l'articulation nécessaire entre l'Europe des Douze et le reste du continent: malgré l'échec de la Confédération à la suite des Assises de Prague qui devaient lancer le projet au printemps 1991, il déclare lors de ses vœux du 31 décembre 1991 que l'Union européenne issue de Maastricht offrira un «exemple de stabilité» aux peuples «qui se déchirent». Le constat est le même un an plus tard, en plus sombre: «si l'Ouest de notre continent va vers son unité», dit-il le 31 décembre 1992, «l'Est va vers sa dispersion», déplore-t-il alors même que, ce même jour, la Tchécoslovaquie se scinde en deux Etats.

Reste que l'échec du projet confédéral contraint bientôt Mitterrand à repenser sa conception des rapports entre l'Union européenne et l'Europe élargie: la stabilisation de l'ensemble du continent devra bel et bien passer par l'élargissement progressif de l'Union, dont la Confédération visait justement à repousser l'échéance dans l'espoir d'éviter la dilution du projet communautaire. Déplorant le 31 décembre 1993 que «l'ancienne Europe soviétique continue de se disloquer» et que «les haines raciales et les passi-

15 Voir à ce sujet Frédéric Bozo, «"Tout ce qui permettra de sortir de Yalta sera bon": la vision mitterrandienne de la fin de la guerre froide», dans Nicolas Badalassi et Jean-Philippe Dumas (dir.), *Reconstruire l'Europe 45 ans après Yalta. La charte de Paris (1990)*, Paris : MEAE/CTHS, 2020, pp.17-31.

ons nationalistes» redoublent en Yougoslavie, il voit en l'Europe des Douze «notre meilleur rempart» tout en concédant souhaiter «que s'élargisse au continent tout entier la zone de paix qui nous protège». Si l'acceptation de l'élargissement de l'Union européenne — envisagé ouvertement depuis le conseil européen de Copenhague en juin 1993 — n'est encore qu'implicite, elle devient explicite le 31 décembre 1994, non sans être assortie d'un « *caveat*» : acceptant désormais clairement la perspective d'un «élargissement progressif» à «l'ensemble des démocraties européennes», Mitterrand ajoute: «Elargir l'Europe, oui, mais sans l'affaiblir».

C'est sur cette note qu'il évoque pour la dernière fois l'Europe à l'occasion de ses vœux à ses concitoyens. Elle dit bien ce qui sera resté, jusqu'au terme de son action, le dilemme qui résultait à la fois de sa prédilection pour le projet européen désormais incarné dans l'Union européenne, auquel il aura contribué à faire franchir des étapes décisives et dont il souhaite plus que tout préserver les acquis, et la conscience qu'il avait de l'indispensable élargissement de la construction de l'Europe à l'ensemble du continent en tant que projet de civilisation.

L'«angle mort» franco-allemand

Au total, les vœux du Nouvel An traduisent fidèlement la manière dont le président Mitterrand entend persuader ses concitoyens de donner leur adhésion au projet européen dans une période décisive. Certes, la destination de ces discours et leur concision font que nombre d'aspects n'y sont pas abordés ou y sont éludés, surtout s'ils sont politiquement sensibles ou techniquement complexes. Leur auteur n'y entre pas dans le débat sur les fins ultimes de la construction européenne ni n'y aborde des questions théoriques comme celle de la souveraineté ou de la supranationalité, de l'intergouvernementalisme ou du fédéralisme, préférant s'en tenir à des formules générales mais fortes telles que celle sur la «patrie» et l'«avenir» européen. Il ne s'y attarde pas davantage sur des aspects tels que la nature du marché unique, la forme l'union économique et monétaire ou le fonctionnement et les rôles respectifs des institutions communautaires, préférant aborder ces enjeux par le biais de notions qui peuvent «parler» aux Français comme l'Europe des citoyens ou à la lumière des avantages tangibles qu'elle peut leur apporter. Mitterrand fait ainsi le choix du consensus européen quitte à donner l'impression d'esquiver des enjeux qui peuvent diviser, comme l'a montré le référendum sur le traité de Maastricht à l'automne 1992; c'est que ces vœux sont par nature un moment de communion nationale. N'expriment-ils pas, pourtant, une certaine «vérité»

européenne, celle d'un dirigeant marqué à la fois par son expérience personnelle— celle du jeune ministre français qui participa à la conférence de La Haye en 1948— et par son destin politique, celle du successeur du Général de Gaulle, dont il aura voulu—sans toujours le reconnaître— préserver l'héritage tout en l'adaptant aux temps nouveaux ?

D'où, pour conclure, une interrogation sur un «angle mort» qui peut surprendre: celui qui concerne l'Allemagne et la relation franco-allemande, étrangement peu présentes dans ces discours. François Mitterrand, à partir du milieu des années quatre-vingt, fait de cette relation une orientation décisive tant au plan bilatéral qu'au plan européen, en se plaçant sur un terrain pour ainsi dire existentiel: en témoignent des symboles tels que la poignée de main de Verdun en septembre 1984 ou des formules telles que la «communauté de destin» franco-allemande. Pourtant les discours de vœux, qui pourraient sembler propices à l'évocation voire à la célébration de cette relation, en sont quasi-exempts. Événement majeur, la réunification ne peut certes être passée sous silence, mais elle y est abordée en des termes dénués d'affects. Le 31 décembre 1989, dans la foulée de la chute du Mur, Mitterrand— non sans avoir salué l'«éclatante victoire de la démocratie» à l'Est— se contente de s'interroger: «sous quelle forme et dans quelles conditions se réunira le peuple allemand ?» L'année suivante, une fois l'Allemagne réunifiée, le propos paraît moins détaché: mentionnant ce 31 décembre 1990 l'inquiétude qu'elle inspire désormais à certains et qu'il associe à la «peur de l'Europe», Mitterrand, faisant écho à la crainte d'une Allemagne qui dominerait désormais cette dernière, lance: «Tout est péril pour un peuple qui s'abandonne», ajoutant: «la France a toujours eu des voisins, des concurrents ambitieux, incommodes. Voilà mille ans que cela dure!». Ainsi reconnaît-il, implicitement, l'existence d'un nouveau rapport de force franco-allemand qui constitue un défi— un défi dont il estime néanmoins que la France est à même de le relever: «Ayons confiance en nous», dit-il, en notant que «la position de la France est forte». Ce qu'il martèle à nouveau l'année suivante, en se plaçant sur ce même terrain du rapport de force: reconnaissant une nouvelle fois les inquiétudes dont le pays est saisi, en particulier dans le domaine économique, il observe ce 31 décembre 1991 que «la France s'en tire mieux que les autres» et en particulier «qu'elle maîtrise l'inflation mieux que l'Allemagne»¹⁶.

Pour ses derniers vœux aux Français le 31 décembre 1994, Mitterrand, on l'a vu, réaffirme en termes forts sa foi européenne. Pourtant, l'Allema-

16 Sur la France et l'unification allemande, cf. Frédéric Bozo, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht*, Paris: O. Jacob, 2005.

gne en est absente. Le contraste est frappant avec deux autres «discours-testaments» prononcés au cours des mois suivants. D'abord, celui devant le parlement européen, le 17 janvier 1995, alors que la France exerce la présidence de l'Union pour la première fois depuis sa création, discours—le dernier devant cette enceinte— dans lequel le président français, comme souvent, revient sur son engagement européen à partir de son expérience de l'antagonisme franco-allemand, avant de conclure par une formule qui restera dans les esprits: «le nationalisme, c'est la guerre!»¹⁷

Ensuite, l'avant-dernier discours public prononcé dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, à Berlin, le 8 mai 1995, pour l'anniversaire de la capitulation allemande (le tout dernier sera prononcé le lendemain à Moscou), dans lequel Mitterrand délivre un vibrant plaidoyer pour l'amitié franco-allemande et pour l'Europe. «Comme il s'agit de l'un des derniers actes que j'accomplirai dans ce rôle, je suis fier que cela soit ici avec vous», avait-il dit, ajoutant: «C'était bien le moins que je devais à l'Allemagne. A l'Allemagne d'aujourd'hui, mais aussi à l'Allemagne de toujours que l'histoire, la géographie, la culture ont indissolublement liée à la France». Et de conclure ainsi un discours qui ne laissera indifférent ni en Allemagne ni en France, et qui restera controversé aux yeux de certains du fait de la relativisation du nazisme dont se serait prétendument rendu coupable Mitterrand en parlant du «courage» qui avait été celui des soldats allemands quelle que fût «l'idée qui habitait [leur] esprit»: «L'Europe, nous la faisons, nous aimons nos patries. Restons fidèles à nous-mêmes. Relions le passé et le futur et nous pourrons passer l'esprit en paix le témoin à ceux qui vont nous suivre»¹⁸.


Un tel contraste entre les derniers vœux du Nouvel An aux Français et ces deux discours, l'un à l'intention des Européens, l'autre des Allemands, ne peut qu'interroger. Ambivalence profonde sur ce sujet, essentiel, du rapport à l'Allemagne dans la construction de l'Europe, ou crainte d'être incompris de ses concitoyens? Il est difficile de répondre à cette interrogation qui, pourtant, va au fond de l'engagement européen de Mitterrand. Il

17 <https://www.elysee.fr/francois-mitterrand/1995/01/17/discours-de-m-francois-mitterrand-president-de-la-republique-sur-le-programme-de-la-presidence-francaise-de-lunion-europeenne-notamment-en-matiere-delargissement-dunion-economique-et-monetaire-dorganisation-de-leurope-sociale-didentite-cultu> [consulté le 28/10/2021]

18 <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/205118-allocation-de-m-francois-mitterrand-president-de-la-republique-sur-la>[consulté le 28/10/2021]. Pour une critique de ce discours, cf. Paul Thibaud, « Mitterrand à Berlin, le dernier discours », in *Esprit*, No. 213 (7) (Juillet 1995), pp. 41-56.

y consacra certes un ultime ouvrage paru à titre posthume, dans lequel il écrira « rêve[r] à la prédestination de l'Allemagne et de la France, que la géographie et leur vieille rivalité désignent pour donner le signal »¹⁹. Mais, au bout du compte, ne faut-il pas admettre à cet égard chez François Mitterrand l'existence d'une part irréductible de mystère ?

Tableau: le thème européen dans les vœux du
Nouvel An de François Mitterrand (NB 1981=31 décembre 1981)



19 François Mitterrand, *De l'Allemagne, de la France*, Paris: Odile Jacob, 1996, p. 129.

Helmut Kohl:
Master Builder of a United Europe in Words and Deeds¹

Deborah Cuccia

*„Der Pfalz ist meine Heimat, Deutschland ist mein Vaterland,
und Europa ist unsere Zukunft“*

Helmut Kohl

Press conference 31.8.1984



¹ This article is based on a vast set of literature on Helmut Kohl as well as on the collections of German diplomatic acts already published. Still, the sole support of archival and secondary material would not have been sufficient to ensure a full picture of the background to the chosen speech by Helmut Kohl and, therefore, to place its linguistic analysis in an appropriate context. This study was also supplemented by additional data gathered through the use of memoirs, accounts and thanks to an interview with Prof. Dr. Michael Gehler (1 April 2021), who had been invited to participate when former Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave the chosen speech. A primary debt of gratitude is, therefore, owed to him for kindly agreeing to share his impressions. The framework of a semi-structured interview was applied. This means that some general questions were prepared in advance to help focus on the key issues, without constraining the interviewee to a particular scheme. Such interviews are, in fact, open to further questions to develop during the course of the discussion, based on the interviewee's responses. The images have been kindly provided by Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühhardt.

Introduction

By 1982, after more than a decade serving in the opposition, the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) came back to power.² At the time, its leader, Helmut Kohl, was no stranger to politics. In addition to directing the CDU, he had, among others, held the prestigious office of Minister President of the German region Rhineland-Palatinate. At the beginning of the 1980s, he was, therefore, considered a skilful tactician, well versed in the inner functioning of his own party. Moreover, as several observers at home have already acknowledged, he was a man with an unmistakable gift for politics.³ Last but not least, he had a fascination, which he shared with French President François Mitterrand⁴, for European history and a robust knowledge of his country's past.⁵

From the very beginning, Kohl's political career had been a quick and promising one. Still, by 1982, he was not a career politician, either at the national or European level. Unlike, his predecessor, the former SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, he had never held federal offices during the previous decades. Thus, Helmut Kohl, the eager reformer of the 1970s, was often depicted by the West German media as a provincial simpleton ill-equipped for high office. Despite his generally respected political skills and his acknowledged support— even beyond the borders of the Federal Republic— for European integration, he was mocked for what many considered a certain amount of provincialism.

All these historical and personal features left a trace in the way he expressed himself in his political addresses, which this essay intends to analyse.⁶ It will focus on one group of political speeches, namely those revolving around Europe and the European integration process, by delving

2 S. Helmut Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982-1990*, München: Droemer Verlag, 2005.

3 S. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie*, München: DVA, 2012. Hans Stark, *L'Allemagne et l'Europe. La politique d'intégration européenne de la République Fédérale 1982-1998*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004.

4 S. Tilo Schabert, *Mitterrand et la réunification allemande : une histoire secrète (1981-1995)*, Paris: Grasset, 2005.

5 "Kohl was enormously aware of history; he repeatedly tested his employees to see what they knew about history. He exchanged ideas with Mitterrand [...] about German philosophy and history and, of course, about current political issues". S. Interview with Prof. Dr. Michael Gehler, 1 April 2021.

6 Alistair Cole, "Political Leadership in Western Europe: Helmut Kohl in Comparative Context" in *German Politics*, 7, 1, 1998, pp.120–142.

into the structure and the characteristics of one specific text, which can be considered particularly representative of Kohl's vision of Europe.⁷

Firstly, the following pages will present the specific historical and personal context in which the chosen speech should be read and understood. Then, this essay will investigate its main contents, meaning new and old knowledge conveyed through it. Lastly, this contribution will analyse in more details how the selected contents were expressed through words and rhetorical devices, and with which effects on the listeners. The basic question around which this article revolves concerns, in fact, the specific kind of strategies that the speaker used to persuade his audience. Communication is, indeed, effective only if the receivers understand the message and act accordingly. The message must, therefore, be structured according to the target audience, the place where it is held and the position the speaker has.

This explains the particular interest embodied by the selected speech, the comparatively little known *Der Euro und die Zukunft Europas* (The euro and the future of Europe). It was given in 2002, when Helmut Kohl was no longer German Chancellor. Such a choice might appear rather unexpected. It is, however, rooted in and justified by the peculiar characteristics of this address.

On the one hand, the chosen text provides us with an overall picture of nearly two decades of unbroken leadership by Helmut Kohl. In this address, the former Chancellor skilfully brought together the past, namely his own past and the foundations of the European integration process, the present situation and his future expectations for Europe. It shows, therefore, the level of maturity, which the European rhetoric of Helmut Kohl had by then achieved.

On the other hand, the rather informal situation in which the speech was given and the fact that Kohl no longer had a political role gave him a certain flexibility in defining the length of the intervention, as well as its structure and contents.

⁷ S. Henrik Meyer, *Deutsche Europapolitik unter Helmut Kohl. Die Auswirkungen des politischen Umfeldes auf die Integrationsbereitschaft der Bundesregierung*, Berlin: Verlag Dr. Köster, 2004.

Deborah Cuccia

*Historical and Personal Background:
Looking for the distinctive style of Helmut Kohl*

The death of Helmut Kohl, just a couple of years ago, prompted a wave of interest and reflection in the German media, reflection devoted to the life and legacy of Germany's longest-serving chancellor.⁸ Analogies have been drawn between Kohl's biography and that of his nation. In his own words, he had "the blessing of late birth"; born in 1930, he was young enough to have experienced the Second World War, but not old enough to bear responsibility for it.

His belonging to the Christian Democratic family should also be regarded as an important element with which to understand Kohl's legacy. Not only was he profoundly influenced by the values and ideas of the political tradition he belonged to, but he was also extremely skilful in directing and leading both the German Christian Democrats and the EPP. The role of Kohl as a European politician, in the 1980s as well as in the first half of the 1990s, has often been underestimated. He was indeed more than a skilful national leader; he was in every respect a European transnational party politician, a circumstance, which—coupled with a natural closeness to his fellow men—offered him a valuable opportunity to build a solid network of connections with Christian Democrats from other European countries.

Still, his empathy was also made of flexibility in dealing with different political approaches. Similarly to Adenauer, also a convinced Christian Democrat who could work very well with Guy Mollet, a socialist, with Robert Schuman, a Christian Democrat, and with Charles De Gaulle, a French nationalist, Kohl developed effective links of trust and friendship with partners belonging to different political families, such as, for instance, Felipe Gonzalez and François Mitterrand.

Kohl's regional identity can arguably be considered as strong as his generational and political identity. His provincial appearance, combined with a pronounced traditional heritage, constituted, in fact, the cornerstone of his image. As already remarked on in the introduction, the national and foreign media often mocked him for this touch of provincialism, by which I mean, among other things, his simple, staid and, from time to time, plump demeanour. In addition, he suffered from a speech impediment; like many other people in the Rhine area, he could not correctly pronounce the German 'sch' sound in the middle of words. A further

8 S. Peter Walter, *Die Darstellung der europäischen Integrationspolitik des Bundeskanzlers Helmut Kohl in ausgewählten deutschen Printmedien*, PhD thesis, Gießen, 2001.

impediment lay in the fact that Helmut Kohl could not speak any foreign language fluently, neither English nor French, let alone Italian. In private meetings with fellow politicians, his wife, a professional interpreter, was often charged with ensuring a fluid conversation⁹.

Still, as time went on, his regional countenance, his closeness to people, his flexibility and his empathy turned themselves into a useful and effective instrument with which to counterbalance his weaknesses and to win the trust of his partners.

He knew his limits [...] he knew who was drinking which wine, about the women and children of the other EU heads of state and government. This was in a way more important to him than currency and political details. He could talk with other people about their vita, about their origins [...]. He could win them over¹⁰.

Personal relationships and human closeness were, in a word, paramount to both Kohl's diplomacy and to Kohl's rhetoric. During political meetings, he often resorted to the traditional repertoire of provincial nearness and *Männerfreundschaft* (human 'male' bonding); in his speeches, he usually exploited the advantages of addressing his listeners directly in simple and colourful language, marked by the contrasts in his lexical repertoire.

It would be interesting to enquire in detail to what degree this was part of his character and personality and to what degree it was the result of a skilful political strategy to support his political goals and to advance his passionate European faith. Unfortunately, this would be beyond the purpose of this contribution. Still, even a brief analysis of Kohl's personality and style of government shows that the Christian Democratic leader was deeply connected to the Palatinate and Rhenish ambience. It would, therefore, be incorrect to conclude that, throughout his career, he staged himself as the provincial man for political purposes. Quite the reverse, this provincialism was an integral part of his personality, as well as his closeness to people and his empathy in dealing with them.¹¹ It is, however, likely that, as time went on, Kohl himself acknowledged the potential of constantly nourishing this self-representation by portraying himself as genuinely provincial and Catholic and, therefore, as anti-ideological¹².

9 S. Interview with Prof. Dr. Michael Gehler, 1 April 2021.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 S. Charis Pöthig, *Italien und die DDR*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 2000, p. 59. S. also Deborah Cuccia, *There are two German States and two must remain? Italy and the long Path from the German Question to the Re-unification*,

Throughout the 1990s, Germany, once an economic giant within the frontiers of a political dwarf, had grown in importance and self-confidence. The provincialism of Chancellor Kohl had become, under such circumstances, even more reassuring. Through this feature, he represented in his own person the idea of German normality. According to the definition proposed by Jürgen Habermas, he was the “verkörperte Entwarnung”¹³.

His place of birth, the specific moment when he was born, the history of the party he belonged to, as much as that of his Catholic milieu, and, last but not least, his own political career were, therefore, at the very heart of his personality and self-representation, not only in the image provided by the media, but also in the mental mappings his speeches offered to public opinion.

During the first years of his political mandate, references to Europe in Kohl's speeches did not have their sole, but one of their main sources of backing in the longstanding support which the German Christian Democrats had been providing to the European integration path. As Hans August Lückner, an expert on European questions within the Christian Democratic ranks, remarked, at the very beginning of his chancellorship, Helmut Kohl certainly possessed a general picture of the main European issues, but he was not in full possession of their ramifications and details¹⁴.

Metaphorically speaking, Kohl followed in the footsteps of well-known predecessors, first and foremost Konrad Adenauer¹⁵. References to Europe were, in fact, deeply rooted in the tradition of the Christian Democratic political family¹⁶. It should, therefore, not be a surprise, that from the very

Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Olms Verlag, 2019, pp. 56–57. For decades, the vision of Germany in other European countries was held hostage to strong political polarisation. Conservative parties, especially in Southern Europe, supported the image of the Federal Republic as a ‘Catholic’ country, some sort of enlarged Rhineland/Bavaria. This image was presented as the living antithesis of the Prussian military and ideological legacy. The fact that both Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl were born in the Rhineland area was, therefore, a political tool often used in the representation of Germany that both politicians offered in their speeches.

13 Jürgen Habermas, “Meine Jahre mit Helmut Kohl”, in *Die Zeit*, 11. März 1994.

14 S. Matthias Stenger, *Transnationale Parteienzusammenarbeit. Die Beziehungen der deutschen und portugiesischen Christlichen Demokraten von der Nelkenrevolution bis zum Vertrag von Maastricht (1974-1992)*, Bonn: Droste Verlag, 2011, p. 247 (interview with Hans August Lückner).

15 S. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Die Ära Adenauer*, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1983.

16 S. Michael Gehler/Marcus Gonschor, *Ein europäisches Gewissen. Hans-Gert Pötering – Biographie* (mit einem Vorwort von Donald Tusk), Freiburg/Basel/Wien:

beginning of his sixteen-year mandate as Chancellor, Kohl's speeches, his addresses, his statements and his interviews to the press, both at home and abroad, at both formal and informal events, were in any way lacking in general references to Europe and to the European integration process. Starting with his inaugural address, given on 12 October 1982, he declared his support for the establishment of a European Political Union¹⁷. These references can be considered a distinctive feature of his vision of politics.

It was, however, not until the so-called fall of the Berlin Wall and the following events—which led to the end of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and to the foundation of a united German state with Berlin as its capital city—that Helmut Kohl enjoyed his greatest political momentum. By then, Kohl's approach to Europe had evolved into a more complex and better-structured attitude, which could benefit from the legitimacy that the events of 1989–1990 had bestowed on him. In the 1990s, he was addressed as the *Einheitskanzler* (the Chancellor of Unity) and implicitly considered an acknowledged statesman. By the time he was defeated in the election, which would have granted him his fifth term, he was addressed as *Europas Baumeister* (the master builder of Europe).

The 1990 turning point did not alter his belief that Europe was more than the total amount of the GDPs of its member states or the sum of the directives adopted; rather, it provided him with the opportunity to play a central role in shaping the transition from the European Communities to the European Union and in defining the profile of the latter. It also contributed to modifying the representation which the media, both at home and abroad, provided of him and in many ways the very nature of his speeches, which acquired new strength in the arguments presented to the listeners, an enhanced ethos and, last but not least, greater legitimacy and self-confidence.

Herder, 2020. See also Johannes Großmann, *Die Internationale der Konservativen. Transnationale Elitenzirkel und private Außenpolitik in Westeuropa seit 1945*, München: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2014. See as well Michael Gehler/Marcus Gonschor/Hinnerk Meyer/Johannes Schöner, *Mitgestalter Europas. Transnationalismus und Parteinetzwerke europäischer Christdemokraten und Konservativer in historischer Erfahrung*, Sankt Augustin, 2013.

17 S. Deborah Cuccia, *There are two German States and two must remain?*, pp. 132–133.

The making of a—successful—political speech

In search of the distinctive style of Helmut Kohl and how it was expressed in his speeches, we should go beyond the prevailing stereotype of the pragmatic Schmidt in contrast with a successor primarily driven by emotions. Throughout his years in power, Helmut Kohl's distinctive style slowly took on definite features: political foresight, the capacity to seize the right moment and a passionate approach to politics. His undeniable skills, his tactical mastery and capacity to manoeuvre within the government, as well as within his own party, and his university education in history— not always and not necessarily a strong point of political leaders— were coupled with the human touch, curiosity and a closeness to his fellow men, by which I mean the capability of combining toughness with tenacity, together with his inborn ability to engage in political experimentation and his remarkable disposition to accept risks and changes.

In Bonn, the German politics was *Chefsache*, namely an issue under the sole responsibility of the Chancellor. And Helmut Kohl ruled over the Chancellery in a rather personal way, not according to the inner logic of the bureaucratic apparatus [...] but on impulse, according to the current situation and, above all, by means of personal exchanges of views and relationships of trust, also and especially on the international stage. In this way Helmut Kohl acted [...] through his personal qualities [...] his practicality, his inexhaustible potential for action and through his strong determination, coupled with—his political sensitivity taken into account—a tenacious sense of self confidence [...] ¹⁸.

To be persuasive, a speaker must take into account his own profile and appeal to people in ways that will convince them. The Greek philosopher Aristotle described three modalities used to persuade an audience: Logos, Pathos and Ethos¹⁹.

Logos and pathos can be considered the two sides of the same coin. Through logos, the speaker appeals to the audience's sense of reason using logic and facts. Here, the goal pursued consists in presenting the image of someone who is competent enough to deal with the problems at hand. By resorting to pathos, the debater appeals to the audience's emotions using, for instance, sensory images and anecdotes. Here, the goal pursued consists

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 277–278.

¹⁹ S. Szymon Wróbel, “Logos Ethos, Pathos in Classical Rethoric Revisited” in *Polish Sociological Review*, 191, 2015, pp. 401–421.

in presenting the image of someone who is sympathetic to their emotions and, therefore, capable of dealing with the problems at hand. Ethos, in turn, allows the speaker to show the audience that he or she is reliable and trustworthy.

Reputation is the main factor which affects one's ethos. Ethos is, indeed, mainly rooted in the credibility of the debater. The specific grammatical and syntactical strategies exploited in a speech to convey ethos—for example, the use of first-person plural pronouns—can only be effective if the orator has already established himself as credible, reliable and trustworthy. Both elements, reliability and trustworthiness, are of the utmost importance in building a bridge between the speaker and the listeners. The structure of a speech as well as the complexity of the language used have, in turn, a great impact on further enhancing the ethos of a particular orator. Fragmented and easy sentences, for instance, reach minds much more quickly and efficiently than long and complex ones.

In the chosen intervention, Helmut Kohl used a combination of all three elements, with, however, a very strong penchant for pathos and ethos. This was coherent with his well-established position and his personality, which this article has tried, thus far, to retrace. The use of logos was not completely absent; rather, it was well concealed under a cloak of self-confidence, impulse and practicality, which enveloped the whole speech.

Helmut Kohl was a politician who relied on instinct. For a long time, he rightly claimed that he felt exactly what was going on among his fellow citizens. That made him popular. His sedate habit, his love of hearty dishes and folk tunes, his aversion to modish trends—all of this reflected an old German way of life²⁰.

Kohl's historical knowledge is undeniable and it clearly emerges through the pages of the text. By contrast, it is difficult to deny that he had little understanding, let alone good expertise, in the field of economic and currency issues. The chosen speech shows more than any other how an economic goal can be successfully approached as a political and historical turning point by using generic expressions conveying pathos, such as “a question of war or peace”, rather than specific information. Pathos and ethos are, therefore, combined together. A generic expression such as the one quoted must carry a strong emotional charge to be effective; this charge can, how-

20 Jürgen Leinemann, “Die verkörperte Entwarnung. Der Kanzler Helmut Kohl” in *Der Spiegel*, 16. Mai 1996.

ever, deploy its full effect only if supported by pronounced ethos. Kohl was acknowledged by his audience as a trustworthy and passionate man. A passionate expression was, therefore, not perceived as misplaced. Its vagueness was compensated for by a well-established reputation. In other words, the listeners considered Kohl a master builder of Europe, with his deeds of the previous years being proof of it. Precisely these deeds gave the necessary legitimacy and strength to the lexical and rhetorical repertoire employed by the former Chancellor.

A speech, regardless of its objective requires not only a talker but also an audience, a specific context and effective rhetorical devices. This essay has thus far mainly focused on the speaker. It is now indispensable to also refer to the circumstances in which the address was given and to the characteristics of the audience.

Context and strategies of a successful political speech

The speech “Der Euro und die Zukunft Europas” was delivered in January 2002 at the Centre for European Integration Studies at Friedrich Wilhelms Universität in Bonn and was soon after published as a discussion paper. The first difficulty in analysing its contents lies in the fact that Helmut Kohl did not read the manuscript he had brought with him; rather, he often spoke off the cuff. As a result, the manuscript published can only partially support a discussion of the contents and strategies of the intervention at hand²¹. The speech’s written contents will, therefore, be used in parallel with accounts by eyewitnesses.

In January 2002, Ludger Kühnhardt organised an event in the Audimax at the University of Bonn; the guest and speaker was the former Federal Chancellor and member of the Bundestag Helmut Kohl. [...] The Audimax at the University of Bonn is a large hall. [...] In the first row, several representatives of the diplomatic corps had their seats. I still remember the French representative very clearly; I do not know, whether he was an envoy or an ambassador. He was sitting in the front row and, like a small squirrel collecting grain, eagerly writing down in a notepad everything Kohl said. I assume—but I cannot put an exact figure on how many people were there—that between three and five hundred individuals were sitting on the ground floor. There was also

21 S. Christoph Lumme, “Ansicht eines Architekten”, in *General Anzeiger*, 15 January 2002.

a gallery and there must have been about 100 people there. A total amount of around 500 hundred participants must have been present. [...]

It was the year in which the euro was introduced [...] Ludger Kühnhardt²² wanted to honour Helmut Kohl [...] Helmut Kohl made his first public appearance after the suicide of his wife, Hannelore Kohl. After this tragic event, he had withdrawn and no longer acted in public life. One must not forget that Helmut Kohl's image had also been clouded by the party donations scandal, which had arisen at the turn of the century and which was associated with severe irritation and upheavals within the party leadership. [...] That event had put a heavy strain on the image of Helmut Kohl, as the Chancellor of Unity, as a triumphant politician. In this respect, the mood in Bonn's Audimax was a mixed one. In contrast to other events, such as election campaigns and political speeches, it was clear that this was a special occasion beyond party politics, beyond domestic politics and election campaigns. It was a historic moment; there were no whistles and Helmut choirs accompanying the arrival of the former Chancellor. Rather, a respectful attitude for this man. And as he came in, an appreciative applause rushed through the room. [...] ²³

According to its contents, the speech can be divided into three different parts. All three sections are connected to each other by the leading idea that German Unity and European Unity were inseparable issues, whereby the common currency was the link between them and one of Kohl's greatest and most discussed achievements.

A short introduction covers the first page of the address. Its main goal is to capture the attention of the audience and to guide the listeners to the cornerstone of its argumentation; the common currency is presented as a central turning point, a hiatus in European history. The following pages revolve around three main ideas. Firstly, the infancy and the development of the recently enforced common European currency is outlined and, thereby, the choices taken by the speaker supported and his legacy justified. Secondly, another key issue of those years is drawn to the attention of the listeners and its fundamental importance explained: the Eastern

²² Ludger Kühnhardt (born on 4 June 1958 in Münster) is a German political scientist and professor. Since 1997, he has been the director of the Zentrum für Europäische Integrationspolitik (ZEI) at the University of Bonn and a professor at the Institute for Political and Social Sciences at the same university.

²³ Interview with Prof. Dr. Michael Gehler, 1 April 2021.

Deborah Cuccia



Images kindly provided by Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhard

enlargement of the European Union. Thirdly, Kohl dwells extensively and at great length on German relations with France. This last topic was both dear to his heart and an opportunity to introduce and discuss the meaning of three central issues, namely the definition of the “United States of Europe”, the notions of centralisation and decentralisation, and, last but not least, the concept of subsidiarity. In the end, Kohl repeatedly stresses the necessity for Europe to work together, as Europe itself had always been a work in progress built after the annihilation which an exasperated form of nationalism had triggered on the continent.

All the issues which the previous paragraphs have briefly hinted at are not presented in the speech within a rigid formal framework; rather, they are interlinked with each other and, thus, mentioned on three different levels. Helmut Kohl refers to them through a historical lens, through the experience of the acknowledged statesman and through the perspective of a politician who, though retired, had not fully relinquished his taste for politics.

I can still remember that Kohl unleashed a few remarks against the red-green government²⁴, and that he spoke in negative terms of Gerhard Schröder as Federal Chancellor, especially concerning him calling Europe a premature birth (not a miscarriage, a premature birth). He also criticised the lack of concertation in the area of economic and monetary issues. It was gratifying for Kohl to say that, despite such reservations, the euro had become reality. He also emphasised, if I remember correctly, that this issue of the euro was a question of war and peace. It sounded very dramatic [...]. In a speech in Leuven, [...] he had already emphasised that for him the euro was a question of war and peace, according to the motto that the internal market was not enough, whereas the euro was a network, a framework from which one cannot easily get out. History has proven him right to this day. No country has left the euro. It was debated as far as Greece was concerned. Wolfgang Schäuble, the then Finance Minister, was in favour of such a procedure, but Chancellor Merkel decided otherwise²⁵.

Although the main subject of the speech should have been the common currency²⁶, Helmut Kohl more than once shifted his attention mainly to the issue of Franco-German relations. This represents a pattern linking the wide range of speeches which he had uttered throughout his long political career. As far as the common currency is concerned—and regardless of it—he almost obsessively draws the attention of his audience to the utmost importance of smooth Franco-German cooperation and to the necessity of taking into account and respecting French sensibility, as well as its attachment to the values of grandeur, prestige and rank in international politics. As a *Reinlandpfälzer*²⁷, and as a historian, he was well aware of the bloody legacy which the politics of French King Louis XIV—and the war of destruction and annihilation which had followed—had left to the area where he was born and, by extension, to Germany's collective imagination. This entire legacy may not be mentioned in detail in the speech, but references to it are easily detectable. Effective Franco-German cooperation must be perceived by the public as a credit to him and as his legacy to German politics, even, and more crucially, after the events of

24 S. Christoph Lumme, "Ansicht eines Architekten", in *General Anzeiger*, 15 January 2002.

25 Interview with Prof. Dr. Michael Gehler, 1 April 2021.

26 S. "Der Euro ist die große Chance für die europäische Einigung", in *Bonner Rundschau*, 15 January 2002.

27 A man native of the German region Rheinland-Palatinate.

1990. This did not mean, though, that he was blind to what he considered the disadvantages of the French economic tradition, meaning a strong penchant for dirigisme and mercantilism. References to France are, therefore, also an opportunity to introduce the kind of future which Kohl envisaged for the continent: More than creating just a monetary union or some kind of economic government, he aimed in the direction of an effective political structure.

Against this background, Churchill's beloved slogan 'United States of Europe'— which Kohl had admired and valued— was considered no longer realistic and, worse than that, in many ways misleading and worrying for the current European generation. Impetus towards innovation goes together with reassuring transition sentences, where both foreign observers— first and foremost French dignitaries— and the German audience are given assurances that Europe will respect and defend national and local identities²⁸.

Having discussed the main issues of the speech, I now need to delve into the specific rhetoric structures used to convey them.

Words have been selected to be the starting point of this analysis, obtained by breaking down the text into its elementary particles. The analysis of lexical frequencies confirms what has previously been assumed through discussion of the contents of the speech, namely that Europe and the idea of a united European Union are the core of this discourse. *Europa*, *Einigung*, *Euro* and *Grenzen*²⁹ are the prevailing terms in the lexical repertoire employed. Kohl's attention to European integration is preponderant throughout the whole speech. Germany is presented as an entity on its own and, at the same time, as a reality which cannot be thought about without proper reference to the European context. Europe is a common heritage and a unifying force. Three different grammatical and lexical strategies are employed to persuade the audience of the above-mentioned idea.

Firstly, the discourse is marked by skillful use of personal pronouns, which provides the necessary conditions for defining an efficient commu-

28 "Ich muß Ihnen gestehen, dass ich viele Jahre hindurch die Position vertrat, wir könnten die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa schaffen. Dieses Wort hat aber eine falsche Assoziation geweckt, nämlich die der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Doch wir sind nicht und werden nicht vergleichbar sein mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Denn jedes Land hat in diesem Haus Europa seine eigene Identität. Die Franzosen bleiben Franzosen, die Engländer bleiben Engländer, die Italiener bleiben Italiener" in *Der Euro und die Zukunft Europas*, p. 14.

29 Europe, Unity, Euro and Frontiers.

nicative theoretical construct. After the first-person singular pronoun is predominant at the beginning of the address, the personal pronoun “we” progressively gains more ground to finally attain a dominant position at the end. This grammatical choice allows the speaker to firstly reaffirm his ethos and, then, to swiftly transfer information from one man to another, from one generation to another through a sort of system of communication vessels. It also allows the orator to build up a link with the audience, to create a sense of inclusiveness, of belonging to the same world.

Secondly, key words are prioritised and their constant repetition is favoured at the cost of variety. In addition to grammatical strategies, lexical choices are, indeed, also relevant. In other words, this speech opts for the strategy of *repetition* rather than lexical *variation*. Even within the same sentence, central words may be repeated up to three or four times. An analysis of the sequences of repeated segments reinforces what has just been stated.

Thirdly, the text distinguishes itself through its interesting and effective use of adjectives. As the French writer and linguist Roland Barthes remarked, adjectives are “*le rempart de l'imaginaire*”, meaning the fortification of the imaginary³⁰. Adjectives may be in danger, more than any other part of discourse, of succumbing to consumption as a result of excessive use and, therefore, of losing their significance. Still, they are also the easiest and quickest way to identify the quality of a certain object or idea. In a nutshell, they allow the speaker or writer to give substance to a certain theoretical construct, to let ideas move and to fix them in the minds of listeners and readers. The German language is characterised by the richness and the variety of its vocabulary, whereas its verbal system provides far less flexibility in comparison to other idioms. Kohl makes effective use of this peculiarity of his mother tongue. Right at the beginning of his speech, he employs, for instance, six different synonymical adjectives to qualify the European choice as non-reversible: *irreversibel*, *unumkehrbar*, *definitiv*, *endgültig*, *fest*, *unauflöslich*³¹. These adjectives provide a variety of nuances to the central idea; thus, they enrich it. Such a profusion of adjectives compensates for the above-mentioned lack of variety in the nouns used. Lastly, the use of synonymical adjectives can also serve to better fix the idea in the minds of the audience.

Against this canvas, we can now focus on analysing concordances, words combined with the core ideas, first and foremost with *Europe*.

30 Roland Barthes, *Le Degré zéro de l'écriture*, Paris: Seuil, 1953.

31 In *Der Euro und die Zukunft Europas*, p.2.

Concordances provide information on how Kohl narrates Europe through *pathos*. He favours terms of high emotional value and far fewer rhetorical figures. The language used is simple, both in the lexical choices and in the rhetorical options selected and, therefore, easily understandable for a large audience. This everyday language is, for instance, almost entirely deprived of metaphors. Just a few widespread expressions are employed, such as, for instance, references to the *Haus Europa* (European home). By contrast, anecdotes and recollections of personal experiences³² are ever-present. An orator with a strongly acknowledged ethos, can, in fact, wager on his reputation to persuade, without overloading his words with rhetorical structures.

Pathos, meaning the sensational effect, is injected into the speech by the use of hyperbolic adjectives (such as triumphal³³) and expressions (*Schicksalsfrage*³⁴), as well as by Kohl combining words with either different or contrasting meanings, for instance through the association of the noun *choice* with adjectives such as *unavoidable*³⁵. Adverbs are also employed to reinforce the meaning of verbs and adjectives³⁶. The recurring strategy of mixing climax with anti-climax in the meaning of the words used also provides added pathos to the whole³⁷.

Not only does the use of certain strategies assist in achieving the desired effect, but so does the lack of other strategies, for instance the lack of modality. Modality refers to the system that the speaker can exploit to express his degree of commitment to a certain belief. It consists in the use of certain particles, of modal verbs and, for the German language, also in the use of the so-called first subjunctive, which guarantees a certain distance between an idea and the person who declares it. From yes to no, speakers can state things and explain how much they believe in them. Modality is, therefore, often used to mitigate ideas. The lack of modality is as important here as its use would have been. It stresses once more Kohl's full commitment to the European integration process.

A speech is usually created to be read aloud, rather than for reading purposes. We should, therefore, conclude this analysis by considering the rhythmical strategies deployed. Long speeches require, in fact, specific strategies to ensure the audience's attention remains high. Helmut Kohl

32 Ibid., p.9.

33 Ibid., p.5.

34 Fateful question.

35 Ibid., p.2.

36 For instance "heftig verblassen" (sharply fade). S. Ibid., p.6.

37 Ibid., p.8.

opts for a recurrent practice in German literature more than once: the use of alliteration. Alliteration is the repetition of an identical consonant sound in successive or closely associated syllables within a group of words. It is a method of linking words and creating a rhythm which guides the listeners through a speech. It is extensively employed in Germanic languages, whose peculiarities³⁸, compared to other idioms belonging to the Indo-European family—as far as accent is concerned—, make the use of alliteration a recurrent device. Alliteration creates a pattern, which softens the drawback of the German language as a consonant-heavy idiom, which guides the listeners throughout a speech and which suits the importance of the first syllable in German words very well. Once again, Helmut Kohl knows how to use the peculiarities of his mother tongue to his advantage by adapting them to his style. His warm, sonorous and always calm voice did the rest to win over those who were present.

To intellectuals Kohl appeared simple-minded, because he never approached problems or issues in an analytical way. He always reacted intensely, with strong feelings to people, events, keywords, topics and data. His emotional memory released images and scenes, recalled stored impressions and sensations, delivered linguistically prefabricated set pieces that were lined up associatively³⁹.

Conclusions

What conclusions can be drawn from this combined historical and linguistic analysis? What were the defining features of Kohl's vision of Europe?

On the one hand, Kohl was a pragmatist and, on the other, he was visionary. He was convinced that successful European unification required the strengthening of the powers and prerogatives of supranational institutions, such as the European Parliament. Still, he was also convinced that such unification could only be achieved gradually and that, in the end, the cardinal decisions should be accepted and taken by member states.

38 The development of a strong stress on the first syllable of the word triggered significant phonological reductions of all other syllables. This was responsible for the reduction of most basic words of these languages into monosyllables, and for the common impression of modern German and English as consonant-heavy idioms.

39 Jürgen Leinemann, "Die verkörperte Entwarnung, Der Kanzler Helmut Kohl" in *Der Spiegel*, 16 May 1996.

In the media's representation of him, he appeared a bit clumsy and dull, the provincial politician. His big glasses in the shape of a pear became a well-known caricature of him. But, he was a true strategist: Kohl knew that Europe would not work without the member states and that nothing would work without Germany. [...] He knew that the EU was a member states construction, but he was also convinced that the powers of the EU institutions were to be strengthened. He was a *Unionseuropäer* (supranational European) and not just a *Regierungseuropäer* (governmental European). There are namely different types of politicians: the *Unionseuropäer*, the *Regierungseuropäer* and the politicians who still think in terms of the categories of national interests and little care for Europe. Kohl was both a *Unionseuropäer* and a *Regierungseuropäer*; these two dimensions were inseparable for him. The introduction of the common currency is inextricably linked with this observation⁴⁰.

Throughout his decades of political activity, Helmut Kohl had been developing a complex and comprehensive European project. He had, however, also remained faithful to a key concept, which he had heralded in an interview of 1984: "*Der Pfalz ist meine Heimat, Deutschland ist mein Vaterland, und Europa ist unsere Zukunft*" (The Palatinate is my home, Germany is my fatherland and Europe is our future). Nearly twenty years before the speech analysed in this essay, he had already recurred to the skilful use of pronouns to support his firm belief that a European identity should be a layered one.

Helmut Kohl was one of the last German politicians to think and act as a true European, to combine words with deeds, to propose not just short-term strategies and measures, but passionate long-term visions for the European continent and to strive to implement them. Grammatical and lexical choices were functional to him conveying such visions so that they could be implemented. They were successful, as they were not used to conceal a lack of ideas, but rather to provide ideas with an effective framework.

The German philosopher Josef Johann Wittgenstein once wrote in his *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*⁴¹ that the borders of one's language are also the borders of one's world. The chosen speech shows how widening the borders of one's world also facilitates widening and enriching the borders of one's language and vice versa. Ideas, political achievements and future

40 Interview with Prof. Dr. Michael Gehler, 1 April 2021.

41 Josef Johann Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, Berlin: Bibliothek Suhrkamp, 1999.

Helmut Kohl

goals are not expressed in the chosen speech by means of grammatical and rhetorical structures but, rather, are 'shown' to the audience. What remains after listening to a successful political speech are the images which the listeners can visualise and the emotions which the speaker communicated. To be successful, an orator should rely on effective mastery of the language used; however, excellent mastery of the language in itself is not sufficient; it must be combined with the capacity to build a solid link with the audience and to win it over.

To Be Europe, to Be In Europe. The European speeches of Felipe González

Antonio Moreno Juste and Carlos Sanz Díaz

Introduction: myth and narrative of Europe in the thought and political action of Felipe González

Prime Minister of Spain (1982-1996), Secretary-General of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (1979-1997), Vice-President of the Socialist International (1978-1999) and President of the Reflection Group on the Future of Europe (2007-2020), Felipe González (Seville, 1942) is recognized as one of the great European leaders of the generation of Jacques Delors, Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher¹. Throughout his long political career, González has articulated his thought about Europe on numerous occasions and through different channels, generally in line with his national and international political action and the political debates of each historical juncture.

One of the channels through which González articulated his ideas about Europe are what we can call his 'European speeches', that is, those speeches he delivered on stages and before audiences directly related to European integration and in which Europe is the central theme. In Strasbourg (1984 and 1995), Madrid (1985), Aachen (1993) and Cuacos de Yuste (2000), González has developed an increasingly complete narrative about Europe and Spain, a narrative that has evolved with the evolution of European integration itself. In turn, González is a central actor in the formulation of

¹ This chapter has been written within the framework of the research projects "Spain and Portugal before the second enlargement of the European Communities: a comparative study (1974-1986)" (ref. HAR2017-84957P), and "European construction from the South. From the Mediterranean enlargement to the northern enlargement (1986-1995). The contours of Europeanization in comparative perspective", (ref. PID2020-113623GB-I00), of which both authors are Principal Investigators. Authors are responsible for all English translations of cited texts; the original texts can be consulted through the respective references.

the European narrative of contemporary Spain, which is closely linked to the success story of Spanish democracy².

A narrative constitutes an interpretation of reality that mobilizes myths, symbols and events with the aim of legitimizing a certain project or political-social order. Through events of the past and their connection with the present, the narrative seeks that the audience share the values, interests and objectives of the authors of the narrative³. As Chiara Bottici points out in this way, mythical and historical narratives do not contradict each other, but rather converge in the creation of imaginaries and social identities, as occurs with historical political myths, in which political myths are fused with historical narratives⁴. This is the case of European integration as a political myth⁵. As formulated by Margaret Somers, the myths that make up the stories always have a similar structure. Their objective is to mark a series of regulatory ideas to govern society, as well as to establish a series of unrealized ideals to generate a project and a political trajectory on the horizon. The objective of the story is, mainly, to generate legitimacy, collective identity and adherence to a specific project⁶.

A narrative always has, according to Somers, a scatological moral dimension articulated in three times: past, present and future. The past establishes the starting point that sustains the moral dimension of the

2 Moreno Juste, Antonio: "El relato europeo de España: de la Transición democrática a la gran recesión", *Ayer*, 117/1 (2020), pp. 21-45; Moreno Juste, Antonio, "The Crisis of the Integration Process and its Impact on the European Narrative", in Levi, Guido y Preda, Daniela (eds.), *Euroscepticisms. Resistance and Opposition to the European Community/European Union*, Bologna: Società Editrice Il Mulino, 2019, pp. 75-88.

3 Cloet, Quincy, "Two Sides of Every Story (Teller): Competition, Continuity and Change in Narratives of European Integration", in *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 23, 3, 2017, pp. 291-306.

4 Bottici, Chiara, *A Philosophy of Political Myth*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 259.

5 Hansen, Lene, Williams, Michael C., "The Myths of Europe: Legitimacy, Community and the 'Crisis' of the EU", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 37, Nr. 2, 1999, pp. 233-249; della Sala, Vincent, "Political Myth, Mythology and the European Union", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 48, nr 1, 2010, pp. 1-19; Mannes Ian, "Global Europa: Mythology of the European Union in World Politics", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 48, nr 1, 2010, pp. 67-87; Jones Erik, "The Economic Mythology of European Integration", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 48, nr 1, 2010, pp. 89-109. For a wider framework see Littlejohns, Richard and Soncini, Sara (eds.), *Myths of Europe*, Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2007.

6 Somers, Margaret, "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: a Relational and Network Approach", in *Theory and Society*, 23, 3, 1994, pp. 720-741.

project, presenting a shared tragedy of suffering and disorder. The present acts as a plot knot, in which the project acts as a retaining wall against the barbarism of the past, thus legitimizing the new order of things. The future is presented as a final destination or denouement in which the ethical teleology of the project is resolved and the promise of a better tomorrow is fulfilled⁷. As a collective project, European integration has given rise to a multiplicity of narratives through which Europeans tell themselves their story and make sense of their reality.⁸ Such stories, according to the Elliot Mishler's model of narrative analysis, must have a structure (including a chronology, a plot and some characters), generate an identity (make the audience feel identified with the story), create a commitment, provoke a feeling of security (show the political project as a solution to collective problems, such as a safe place to go) and define what is 'normal' and what is not⁹.

Narratives fulfil legitimation through the mobilization of specific linguistic resources, which allows analysing their discursive dimension¹⁰. Van Leeuwen sets out a framework for analysing the language of legitimation according to four categories: *authoritation*, that is, legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom and law, and of persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested; *moral evaluation*, that is, legitimation by (often very oblique) reference to value systems; *rationalization*, that is, legitimation by reference to the goals and uses of institutionalized social action, and to the knowledge society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity; and *mythopoesis*, that is, legitimation conveyed

7 Eder, Klaus, "Europe's Borders. The Narrative Construction of the Boundaries of Europe", in *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9, 2, 2006, pp. 327-350.

8 Manners, Ian and Murray, Philomena, "The End of a Noble Narrative? European Integration Narratives after the Nobel Peace Prize", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54, 1, 2016, pp. 185-202; Eder, Klaus, "A Theory of Collective Identity: Making Sense of the Debate of a 'European Identity'", in *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 12, Nº 4, 2009, pp. 427-447; Gilbert, Mark, "Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 46, Nr. 3, 2008, pp. 641-662.

9 Mishler Elliot G., "Models of Narrative Analysis: A Typology", in *Journal of Narrative and Life History*, 5, 2, 1995, pp. 87-123.

10 Carta, Caterina, «Discursive aproches», en Bigo, Didier *et al.* (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Critical European Studies*, London: Routledge, 2021; Crespy, Amandine, «Analysing European discourses», in Lynggaard, Kennet, Manners, Ian, and Löfgren, Karl, (eds), *Research Methods in European Union Studies* (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics), London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 102-120.

through narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions¹¹.

In what way are these legitimization mechanisms visible in Felipe González's European speeches? How are the constitutive elements of his narrative configured to elaborate a certain vision of Europe? What language resources did González use to contribute to the construction of the European narrative? How were the elements of this narrative articulated based on the need to build a legitimizing and mobilizing European myth? To answer these questions we must consider not only the textuality of his speeches and their specific historical context, but also the political biography of González in the framework of the recent past of Spain and Europe.

As González became Prime Minister of Spain in 1982 he and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE, Partido Socialista Obrero Español) had lived a long process of reception and acculturation of the European integration project. The Spanish socialists participated in the liberal and progressive tradition that emerged after the so called Disaster, when Spain lost its last colonies after being defeated in the War against the United States in 1898. Spanish Europeanism at the beginning of the 20th century was synthesised by the philosopher Ortega y Gasset in the sentence "Spain is the problem, Europe the solution". Assumed by the regenerationist and democratic groups that sustained the Second Republic, Spanish Europeanism was tragically interrupted by the Civil War (1936-1939) and the dictatorship of General Franco (1939-1975). In this long stage, the entire democratic opposition –both at home and in exile- and the vast majority of Spaniards learned to identify Europe with modernity and democracy. After Franco's death, integration into the European Communities was a priority objective of Spanish foreign policy, of the Spanish society and of the entire political spectrum¹².

Unlike many Spanish socialist leaders after 1939, González himself had not lived the exile, but he and the young socialists that ruled the PSOE from 1974 inherited from the older generation in exile Europeanism as one of the hallmarks of the political culture of Spanish democrats¹³. In

11 Van Leeuwen, Theo, « Legitimation in discourse and communication », in *Discourse & Communication*, vol. 1(1), 2007, pp. 91-112.

12 Martín de la Guardia, R., *El europeísmo. Un reto permanente para España*, Madrid: Cátedra, 2015.

13 For Felipe González's biography see Ortega Ruiz, Manuela, *Felipe González. La ambición que cambió España*, Madrid: Tecnos, 2015; for the historical background

this context, a 37-year-old González led as secretary general the PSOE to abandon Marxism in 1979 and to adopt the European model of social democracy, which also reconciled the party with the idea of the continent's economic integration within the context of the Common Market¹⁴. Over time, Europe occupied an increasingly important place in his political action and in his speeches. Pragmatic and little given to theorizing, González gradually became a pedagogue of the idea of Europe among the Spaniards, and a convinced believer in the integration project before European audiences: an inspiring and compelling Europeanist, a very pedagogical and thoughtful speaker, owner of a highly efficient oratory style supported by his personal charisma.

Throughout his almost 14 years as president of the government, González had the collaboration of various writers of speeches in the Cabinet of the Presidency of the Government, such as José Enrique Serano, Julio Feo or Enrique Guerrero¹⁵. The documents available to the researcher often do not allow us to discern how much there is of González's personal pen and how much of the contribution of his collaborators in the speeches he delivered. González in any case conscientiously prepared his public interventions, especially the most important ones, so the final form of his European speeches can be considered a faithful reflection of the articulation of his thought in form and substance. A glance at the numerous Notebooks handwritten by Felipe González throughout his political career is enough to verify that Europe and European integration were a constant object of reflection for him beyond their expression in public addresses¹⁶.

see Juliá, Santos, *Los socialistas en la historia de España 1879-1982*, Madrid: Taurus, 1997.

14 Andrade Blanco, Juan, *El PCE y el PSOE en (la) Transición. La evolución ideológica de la izquierda durante el proceso de cambio político*, Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2012.

15 José Luis Barbería, "¿Quiénes escriben los discursos de los políticos?", *El País Semanal*, 29 de febrero de 2017, https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/02/26/eps/1488063927_148806.html, accessed 20 January 2021.

16 The Felipe González Foundation holds the collection of "Manuscripts of the ex-president (1978-1993)" that includes the Notebooks of González's. They can be consulted online at <https://archivo.fundacionfelipegonzalez.org/es/consulta/registro.do?id=81625>, accessed 20 January 2021.

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1984

On the 31 of January 1984 González delivered his first major speech on a European stage¹⁷. That day he talked for about an hour before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Invited by the most important institution of Europeanism, in a city that symbolized the ideal of European unity, González chose to link the ideas of Spain, Europe, freedom and democracy in his speech. The global context was marked by the resurgence of the Cold War; the European context was dominated by the forthcoming launch of the Single European Act; while the Spanish context in relation to Europe was marked by the negotiations to enter the European Communities, initiated by the center-right President Adolfo Suárez (1976-1981) and continued by his successor at the head of the Unión de Centro Democrático, President Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo (1981-1982), who in 1982 handed over power to González after a landslide electoral victory of the PSOE. Under the three Presidents Europe was the priority of Spanish foreign policy, the essential anchor to consolidate democracy, modernize the economy and redefine Spain's international role.

González chose to be the spokesperson for a collective ethos by explaining his vision of European integration not from a personal point of view, but from the point of view of the 'young Spanish democracy' that had joined the Council of Europe in 1977. Mobilizing legitimation strategies based on his moral authority as a democratic leader, he linked his personal memory as leader of the PSOE with the history of Spanish Europeanism. He evoked the "emotion" he felt on October 11, 1977 when he spoke from the same rostrum in the company of other democratically elected representatives of the Spanish people, to endorse Spain's application for admission to the Council of Europe. He also praised the "generosity" and "wisdom" of the Parliamentary Assembly in trusting Spain and recommending its admission, resorting to expressions loaded with a strong emotional and moral meaning. Additionally, he placed the Council of Europe on a high level of moral authority by stating: "You are the collective conscience of the peoples of Europe. The Spaniards know well the value of this voice of conscience for people who long for freedom".

17 "Discours de Felipe González devant l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe. Strasbourg, 31 janvier 1984. <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-XML2HTML-FR.asp?SpeechID=76>, accessed 20 January 2021.

If the Council of Europe set the standard of European normality, the participation of Spain in the organization reinforced a shared democratic and European identity. Spaniards, González affirmed, had not ceased to “believe” in the construction of Europe and in the role of the Council of Europe in this task, and were sometimes more “confident in the fate of Europe” than other countries already integrated into the European institutions, he stated. These legitimizing elements of the European project, articulated in the language of faith, were completed, in González's speech, with the guarantee of the “enthusiastic participation” of the Spaniards in the “noble task” of building a “truly free and prosperous Europe”. Such an affirmation of European commitment strengthened the conviction shared between the speaker and the audience regarding the ultimate meaning and strength of the European project.

The structure of González's speech reveals four parts. In the first part, González explained the history of the relationship between Spain and the Council of Europe. In the second, he described the different areas in which the Council of Europe carried out its task of guaranteeing, defending and promoting freedom and democracy among its member countries. In the third part he referred to the role of European institutions in promoting democracy abroad, in particular the Third World and Latin America, without forgetting a reference to the “severed Europe” of the regimes of state socialism. In the very brief last part he took up the idea of Spanish support for European integration.

It is in the first and last part where González's narrative about Europe is most clearly expressed. For him, European integration was the only possible response to the loss of relevance of Europe in the world since 1945.

From the Second World War”- he said - “Europe’s position in the world has changed dramatically. While it was a center that inspired international relations, Europe has become the ground of rivalry between the two superpowers. In the decades following the Second World War, this process was completed with the progressive emancipation of the peoples of the Third World who until then had been subject to the colonial domination of several European countries.

To the past corresponded, therefore, the ‘Eurocentrism’ which prevailed until the first decades of the 20th century. The transition from the past to the present was marked by the decadence of Europe, a historical decline whose cause was not made explicit. It is striking that González did not mention the violence of the 1914-1945 years in his narrative on Europe. This omission was nevertheless common in the political culture of

Spanish Europeanism and is explained by the marginal position of Spain in the conflicts of the period (with the exception of the Civil War of 1936-1939)¹⁸. For the Spanish, the 'noble narrative' of the EU as a peace project is secondary to the promise of progress and democracy that the European myth represents.

The present was presided over by the pragmatic efforts of Europeans to regain autonomy and relevance in international affairs through cooperation:

Europeans must adjust their behaviour to this real revolution in international relations", he asserted. "This is the deep meaning of the long march towards European integration considered as the only way to respond in an adequate way to the challenge that the new circumstances present in view of the survival of Europe as an actor of international politics. [...] In the midst of this crisis of civilization", asserted González, "Europe is struggling simply to be itself, to have a say in world affairs.

Spain, stated González, wanted to be accepted in Europe to complete its modernization. It also wanted to bring to Europe the Latin American and Mediterranean dimensions inherent in Spanish history and identity – one more indication that González, in this speech, was thinking especially about the role of Europe in international relations. The future, as far as the Council of Europe was concerned, was drawn in general terms but no less charged with meaning: "For me, the task of the Council of Europe could be summed up in one sentence: the guarantee, defense and promotion of freedom and democracy. These objectives are also those which drive the Spanish Government".

To sum up, in González's 1984 speech Europe is synonymous with 'freedom', 'democracy' and 'modernization', precisely the historical objectives of several generations of Spanish intellectuals since the 19th century, now decanted in the middle class society that was post-Franco Spain¹⁹. González presented Europe and its institutions under a triple prism: as the historical objective to which Spain aspired and which it finally seemed

18 Jover, José María, "La percepción española de los conflictos europeos: notas para un entendimiento", in *Revista de Occidente*, 57, 1986, pp. 5-42; Moreno Juste, Antonio, "Las relaciones España/Europa en el siglo XX: notas para una interpretación", in *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, 22, 2000, pp. 95-133.

19 Díez Medrano, Juan, *Framing Europe. Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003, pp. 159-178.

about to achieve; as the democratic standard that the Spanish were already complying in fact; and as a guarantee for Spanish democracy. The core of his message was an Europeanist profession of faith that could be endorsed by any representative of the political spectrum in Spain, where the idea of Europe evoked a broad social and political consensus²⁰. Like other peoples that suffered dictatorships in the second half of the 20th century, the Spanish people saw in Europe the ideal on which to build a horizon of democracy, progress and social modernity, and González's speech expressed these hopes²¹.

Palacio de Oriente, Madrid, 1985

González further developed his thoughts on Europe on 12 June 1985, when he as head of the Spanish government signed the Act of Accession of Spain to the European Communities. As Spanish President of the government he delivered a speech at the end of the signing ceremony, which was held in a festive event of the highest institutional level with a wide international media coverage²².

The setting of the ceremony was carefully arranged to underline the historical character of the act. The site chosen was the impressive Columns Hall of the Palacio de Oriente at Madrid, the historic seat of the Head of the State and the political heart of Spain for centuries. The table where the act of accession was signed and the lectern from which Felipe González

20 Díaz Medrano, Juan, "La opinión pública española y la integración europea (1986-2006)", in Morata, Francesco and Mateo, Gemma (eds), *España en Europa. Europa en España (1986-2006)*, Barcelona: Fundació CIDOB, 2006, pp. 206-232; Sánchez Cuenca, Ignacio and Barreiro, Belén, "La europeización de la opinión pública española", in Closa, Carlos (ed.), *La europeización del sistema político español*, Madrid: Istmo, 2001, pp. 29-51.

21 Moreno Juste, Antonio: "Sueño, aventura y realidad del proceso de integración europea", in *Rúbrica Contemporánea*, 3, 6, 2014, pp. 129-146.

22 "Discurso del Presidente del Gobierno en la ceremonia de la firma del Tratado de Adhesión a las Comunidades Europeas, Madrid, 12 de junio de 1985". <https://www.europa.clío-online.de/quelle/id/q63-28249> On this speech see Joaquín Abellán, "Der Beitritt Spaniens zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft in den 1980er Jahren, oder: Warum die Spanier für Europa votierten", in Rüdiger Hohls, Iris Schröder, Hannes Siegfried (eds.), *Europa und die Europäer. Quellen und Essays zur modernen europäischen Geschichte*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005, pp. 349-354, <https://www.europa.clío-online.de/essay/id/fdae-1308>

and the rest of the speakers spoke were located under the flags of the 12 EEC member countries. In the centre and elevated, dominating the scene, was a life-size sculpture of Emperor Charles V, a work by Leone Leoni created between 1551 and 1555 that represented allegorically the victories of the emperor who one day dominated over a good part of the countries and territories that now made up the united Europe.

King Juan Carlos I presided over the ceremony, he himself a living symbol of continuity with the country's Bourbon dynastic legacy and the living embodiment of the democratic Monarchy that had led the return of Spain to Europe. Among the European representations attending the event were the Heads of Government of Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, as well as the French Prime Minister. United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Greece sent their respective Foreign Ministers to the ceremony, while Luxembourg was represented by its Vice President of Government.

González delivered the last speech of the ceremony after the addresses by King Juan Carlos, Bettino Craxi, Giulio Andreotti and Jacques Delors²³. It was a celebratory speech with a high symbolic meaning. Felipe González resorted to numerous rhetorical elements to emphasize the significance of the moment: "Today we are taking a step of *historical importance* for Spain and for Europe", by putting "a *fundamental milestone* to complete the unity of our old continent and also to *overcome the secular isolation* of Spain"²⁴.

The return to Spain to Europe was the leading thread of his narrative. After being excluded from the European community, Spain reunited with its natural family and thus found the meaning of its historical being: "For Spain", he stated, "this fact means the *culmination of a process of overcoming our secular isolation and participation in a common destiny* with the rest of the Western European countries". With the entry into the EEC, it was "a whole nation that *recovers the full meaning of its history*"²⁵. In this way, Spain combined "its evidence of 'being' Europe with the present reality of 'being' in the European institutions", thus getting to be Europe and to be in Europe.

González's speech again ordered the temporal continuum in three historical times (past, present and future). The past was marked by the mile-

23 The Italian Prime Minister Craxi spoke as and President of the European Council, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti as President of the Council of Ministers of the EEC during the semester, and Delors as President of the European Commission.

24 Our emphasis.

25 Our emphasis.

stones of European construction, which González evoked by referring to the 1948 Hague Congress, the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the IV Congress of the European Movement in 1962. A few exiled Spanish democrats, he recalled, had participated in the 1948 and 1962 meetings, but Spain as a whole had been absent from European construction²⁶.

The act of signing of adhesion that was being celebrated at that precise moment marked the transition from the past to the present. Spaniards, he affirmed, “were late joining a process already underway”, but through participation “in Europe” they had the objective of facing “the challenge of modernization” and consolidating their democracy. For Spanish citizens, González pointed out, summarizing a secular aspiration of the country, “the integration of Spain in Europe has been identified with participation in the ideals of freedom, progress and democracy”.

The future, to which González dedicated the second part of his speech - marked by a recurrent use of this verb tense - was presided, from the angle of Spain, by the determined will of Spain to contribute to the European ideal with the countries of the leading group. In his commitment to “participation in a common destiny with the rest of the countries of Western Europe”, González evoked a federalism never explicitly mentioned, but present through facts and formulas such as the “determined will to advance with those who they want to advance and as far as they want to advance”.

This speech is paradigmatic in several respects. First, Europe and the European Communities were always used as synonyms in González’s rhetoric, hiding the debate on alternative models for European integration and different views on Europe. “A future of unity is the only possible future for Europe”, he asserted, but he did not explain why or what kind of unity he was talking about. Second, the participation of Spain in Europe brought the promise of solving a series of historical problems: the consolidation of democracy, the modernisation of the country, and the break from Franco’s isolation, thus allowing the Spanish return to the international community. Third, his speech he stressed the inner Spanish consensus about joining the European institutions; Europe had become in Spain a symbolic element, a meta-political reference that everyone could fill in whatever meaning they wanted. Spain was the first country to join

26 See on this topic Satrústegui, Jorgina (coord.) *Cuando la transición se hizo posible. El “contubernio de Múnich”*, Madrid: Tecnos, 1993; Moreno Juste, Antonio, *Frankismo y construcción europea (1951-1962). Anhelos, necesidad y realidad de la aproximación a Europa*, Madrid: Tecnos, 1998; Amat, Jordi, *La primavera de Múnich. Esperanza y fracaso de una transición democrática*, Barcelona: Planeta, 2016.

the EEC with the unanimous support of all parliamentary forces, showing that the culture of consensus defined in the transition to democracy found its peak in European politics²⁷. In his narrative, European integration took on meaning as a counterpoint to the modern history of Spain and as a collective horizon of the new democratic Spain.

Parenthesis: Congress of Deputies, Madrid, 1982-1996

From January 1, 1986, when Spain's entry into the European Communities became effective, participation in the European integration became the main axis of Spain's politics and the key to the modernization and consolidation of democracy in the country²⁸. Spain had passed into the phase of consolidation of democracy and was facing the challenge of its modernization and normality²⁹. Spain projected the image of a "country of success" full of "Euro-enthusiasm", and both traits were intimately linked to the positive and self-indulgent narrative of the Transition to democracy that became mainstream in these years³⁰. To sum up, González linked "being in Europe" with the deepening of democracy in Spain as postulated by liberal socialism.

González presented modernisation and Europeanisation as the only possible options for the country also because both ideas served to legitimise and justify domestically some painful economic reforms, such as inflation control, tax discipline, industrial reconversion, and structural socio-economic measures³¹. On the other hand, the consequences that European inte-

27 López Gómez, Carlos. "El europeísmo en España. La sociedad civil ante el proceso de construcción europea", in *Circunstancia. Revista de Ciencias Sociales del Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset*, 25 2011, pp. 16-26.

28 Moreno Juste, Antonio, "España en la Europa comunitaria: europeísmo y praxis política. Cambio y continuidad en la política europea de España (1986-2004)", in Forner, Salvador, Senante, Heidy Cristina (eds.), *Miradas a Europa. Percepciones y relatos desde España*, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2020, pp. 223-243.

29 Fusi, Juan Pablo, and Palafox, Jordi, *España (1808-1996): el desafío de la modernidad*, Barcelona: Espasa.

30 See for instance Tusell Gómez, Javier and Soto Carmona, Álvaro (eds.), *Historia de la transición 1975-1986*, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1996; Guerra, Alfonso and Tezanos, José Félix (eds.), *La década del cambio. Diez años de Gobierno socialista, 1982-1992*, Madrid, Sistema, 1992.

31 Soto Carmona, Álvaro and Mateos López, Abdón (eds.), *Historia de la época socialista. España: 1982-1996*, Madrid: Sílex, 2013; Marín Arce, José María, "Los

gration could have on national identity and politics, and specifically the erosion of the national sovereignty, which was widely discussed in other European countries in those years, were carefully avoided in González's interventions and in the Spanish public debate³².

In these years, the ideas expressed by González about Europe did not go beyond generic affirmations of Europeanism and support for the integration of Spain into a "Europe of men and of peoples". Over time, the narrative of González on Europe started to stress the topic of "social cohesion" and of "solidarity" as a tool to counteract the North-South economic divide within Europe. In overall, 'Europe' as a topic and as a framework gained more and more weight in the speeches of Felipe González also in the domestic arena. When he was elected president of the government in 1982, in his inauguration speech in the Congress of Deputies, he only mentioned the terms "Europe" or "European" three times. Nevertheless, in his inaugural speech of 1986 he mentioned "Europe" or "European" 53 times; in 1989 it was 25 times and in 1993 it was 36 times (to compare, in the same years he uttered the words "Spain" or "Spanish" 43, 40, 20 and 30 times). From 1986 on European politics came to occupy about a third of his inauguration speeches and, generally, the topic was touched upon at the beginning, which clearly indicated that Europe had become the framework of possibility for any government action³³.

All the important issues on the Spanish political agenda now passed through the European Communities, which had become the axis of the Spanish socialist programme. So González did not miss the opportunity to educate people thereon while portraying himself not only as an active Europeanist, but as a respected leader of European stature at the forefront of the integration process. With his support for German reunification in 1989-1990 and for the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, González rose to the rank of a European leader on the back of a pragmatic rearrangement of

socialistas en el poder (1982-1996)", *Historia y Política*, núm. 20, julio-diciembre, 2008, pp. 43-71.

32 Amat, Jordi, "El proyecto del felipismo contado por él mismo", *Papeles*, 3, 2020, https://archivo.fundacionfelipegonzalez.org/es/catalogo_imagenes/grupo.do?path=1063711.

33 The four investiture speeches can be found at https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/presidentes/investiduras/Paginas/30111982_InvestGonzalez.aspx (1982); https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/presidentes/investiduras/Paginas/22071986_InvestGonzalez.aspx (1986); https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/presidentes/investiduras/Paginas/04121989_InvestGonzalez.aspx (1989) and https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/presidentes/investiduras/Paginas/08071993_InvestGonzalez.aspx (1993).

Spain into a rapidly transforming European family³⁴. Between the rotating Spanish Presidencies of the European Council of 1989 and 1995, Felipe González shone in Europe at the head of a new generation of Spanish politicians such as Javier Solana, Manuel Marín, Carlos Westendorp, Enrique Barón and José María Gil Robles, who held prominent positions in the European institutions³⁵.

The European project continued to enjoy wide support among Spanish society, which related the EEC to the international achievements of democratic Spain in the context of the end of the Cold War³⁶. In 1991 Spanish soldiers participated for the first time in a United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Gulf War, in 1992 the Spanish parliament ratified the Maastricht Treaty, and that same year a modern and self-confident Spain showed itself to the world with a concentration of mega-events which included the Olympic Games in Barcelona, the Universal Exposition in Seville, the European Capital of Culture in Madrid and the celebrations of the Fifth Centennial of the Discovery of America³⁷. Spanish public opinion perceived the integration of Spain into 'Europe' through the lens of 'national pride' and the will to 'put Spain in its place' – it is, as a way to overcome the collective inferiority complex inherited from Franco's regime³⁸. The advances in European integration on the other hand compensated for the progressive erosion of the socialist project, the exhaustion of the reformist impulse of the government, the break with the unions in 1988, the economic crisis of 1992, the accusations of State terrorism in the fight against the Basque terrorist gang ETA and the numerous corruption scandals involving the government.

34 Pardo Sanz, Rosa, "La política exterior de los gobiernos de Felipe González: ¿un nuevo papel para España en el escenario internacional?", in *Ayer*, 84/2011 (4): 73-97.

35 Barbé, Esther, *La política europea de España*, Barcelona: Ariel, 1999.

36 This European consensus had been cracked, however, before the Maastricht Treaty, rejected by the coalition Izquierda Unida-Iniciativa per Catalunya, which represented 9.07% of the electorate to the left of the PSOE and had 17 of the 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies.

37 Canal, Jordi, *25 de julio de 1992. La vuelta al mundo de España*. Madrid: Taurus, 2021; Sanz López, Julio, *1992: el año de España en el mundo. Diplomacia pública y proyección iberoamericana*, Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2020 (PhD Thesis).

38 Villar, Francisco, *La transición exterior de España. Del aislamiento a la influencia (1976-1996)*, Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2016.

Aachen City Council, 1993

González's conceptions about Europe and Spain crystallized even more clearly in these years in a historical narrative of backwardness and modernity, of estrangement and reunion. These topics articulated the speech he delivered at the solemn award ceremony of the Charlemagne Prize in Aachen on May 20, 1993, in the Coronation Room of the Aachen City Council. González delivered his speech before an audience of European personalities, after the interventions of the mayor of the city and the eulogy by the former Austrian Social Democratic Chancellor Franz Vranitzky³⁹.

The context of the award ceremony was marked by the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in some European countries like France and Denmark, the economic recession of 1992-1993 and the failure of the EU in the war in Yugoslavia. It is not surprising that in his speech, González linked his personal gratitude and the celebratory aspect of the ceremony with a re-legitimation of a European project now at low ebb. The task of the last few years was, as he said, "organising society after the Cold War and structuring the continent when there were no longer any blocs or threats -a time when, for that very reason, some did not feel the need for the Union". His speech contained a call for reinforced commitment to the European project and an affirmation of confidence in the assurance of eventual success.

In the rhetoric of this speech by González the juxtaposition of elements to reinforce his argumentation stands out, and especially the anaphora or reiteration. Given that this figure is used to expressively reinforce some elements of the discourse, it is interesting to see that González uses it in three specific contexts. First, to refer to the "renewed impulse" that, in his vision, the European project needed, "A *new impulse* that allows [...]"; "A *new impulse* that deepens [...]"; "A *new impulse* in radical development [...]". Second, that of the references to the need for agreement around "A *great pact* so that the whole process is at the service of man [...]"; "A *great pact* to push progress [...]"; "A *great pact* of internal and external solidarity [...]". And third, to build the identity of the "hero" of the story he was about to tell about the reunion of Spain and Europe, a collective hero that he defined in generational terms: "This recognition legitimately belongs to

39 "Discurso del Presidente del Gobierno al recibir el Premio Carlomagno, Aquisgrán, 20 de mayo de 1993". AFGG FFG0006383. <https://archivo.fundacionfelipegonzalez.org/es/consulta/registro.do?id=85316>, accessed 20 January 2021.

a *whole generation of Spaniards. A generation without exclusions [...]*”; “A *generation* that has been able to close a long cycle of imposed singularity”; “*This generation*, to which I belong, took on the exciting challenge of concluding that page of our history”; “A *generation* that acceded to politics [...] in response to an ethical imperative in the face of the absence of freedom”; “A *generation* that [...] had learned from recent experiences in their environment, and renounced, out of generosity, some of their most radical approaches”⁴⁰.

In the terms proposed by Mishles, all narrative needs a chronology, a script and some characters. The Charlemagne Prize, created in 1949 to reward commitment to European unification, placed González in the pantheon of ‘heroes’ of European integration. However, González chose in his speech to dilute his personality in that of the collective subject (Spain) whom he represented as President of the Government, thus using his speech to affirm the collective European identity of the Spanish. “[...] I understand”, he asserted, “that you have wanted to honor my country more than my person”. The prize was not awarded to him, he affirmed, but to the “European Spain, the happy reunion of Spain with its European environment”. Throughout his speech González alternated the position from which he spoke: from the “I” of his personal experience, to the restricted “we” (the Spanish), to an expanded “we” (the Europeans). In this way he acted as spokesperson of the broad Europeanist consensus expressed by Spanish society, and of the hopes of integration of European society. At the same time, he reinforced the bonds of common identity between himself and his listeners.

González's speech can be divided into two parts. The first part focused on the relationship between Spain and Europe. The second part was dedicated to exposing his conception of European integration. The first part adapts perfectly in its structure to the three times (present, past and future) of the myths, according to Somers' proposal. González exposed the Spain-Europe relationship as a historical drama in three acts. In the first act, Spain followed a European trajectory marked by ‘integration’ and ‘religious and cultural coexistence’. González did not need to be more explicit for his audience to understand this positive reference to medieval Spain – where Christianity, Islam and Judaism coexisted- and to the Renaissance when Erasmian thought and Humanism conveyed the dense imbrication of Spain in the European cultural currents. In the second act, beginning “back in the 16th century”, a new era of “exclusion and not belonging”

40 Our emphasis.

to Europe began for Spain, an implicit allusion to the cultural closure of Spain under the King Philip II and in times of Counter-Reformation which allegedly isolated the country from modernity, science and progress. “The clock had stopped and history was interrupted” for Spaniards, he said, despite attempts by reformists, Erasmians, the enlightened, and Regenerationists to reintegrate Spain into European currents or, as he said, to “Europeanise Spain”⁴¹. This period, González affirmed, culminated in the “curse” of Civil War, the dictatorship of General Franco, and exile. In a third, final stage, Gonzalez depicted a present of “a definitive re-encounter with institutional normality”, a time of a return to Europe with the participation of a democratic Spain in the “European project of stability and progress”-in short, the birth of “a developed Spain in a united Europe”.

From a narrative point of view, we can recognize very clearly in this account the classic pattern of the Golden Age, the fall into Dark Times, and a new Golden Age that lays ahead. In the case of Spain, the Civil War was the sustenance of the past, marked by barbarism, on which the moral and eschatological dimension of Spain's European project was built. What this speech celebrated was the return of Spain to Europe, anticipated in some milestones of Spanish Europeanism – the participation of some Spanish democrats in the Congress of The Hague 1948 and in the IV Congress of the European Movement in Munich 1962. Now it was all Spain that had the realization of this utopian future at hand: Spain had returned to Europe - which Gorbachev had called ‘the Common European Home’ -, recovering its denied European identity and restoring the heartbreaking loss of the son absent. González did not allude to the USSR and Eastern Europe, but his narrative on Spain fitted the European ‘narrative of return’ that reached its zenith in 1989 with the reunion of the countries that met again with (Western) Europe and returned to democracy and freedom after the fall of the Berlin wall⁴². González participated in the spirit of the times by incorporating into his European storytelling a narrative about reunion and belonging in a context of enlargement of the EU⁴³.

41 Erasmism, flourishing in Spain in the first decades of the 16th century, went into decline in the 1530s, persecuted by conservatives in alliance with the Inquisition. With Felipe II came the Catholic rearmament of the Hispanic monarchy and the prohibition of studying in foreign universities. The regenerationists were reformists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries who sought the total regeneration of Spain by reforming social, political, and economic structures according to models borrowed from Western and Central Europe.

42 Cloet, p. 15.

43 Manners and Murray, p. 190.

In the second part of his speech, González recapitulated the vision of European integration that he had forged throughout his career and political practice. In his assessment, “the last 45 years of Western Europe have been an example of democratic tolerance within the most absolute respect for diversity”. ‘Democracy’, ‘coexistence’, the prevalence of the “spirit of integration over that of rivalry” were the guiding values of a united Europe. González started this story of integration with the Treaties of Paris (1951) and Rome (1957), which

[...] wanted to order the European coexistence of the society that emerged after World War II. The will for physical and moral reconstruction, for the ordering of consciences and economies, fostered a political framework called to overcome the inertia of History. Everyone understood it that way.

Repeating formulas to which he often resorted, González invoked the “dynamic and progressive integration” of the continent as a means for “the spirit of integration to prevail over that of rivalry”, specifically “in the face of the ever-present risk of disintegrating nationalisms” such as those that were shaking the former Yugoslavia. Implicitly alluding to fascisms and the Second World War, González expressed his hope that “the European construction is the work of all, without exclusions” so that “the return to exclusive nationalism and xenophobic attitudes or racial discrimination is impossible”. Following Mishler's model, we can see how his speech created a commitment that linked his audience with the non-repetition of past mistakes, and at the same time raised a promise of security, by showing the European political project as the solution to collective problems of the continent. In the 1990s, EU integration promised to resolve all contradictions and reconcile all antagonisms, as state and sub-state nationalisms were expected to dissolve into a supranational European identity. González explained in this context his personal contribution, the idea of “citizenship of the Union”, which he saw as “the common thread that will allow us to consolidate this work”. In fact, it is interesting to note that in Felipe González's speeches any allusion to the defense of the national interest is attenuated and subsumed in the implicit idea that the best way to defend it is through the general European interest, in a formulation of implicit federalism which results in the parallel discrediting of any kind of nationalism. In the case of Spain, this hope was linked to the perspective

that the aspirations of the Catalan and Basque nationalists could be diluted in a Europe of the Regions⁴⁴.

González's narrative was very explicit when it came to defining what is "normal" and what is not, if we stick again to the model proposed by Mishler. In his vision, shared by Spanish society, being "normal" was being "European" and being European meant participating in the European construction –the only really existing utopia for the Old Continent. As so often in González's speeches, the Spanish president reaffirmed his conviction that "the only answer to Europe's problems was more Europe" - a Europe that had to recover "the values of the Enlightenment", that is, "the defense of reason and the inherent values of the person". González celebrated that Spanish society was finally very similar to the rest of European societies: "it feels the same concerns and have similar expectations". Likewise, he expressed his ambition that Spain "be one more, a country like those around it", thanks to its "irreversible" link in "a European project of stability and progress". The collective objective of the country was to erase the stigma of Spain's past - its division, isolation, trauma and failure- and to leave behind the idea of Spain as an anomaly in the European context – a hindrance that the Franco dictatorship tried to reinterpret in a favourable light with the tourist slogan "Spain is different!"⁴⁵ "We don't want any more absences", González said: "We are now actively participating in the design of the shared European future". The future that was becoming a reality was the overcoming of a negative Spanish exceptionalism and the solution of all the historical problems of the country by giving "a common European answer to the questions that had always been entrenched as dilemmas among the Spaniards". A "developed Spain in a united Europe" was the utopic horizon of this collective epic in which the country "would be, once and for all, an advanced, stable, modern, and European society":

I am moved by the will to make Spain a solid piece of European construction. What I want is for the level of interdependence and progress to be so important that we never again experience the internal confrontations, the emigration fleeing from misery or exile as a result of intransigence or fanaticism.

44 Morata Tierra, Francesc, "La europeización del Estado autonómico", in Morata Tierra, Francesc and Mateo González, Gemma (eds), *España en Europa, Europa en España (1986-2006)*, Barcelona: CIDOB, 2007, pp. 149-178.

45 Santos Juliá, "Anomalía, fracaso y dolor de España", in *Claves de razón práctica*, 66, 1966, pp. 10-21.

European Parliament, Strasbourg, 1995

The Spanish presidency of the EU Council in the second semester of 1995 allowed González to refine his narrative on Europe two years after receiving the Charlemagne Prize. At the Debate on the State of the Union, González delivered a speech as rotatory President of the Council of the EU before the European Parliament in Strasbourg on November 15, 1995. In his speech González took stock of the achievements of the Spanish Presidency and presented the priorities for the immediate future, seizing the opportunity to intervene in the political debate on integration European and to try to shape its future, like his predecessors in the rotating presidency had done before him⁴⁶.

The context had not improved since his 1993 speech. The EU had enlarged to 15 members but uncertainty persisted in the post Maastricht scenario and Euroscepticism was increasing in European societies. Years of war in the former Yugoslavia, US intervention, and the negotiation of the Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina that was taking place at that precise in Dayton (Ohio, US) moment without EU participation expressed the failure of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. In this scenario, González reiterated his pro-European creed and raised his vision for the future for the Union. The first part of his speech concentrated the most ideological message, while the second and third parts had a more technical nature and were dedicated to reviewing the achievements of the Spanish presidency and establishing a calendar of the next steps and planned milestones of European integration⁴⁷.

Although the purpose of his speech was persuasive and legitimizing, from a rhetorical point of view it was marked by the sobriety and reflective tone characteristic of González. In his speech, González established a diagnosis of the situation in which the EU found itself and reestablished the validity of a united Europe as a utopian horizon. The EU's difficulties, he said, stemmed from Europe's need to adapt to the "moment of historical change in Europe and in the world". This change was based, first, on

46 "Discurso del Presidente del Gobierno, don Felipe González, ante el Pleno del Parlamento Europeo en el Debate sobre el Estado de la Unión. Estrasburgo, 15 de noviembre de 1995". <http://repositori.uji.es/xmlui/handle/10234/104594>

47 These milestones included the future Intergovernmental Conference, the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, the third phase of the Economic and Monetary Union, the adoption of the financial perspectives from 1999, and the decision-making on security that imposed the expiration in 1998 of the Brussels Treaty on WEU.

“the challenges derived from its own success”, an implicit reference to the foreseeable enlargement of the EU to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, to the Baltic states, and to Malta and Cyprus; second, on the end of the Cold War; and third, on globalization. Since these last two factors represented a global challenge for everyone, not just Europeans, and the first was a consequence of the attractiveness of the European project, the audience could conclude that there was no reason for pessimism. And indeed, the brief narrative mobilized by González on this occasion was aimed at restoring security and confidence in the European project, and renewing the commitment to building the EU.

Returning to a recurring formula in his public interventions, González invoked the idea of “more Europe” as the only solution to the problems of the present. As he stated: “Precisely during a period of skepticism and uncertainties, the only answer to Europe's problems continues to be, as I said years ago, more Europe”, an idea that he emphasized by adding: “Integration is not the cause of the problems [...] but the framework through which to channel the solutions”. Regarding the question of “which Europe” should be built and how it should be reached, González resorted to his well-known formula:

Dynamic, solidary and progressive integration, which is at the very essence of the European construction model, is the most appropriate response to organize our continent in the period after the Cold War and to preserve wellbeing and stability for the future.

It was a matter of avoiding paralysis or regression, and -one might assume- of deepening the federalist principle in the face of the intergovernmental trend which could be reinforced with the enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries: “A greater Europe also requires more Europe. It is necessary to expand to empower, not to weaken”. Europe was invoked again as a way and goal, without entering the debate between the contending models of integration or proposing alternatives to the European utopian horizon.

*Monastery of San Jerónimo of Yuste, 2000*⁴⁸

Five years after his speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, González had the opportunity to reformulate his narrative on Europe more extensively in the speech he delivered on 9 October 2000 when receiving the Carlos V European Prize granted by the Spanish Foundation Academia Europea de Yuste⁴⁹. The award ceremony took place in the Royal Monastery of Yuste, in Cuacos de Yuste (Extremadura, Spain), the place where Emperor Carlos V, born exactly 500 years before, retired in 1556 when he renounced his dominions and imperial dignity and where he died two years later.

González had also retired from public affairs and evoked this circumstance in his reception speech to ironically compare himself, at 58 years of age, with Carlos V who had retired to Yuste, he said, at 54 - although unlike the Emperor, he affirmed, he did not feel tired or ill. He had lost the government in the legislative elections of 1996 and one year later he stepped down as a Secretary of the Spanish Socialists Workers' Party. But he had never fully withdrawn from European affairs, for he took public position on different occasions on the major issues of European integration. A figure of great moral authority in Europe, he called on numerous occasions for radical reforms to prevent the continent's loss of status in the world and the deterioration of its social model. González has also expressed concern about the loss of momentum of European integration due to the rise of Euroscepticism and the threat of Eurosclerosis⁵⁰.

That October 9, González delivered a speech of acceptance and gratitude speaking in a personal capacity. He offered his personal vision of Europe, its history, its present and its future, a Europe that identified with his autobiography. Having left behind the responsibilities of power, he spoke with the greatest freedom. Some elements of González's language

48 Discurso de Felipe González Márquez en la entrega del "Premio Europeo Carlos V" de la Academia Europea de Yuste. Yuste (Cáceres, Spain), 9 de octubre de 2000. <https://www.fundacionyuste.org/project/remiado-2/>

49 This award is granted annually "to individuals, organizations, projects or initiatives that have contributed to the general knowledge or enhancement of the cultural and historical values of Europe or to the integration process of the European Union". <https://www.fundacionyuste.org/>

50 González, Felipe and Cebrián, Juan Luis, *El futuro no es lo que era. Una conversación*, Madrid: Aguilar, 2002; González, Felipe, *Memorias del futuro*, Madrid: El País Aguilar, 2003; González, Felipe, *Mi idea de Europa*, Barcelona: RBA, 2010; González, Felipe, *En busca de respuestas. El liderazgo en tiempos de crisis*, Barcelona: Debate, 2013.

on this occasion are very close to colloquial speech. Flashes of seemingly improvised wit appear even here and there, as when he expressed his modesty in exposing his ideas in public, stating that whenever he expressed them, “I screw it up, as everyone knows”. González is perceived to be comfortable and loose in a friendly environment, even if the audience was impressive, comprising King Juan Carlos I and Doña Sofía, the former Portuguese president Mario Soares -who delivered the laudatio to González-, the president of the Extremadura region and other Spanish and European personalities. Following protocol conventions, González addressed the King and the Queen directly in his speech, and sometimes only the King, as the highest-ranking person who presided over the ceremony, although the direct recipient of his speech was the entire audience present and the indirect recipient purportedly a wider, European audience⁵¹.

In the structure of the discourse, two parts can be distinguished: a first in which González related the Europe of Carlos V with the present of European integration; and a second in which he focused on current challenges and on the immediate future of the EU. The division between both parties, however, is fluid, since throughout his speech González slipped references to the 16th century that he put in relation to current situations, turning the past into the moral instance that illuminates the present and engenders the future. In his coming and going through European history, the former president stopped at two scenarios of the past: the Europe of Charles V, and the Italy of the Renaissance. González evoked various facets of the figure of the Holy Roman Emperor and his conflict over the “leadership of the European Union”, attributing to him “joint concerns, European concerns”. These concerns had led him to face various challenges, and especially the taking of Belgrade by Suleiman the Magnificent in 1521, the same year he was crowned emperor to, a few years later, stop the Turkish advance at the gates of Vienna. As for the Italy of the Renaissance, he asserted, it had been “the source of creativity” and at the same time “of great political weakness” due to its disunity – an evocation aimed at awakening in the audience the reflection on the implicit parallel with the EU of the moment.

Through both scenarios, González drew a historical lesson for Europe, making his speech the vehicle for a moral tale. Five centuries ago in Europe, he said, “there was a clear demonstration that a mission, a will

51 “Discurso de Felipe González Márquez en la entrega del ‘Premio Europeo Carlos V’ de la Academia Europea de Yuste”. Yuste (Cáceres, Spain), 9 de octubre de 2000. <https://www.fundacionyuste.org/project/remiado-2/>

and a tenacity were capable of overcoming obstacles". In sharp contrast, the European Union, with all the scientific advances, "with the technological revolution, with the Internet, with the knowledge in real time of everything that happens", was unable to overcome the challenges before it. Carlos V - González recalled -, with less means than the United States currently had, had responded five centuries ago to a crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In contrast, the current European Union had failed for lack of "audacity", of "illusion of thinking" in an answer in "a neighbouring country". It was the United States that, instead, had given an answer to the European crisis, he lamented. He didn't mention it specifically, but it's easy to assume that both he and his audience had in mind the US-led NATO bombing of Yugoslavia during the 1999 Kosovo War. González, on the other hand, found a second lesson to be drawn from the more recent history of Europe: the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia was an obvious example of "the agony of a people absolutely deceived by an exclusive nationalism". This "exclusive nationalism" was for him the antithesis of Europe and the cause that justified European integration.

If this diagnosis seemed disbelieving or pessimistic, González corrected this impression in his final profession of faith in the future of Europe and of Spain in an integrated Europe. At the same time that he warned against the risks of a retreat towards intergovernmentalism, a theme that since then permanently incorporated into his reflection on European integration:

Sire, at this point in my life, now old but not sick, and therefore not wanting to retire to Yuste, from this situation of retirement, of 'joy',⁵² I want to say to you, Sire, and I do not resign myself, I believe and I always have believed that the interest of Spain is the interest of Europe, that a Europe that deepens and expands is what is best for Spain and, what is more, I think it is what is best for Europeans. And that is why I do not give up, and I do not understand that there are intergovernmental setbacks in this evolution of Europe.

Conclusion

The European speeches of Felipe González emerge as the pedagogical articulation of a pragmatic experience of government in which sincere

⁵² The Spanish word for retirement, 'jubilación', shares a root with the word for joy, 'júbilo'.

Europeanism, social-democratic tradition, and the paradigm of modernisation in the specific variant that transpired during the Spanish transition to democracy are all combined. The narrative on Europe expressed through his speeches is better understood from the perspective of a statesman whose long experience in European politics prevail over the theoretical dimension of an intellectual reflection on the idea of Europe or what Europe is. The language in which this narrative is expressed is functional to the objective sought: clear, pedagogical, didactic, alien to metaphors and contrived tropes, and inseparable from González's own charismatic personality.

It is possible to distinguish two well differentiated phases in the European narrative of Felipe González. During the first phase, between 1982 and 1996, as he was at the head of the Spanish government, Gonzalez showed himself to the Europeanist out of conviction that he displayed a brilliant pedagogy on the meaning and benefits of European integration based on pragmatism. During the second phase, between 1996 and 2010, González articulated a more complex and intellectualised discourse on Europe. That last year González culminated the articulation of his thoughts with the presentation of the report commissioned by the European Commission on Europe on the '2020-2030 horizon', that he coordinated at the head of the Reflection Group on the Future of Europe, or the 'Wise Men (and Women) Committee'. In this report we once again find the appeal for reform -recurrent in González- impelled by historical necessity: "The European Union must re-found itself and apply radical measures to save the dream born after World War II". The succession of González's European speeches that we have examined allows us to perceive three characteristics over time: the articulation of an increasingly coherent narrative about Europe (and about the role of Spain in it), the passage of unblemished trust initial to a growing concern for the shortcomings of the European project, and the constant profession of faith in European integration as the only imaginable project for a Europe that wants to depend on itself in the globalized world.

History is the guiding thread of González's European narrative, a story that is structured in three stages and in which the past acts as a moral endorsement of the present. The impulse of European integration, for González, is in the decline of a continent that hit bottom in 1945; the driving force behind Spain's participation in Europe is the desire to turn the page on the country's tragic past. Consequently, the initially dominant narrative in González's European narrative is that of progress and democracy, extended over time to the idea of inclusion and belonging. Instead, the narrative of peace appears in his speech as a remedy against the nation-

alisms and divisions of the present, without a strong connection to the violence of the 1914-1945 period.

González mobilizes different legitimization strategies in his European discourses, including legitimization by authorization (becoming the spokesperson for the Spanish and European people), moral legitimization (invoking European values), legitimization by rationalization (the European Union as the only solution to the challenges of the present) and mythopoiesis (building a narrative in which the correct performance, i.e. European unity, is rewarded with peace and progress, and the wrong one, i.e. disunity receives the punishment of war and violence). His speeches establish a shared European identity that links Spaniards and Europeans in a renewed common project. For the rest, González rather emerges as a pragmatic politician who assimilates and puts himself at the head of a mainstream discourse on Europe. He repeatedly expressed his idea of European normality: a Europe that is increasingly encompassing, and narrower and more deeply integrated, oriented towards a federalist horizon that, however, he did not explicitly invoke.

The whole of González's narrative on Europe ultimately stems from the historical experience of Spain and the generation that made the transition to democracy between 1975 and 1978. In these years the new political class of the parliamentary monarchy assigned Europe first, and the European construction later, a metapolitical value. After accession to the European institutions in 1986, Europa was configured as the solid foundation for the development of a new identity among the Spanish. As the protagonist of this process and an outstanding European leader, González developed a dynamic and not doctrinaire pro-European narrative that occupied a growing place in its public manifestations. González's idea of Europe is formulated from the vision of Spain, a southern country that has been excluded from European integration for a long time. González's thinking about Europe is almost always a thinking about Europe as seen from Spain and about Spain's reunion with Europe after centuries of estrangement.

Europe served in González's speeches as a framework to redefine the traits of a new national project for Spain, a project firmly rooted in the European unity. Europe and European integration are therefore presented as the solution to the national problem and the way for Spain to overcome its 'exceptionality' through 'normality' and European 'homologation'. Europe offered Spain the political, moral and historical redemption that would complete the collective success of the transition and of Spain as a nation, consolidating in a broader framework the national objectives of 'peace', 'stability', 'prosperity', 'modernization' and 'democracy'.

**CHAPTER V:
CHALLENGES AND REACTIONS TO CRISES:
EUROSCEPTICISM OR EUROPEANISATION?
OPPONENTS AND SUPPORTERS FROM WITHIN
AND WITHOUT, BUT ALSO VISIONARIES
FOR THE EU IN THE 21st CENTURY**

V.1 Different Italian Speeches between Stopping and Moving on with Europe

What a Kind of Relationship? A Reading of Berlusconi's Speeches Concerning the EU

Andrea Catanzaro

“The story of Berlusconi's foreign policy can be interpreted as a theatrical plot in which he is always the main character. Other characters exist primarily to confirm the centrality and importance of the Cavaliere. On the international scene, those characters are the heads of state and governments of the great powers”¹. These words by Emidio Diodato and Federico Niglia effectively summarise three main elements useful in understanding the *ratio cognoscendi* of Silvio Berlusconi's ideas concerning the relationship between Italy and the EU. They appear to be pivotal elements of a theoretical framework that will allow us to analyse some significant sections of his speeches where he discusses this theme.

The image of the “theatrical plot”², Berlusconi's willpower to both consider and present himself as the main character on the stage, and his attempts to upstage all the other actors, whoever they are, are surely recognisable elements of his approach to foreign policy as a whole and to the EU in detail.

With a view to framing the crucial point of the relationship between Berlusconi and foreign policy better, which is pivotal in order to sound out his positions concerning the EU in depth, it seems to be useful to follow Diodato and Niglia's analysis for a moment longer. They write: “An assessment of Berlusconi's international success and failures cannot follow traditional analytic interpretations. Berlusconi is a nonconventional politician. What differentiates him from his predecessors (and partially from his successors) is the belief that Italy (and the Italians) do not require external models and constraints [...] [His] program of reform [regarding foreign

1 Emidio Diodato – Federico Niglia, *Berlusconi 'The Diplomat'. Populism & Foreign Policy in Italy*, Cham (CH): Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 53; on Berlusconi's foreign policy, see also, for example, Elisabetta Brighi, “One man alone? ‘A Long Durée’ Approach to Italy's Foreign Policy Under Berlusconi”, in *Government and Opposition*, 41, 2, 2006, pp. 278–297.

2 Emidio Diodato – Federico Niglia, *Berlusconi 'The Diplomat'. Populism & Foreign Policy in Italy*, p. 53.

policy], which changed significantly during his four governments (1994–1995, 2001–2005, 2005–2006, 2008–2011), was affected by the ‘reality’ of international relations”³.

A second element worth stressing concerns the period which Berlusconi’s political activity spans. If we move outside the boundaries of his service as President of the Italian Council of Ministers and consider his political career entirely, we can easily see that he, directly or indirectly, went through crucial steps in the EU integration process.

A third element deals with another point highlighted by Diodato and Niglia’s analysis: “For Berlusconi, however, the making of foreign policy means, first and foremost, ‘mediatization’ of international affairs [...]. ‘Mediatization’ is not just the rhetorical use of summits and international meetings to increase the [*sic*] domestic prestige. For Berlusconi each international problem was something that had to be presented and explained to the Italian people”⁴. What sounds remarkable for our analysis is this twofold dimension of foreign policy in Berlusconi’s view. It is conceived as a useful tool at both the external and, mostly, at the domestic level. However, and this is a fourth remarkable element, this second aspect remains the pivotal one. As the scholars stress: “Berlusconi never put [*sic*] into question the Italian commitment to Europe and the aspiration to have a cooperative and fruitful friendship with other European partners. Having said that, Berlusconi refused the idea that Italy had to stick to an external model for its development and forcefully rejected the interpretation of Italy as a country that required a foreign model to implement its process of domestic reforms”⁵.

3 Ibid., p. XIV.

4 Ibid., p. 55; on this topic, with a specific focus on the second Berlusconi government, cf. Elisabetta Brighi, ‘One man alone?’ “A Long Durée” Approach to Italy’s Foreign Policy Under Berlusconi, p. 281: “A textbook example of ‘two-level game’ dynamics, Berlusconi’s personalization of foreign policy has arguably served a dual function: on a domestic level, the prime minister has used international diplomacy as a way to enhance his leadership and profile as statesman, with generally flattering results in terms of image and public relations at home; on an international level, Berlusconi has often interpreted diplomacy as a legitimizing arena and highly personalized practice”.

5 Emidio Diodato – Federico Niglia, *Berlusconi ‘The Diplomat’. Populism & Foreign Policy in Italy*, p. 77; cf. also Emidio Diodato, “The peculiarities of Berlusconi’s Euro-Scepticism since the 1990s”, in Guido Levi – Daniela Preda (eds.), *Euroscepticisms. Resistance and Opposition to the European Community/European Union*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2019, p. 198: “In charge from May 1994 to January 1995, Berlusconi emphasized the country’s opportunity to pursue national interests independently from the European context. His impatience with international con-

Similarly, Paul Ginsborg highlights: “Berlusconi would like to change his country’s traditional European policy. For many years Italy has been content to be in the shadow of France and Germany, sometimes performing a valuable role of mediation, but little else”⁶.

To sum up, the refusal of external constraints, a political career spanning a crucial period in EU history, the use of foreign policy principally on the domestic stage and the rejection of any influence on domestic reforms seem to be four key elements useful in creating the theoretical framework into which to insert Berlusconi’s speeches with a view to analysing them from the perspective of highlighting his positions concerning the relationship between Italy and the EU.

That being stated, what I aim to do in what follows is to pick up on some sections of Berlusconi’s speeches, analysing them both with regard to their content and from a rhetorical perspective, with a view to highlighting some peculiar aspects of his political vision concerning the aforementioned relationship between Italy and the EU.

From an analytical perspective, what helps us to find an ideal starting point useful in framing our topics is a well determined historical event

straints was immediately clear and reflected his strong personality. In particular Berlusconi’s political rhetoric gave relevance to the ability of the Italians to affirm their own identity in the face of internationalization and global competition”; see also *ibid.*, p. 207.

- 6 Paul Ginsborg, *Silvio Berlusconi. Television, Power and Patrimony*, London – New York: Verso, 2004, p. 150; cf. also Michael E. Shin – John A. Agnew, *Berlusconi’s Italy. Mapping Contemporary Italian Politics*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008, pp. 102–103: “Although several circumstances and events would challenge Berlusconi’s leadership, issues related to a united Europe proved to be divisive on several levels (Parker 2007). Italy and Italians have long been considered champions of a united Europe, but by virtue, circumstance, and with a little help from the former president of the EU Commission and former prime minister of Italy, Romano Prodi, the European project became an issue associated with and attributed to the center-left in Italy. As such, Berlusconi and some of the components of the House of Freedoms wanted to distance Italy from ‘Europe’. This separation was first achieved by default when Berlusconi and the House of Freedoms won the 2001 election and became one of the few ruling center-right governments in Europe. Further distancing Berlusconi’s Italy from Europe were the economic constraints and targets set by the EU, which in turn called into question whether or not Berlusconi could keep his ambitious campaign promises. Within the House of Freedoms itself, the most vehement and vocal opposition to Europe came from the Northern League. Already pushing for devolution, Italy’s commitment and involvement in a (more) united Europe ran directly in the face of the League’s anticentralist and radical populist tendencies”.

which took place on 26 January 1994⁷. That day, through a famous TV speech, Silvio Berlusconi launched his political movement, a movement able to win the Italian political elections of 27 and 28 March 1994 in a few months and allow him to become the President of the Council of Ministers. This speech, which represents the ideal manifesto of *Forza Italia*—Berlusconi's party—is obviously principally focused on domestic policy and the peculiar situation of Italy in that period, but there is a passage devoted to Europe; however, according to his habit, which I have previously stressed through mentioning some findings from literature on this topic, it seems to be addressed more to the Italian audience than to a foreign and international one. He said:

The history of Italy is at a turning point. As an entrepreneur, as a citizen and now as a citizen who takes to the field, without any bashfulness but with the determination and serenity that life has taught me, I tell you that it is possible to get over with a policy of incomprehensible chit-chat, stupid brawls and politics without craft. I tell you that it is possible to make a great dream come true together: that of a fairer Italy, more generous towards needy people, more prosperous and serene, more modern and efficient, a leading player in Europe and the world. I tell you that we can, I tell you that we must build together, for us and for our children, a new Italian miracle⁸.

As is immediately clear, Berlusconi's reference to Europe—a reference, and this is worth noticing, which is general and not targeted at the EU—does

7 On this speech as a whole, cf. the deep and detailed analysis by Michela Deni – Francesco Marsciani, “Analisi del primo discorso di Berlusconi. Indagine semiotica sul funzionamento discorsivo”, in Marino Livolsi – Ugo Volli (eds.), *La comunicazione politica tra prima e seconda repubblica*, Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1995, pp. 227–241. I have greatly benefited from this work both with regard to framing the speech of 26th January 1994 to which it is expressly devoted, and for the analyses of the following ones. I have also greatly benefited from the precise analysis by Alessandro Amadori, *Mi consenta. Metafore, messaggi e simboli. Come Silvio Berlusconi ha conquistato il consenso degli italiani*, Milano: Libri Scheiwiller, 2002, pp. 109–126. On this speech and on Berlusconi's political communication as a whole, cf. also Ugo Volli, “Fra assenza e seduzione virtuale. Appunti sulla comunicazione di Silvio Berlusconi”, in Marino Livolsi – Ugo Volli (eds.), pp. 192–198. Cf. also Paul Ginsborg, pp. 65–67, Emidio Diodato – Federico Niglia, pp. 76–78, and Elena Semino – Michela Masci, “Politics is football: metaphor in the discourse of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy”, in *Discourse & Society*, 7, 2, 1996, pp. 243–269.

8 Silvio Berlusconi, *Discorsi per la libertà*, Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 2013, p. 6 [here and henceforth, unless otherwise specified, the translation is mine]. Cf. Emidio Diodato – Federico Niglia, p. 77.

not look at the foreign dimension but at the domestic one. His linking Europe and the world as general scenarios bereft of further peculiar characteristics seems to speak for itself. The aims sound clear: to shed light essentially on Italy, to stress the need that it plays an important role among other countries, and to highlight its primary position in the international theatre.

From a rhetorical perspective, this passage opens with the really evocative image of the *turning point*, which immediately provides the audience with the idea of a cut in the temporal line, a detachment that divides time into a past and a future. Accordingly, what splits the former from the latter is exactly the event the audience is watching at that moment, an event whose purpose is presented as a proper change of pattern⁹. The reiteration of the expression “I tell you” followed by two “it is possible” and both a “we can” and a “we must” shapes a rhetorical crescendo which seems to have both a great persuasive connotation and a high degree of involvement. In a few sentences, we can find three different moments portrayed in a row: the negative one, the opening to hope and the call for action. Such a structure, by showing in just a few phrases the problem and the solution, appears to allow Berlusconi’s words to be clear, immediately understandable and very persuasive. No more elements concerning the EU seem to come from this passage or from this speech as a whole. However, it is historically important as the foundation deed of a political path and, as such, it deserved to be mentioned here.

Something more detailed and interesting can be deduced from the programmatic speech of Berlusconi’s first government, a speech that he gave at the Chamber of Deputies on 10 May 1994. He said:

We are known in the world as the country of the hundred cities and our geographical, political and cultural landscape would not be recognisable without taking into account the great, abundant variety of life forms which together connect and distinguish North from South. Within these limits and boundaries, the majority looks with respect and interest at the federalist debate, ancient and new, both from a European perspective and in the sense of a better structure of the nation state¹⁰.

⁹ On the topic of change in this speech, cf. Michela Deni – Francesco Marsciani, p. 228.

¹⁰ S. Berlusconi, *Discorsi per la libertà*, p. 8.

Even in this case, the focus is on Italy. However, there is a detail that deserves to be highlighted. In this speech, Berlusconi makes reference to an element that had played, plays in the moment he is speaking, and will play again in the future a key-role, though with different shades according to the period. When he says that his “majority looks with respect and interest at the federalist debate”¹¹, he uses a term—*federalism*—that has a long tradition in the history of political thought, but also—and that is particularly remarkable from our perspective—both in the Italian domestic debate and particularly within Berlusconi’s majority in itself. That is why it does not seem that he refers to an ancient and a new debate on federalism and to a European and also an Italian federalist dimension by chance. In this period, he was governing, also thanks to the support of the Northern League, a party which has a crucial cornerstone of its politics in the idea of federalism—a form of federalism based on a peculiar vision promoted by this party.

Two other elements seem to be worth stressing in the speech of 10th May 1994. The former concerns the positioning of Italy in the international theatre, the latter deals with the explanation of Berlusconi’s government’s strategy with regard to foreign policy. He describes the first point using these words:

Loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance, economic and political collaboration with the European Community, the rejection of war as a means of resolving international disputes, the principles of the Helsinki Conference on the solidity of borders, the defence of human rights, the self-determination of peoples and non-interference: these are the cornerstones of both the identity and programme with which this coalition is committed to forming a government up to Italy’s international role¹².

Berlusconi summarises his government’s position on the EU in this way:

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is in Brussels, and is already at work in order to affirm and strengthen the Italian role as a main character in the European Union. Italy will have to foster the enlargement of the Union, also towards Eastern Europe, increase trade relations with the free trade areas of North America and the Pacific, also to avoid a twist of a protectionist spiral; a careful analysis of the Maastricht Treaty has not to delay the implementation of the unification programme; and

¹¹ Ibid., p. 8.

¹² Ibid., p. 8.

any delay concerning both the Union's defence and foreign policy must be banished¹³.

The essential point sounds clear enough: Italy must play a key role in the international theatre, must be an active actor, and has to be recognised as such by the other partners. This game has to be played in a twofold dimension: on the one hand, the focus is on the EU, on the other hand on the North American area¹⁴. The aim of this commitment is likewise twofold: the economy and defence policy are seen as cornerstones of Berlusconi's government's strategy. With regard to the latter, and given what has been previously sketched out, it does not sound astonishing that he stresses the point of the need for a common defence and foreign policy. On this occasion, the use of the noun *delay* deserves to be particularly pointed out. This is a term that may have been used here to instil into the audience the idea of a cut in the temporal line, akin to what we have previously analysed. A dilatory behaviour concerning these themes—the sentence seems to allude to this, though without providing any pieces of evidence or examples—has been happening until now, but it cannot be accepted any more. A mention is also deserved for the reference to the Maastricht Treaty, careful analysis of which, according to Berlusconi, should not have to impact on the unification process. It seems to be an interesting point: in the programmatic speech of Berlusconi's first government, the unification path appears to be taken for granted and even greatly wished for.

Four years later, Berlusconi's position on the EU seems to have a few different shades: although the idea of the EU is not questioned, some related elements are. Obviously, we have to take into due account that the context is deeply different compared to the previous one. Berlusconi is no longer the President of the Council of Ministers, but the leader of the major opposition party. Italy is governed by a centre-left coalition which is leading the country in taking some crucial steps on the path to EU integration.

¹³ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁴ On this topic, it seems to be very useful to stress what Diodato, *The peculiarities of Berlusconi's Euro-Scepticism since the 1990s*, pp. 206–207, highlights: “He conceived Europeanism as part of a broad Atlanticism. In the culture of the post-fascists that formed the centre-right coalitions in the 1990s, there was a strong nationalist legacy and, above all, a clear opposition to Europe as a consequence of the anti-fascist origins of Italian Europeanism. However, quite to the contrary, the centre-right that Berlusconi built was not anti-European, though mostly Atlanticist”.

On 16 April 1998, giving a speech during the first national congress of his party and speaking about *federalism*, he says with specific regard to the relationship between Italy and the EU:

[...] but there is also a transfer of tasks and functions to supranational levels of government. This is what happens with regard to the European Union, on which we have a very precise position: we believe that the political unity of Europe must be promoted by any means, so that it can have a common foreign and defence policy as soon as possible. On the other hand, we are highly scared by Euro-dirigisme and we believe that Europe should not intervene where the States can do it best, with a rigorous application of the principle of *vertical subsidiarity* that we have come to know. Private individuals, namely, must have their own sphere of activity in which they can achieve their aims on their own, to satisfy their needs independently of the intervention of public institutions. When this intervention becomes necessary, the level of government closest to the citizens, that which the citizens are mostly able to control, must intervene. Therefore, the Province should not do what can be done better by the Municipality, the Region should not do what can be better done by the Province, the State should not do what can be better done by the Region, the European Union should not do what can be better done by individual States¹⁵.

The climax used by Berlusconi in the last lines of this excerpt is surely an effective means to explain in a plastic way the concept of *vertical subsidiarity* that he mentioned just a few lines before. This is a recurrent element in his speeches, and it is deeply related to the question of the relationship between Italy and the EU; due to this, it deserves to be sounded out, though briefly. We can identify an analogous reference joined to a very similar explanation in a previous speech given by Berlusconi on 17 July 1996¹⁶ and in a following one where there is a significant passage clearly devoted to highlighting the relationship between the national government and the EU with specific regard to finding the best possible decision maker. While speaking at the convention of the young militants of the European People's Party, which took place in Bilbao on 25 February 2001, he says:

The principle of subsidiarity also says that the State cannot intervene if choices can be better made by governments that are under the State,

15 Ibid., pp. 51–52 (italics in the original text).

16 Silvio Berlusconi, *Discorsi per la democrazia*, Milano: Mondadori, 2001, p. 156.

and we are present in Europe, as the People's Party, to make sure that Europe too does not take decisions that can be better taken by individual States¹⁷.

This idea of *subsidiarity* sounds like a pillar of Berlusconi's conception regarding the relationship between Italy and the EU. His vision seems to have as its cornerstones a high level of freedom for national governments as far as the political economy and institutional reforms are concerned, along with a request for a common defence and foreign policy.

From a rhetorical perspective, these sections of Berlusconi's speeches play on the spatial binomial *close-far*. The emphasis is placed on the distance between decision makers and citizens, with a view to stressing the point that the closer the decisional centres are to people, the more their choices could be appropriate to the needs of the communities involved. This sounds consistent with what has been previously sketched out with regard to the idea of liberty of action at the domestic level and a common policy on external issues. Obviously, it has a certain logic from the perspective of both the creation and the maintenance of consensus, a dilemma which is typical of those situations where the sovereignty of the national state has to be shared with a supranational level, though only on specific issues.

Berlusconi stresses the advantages of joining the EU again in his speech addressed to the young militants of the European People's Party on 25th February 2001. He says:

The freedom that comes to us from Europe is for us an ambition, a will, a need since it has given us well-being, safety, it has given us peace, it has given us and will give us well-being and freedom¹⁸.

Although the passage might sound a little tautological, some elements, both substantial and rhetorical, need to be highlighted: the focus on the deep link between Europe and freedom, the use of the tricolon *ambition-will-need*, the triple repetition of the expression *it has given us* (joined to a fourth one that opens on the future), and the reference to peace, safety and well-being stemming from Europe. The temporal plans appear pretty confused, the logical and causal nexuses too, but, from a rhetorical perspective, the sentence seems to sound effective: the emphasis laid on freedom, which is the opening and closing word—and it does not seem to be so by chance—, plays a crucial role and pushes all the other words

¹⁷ S. Berlusconi, *Discorsi per la libertà*, p. 92.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

and related concepts, including those that may sound not so clear, into the background. The sequence, not logical but rhetorical, *freedom-Europe-freedom*, is clear-cut, and it does not appear so difficult to say which of these two elements has pre-eminence in this sentence.

In the programmatic speech of the second government led by Berlusconi, a speech presented at the Italian Senate on 18 June 2001, he clearly restates the importance of the relationship between Italy and the EU. President of the Council of Ministers for the second time, he frames his reading of this issue within a bigger picture, where foreign policy takes the lion's share. As has previously been seen, it involves both the EU and NATO, with particular regard to the US. This last relationship, also because of the events of a few months later, seems to become narrower and narrower in the following months and years¹⁹.

In order to analyse the section devoted to foreign policy in this speech by Berlusconi in depth, it seems useful to divide it into three sections and take them into account step by step. In the opening sentences, we find an adverb which seems to be worth stressing. Berlusconi says:

Mr President, Honourable Senators, the majority that is presenting itself before the Chambers today is with certainty, I would say 'intrinsically', pro-European²⁰.

The use of *intrinsically* immediately clarifies the position of the new government on the relationship between Italy and the EU. It seems to imply that loyalty to the EU has not to be questioned, and if some criticisms came, they would be handled within the borders of a normal institutional dialectic among the actors involved. The passage in Berlusconi's speech which immediately follows shows his intention to look at foreign policy as a *unicum*, where both the relationships with the EU and with the other countries are conceived as part of the same picture. He says:

19 On this relation, cf. also cf. Elisabetta Brighi, "One man alone? 'A Long Durée' Approach to Italy's Foreign Policy Under Berlusconi", pp. 286–287: "Atlanticism has come to represent the second cornerstone of Berlusconi's foreign policy. Over the last three years considerable effort has been put into trying to build a 'special relationship' with the USA. This has not only responded to Berlusconi's penchant for a 'personalized' bilateralism, but has also enabled the government to distance itself from the tradition of lukewarm or qualified Atlanticism that centre-left governments pursued with varying intensity through the 1990s [...] No doubt the events of 11 September 2001 acted as a momentous catalyst for precipitating the advance of Berlusconi's policy priority. But it was the war on Iraq that offered the final opportunity to show Italy's eagerness to follow the US lead".

20 S. Berlusconi, *Discorsi per la libertà*, p. 98.

With the position taken up at the NATO summit and the European Council, the government has highlighted the continuity of the foreign policy course of action, which it intends to strengthen with a more incisive commitment aimed at European integration and its future, as well as the consolidation of the Atlantic Alliance and the relationship with the United States²¹.

Once again, the relationship with both the EU and the partners of the North Atlantic Alliance, particularly the US, are presented as staying on the same level, without any distinction, for example, related to the different and specific natures of these actors. Coming back to focus on the EU, Berlusconi appends some other elements which deserve to be taken into consideration. He says:

The hindrances to the enlargement of the European Union have now fallen and we have before us the historical responsibility to unify the continent in democracy and freedom, after the Nazi and Communist totalitarianisms and after the post-war divisions. The European Council in Göteborg strongly restated that this process is irreversible. In this respect, we will work with certainty, certain to ensure in this way national interests²².

Firstly, Berlusconi opens to the enlargement of the EU and highlights that the pillars of such a process have to be both democracy and freedom. Secondly, he affirms that it is not possible to stop this course, which is also said to be *irreversible*. Finally, he, who—and it is important to remember that here—is addressing a national audience with this speech, stresses the primary importance of the integration process for Italian interests. From a rhetorical perspective, by leaving this aspect last, he is able to emphasise its value, underline its primacy, and show the Italian people the domestic advantages stemming from the course of action concerning the foreign policy that he and his government want to pursue.

We find a very similar position in a discourse delivered on 13 May 2008, when Berlusconi, in front of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, gives the programmatic speech of his fourth government. Once again, the relationship between Italy and the EU and Italy and other foreign countries seems to be conceived with specific regard to domestic policy. He says:

²¹ Ibid., p. 98.

²² Ibid., p. 98.

The growth of Italian prosperity and of its role in Europe and the world, in the wake of Western responsibility and the search for believable paths to peace, will be the compass of our policy as a founding country of the European project, as a great Mediterranean nation naturally called upon for cooperation between the two shores of our sea, and as a pillar of friendship between Europe and the United States²³.

At the centre and at the top of the list of priorities there is always Italy; the rest—however remarkable or, even, *more* remarkable—seems to have secondary importance.

Obviously, we always have to bear in mind the peculiar audience this speech is addressed to, but the idea of reading foreign policy principally with respect to the domestic context seems to be once again clear. The threefold scenario—the EU, the Mediterranean area, the US—always keeps Italy as the main character, which, in Berlusconi's vision, seems to have to play a pivotal role in all these contexts. The key word in this excerpt appears to be the adverb *naturally*, which evokes the idea of an unavoidable task attributed—but by whom or what?—to Italy. Therefore, the narrative acquires a persuasive tone; though any rational explanation of this alleged natural vocation appears to be completely missing.

The metaphor of the compass, moreover, allows Berlusconi to provide his audience with an immediately visible idea of intent²⁴. Like a compass needle always points North, his government will constantly move in the groove of the three targets which he has shown in the sentence which comes immediately before the metaphor. Furthermore, Berlusconi seems to be very accurate in continuously joining the relationship between Italy and the EU to that between Italy and the US, almost wanting to highlight their having to be conceived on the same level. This seems to be consistent with what has been previously stated about this issue: from his perspective, Italy has to be and mostly has to act as the scale needle between Europe and the US.

On this occasion, he also presents Italy as an actor able to join the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea. This image seems to refer, though implicitly, to the metaphor of a bridge, namely, something built with a view to creating links where there were none or where they had been broken.

23 Ibid., pp. 133–134.

24 On political metaphors as a whole, cf., for example, Francesca Rigotti, *Il potere e le sue metafore*, Milano: Feltrinelli, 1992.

Berlusconi also maintains an analogous position in the speech delivered in Rome on 27 March 2009, during the first national meeting of the People of Liberties, his new party. While speaking about foreign policy, he clearly specifies that it has to be taken into due account particularly for its influences and consequences on domestic policy.

To the great work at home has also to be joined the enormous commitment devoted to foreign policy, which is becoming increasingly "internal" politics, because of the consequences it has on the destinies of our country. Thanks to us, thanks to our government, Italy today is strong, respected and authoritative in Europe and the world. Consistent with our values, we have made a sharp and clear-cut field choice, which has always been the same. We have chosen to be part of the European People's Party and to side with the Great Western democracies and the United States of America²⁵.

From an argumentative perspective, there is nothing more to say than what has been highlighted until now. From a rhetorical one, it is easy to see that Italian centrality is particularly restated here through the use of the tricolon *strong-respected-authoritative*, which has a clear domestic value. Berlusconi is saying to the Italian people—or better, with specific regard to the context of this speech, to the supporters of his party—that, through his and his party's policies, Italy has become a main actor in the international theatre.

The key element in this passage seems to be the word *today*, which suggests the idea of a completed mission by a political entity able to achieve a target that has previously never been hit. From a rhetorical perspective, this positive *today* implies that there has been a negative *yesterday*, though it is not specified to the audience who or what created the alleged situation considered to be bad. The unsaid leaves the audience the task of filling in the blanks and, considering both the context and the speaker, it is not difficult to imagine what kind of thoughts these words were able to provoke in them. That stated, Berlusconi proceeds to look to the future:

These values will also lead us in the future. Our compass, as I said in the programmatic statement of government on 13 May before the Chambers, is the increase of freedom, prosperity and the success of Italy in Europe and the world, in the extent of Western responsibility.

25 S. Berlusconi, *Discorsi per la libertà*, cit., p. 155; on the political metaphors in Berlusconi's speeches, see for example Elena Semino – Michela Masci, *Politics is football: metaphor in the discourse of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy*.

For us, the West is one and only one. This is true on the political, economic and military levels. And it is especially true on the human level and on that concerning values. Europe and the United States are linked to the same destiny. Europe needs the United States; the United States needs Europe. We have no hesitation in making these statements²⁶.

Berlusconi uses the metaphor of the compass once again and explicitly recalls the same themes from the speech given in front of the Chamber of Deputies on the occasion of the programmatic declaration of his fourth government. The immediately subsequent use of the adjective *Western* and the noun *West*— that is, the reiteration of the name of a cardinal point – appears to be in such a position not by chance. The twofold use of the tricolon (*freedom-prosperity-success*; *political-economic-military*) along with the subsequent reference to both the human and the value levels lends a great communicative effectiveness to the passage. The final chiasmus (*Europe-US-US-Europe*) highlights and stresses once more the unavoidable need for the reciprocal relationships and interactions between these actors.

Another excerpt from this speech deserves to be analysed in depth. At some point, Berlusconi says:

We are among the founding countries of Europe and we believe in a Europe which is not castled in an ivory tower, far from citizens, a dirigiste and centralist Europe: the Europe of bureaucrats. We believe, instead, in the Europe which European citizens want and which is made up of a great history, shared values and a common policy. Of democracy and freedom. Of rigour and tolerance. Of free initiative and solidarity. A free, Christian and Western Europe that practices and spreads freedom in the world²⁷.

The plot of this section tries to counterpose two scenarios, with a view to showing both appreciation for the EU and a critical view concerning some of its peculiar elements. The chronological—and also ideological—context of this speech deals with a period when the perception of the EU among public opinion had become deeply different than one or two decades before²⁸. One of the most leading and recurring criticisms concerns the excess of bureaucracy of an institution often perceived as far from its citizens

26 S. Berlusconi, *Discorsi per la libertà*, p. 156.

27 Ibid., p. 159.

28 Cf. for example, Emidio Diodato, “The peculiarities of Berlusconi’s Euro-Scepticism since the 1990s”, cit., p. 201; on the changes in the common feeling about

and their daily problems. Accordingly, it does not seem to be by chance that Berlusconi particularly stresses this point. The ivory tower metaphor is very useful in allowing him to achieve the target of highlighting the theme. It is an image that is easy to understand, well-known and of immediate impact. Through it, he is able not to criticise the EU itself, but only a behaviour perceived and presented as negative. It allows him to show his displeasure—a displeasure probably expected by his audience—without casting doubts on the European integration process as a whole. What is more, *dirigisme* and *centralism* are two words very far away from Berlusconi and his audience's thoughts, ideas and positions. That is why it does not seem to be astonishing that he also chooses to refer to such elements in order to criticise some aspects of the EU.

Once he has closed the negative part, he starts listing some positive qualities of the EU and he does it by using three very effective tricolons in a row. That is why we can see this triple succession: *great history-shared values-common policy, democracy and freedom-rigour and tolerance-free initiative and solidarity, free-Christian-Western*. It is a very structured succession of tricolons: the first one is composed of three nouns preceded by an adjective each; the second one presents three couples of nouns all referring to very important concepts, though left on an abstract dimension and not specified better; the last one plays on immediacy by linking together three words only, words which appear immediately clear, understandable and related to something allegedly very significant for the kind of audience Berlusconi is speaking to.

He goes on with his speech and comes back to a theme which—as we have already seen—Berlusconi has stressed over and over again: the EU has to leave more autonomy to the member States on the domestic level and has to take care of both foreign policy and common defence.

With a view to rebuilding the confidence of European citizens in a unified Europe, it is necessary to work on a reform of Europe that allows giving back to the States some national competences and, at the same time, entrusts and strengthens in the hands of Europe the competences in the sphere of foreign policy and defence without which Europe cannot exist, especially in a moment of vertiginous changes like the one we are going through²⁹.

the EU as a whole, cf. Guido Levi – Daniela Preda (eds.), *Euroscepticisms. Resistance and Opposition to the European Community/European Union*.

29 S. Berlusconi, *Discorsi per la libertà*, pp. 159–160.

On this occasion, Berlusconi does not explicitly mention the idea of *vertical subsidiarity*, but he gives the impression of having it clearly in mind. What seems important to highlight here is the link that Berlusconi establishes between—though he does not mention it—*vertical subsidiarity* and the degree of confidence towards the EU among its citizens. This is a recurring element of his speeches concerning the EU, and it does not seem astonishing that he goes back to this point even on this occasion. Furthermore, he once again restates the need for both common foreign and defence policies, which he considers essential to the existence and survival of the idea of the EU itself.

Perhaps the speech that best summarises the positions of Berlusconi on the relationship between Italy and the EU is that given on 28 November 2000 in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. On that occasion, Giuliano Amato's government was asking for bipartisan support to strengthen the position of the executive branch in view of the imminent European Conference in Nice (7–9 December 2000). He says:

We have always been pro-Europe, but we are not Euro-bigots. In our 'chromosomes', to use the rawness of language used by an eminent exponent of the majority, there is true Europeanism, that of Alcide de Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman, not that of those people converted at the last minute! We do not need to prove anything, nor do we need to make people forget decades of anti-Europeanist activism. It was not us who voted against the European monetary system; it was not us who took to the streets against those missiles that defended Europe and contributed to the fall of Soviet communism. We believe in a linear growth, step by step, of a European constitutional area; and we hope for a more in-depth discussion on the issues recently proposed in the Charter of Rights. We look with favour, in prospect, at the idea of a 'European Constitution', as our President of the Republic Carlo Azeglio Ciampi never tires of urging. But we are also certain, and this has been authoritatively supported by the most prestigious liberal newspaper in Europe and the Conference of European Bishops in Leuven, that the last word on individual rights cannot belong to any bureaucracy, though esteemed and prepared. In terms of freedom and the rights of the person, in terms of the culture of the family and life, in terms of freedom and the ethics of scientific research, the last word must always belong to the legitimising power of the people, and in this

case to the peoples of Europe. What we want to build is a Europe of peoples and citizens³⁰.

In this speech, there is clear overlapping of different ambits, namely, that concerning the EU and that related to NATO, an overlapping which sounds weird enough. However, if we take into consideration how Berlusconi is used to stressing over and over again the need for both common foreign and defence policies, it seems to be not so astonishing that he presents them as merged on this occasion too.

What is more, this sounds consistent with a topic that he frequently uses when referring to the domestic context, that is, the topic of anti-communism, which was particularly important on this occasion since the heir to the Italian Communist Party—the party named *Partito della Rifondazione Comunista* (Communist Refoundation Party)—chose, unique among the Italian parties³¹, not to provide Amato's government with the support it was requesting.

Moreover, Berlusconi clearly tries to present his party as fully embedded in the tradition of the path to EU integration, which stems from De Gasperi, Adenauer and Schuman, who are pinpointed as champions of *true* Europeanism, though not further specified. From a rhetorical perspective, it is worth highlighting that by saying this, he is implicitly insinuating that a *false* form of Europeanism also exists, which is, however, far away from that pursued by him and his party. Furthermore, such a *true* Europeanism is described as being an essential element of Berlusconi's party, though metaphorically: the reference to the "chromosomes", namely, to something that is deeply internal to individuals, returns the image of a deeply-rooted conception, a conception that is strongly related—exactly as chromosomes are—to the reasons for existence itself.

On this occasion, he also uses a lexicon related to the religious one: he speaks of *bigotry*, of "converted people"³² and, in the last section of this excerpt, he mentions themes such as "the culture of the family and life"³³, themes notoriously very dear to those social components linked—though with a different degree and for different reasons—to the religious sphere.

The very widely structured tricolon in the last section of this long quotation ("In terms of freedom and the rights of the person, in terms of the cul-

30 S. Berlusconi, *Discorsi per la democrazia*, pp. 254–255.

31 Cf. Silvio Berlusconi, *Discorsi per la democrazia*, cit., p. 250; cf. also <https://www.repubblica.it/online/politica/nizza/nizza/nizza.html> (accessed: 12 November 2020).

32 S. Berlusconi, *Discorsi per la democrazia*, p. 254.

33 Ibid., p. 255.

ture of the family and life, in terms of freedom and the ethics of scientific research”³⁴) is used to introduce the closing sentence, where Berlusconi restates what his idea is concerning the relationship between citizens and the EU: the latter has to be “a Europe of peoples and citizens”³⁵.

A little further on, Berlusconi shows how he and his party conceive the relationship between the citizens of the Member States and the EU. He says:

An effective, close and persuasive relationship between Europe and public opinion, between EU institutions and European civil society, cannot in fact be based on only institutional dynamics, in the mere geometry of the statutes and papers. For us, Europe is an ensemble of programmatic contents; our Europeanism is totally joined with our idea of an Italy governed under the name of freedom of drive, of the greatest competition, of a competitiveness that creates the resources needed to help those who have fallen behind³⁶.

The references to the ‘institutional dynamics’³⁷, ‘the statutes’³⁸ and the ‘papers’³⁹ seem to be used here to rhetorically detach the EU of bureaucracy from the EU of the peoples. This, according to Berlusconi, has to be the basis for building an EU able to be connected to its citizens in “an effective, close and persuasive relationship”⁴⁰, as the incisive opening tricolon strongly emphasises. After having clarified this, he appends a metaphor able to make the audience immediately frame the picture, clearly capture the idea, and instantly understand his thought. He says:

Europe should be the shield able to protect the individual and entrepreneurial challenges aimed at innovating, a place where the taxpayer sees his rights recognised and protected from any unjust oppression, at the very moment when he fulfils his duties⁴¹.

The image of the EU as a shield immediately evokes an idea of protection, of something created to give safety, to avoid being wounded or bludgeoned to death. However, the discourse can also be overturned: though

34 Ibid., p. 255.

35 Ibid., p. 255.

36 Ibid., p. 255.

37 Ibid., p. 255.

38 Ibid., p. 255.

39 Ibid., p. 255.

40 Ibid., p. 255.

41 Ibid., pp. 255–256.

defensive, the shield is and remains a weapon, that is, a tool useful in war contexts. Accordingly, those citizens who feel themselves in a sort of war—or, more simply, in an unsafe situation—because of the oppression of the State—the example of tax oppression sounds effective enough—can look at the EU—not at the bureaucratic one, but that of peoples—as a powerful ally from which to seek and receive protection.

With a view to briefly summarising the principal elements that have come out of this analysis, it seems to be useful to divide them into two main groups: a political and a rhetorical one. With regard to the former, right before entering the discussion, given the long political career of Berlusconi, it is primarily essential to remember the crucial role played by the changes in the contexts, changes that, as has been highlighted, cause some swings, though more strategical than substantial, in his positioning towards the theme of the relationship between Italy and the EU. The main points principally seem to be related to the Italian position on the international theatre, vertical subsidiarity and the idea of a Europe of peoples counterposed to a Europe of bureaucracy. The idea of both common foreign and defence policies, of the least distance possible between citizens and decision makers, of free economic initiatives not being slowed down or prevented by bureaucrats or bureaucracies (both at the national and supranational level) form the lion's share of Berlusconi's speaking about the EU.

With regard to the rhetorical dimension, though only few examples have been shown in this essay, two significant elements can be stressed in any case. Firstly, in the excerpts examined a massive use of tricolons is clearly recognisable. This particular figure of speech occurs very frequently in Berlusconi's discourses. From the most articulate to the simplest forms, a tricolon surely represents a recurrent element of the analysed sections of speeches, so much so that its use could be considered almost systematic. Secondly, metaphors also appear to play a significant role. Their ability to make even complex concepts immediately usable, easily comprehensible issues that are not always simple to understand, place themes perceived as distant near to the audience, make them powerful tools of both clarification and persuasion. That seems to be why we find such a great number of them in these excerpts.

With regard both to the political and the rhetorical dimensions, it can be said that an analysis of Berlusconi's speeches is without doubt able to show a partial but significant side of the polyhedron and multifaceted figure of—to close with a tricolon—the Berlusconi communicator, the Berlusconi politician, and the Berlusconi President of the Council of Ministers.

The Community method “must remain the beating heart of the Union”¹. Purpose and vision of an enlarged EU in Romano Prodi’s European speeches

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Political speeches can be arduous to investigate for historians. The evident dilemma is that they usually appear either too vague, or, on the contrary, too powerful. Furthermore, similarly to what happens with biographical research, there is a risk of historians becoming too involved in the narrative suggested by their author. Analysing speeches is also complicated because they usually convey the personal involvement of the speaker and include different kinds of messages, from mere information to deeper references to social and cultural models. Sometimes they explicitly refer to the broader political debate circulating in society and the media; at other times they just imply it. Speeches often refer to symbols, rhetorical images, and historical and political precedents² in order to create the perfect atmosphere to involve a specific kind of public. Historians not only do not belong to this public, but also have the precise duty to put all those elements into a broader historical picture.

The existing literature on discourse analysis provides scholars with a very helpful framework³, in which ‘discourse’ is usually defined as “re-contextualized social practice”⁴. In historical research, however, not only

1 Romano Prodi, *The past and future of European integration*, SPEECH/02/51, Speech at the Instituto de Espana, Madrid, 7 February 2002 [https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:langVPL8ksEJ:https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/speech_02_51/SPEECH_02_51_EN.pdf+&cd=2&hl=it&ct=clnk&gl=it&client=safari], Date consulted: December 11, 2020, p. 9.

2 Theo Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice. New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; see also Florian Schneider, *Getting the Hang of Discourse Theory*, Post, May 6, 2013 [www.politicseastasia.com/studying/gettin-the-hang-of-discourse-theory], Date consulted: 19 January 2021.

3 Ibid. See also, for example, James Paul Gee, Michael Handford (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012; Isabela Fairclough, Norman Fairclough, *Political Discourse Analysis. A method for advanced students*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012.

4 T. Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice*, Ch. 1.

has the context of language to be interpreted according to the broader discourse it refers to, but also both of them have to be *contextualised* in their historical setting. This multi-level analysis clearly entails the risk of excessive speculation on the intentions of the speaker/writer. Its potential outcome, however, is definitely worth the effort (and the risk): speeches do indeed have the power to connect events and political discourses with biographical research; international history with political and cultural history; and the history of ideas with the evolution of communication and the media.

In this chapter, I will analyse some of the speeches on Europe given by Romano Prodi as President of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004, with the aim of suggesting an interpretative key through the lens of discourse analysis. Such talks were given on different occasions and in various places during his presidency: at the European Parliament; on his visits to some EU member states, candidate countries and neighbouring ones; at academic institutions; and during meetings with various private and public unions and associations. This essay, then, focuses on the genre of public/political speeches and looks into language and style, rather than other communication items⁵.

1. Research questions and context

The chapter's structure follows the lead of some key themes across different, selected speeches, rather than analysing one single text in detail, and looks into the connections and coherence between them. It moves from the context of European politics, as well as Prodi's perspective on European integration⁶ and investigates his speeches in order to understand

5 Only one of the speeches analysed is on video; see Romano Prodi, *The fifth enlargement*, Dublin, 1 May 2004 [https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/speech_by_romano_prodi_the_fifth_enlargement_dublin_1_may_2004-en-b3cc8ff7-77a9-4c76-aa49-7f531f5f8586.html], Date consulted: 30 November 2021.

6 For a background analysis, see Romano Prodi, *La mia visione dei fatti. Cinque anni di governo in Europa* (ed. by Sandro Gozi), Bologna: il Mulino, 2008; Romano Prodi, *Un'idea dell'Europa*, Bologna: il Mulino, 1999. See also, Romano Prodi, Mario Ricciardi, "Intervista a Romano Prodi" in *il Mulino*, n. 1, 2019, pp. 57–64; Cindy Jung, "The Future of Europe. An Interview with Romano Prodi", in *Harvard International Review*, no. 1, vol. 39, 2018, pp. 45–46; Laura Fasanaro, Leopoldo Nuti, "Romano Prodi. His European vision and his Presidency of the European Commission", in Vincent Dujardin, Eric Bussière, Piers Ludlow, Federico Romero, Dieter Schlenker, Antonio Varsori (eds.), *The European Commission 1986–2000*.

what kind of narrative they express. The following research questions will therefore be addressed: what key themes/discourse strands can we find in those sources? Did they actually reflect the main challenges of European politics? What kind of knowledge about Europe did Prodi presumably want to impart and what kind of European environment did he picture? Did this image reflect the approach and vision of the European Commission as a collegial body and, in a broader sense, the mainstream discourse on Europe at that time? What kind of change, if any, did Prodi want to foster in his audience⁷ and through what means?

Based on a preliminary assessment, two initial remarks seem worth making. First, Prodi's conception of European politics, goals, timing and procedures are totally consistent with both the language, content and style of his speeches. Even though one cannot exclude the fact that in some cases his speeches might have been drafted by one of his advisors; therefore, looking into the possible role and influence of ghostwriters seems almost irrelevant in this case. Public speeches very much represent Prodi's own ideas, concepts, feelings, motivation and spirit about European integration at that time, as well as today. Second, Prodi's speeches are characterised by a coherent narrative: they very often reflect a clear and purposeful idea of European politics and of the Commission's place in it. Keywords, images and rhetorical figures belong to his style: in some cases they just evoke that narrative, yet most of the time they explain it straightforwardly.

From 1999 to 2004, the European context was characterised by unusual complexity and changed rapidly. Long and medium-term political processes were finally achieved, like the euro, the Eastern enlargement, some relevant institutional reforms and the EU's foreign, security and defence policy. Such dramatic events as 9/11 and the Iraqi crisis, however, significantly impacted on Europe's political climate and stability in the middle of a critical political and institutional transition. To describe the background

History and memories of an institution, Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union, 2019, pp. 623–630; Laura Fasanaro, Leopoldo Nuti, “Romano Prodi (1999–2004): so much to do at such a critical time”, in Jan van der Harst, Gerrit Voerman (eds.), *An Impossible Job? – The Presidents of the European Commission, 1958–2014*, London: John Harper Publishing, 2015, pp. 216–241.

⁷ Following Francesco Pierini's guidelines for the Conference “Narrating EU Integration: Speeches and Speakers from 1946 to 2018” (University of Genova, 3–5 February 2021), a ‘cognitive change’, an ‘affective change’ or a ‘behavioral change’?

of EU politics, then, one can move from this dual concept: complexity and change⁸.

Prodi's vision of Europe must also be taken into consideration. Born in Scandiano (Reggio Emilia) in 1939, Prodi became the President of the Commission after a prestigious academic career, as an eminent economist and an expert in industrial economics and anti-trust policies. He had been professor of industrial policy at the University of Bologna since 1971 and was the author of many books and essays on the economy of small and medium-sized enterprises and the evolution and models of capitalism. In his early political experience, from 1978 to 1979, he had been Minister for Industry. Later on, in the 1980s, he was appointed as President of the Italian Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI), which was restructured and modernised during his time in office. In 1995 he founded the renewed centre-left political coalition in Italy, named *L'Ulivo*, which won the general elections of 1996. From 1996 to 1998 (and later on again, in 2006–2008), he served as Prime Minister of Italy. Despite this outstanding academic and political background, at the time of his appointment as President of the European Commission, he did not have any previous experience in European politics.

His intellectual background, however, encompassed a robust federalist tradition, which grew stronger during his term in office, although neither 'federal' nor 'federation' belong to the vocabulary used in his talks. This approach sincerely inspired not only his own agenda, but also his deep confidence in the success of the Commission's. In general, the College led by Prodi seems to have been able to share that vision, despite some internal organisational problems unveiled by the Kinnock reform of 2000. Prodi understood the prerogatives of the Commission as the body expressing a fully independent initiative role and dynamic executive power: this firm belief did not escape some criticism among EU governments, most often during the second half of his mandate.

8 I already made this argument in another essay, Laura Fasanaro, "Complessità e cambiamento nell'Unione Europea degli anni Duemila. La visione di Romano Prodi e il ruolo della Commissione", in Elena Calandri, Giuliana Laschi, Simone Paoli (eds.), *L'Europa adulta. Attori, ragioni e sfide dall'Atto Unico alla Brexit*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2020, pp. 69–90.

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2. The key themes of European politics and the narrated ones

Prodi's public speeches reflected the many challenges facing the EU in those years. Most of them focused on the goals of enlargement, institutional reforms and the economic and social agenda, and emphasised the interaction between the three of them. They included other key goals as well, such as the entry into force of the euro and the internal reorganisation of the Commission. Those themes are usually connected to each other by several cross-references that will be explained in detail in the following paragraphs. Very often, moreover, the main theme leads to connections with 'sub-categories' or broader concepts⁹. The biggest enlargement ever faced by the EU suggested a radical revision of its decision-making processes. The extension of the Community method to a growing number of EU policies was especially controversial in those years, yet in Prodi's conception it was pivotal. He made it a consistent part of his own agenda, with the aim of promoting a wide shift to supranational decision-making. In his speeches, therefore, the Community method can be considered both a sub-category of the discourse strand on institutional reforms¹⁰ and a key theme in itself, informing most of the others and impacting on the very future of Europe. At the same time, economic and social reforms pertained to the Lisbon Agenda, which can also be considered a sub-category of that main discourse strand. The Lisbon Agenda, however, often leads to other connections with broader concepts like the welfare state, the European social model and the ideas of an inclusive society and a knowledge society. Similarly, institutional reforms can either be included in the broader 'chapter' of the future of Europe or linked to the post-Nice phase (another sub-category). Other recurrent arguments are the Convention on the Future of Europe (a sub-category); European governance; the process of globalisation; and the discourse on sustainable development (the three of them being broad discourse strands). Finally, it is worth noting that Prodi repeatedly refers to the goal of making the European Union a 'policy-oriented' rather than a 'procedure-oriented' organisation¹¹, another idea

⁹ See Florian Schneider, *How to do a Discourse Analysis*, Post, 13 May 2013 [<http://www.politicseastasia.com/studying/how-to-do-a-discourse-analysis/>], Date consulted: 22 January 2021.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Romano Prodi, *2000–2005: Shaping the New Europe*, SPEECH/00/41, Speech given at the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 15 February 2000 [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_00_41], Date consulted: 11 December 2020. See also, Romano Prodi, *September 11, 2001: Attack on America*,

related to the wider key theme of EU reforms, which recalls both the need for EU efficiency and the setbacks of its ‘technocratic’ structure and persistent democratic gap. This chapter focuses on the themes of enlargement and institutional reforms, while it only briefly mentions the other ones¹².

3. *Enlargement and the post-Nice phase*

The Eastern European enlargement was a paramount goal of and task for the Prodi Commission. The EU’s relations with applicant countries had become closer by the time Prodi arrived in Brussels. Accession talks had already been opened with Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus in March 1998. The new Commission, however, gave its own impetus to that process by promoting an ‘inclusive’ strategy, which envisaged the inclusion of all applicant countries in one single framework, namely the opening of formal negotiations with all those countries that could at least match the Copenhagen political criteria—Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Malta—even though they were still far from matching the economic ones. This was the alternative strategy to the straighter one of beginning formal negotiations only with those countries that were closer to achieving both the political and economic criteria¹³. The Commission’s approach was approved by the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999¹⁴.

SPEECH/01/451, Speech given to the European Trade Union Confederation Brussels, 11 October 2001 [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/eu_003.asp], Date consulted: 11 December 2020.

12 I will underline quotes from speeches, to indicate discourse fragments and other language references that can introduce/make reference to relevant discourse strands. If underlining or another special font are present in the original version of the text, I will explicitly mention this in a footnote. In all other cases, underlined characters are mine.

13 European Commission, *Composite Paper on the Commission Reports (Progress Reports [...] on Progress towards Accession by each of the Candidate Countries)*, 13 October 1999 [ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/reports_1999_en.htm], Date consulted: 9 October 2011.

14 See Ian G. Barnes, Pamela M. Barnes, “Enlargement”, in Michelle Cini, Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borrogon (eds.), *European Union Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 421. On the Prodi Commission, see Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos (ed.), *The changing European Commission*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004.

At the time of their appointment, Prodi and the new Commissioners enjoyed the EU governments’ strongest support. He was not only a distinguished economist, with an international reputation, but had also led Italy’s government through the arduous negotiations for its admission into the euro. His designation as candidate President, followed by the making of a Commission composed of the highest profile and most highly skilled personalities, were accompanied by a plethora of positive comments and a considerable burden of high expectations¹⁵. This atmosphere suggested that the new Commission could make the difference in various fields, beginning with the big enlargement: Prodi enthusiastically welcomed both his new role and those expectations. His personal contribution to steering the debate on enlargement in favour of an inclusive strategy is confirmed by former Commissioner Günter Verheugen¹⁶ and Prodi himself¹⁷. The first speech mentioned in this paper¹⁸, addressed to the EP, further corroborates the President’s intention to have the Commission play a leading role in the enlargement strategy. In this text, the CEECs’ accession to the EU is linked to the “momentous events of 1989, which led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Iron Curtain”: these discourse fragments recall a special and unprecedented time in history.

“Rarely in the course of history does an opportunity like this present itself. For the first time since the fall of the Roman Empire we have the opportunity to unite Europe—and this time it will not be by force of arms but on the basis of shared ideals and agreed common rules”¹⁹.

The exceptional time to which the text refers is not only the end of the Cold War, but also the moment in which critical choices about enlargement need to be made. These significant fragments also mention

15 For a background view on the appointment of the Prodi Commission, see L. Fasanaro, L. Nuti, “Romano Prodi (1999–2004): so much to do at such a critical time”, pp. 223–226.

16 See Günter Verheugen, *Enlargement: Speed and Quality*, SPEECH/99/151, The Hague, 11 November 1999 [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_99_151], Date consulted: 30 November 2021. On the broader role of the Commission in the CEECs’ enlargement, see for example, Irene Bellier, “The European Commission between the *acquis communautaire* and enlargement”, in Dimitrakopoulos (ed.), *The changing European Commission*, cit., pp. 138–150.

17 Laura Fasanaro’s and Leopoldo Nuti’s interview with Romano Prodi, 1 September 2011.

18 Romano Prodi, *On enlargement*, SPEECH/99/130, European Parliament, Brussels, 13 October 1999 [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_99_130], Date consulted: 6 January 2021.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

‘opportunity’ as a keyword: a recurrent word in Prodi’s narrative. Here, ‘opportunity’ is quoted five times and ‘chance’ one more time,

“Now, as never before, and perhaps as never again, we have the chance to create a Europe in which all the peoples of this continent can live together in peace, security, freedom, justice and equality”²⁰.

In only one case is ‘opportunity’ mentioned in a precautionary way, to indicate a potentially negative scenario in the case of a setback in the enlargement process,

“The risk in taking this ‘hard-line’ approach is that the countries concerned, having already made great efforts and sacrifices, will become disillusioned and turn their back on us. Their economic policies will begin to diverge, and a historic opportunity will have been lost—perhaps forever”²¹.

Later on, in January 2002, speaking at the Bocconi University in Milan, Prodi would reinstate the uniqueness of time and opportunity: “Europe is at a turning point in its history”²². ‘Opportunity’ remains a keyword in a number of other texts. Speaking at University College, Cork, in late June 2001, after the Nice Treaty failed to be ratified due to the negative outcome of the Irish referendum of 7 June, Prodi used the same word to open his talk and urge the Irish to endorse the treaty, “Let me recall how the late Jack Lynch, who was Taoiseach when Ireland joined in 1972, summed up in one word what Europe meant to Ireland: ‘Opportunity’”²³. This speech is worth quoting more thoroughly for two main reasons. The first one is that from the keyword ‘opportunity’ Prodi develops a multifarious argument that prompts the Irish to reverse their attitude towards the Nice Treaty. The second one is that that argument contains some very interesting legitimization and purpose building items²⁴, referring to both the EU and its enlargement to the CEECs.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., p. 3.

22 Romano Prodi, 2002, *a tremendous year for Europe*, SPEECH/02/29, Speech given at Bocconi’s University, Milan, 28 January 2002 [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_02_29], Date consulted: 14 January 2021, p. 8. See also, *September 11, 2001: Attack on America*, October 11, 2001, SPEECH/01/451, cit.

23 Romano Prodi, *Our common future*, SPEECH/01/305, Speech given at University College Cork, 22 June 2001 [<https://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do;jsessionid=NAM0IQ30L-NBsiZxnThuuSI340940oPcJbfTo4JBLK6FQv-uEoJy!-898031139?docId=215353&cardId=215353>], Date consulted: 14 January 2021, p. 1.

24 Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice*, Ch. 6 and 7.

In particular,

1. Analogies (between Ireland and Italy, “Italy went through the same process after we helped to set up the EEC in 1958”; between Ireland and the EU, “Ireland has come a long way in the last 30 years or so. So has the European Union”). Such analogies evoke legitimization through moral evaluation²⁵.
2. References to results/effects-oriented purposeful actions put in place by Ireland as a member of the EC (“You clearly saw the European policies that could best serve your national interests”; “With great intelligence, application and far-sightedness, you have taken full advantage”; “As a result your country has achieved success and fame”).
3. Legitimation of the EU’s purposeful action of carrying out the Eastern enlargement, implied by quoting various historical achievements of the EU and mentioning previous enlargements, of which Ireland was also a beneficiary (“It has undergone four successive enlargements”; “It has created a Single Market and a single currency”; “It has given its Member States [...] prosperity”).
4. Legitimation of the EU’s purposeful action of promoting the Nice Treaty by explaining the nexus between the purpose of ratifying the Nice Treaty and the purpose of enlargement (“Why do we need the Nice Treaty?”, “Let me be absolutely clear. The essential purpose of Nice is to enable us to welcome within a few years, all twelve of the countries currently negotiating accession”, “let there be no doubt whatever that the Nice Treaty is a political condition for enlargement”). Ratification becomes a means-oriented action here. Prodi himself, in fact, did not like the compromise reached at Nice and considered the treaty to be only temporary and instrumental in realising enlargement.
5. Legitimation of the inclusive approach to enlargement, encompassing even the weakest countries of Central and Eastern Europe, by directly referring to a system of values that defines the EU’s identity, history and goals (“all twelve of the countries currently negotiating accession”; “10 of the Candidate Countries lived under dictatorship for 45 years”; “These fellow Europeans [...] deprived of freedom, democracy and a decent standard of living”) and indirectly referring to a principle of responsibility from the EU towards these countries (“they have undertaken enormous changes in their economies and politics”, “have undergone enormous pain in the process”, “all 12 applicant states have been

²⁵ Ibid.

striving to meet the [...] imperatives of membership of the European Union"). The use of such meaningful words as "fellow Europeans", meaning the peoples of candidate countries, and 'welcome', meaning granting accession, also aims at legitimating the inclusive strategy through moral evaluation.

6. Finally, the legitimization of enlargement, the Commission's role in that process and the ratification of the Nice Treaty is also expressed through personal authorisation items ("Does anyone seriously believe the Irish economy would have taken off in this way had it been outside of the EU? I do not think so", "I believe", "I know", "Let me be absolutely clear"). These expressions suggest an attempt to reinforce personal authority legitimization at a time when the broader effort made by the Commission to successfully accomplish the EU was at risk.

From the early debate on enlargement to the difficult 'post-Nice' phase, Prodi seems to have continuously tried to enhance the Commission's legitimization, based on the following line of reasoning. The momentous time suggested that the Commission should act and, accordingly, it "will [...] urge the European Council"²⁶ to act as well; at the same time, a system of moral values justified the EU/Commission's actions (moral evaluation). This system (that "we have the opportunity" to build) is characterised by such meaningful keywords and fragments as: 'shared ideals', 'agreed common values', 'peace', 'security', 'freedom', 'justice', 'equality', 'democratic Europe', 'human rights', 'rule of law', 'economically integrated', 'growth' and 'prosperity'.

"Rarely in the course of history does an opportunity like this present itself. For the first time since the fall of the Roman Empire we have the opportunity to unite Europe—and this time it will not be by force of arms but on the basis of shared ideals and agreed common rules. Now, as never before, and perhaps as never again, we have the chance to create a Europe in which all the peoples of this continent can live together in peace, security, freedom, justice and equality. A democratic Europe where human rights are respected and the rule of law prevails. An economically integrated Europe which offers growth and prosperity through a single market and a single currency."²⁷

These principles are an essential part of Prodi's narrative on Europe. His political style often emphasises them, while addressing all kinds of

26 Romano Prodi, *On enlargement*, SPEECH/99/130, European Parliament, Brussels, 13 October 1999, p. 4.

27 Ibid, p. 2.

audiences: they are a sort of necessary frame to all other EU goals and policies. To cite another example, in commemorating the ten-year anniversary since the fall of the Berlin Wall, he says,

“The fall of the Wall was the culmination of a unique peaceful revolution by the people of Eastern Germany, who for many months, with great courage and tenacity, took to the streets to demonstrate for freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Their victory is the victory of freedom over oppression, of democracy over totalitarianism, of the social market economy over the Marxist-socialist command economy [...] We can and will succeed in creating a unified, prosperous, democratic Europe where citizens can live in peace and freedom.”²⁸

Later on, in October 2000, talking to the Paul-Henri Spaak Foundation in Brussels, he concludes his speech *Saisir le flux de l’histoire: l’élargissement et l’avenir de l’Union* by referring to “Une Europe juste, humaine et refusant l’exclusion. Une Europe passionnante et énergique. Une Europe en paix, puissante et prospère”²⁹. The order based on those same principles is introduced here with an emphasis on affection (the image of a passionate, ‘energetic’ and dynamic Europe is also recurrent in other speeches). Prodi adopted almost the same wording to conclude his speech to the EP of 15 February 2000, *2000–2005: Shaping the New Europe*,

“If we act boldly and decisively together, we can shape the new Europe our citizens want and that we owe to future generations. A just, humane, inclusive Europe. An exciting, energetic enterprising Europe. Everyone’s Europe.”³⁰

Finally, speaking to an entirely different audience, the Federal Presidium of the German Confederation of Trade Unions in Brussels in November 2000, he coherently outlined the same values in unmistakable terms,

28 Romano Prodi, *Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall*, SPEECH/99/159, Speech at the EP, Brussels, 10 November 1999 [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-99-159_en.htm], Date consulted: 29 January 2021, pp. 2–3.

29 Romano Prodi, *Saisir le flux de l’histoire: l’élargissement et l’avenir de l’Union*, SPEECH/00/374, Speech at the Fondation Paul-Henri Spaak, Brussels, 11 October 2000, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/SPEECH_00_374], p. 9.

30 Romano Prodi, *2000–2005: Shaping the New Europe*, SPEECH/00/41, Speech given at the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 15 February 2000, cit., p. 11. The underlined character is reported from the original text.

“We in the European Union are determined to create:

- a peacefully united Europe embracing all its diverse peoples;
- a democratic Europe where the people decide their own destiny;
- a tolerant Europe where freedom flourishes;
- a safe and just Europe where human rights are respected and citizens are protected.

But it must also be a fair and caring Europe—an inclusive Europe where every individual matters and has a place in our society.

And I want it to be a strong, prosperous Europe, playing a leading role on the world stage.

These are noble ambitions.

To achieve them we need to do two essential things:

- successfully enlarge the European Union, and
- thoroughly modernise Europe’s economy and society.”³¹

Two points seem relevant in this quotation: first, it defines a whole conception of Europe in a sequence of keywords; second, it tries to dispel the trade unions’ and producer associations’ fear of enlargement by raising, in the last three lines, a rational, means-oriented argument that explicitly connects the achievement of a ‘strong, prosperous Europe’ with successful enlargement and the modernisation of Europe’s economy and society (the Lisbon Agenda). It establishes a straightforward cause–effect relationship between the first goal and the other two, ultimately strengthening the purposeful character of enlargement policies.

To sum up, one could argue that those moral values are at the core of action legitimisation—sometimes based on moral evaluation, others on rationalisation—and they always explain or justify purposeful actions (with goal-oriented strategies of preparation or precaution)³². The style often emphasises legitimisation of action through personal authorisation, by means of the ‘I’ or ‘we’ subject and such assertive verbs as ‘want’ and ‘must’. For example, the system of values that ‘we have the opportunity’ to build

31 Romano Prodi, *The Road to Europe’s Future*, SPEECH/00/416, Speech at the Federal Presidium of the DGB (German Confederation of Trade Unions), 7 November 2000 [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_00_416], Date consulted: 11 December 2020, p. 7. In this text, bold and underlined characters are reported from the original version.

32 T. Van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice*, cit., Ch. 6 and 7.

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becomes, more directly, ‘the kind of Europe we want’³³. In general, the style consistently tends to involve the listener in an emotional way, while at the same time affirming the authority of the speaker.

4. Institutional reforms, the European crisis and the Community method

The Eastern enlargement obviously implied a transformation of EU institutions. The above-cited speech *On enlargement* not only points out the nexus between these two goals, but also gives the Commission’s clear perspective on it.

“[...] the EU must seriously address the indispensable institutional reforms needed to create an enlarged union which works. Institutions designed for six members, and which are already inadequate now, will certainly not be able to manage a Union of 25 or 30 countries. The necessary changes must be in place by the end of 2002, at which time negotiations with the most advanced candidate countries will be reaching their conclusion”.³⁴

In this text, the goal of institutional reforms is legitimated in an authoritative way with such keywords as ‘indispensable’ and ‘necessary’; they are ‘needed’, and the EU will ‘certainly’ not be able to function without them. Carrying out both processes in a consistent manner became a sort of mission for the Commission.

The international crisis that ensued in the aftermath of 9/11 would only make that mission more urgent. A quote taken from the speech *September 11, 2001: Attack on America*, given a few weeks after the strike on the World Trade Center in NYC, helps to clarify this point. It explains why opting for European integration became “essential”,

“We have to recognise that Europe is at a crossroads. These events have happened at a crucial point in the building of Europe. As all the speeches we have heard since the spring of 2000 confirm, everyone agrees that we need reform. [...] Recent events have simply reinforced this belief.”³⁵

The deepening of European integration looked to be the only viable response to both old and new challenges, including the destabilisation of world politics and the new threat of international terrorism.

33 Romano Prodi, *Laeken: signpost to the Future*, SPEECH/01/636, Speech at the European Parliament, Brussels, 17 December 2001 [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_01_636], Date consulted: 6 January 2021, p. 2.

34 Romano Prodi, *On enlargement*, p. 4.

35 Romano Prodi, *September 11, 2001: Attack on America*.

“I firmly believe that we need to speed up the integration that is under way. The events of 11 September oblige us to act resolutely and rapidly, but not unthinkingly, to continue down the road on which the EU has already embarked.”³⁶

The Nice summit and the subsequent treaty, however, opened a phase of tough and divisive negotiations within the EU, which focused first on ensuring the Treaty’s ratification and second on starting new supranational reforms. Prodi’s Commission took a proactive approach to both: the President’s speeches of 2001 and 2002 show all his personal commitment to implementing the Nice compromise, while at the same time laying the ground for overcoming it. The discourse on institutional reforms had been dominating the European political debate for a decade and would remain unresolved for almost another one: from Maastricht to Lisbon, European politics was carried out while a continuous, still constantly incomplete process of reform was in progress. From Prodi’s perspective, this situation had a destabilising effect in Europe: it spread insecurity among the member states and public opinion. Therefore, he was sincerely willing to seize the chance of the ongoing reform process to promote full supranational transition and the implementation of the Community method in all policy areas, including the traditionally intergovernmental field of security and defence. In November 2001, speaking at the EP, he concluded his *Looking towards Laeken* text with a straightforward appeal,

“The Community method, which succeeds in combining democracy and effectiveness, is still the best way to build the new Europe. For this reason, future Treaty reforms must aim at renewing and strengthening it.”³⁷

Following the exercise of discourse analysis, these discourse fragments encompass two different kinds of arguments in favour of ‘renewing and strengthening’ the Community method: a rational one (‘succeeds’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘the best way to build the new Europe’, ‘must aim’—legitimation through rationalisation) and another one based on moral and political values (‘democracy’, ‘new Europe’—legitimation through moral evaluation, with reference to the above-mentioned European moral order). In the same speech, the word ‘Community’ appears eight times, two of them referring to the ‘method’, the others to ‘Community law’, ‘Community

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Romano Prodi, *Looking towards Laeken*, SPEECH/01/590, Speech to the European Parliament, Brussels, 28 November 2001 [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_01_590], Date consulted: 6 January 2021, p. 9.

system’, ‘Community policies’, ‘European Community’ and ‘Community’ as synonyms and, interestingly enough, in one case the ‘Community spirit’. The latter is defined as a synthesis of efficiency (rational or expert authority) and morality (moral evaluation) in the following.

“[...] The new Member States will not only have to adapt to the established body of Community law; they will also have to absorb the Community spirit that has enabled us to achieve extraordinary results and that is based, above all, on making an effort to understand the thinking of others, on the desire to work together and on a shared long-term political vision. [...] the involvement of representatives of the applicant countries in the work of the Convention is of paramount importance.”³⁸

This definition of the ‘Community spirit’ sums up some coherent aspects of Prodi’s narrative on enlargement and institutional reforms. It embodies the values of unity and inclusiveness (which were very important for the enlargement strategy), is associated with such terms as ‘enable’ and ‘extraordinary results’ (suggesting its effectiveness) and reveals the existence of a ‘shared long-term political vision’ that informs all other aspects of the life of the EU (bringing the audience back to the European system of values). The European Convention was also part of that narrative: in December 2001, enlargement was represented as “a major motivation for the Convention”³⁹. The Convention is obviously a critical sub-category of the discourse strand on institutional reforms. Prodi himself stressed its importance in his later speeches: it remains, however, essentially instrumental to the purpose of enlargement. The Community method, instead, is meaningful in itself. This post-Laeken speech refers to it twice, both times in a sort of direct plea to the EP in favour of its further implementation and strengthening.

“One thing should already be clear. The ‘Community method’ has enabled the Union to become what it is: a union of peoples and a union of States, requiring an innovative decision-making structure, with common institutions and a voice for all countries large and small.

The ‘Community method’ has already served to promote efficiency and democratic legitimacy. We must simply adapt and strengthen it.”⁴⁰

The purpose of the Community method is means-oriented; in fact, it ‘served to promote efficiency’ and ‘has enabled the Union to become what it is’; however, it has also promoted ‘democratic legitimacy’. This makes

38 Ibid., p. 8.

39 Romano Prodi, *Laeken: signpost to the Future*, p. 2.

40 Ibid., p. 3.

the Community method critical to both the functioning of the EU and the preservation of its values and ideals. It is also nothing new to the EU; in fact, its further adaptation and strengthening can be done ‘simply’. In other words, the audience receives the message that the Community method is part of Europe’s tradition and natural development.

The Convention, instead, has an essentially instrumental character,

“The Convention must deliver what is expected of it—change, to enable us to face the future with confidence. [...]

The Convention approach is a deliberate break with the past. Our aim is to have it draw on the ideas and experience of the many, not the few. Our aim is for it to conduct its business in the clear light of day.

Within the Convention, the Commission will act as guardian of the treaties and promoter of the Community spirit.”⁴¹

These discourse fragments suggest the following essential points.

A) The instrumental character of the Convention (it “must deliver what is expected of it”—means/effect-oriented). B) the Convention is instrumental to putting in place a method of work and a result that must be different from the past, moving beyond the negotiation patterns of IGCs, which Prodi often criticises in his speeches, (“expected [...] change”, “The Convention’s approach is a deliberate break with the past”—since it is expected to have that effect, its legitimisation depends on it, so the Convention might be delegitimised if unable to provide change). C) the Convention is expected (by the Commission—“Our aim is [...] Our aim is [...]”) to play differently than such intergovernmental bodies as the IGC in two different ways, by making decision-making broader (“the ideas and experience of the many, not the few”) and by making it transparent (“in the clear light of the day”). Later on in 2003, disappointed by the Convention’s results, Prodi warned, in front of the French National assembly, that “The members of the Convention must come up with a constitutional text that is worthy of the name; a single text that is clear and coherent [...] The intergovernmental conference cannot succeed where the Convention fails”⁴². D) the Commission acknowledges and declares its own authority (impersonal

41 Ibid., p. 4.

42 Romano Prodi, *Hearing before the French National Assembly – Delegation for the European Union*, SPEECH/03/126, French National Assembly, Paris, 12 March 2003 [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjCjPHV7sjtAhUGDOWKHTX8CF4QFjAAegQIBBAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fcommission%2Fpresscorner%2Fapi%2Ffiles%2Fdocument%2Fprint%2Fen%2Fspeech_03_126%2FSPEECH_03_126_EN.pdf&usq=AOvVaw3U3NYFul82JR6cl_wKHlqY], Date consulted: 11 December 2020, p. 4.

authority, granted by law) to “act as a guardian of the treaties” and to promote the “Community spirit”, of which the “Community method” is, essentially, an expression.

If contextualised in the mood of the European debate of December 2001, these discourse fragments express the Commission’s concealed worries about the potential failure of the constitutional process under the pressure of national prerogatives and fears made worse by the collective shock of 9/11; the reiteration of such unproductive negotiations as the Nice Council’s; a political stalemate that Prodi was afraid might hamper the entire process of enlargement; and, finally, the potential isolation of the Commission and the candidate countries. Against such concerns, he reaffirmed the authority and role of the Commission in protecting the Community method: it was the beginning of a complicated relationship with the Convention, which culminated in the so-called “Penelope affair” one year later⁴³.

Finally, in *The past and future of European integration* (February 2002), an emphatic speech addressed to an audience of students and scholars in Madrid, the theme of institutional reforms is narrated through the images of the past and future of the EU. The Community method (or system) connects both: “[...] the Community system [...] has enabled Europe to achieve great things [...]”⁴⁴. Present and future challenges are introduced by a series of direct questions, with the “we” pronoun being repeated, which seems to willingly include everyone in Europe, not just the EU institutions,

“[...] where are we going? What lies at the end of this process of ‘ever-closer union’? And what instruments do we need now to help us get there?

We have reached a point where these questions can be put off no longer.

We stand on the verge of a huge enlargement, preparing to welcome up to ten new Member States by 2004, with more to follow within a few years.

[...] It is time we all came to an agreement on what we want for our common future, and set it down in a constitutional Treaty”⁴⁵.

EU reform demanded simple answers to concrete questions in a context that could not bear more uncertainty: “where are we going”? “What instru-

43 L. Fasanaro, L. Nuti, “Romano Prodi (1999–2004): so much to do at such a critical time”, pp. 243–247.

44 Romano Prodi, *The past and future of European integration*, p. 2.

45 Ibid., p. 3.

ments do we need”? “We have reached a point”, “We stand on the verge of”, “It is time” and “what we want”. More direct questions can be found in the following lines, interrupted by “I believe” and “we must”, which were probably meant to strengthen argumentation, and followed by a series of exclamations to accelerate the rhythm of the speech.

“The EU has reached a crossroads—or rather a roundabout.

Several directions are possible from here. Which one do we take?

The road towards complete political union?

Or the road of purely intergovernmental cooperation?

The road of deeper integration among all Member States?

Or the road of ‘enhanced cooperation’ among various groups of countries?

I believe we cannot agree on the road to take without first agreeing on our long-term goal. We must have a vision of the kind of Europe we want to achieve in the end.

For too long we have been focusing on budgets and accounts, trying to run Europe as if it were a business.

Europe is not a business: it is a family of nations and peoples who have come together to pursue common goals.

So let’s get away from the accountancy approach.

Let’s lift our eyes from our ledgers and look at the far horizon.

Let’s have a vision of what lies ahead—a vision of where we want to go together.

Let me tell you my vision of Europe.

I am profoundly convinced that Europe must be built on the core values we all share.

- peace and stability;
- freedom and democracy;
- tolerance and respect for human rights;
- solidarity and social justice”⁴⁶.

These lines sum up Prodi’s perception of a political context that was already very different from the one in which he had been appointed. The enthusiasm of the early months was downsized by the Nice negotiations, the terrorist attacks in America, and the feeling that distrust and selfish interests were jeopardising the entire framework of enlargement negotiations: the Commission President probably felt that the Convention itself could be thwarted if it became hesitant about its role in the making of the

46 Romano Prodi, *The past and future of European integration*, p. 4.

The Community method “must remain the beating heart of the Union”

Constitution. All the principles and values quoted in the other texts are mentioned in this meaningful speech and become the essential legitimation to the Commission’s claims and actions in favour of the Community method, “I believe the Community method renewed and strengthened, must remain the beating heart of the Union”⁴⁷.

Concluding remarks

The narrative on Europe that Romano Prodi included in his speeches as Commission President is composed of a number of key themes reflecting the time of complexity and change that Europe was going through: the Eastern enlargement, involving the relations with candidate countries and their perception of the EU; institutional reforms, including the debate between the Community method and the intergovernmental approach, as well as the role of the Convention; the economic and social goals, summed up in the Lisbon Agenda and affected by the entry into force of the euro; the CFSP/ESDP, including the reshaping of EU relations with Russia and transatlantic relations; European governance; and, from a broader perspective, globalisation and sustainable development. This paper has taken into account only the first two discourse strands, as they appear and are developed in a number of speeches given to different audiences at different times. All of them, however different in their focus, style and tone, included direct or indirect references to a broad and coherent vision of Europe and a ‘project’⁴⁸ for Europe. They convey a sense of purpose and reveal the speaker’s intention of legitimating the actions of agents committed to that purpose (the EU, the Commission, the other institutions, the member states, the candidate countries, the people of Europe). As cornerstones of this project, enlargement and the reform of EU institutions are repeatedly mentioned, explained, advocated and analysed in their implications with other goals, even when they are not the main focus of the speech. Prodi’s texts on Europe are full of keywords and key discourse fragments, which define the contours of that vision, often in a straightforward manner; of evocative images; of references to historical events and connections between the categories of past and future; of links between different goals that give an idea of his own integrated conception

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴⁸ See, for example, Romano Prodi, *Hearing before the French National Assembly*, Paris, 12 March 2003.

of European values, politics, socio-economic developments and functioning. They try to convey this integrated approach to European politics, combined with the Commission's strong commitment.

The European environment they represent is a work in progress—blessed, but also threatened, by a time of momentous transformation. The meanings and language of these speeches aim at fostering change in the minds and feelings of the audience, either the one convened to listen, or the broader public, composed of European institutions, stakeholders and citizens. That change could be cognitive, affective and behavioural, depending on whom the message was conveyed to. Some of these speeches are more technical and detailed, tailored to experts; others are more passionate and visionary; others, finally, have a formal and institutional approach. In general, however, they enhance knowledge about Europe, clarify information and explain the meaning of political and economic measures. In this sense, they encourage a cognitive change about Europe, but also a change of mentality, in line with the Commission's perspective. This second aim involves not only knowledge, but also feelings and affection towards the idea of Europe, associated with a peaceful and stable order, a common history and a place where one's own values and identity are rooted and recognisable. Affective change is probably the most important one from Prodi's perspective, the real missing one, a gap that had made Europe considered to be 'a business', rather than 'a family of nations and peoples who have come together to pursue common goals'⁴⁹. The 'family' analogy is, indeed, one of the most recurrent and authoritative used by Prodi in his speeches on enlargement⁵⁰: family relations are, indeed, bound by affection, common roots, but also mutual responsibility. Similarly, Prodi often defines enlargement as the 're-unification' of Europe, another image that aims at touching the affective key, both in the EU as well as in the candidate countries, which suggests a sense of unity among the European people, who share the experience of fighting, at different times in history, for freedom, democracy and prosperity. Cognitive and affective change, however, would be meaningless without a behavioural change, which the Commission President encourages most of all when he speaks to the European Parliament and in front of economic and political

49 Romano Prodi, *The past and future of European integration*, p. 4.

50 For example, Romano Prodi, *Bringing the family together*, Speech at the Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 4 April 2001, SPEECH/01/158 [available at, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_01_158].

stakeholders. Some of these speeches are presented, in their structure and wording, like real calls for action.

There is a difference, however, between his early and later speeches. In the first two years of Prodi’s mandate, they evoked widespread optimism, due among other things to a positive economic conjuncture: the “winning combination of low interest rates, low inflation, dwindling public debt and a genuine prospect of sustained and sustainable growth [...] And sustained growth in an expanding markets will give us the margin of manoeuvre we need. Let’s not waste this unique opportunity!”⁵¹. The EMU was also in its last implementation phase: the entry into force of the euro was considered by Prodi a success, both economically and politically. The European Council’s decision to endorse the inclusive strategy on enlargement, moreover, enhanced the Commission’s expectations about the timing and positive effects of that process. This was a time of trust and dynamism for the new Commission, which Prodi totally shared and encouraged, being convinced that the Commission held the power to lead the EU in its new course.

The post-Nice phase, instead, unveiled renewed national reservations and concerns about the consequences of enlargement. The subsequent international crisis triggered by 9/11 made the European environment more unstable and unpredictable, in real life, as well as in Prodi’s narrative. His speeches became less emphatic, optimistic and reassuring; now and then, his style became warning or reprimanding, showing disappointment and longing for a stronger reaction from the other EU institutions to the crisis. This quote from November 2001 at the College of Europe is only one of many examples,

“Europe is at a turning point in its history. The Commission is working for change with zeal, tenacity and competence. But the Commission’s job is to propose, and later to implement. Decisions themselves have to be taken by Parliament and the Council. And too often the decisions are not forthcoming. [...]”⁵²

51 Romano Prodi, *The Road to Europe’s Future*, p. 8 (underlined text is reported as it is in the original version).

52 Romano Prodi, *An enlarged and more united Europe, a global player – Challenges and opportunities in the new century*, SPEECH/01/528, Speech given at the College of Europe, Bruges, 12 November 2001 [<https://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do;jsessionid=GL4LJdxUQU-pnfLEaOfbNNxqq6y-XkwzuEAadukkI0NwPaMb80r!-898031139?docId=725486&cardId=105409>], Date consulted: 5 January 2021, p. 15.

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What did not change, however, was Prodi's vision of Europe, convincingly reaffirmed in his own speeches as the only possible way for the EU to succeed in that crisis. The core of the initial purpose, a pan-European order (enlargement), defined by a set of recognisable common values (the common 'spirit') and by the efficiency of enhanced supranational decision-making (the common 'method'), remained unchanged. The legitimating power of that purpose, investing in the EU institutions, the people, the states of Europe and, lastly, the Convention, also remained unchanged. Throughout his mandate and beyond, Prodi's speeches reflected what he profoundly believed in, namely that the Commission's initiative power was not merely technical, nor procedural, but essentially political.

L'Europe du Président de la République Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (1999-2006)

Sante Cruciani

Introduction

Dans le contexte des narrations de l'Union européenne¹, le discours du Président de la République Carlo Azeglio Ciampi présente une étude de cas stimulante sur l'Italie et le processus d'intégration européenne ainsi que sur l'Europe de l'après-guerre froide, couvrant une période allant de l'entrée en vigueur de la monnaie unique aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001, jusqu'à la Convention et l'échec du projet constitutionnel suite au rejet en 2005 par les référendums français et néerlandais².

Né à Livourne en 1920, élève de Guido Calogero à l'École normale de Pise, adhérent du mouvement « Giustizia e Libertà » après l'armistice du 8 septembre 1943, fondateur du Parti d'action dans sa ville natale, Ciampi traverse l'histoire de l'Italie républicaine en faisant carrière à la Banque d'Italie : dans les succursales de Livourne et de Macerata, pendant la reconstruction et le miracle économique, puis à Rome, au siège de via Nazionale, service des Études, dont il devient directeur en 1970, secrétaire général en 1973, directeur général adjoint en 1976, directeur général en 1978 et gouverneur en octobre 1979.

Désormais bras droit du gouverneur Baffi, partisan de l'autonomie de la Banque d'Italie, d'une politique monétaire garantissant la stabilité, de la lutte contre l'inflation, du redressement du budget public, de la réforme du système productif du pays en harmonie avec la participation au processus d'intégration, en avril 1993 Ciampi est nommé président du Conseil par le Président de la République Scalfaro, pendant la phase la plus drama-

1 Daniela Preda & Daniele Pasquinucci (eds), *Consensus and European Integration. An Historical Perspective*, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2012; Daniele Pasquinucci, Daniela Preda and Luciano Tosi (eds), *Communicating Europe: journals and European integration 1939-1979*, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2013; Mark Gilbert, Daniele Pasquinucci, *Euroscepticism: the historical roots of a political challenge*, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2020.

2 Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori (eds), *European Union History. Themes and debates*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

tique de la crise du système politique et de la spéculation internationale au détriment de la lire.

Il exerce ses fonctions de président du Conseil des ministres jusqu'en mai 1994, devient ensuite ministre du Trésor et du Budget du gouvernement Prodi de mai 1996 à octobre 1998, puis du gouvernement D'Alema jusqu'au 13 mai 1999, date de son élection à la présidence de la République. À l'issue du premier tour de scrutin, il recueille sur son nom 707 suffrages, grâce à la convergence du centre-gauche de Prodi et du centre-droit de Berlusconi³.

Au-delà de sa biographie et de sa présentation correcte, les références à son long « militantisme » au sein de la Banque d'Italie constitue une clé de lecture essentielle pour comprendre l'expérience politique et institutionnelle et sa façon de concevoir l'Europe dans le système international du XXI^e siècle.

Comme l'écrit Ezio Mauro, dans le jour de l'élection de Ciampi au Quirinal, il est «un gentleman président», issue de la classe dirigeante de la banque d'Italie, parmi les architectes de «l'événement le plus significatif de la décennie, l'entrée de l'Italie dans la monnaie unique», avec la personnalité d'«un serviteur passionné de l'État qui n'a jamais suivis les illusions technocratiques d'administrer la politique»⁴.

Il peut alors être stimulant d'identifier les traits saillants du discours pro-européen de Ciampi, un homme qui est passé d'une institution « monarchique » comme la Banque d'Italie à la refonte de l'identité républicaine dans la «commune patrie européenne» depuis la colline du Quirinal, dans ses grands discours en tant que Président de la République⁵.

3 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Da Livorno al Quirinale. Storia di un italiano*, Conversazione con Arrigo Levi, Bologna, il Mulino, 2010; Massimo Giannini, *Ciampi : sette anni di un tecnico al Quirinale*, Torino, Einaudi, 2006; Paolo Peluffo, *Carlo Azeglio Ciampi : l'uomo e il Presidente*, Milano, Rizzoli, 2007; Rosario Forlenza, *La Repubblica del Presidente : gli anni di Carlo Azeglio Ciampi*, Parma, Diabasis, 2011; Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Un metodo per governare*, Bologna, il Mulino, 1999; Idem, *Dall'Europa all'euro, dall'euro all'Europa*, a cura di Federico Galimberti, Treves, 2004; Antonio Puri Purini, *Dal Colle più alto. Al Quirinale, con Ciampi negli anni in cui tutto cambiò*, Prefazione di Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Milano, il Saggiatore, 2012; Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, *Contro scettici e disfattisti. Gli anni di Ciampi 1999-2006*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2013.

4 Ezio Mauro, *Un paese finalmente normale*, in «La Repubblica», 14 maggio 1999.

5 Pour l'historiographie sur les Présidents de la République, il est fait référence à Simona Colarizi, Giovanni Sabbatucci (eds), *I presidenti: da Enrico De Nicola a Carlo Azeglio Ciampi*, Novara, De Agostini, 2006; Giovanni Di Capua, *Dieci Presidenti dieci repubbliche: da Enrico De Nicola a Carlo Azeglio Ciampi*, Tarquinia, Nuove Edizioni Ebe, 2007; Maurizio Ridolfi (ed.), *Presidenti. Storia e costumi della*

1. *Le Quirinal, l'Italie et la Commune patrie européenne (1999-2001)*

Comme l'a observé Umberto Gentiloni Silveri⁶, en s'appuyant sur les journaux du Président Ciampi, son septennat peut être analysé en problématisant trois phases : la refonte de l'identité nationale et sa projection extérieure, le changement de paradigme qui a suivi la cohabitation avec le second gouvernement Berlusconi et l'impact du 11 septembre 2001 sur le système international, la guerre en Irak de 2003 et le projet de Constitution européenne.

Dans ce domaine d'investigation, le discours de Ciampi sur l'Europe est sans aucun doute central et constitue le pivot d'une action visant à accroître la dimension politique de l'Union, la coordination des politiques économiques, la réforme des institutions, l'élargissement à l'Europe de l'Est, le lancement d'une Constitution pour une Fédération d'États-nations⁷.

Dans son discours inaugural du 18 mai 1999, les principes constitutionnels de l'Italie républicaine, l'hommage au président Einaudi, « avec qui je partage un chemin de vie, mais pas la grandeur de la doctrine », sont investis « dans cette Union qui nous a toujours considérés comme des prot-

Repubblica nell'Italia democratica, Roma, Viella, 2014; Marco Gervasoni, *Le armate del Presidente. La politica del Quirinale nell'Italia repubblicana*, Venezia, Marsilio, 2015; Sabino Cassese, Giuseppe Galasso, Alberto Melloni (eds), *I Presidenti della Repubblica. Il Capo dello Stato e il Quirinale nella storia della Democrazia italiana*, Bologna, il Mulino, 2018; Giovanni Orsina e Maurizio Ridolfi (eds), *La Repubblica del presidente. Istituzioni, pedagogia civile e cittadini nelle trasformazioni delle democrazie*, Roma, Viella, 2022; Francesco Bonini, Sandro Guerrieri, Simona Mori, Marco Olivetti (eds), *Il settennato. Una esperienza transnazionale*, Bologna, il Mulino, 2022; Sante Cruciani, Maurizio Ridolfi, Antonio Varsori (eds), *I Presidenti della Repubblica e il ruolo internazionale dell'Italia. Dal Trattato di Pace al Trattato di Maastricht (1947-1992)*, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2022. Pour un voyage à travers l'histoire et les images, consultez aussi Sante Cruciani e Raffaello Ares Doro (eds), *I Presidenti della Repubblica. I Comuni, l'Italia, l'Europa (1946-2013)*, Viterbo, Università della Tuscia, 201.

6 Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, "Carlo Azeglio Ciampi", in Sabino Cassese, Giuseppe Galasso, Alberto Melloni (eds), *I Presidenti della Repubblica. Il Capo dello Stato e il Quirinale nella storia della democrazia italiana*, I, Bologna, il Mulino, 2018, pp. 407-438.

7 Elena Calandri, Giuliana Laschi e Simone Paoli (eds), *L'Europa adulta. Attori, ragioni e sfide dall'atto Unico alla Brexit*, Bologna, il Mulino, 2020.

agonistes de sa construction », fondée sur le dialogue avec la Méditerranée et la consolidation de la « pax européenne »⁸.

Au lendemain du premier voyage à l'étranger, en Albanie le 11 juin 1999, pour soutenir la mission des forces armées de l'ONU contre le nettoyage ethnique de la Serbie au Kosovo⁹, on observe l'ébauche d'un axe privilégié avec le Président de la République fédérale d'Allemagne Rau pour une accélération du processus d'intégration.

La visite à Berlin, Francfort et Bonn les 14 et 15 juillet 1999 constitue en effet le manifeste européeniste du Président Ciampi au début de son mandat, avec un discours sur l'Europe qui réclame, après les traités de Maastricht et d'Amsterdam, « une politique étrangère qui fasse autorité, une véritable politique européenne de sécurité » et « la consolidation de leur institutionnalisation au niveau communautaire avec des pouvoirs définis et autonomes »¹⁰.

L'objectif de combiner stabilité et croissance, progrès économique et sauvegarde des principes sociaux « dont l'Europe est fière », nécessite l'intervention, auprès de la Banque centrale européenne, chargée de préserver la stabilité des prix, d'« un centre de décision pour la politique économique commune »¹¹.

Cette stratégie pro-européenne s'est articulée l'année suivante en une série de visites au cœur des institutions européennes. Lors de la réunion du 7 mars 2000 avec le Président de la Commission Prodi, le discours du Président Ciampi a abordé des thématiques telles que l'élargissement de l'Union et le renforcement des institutions, le renforcement de la politique de défense et de la politique étrangère, la perspective d'une Constitution européenne :

« Je considère la Charte des droits fondamentaux comme la première partie de la Constitution européenne, la partie dans laquelle les valeurs, les principes fondamentaux de référence seront établis, comme c'est le cas dans toutes les Constitutions. C'est la tâche de ceux qui rédigent la Charte

8 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Serment et Message au Parlement du Président de la République le jour de son investiture*, Rome, 18 mai 1999; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=9614>; 4 juin 2021.

9 Giorgio Battistini, *Tornerete a casa, noi vi aiuteremo*, in «La Repubblica», 12 juin 1999.

10 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Brindisi à l'occasion du repas offert par le Président de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne Rau* Berlin, 14 juillet 1999 ; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=9647>; 4 juin 2021.

11 Ibid.

des droits fondamentaux. Je le répète : première partie de la Constitution européenne »¹².

Alors que le discours du 26 septembre 2000 devant l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe s'attarde sur les mérites de cette institution « si les européens ont aujourd'hui un hymne et un drapeau » et sur la « mémoire historique de l'Europe » comme fondement d'une « identité culturelle commune »¹³, le discours du 4 octobre 2000 devant le Parlement européen aborde les questions politiques non résolues.

À la veille du Conseil européen de Nice, l'appel du Président Ciampi à une coopération renforcée, pour donner force et souplesse à l'Union, part de la refondation de l'Europe après la guerre froide, dans une phase où « nous décidons du destin de notre continent, comme l'ont fait les grands hommes d'État des années 50 »¹⁴. La réforme institutionnelle et l'élargissement sont des questions incontournables, afin de faire de l'Union un acteur politique reconnu dans la dynamique de la mondialisation :

« Ce n'est que grâce à l'Europe que les États-nations pourront être des acteurs convaincants au sein de la communauté internationale. La solitude des États européens à l'époque de la mondialisation conduirait à des attitudes velléitaires et à la marginalisation. L'Union doit parler d'une seule voix en matière de politique étrangère, concevoir une stratégie de défense et de sécurité commune. L'élargissement est un impératif éthique autant que politique [...]. L'élargissement nécessite un renforcement; le renforcement permet l'élargissement et ne le compromet pas »¹⁵.

Une approche similaire se retrouve dans la monnaie unique, qui « a poussé le processus d'intégration au-delà du point de non-retour », mais qui doit être soutenue par des formes de gouvernance économique qui dépassent les frontières des États-nations, afin de ne pas trahir les attentes concernant le rôle de l'Union sur la scène internationale :

« L'euro n'est qu'une étape dans la création d'une Europe économique, sociale, politique et culturelle. Il la rend inexorablement nécessaire.

12 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Allocution du Président de la République à l'occasion de la rencontre avec M. Romano Prodi Président de la Commission européenne et le Conseil des Commissaires européens*, Bruxelles, 7 mars 2000 ; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=9763>; 4 juin 2021.

13 Idem, *Allocution du Président de la République devant l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe*, Strasbourg, 26 septembre 2000 ; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=13049>; 4 juin 2021.

14 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Allocution du Président de la République au Parlement Européen*, Strasbourg, 4 octobre 2000; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=1312>; 4 juin 2021.

15 Ibid.

Lorsque l'union monétaire a été décidée, les gens étaient conscients qu'une asymétrie se formait, mais ils étaient convaincus que celle-ci serait éliminée en progressant vers un gouvernement commun de l'économie. [...] Les processus d'intégration régionale dans les Amériques, dans le Pacifique, en Asie, considèrent l'Union européenne comme un modèle et un interlocuteur. [...] La dimension que nous ne pouvons atteindre qu'en tant qu'Union devient une nécessité afin de suivre les autres grands acteurs de la scène internationale».¹⁶

Compte tenu de l'action du Président Ciampi au sein des institutions communautaires, la décision de rétablir la fête nationale du 2 juin dans le calendrier civil italien, par la loi du 14 novembre 2000, doit être interprétée comme le début d'un travail de pédagogie culturelle de haut niveau, pour la redécouverte d'un nouveau « patriotisme républicain » pour la « commune patrie européenne »¹⁷.

Dans le sillage du Président Pertini, la relance des symboles de la République tels que l'hymne et le drapeau, la réouverture du Vittoriano, l'ouverture des jardins et du palais du Quirinal à l'occasion du 2 juin, le défilé militaire avec la participation des représentants des pays de l'Union et de l'OTAN, sont devenus le noyau essentiel du discours de Ciampi sur l'Europe et sont entrés dans l'imaginaire des Italiens grâce aux émissions télévisées en direct de la RAI¹⁸.

À en juger par le succès populaire de la Fête du 2 juin 2001, par les premières pages des journaux et par les indices d'écoute des journaux télévisés¹⁹, c'est un coup gagnant, qui renforcera les idéaux européens du Président Ciampi et le soutiendra pendant la période amère des attentats du 11 septembre 2001 et de la guerre en Irak de 2003.

2. *L'Union européenne et les relations transatlantiques entre la Méditerranée et le Moyen-Orient (2001-2003)*

La formation du deuxième gouvernement Berlusconi le 11 juin 2001²⁰, la personnalisation de la politique étrangère du Premier ministre, la gestion

16 Ibid.

17 Maurizio Ridolfi, *Le feste nazionali*, Bologna, il Mulino, 2003, pp. 282-288.

18 Ibid.

19 Francesco Grignetti, *Orgoglio del passato, fiducia nell'avvenire*, in «La Stampa», 3 giugno 2001

20 Giovanni Orsina, *Berlusconism and Italy : a historical interpretation*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

dramatique du G8 de Gênes avec la mort du jeune Carlo Giuliani, les relations transatlantiques après le 11 septembre 2001, la dérive eurosceptique avec la démission du ministre des affaires étrangères Ruggiero le 6 janvier 2002, ont introduit des éléments persistants de tension entre le Palazzo Chigi et le Quirinal, qui apparaissent en 2003²¹.

Ce qui est en jeu, ce sont les circuits habituels de la diplomatie italienne, l'équilibre nécessaire entre atlantisme et européanisme, l'intangibilité des pouvoirs de la Présidence de la République, en tant que garante de l'unité nationale et de la politique étrangère et de défense du pays.

Fortement convaincu de l'unité transatlantique dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, le Président Ciampi identifie dans la dynamique déclenchée par le 11 septembre 2001 un dangereux dualisme entre l'accélération du processus d'intégration et la régression vers une logique intergouvernementale, qui pourrait neutraliser la dynamique d'élargissement, de réforme des institutions et d'introduction d'une Constitution.

Le discours du 16 novembre 2001 à Berlin, en présence du Président Rau, sur «L'unité dans la diversité: quelle forme politique doit prendre l'Europe», introduit dans le discours de Ciampi sur l'Europe la référence à un tournant stratégique du système international :

« Les attentats terroristes du 11 septembre à New York et Washington nous ont appelés à défendre des valeurs et des règles que nous estimons profondément européennes et essentielles à notre civilisation humaine commune [...]. En défendant ces valeurs, l'Europe est aux côtés des États-Unis. Elle l'est d'abord et avant tout en tant qu'Union européenne. Cependant, ces dernières semaines, on a eu l'impression que le rôle, pourtant nécessaire, des États-nations prenait le pas sur l'approche européenne. [...] Aujourd'hui, face aux incertitudes du monde, notre réponse doit être la même : accélérer l'intégration en termes de sécurité intérieure, de capacité de présence extérieure et de coordination des économies. En agissant de la sorte, l'Europe deviendra un pilier de l'ordre mondial »²².

Il en résulte un appel au Conseil européen de Laeken, convoqué les 14 et 15 décembre 2001, pour donner un « mandat ambitieux en termes de contenu et de délais précis » à la Convention qui préparera la réforme des traités de l'Union, dans le sens d'une « Fédération d'États-nations »,

21 Emidio Diodato, Federico Niglia, *Berlusconi "the diplomat": populism and foreign policy in Italy*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019

22 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Allocution du Président de la République au Septième Forum Européen de la Fondation Quandt sur le thème : "Unie dans la diversité : quelle forme doit prendre l'Europe?"*, Berlin, 16 Novembre 2001; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=16257>; 4 juin 2021.

alliant «la supranationalité comme pierre angulaire de l'Europe, le respect de la diversité des systèmes nationaux, et la capacité de préserver, d'unir et de progresser»²³.

Alors que la Convention, présidée par Valéry Giscard d'Estaing avec la vice-présidence de Giuliano Amato, poursuit ses travaux, l'«unilatéralisme» des États-Unis, la théorisation de la « guerre préventive », la « coalition des volontaires » pour une attaque militaire contre l'Irak²⁴, la volonté du gouvernement italien d'y adhérer contrairement à l'article 11 de la Constitution, font éclater un conflit permanent entre le président du Conseil Berlusconi et le Président de la République Ciampi, déterminé à convoquer le Conseil suprême de la défense.

C'est un moment décisif dans l'histoire de la politique étrangère italienne après la fin de la guerre froide, qui s'exprime dans les journaux intimes du Président de la République Ciampi, qui remarque clairement le 14 mars 2003 :

«Notes et réunions sur l'Irak. Les États-Unis demandent un espace aérien de survol et l'utilisation de bases. Rechercher toutes les possibilités pour éviter les conflits; la sauvegarde des Institutions internationales, respect inconditionnel de la *Constitution* (article 11). L'Italie ne peut pas participer, nécessite l'autorisation des organisations internationales (ONU, OTAN, UE) sous réserve de conflit avec l'article 11»²⁵.

Le Président Ciampi lui-même a rappelé plus tard, sans adoucir le conflit institutionnel et politique en cour en 2003 et soulignant l'affirmation de sa ligne de défense de principes constitutionnels :

« J'étais déterminé à proposer la formule du pays « non belligérant ». Je me suis engagé à fond lors de la réunion avec les chefs militaires. À la fin, il était clair que l'Italie n'avait aucune intention d'envoyer un seul homme se battre en Irak. Nous étions prêts à fournir du personnel pour la reconstruction. Y compris les moyens militaires nécessaires à la défense de nos unités, mais pas pour les opérations militaires. Mon texte a été approuvé, avec de petites modifications »²⁶.

La menace d'un outrage à la Constitution et d'une blessure irréparable aux prérogatives de la Présidence de la République écartée, le discours de Ciampi sur l'Europe en 2003, à l'occasion du semestre de la Présidence ita-

23 Ibid.

24 Andrea Beccaro, *La guerra in Iraq*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2013

25 Cfr. Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, *Contro scettici e disfattisti. Gli anni di Ciampi al Quirinale 1999-2006*, pp. 193-194

26 Ibid.

lienne du Conseil de l'Union européenne, est le moment d'ouvrir la voie à un rôle de surveillance et encadrement du gouvernement Berlusconi.

Dans son allocution à l'université Humboldt de Berlin le 26 juin 2003 sur « l'amitié italo-allemande au service de l'intégration européenne »²⁷ le discours de Ciampi ne manque pas de références autobiographiques, évoquant ses séjours d'étudiant à l'École Normale Supérieure de Bonn durant l'été 1939 pour apprendre l'allemand, puis sa visite en mars 1941 de Leipzig dans un Berlin sous les bombardements britanniques, tandis que l'appel aux armes pesait sur son avenir immédiat.

Les observations sur la naissance des États italien et allemand, le partage de la sombre expérience de la dictature, la renaissance démocratique des deux pays respectivement guidés par De Gasperi et Adenauer sous le signe du « nouveau destin de l'Europe », font place aux souvenirs personnels lors de la chute du mur de Berlin, les 8 et 9 novembre 1989 à Berlin-Est, qui coïncidait avec une rencontre entre le gouverneur de la Banque d'Italie et le président de la Banque centrale de la République démocratique allemande :

« À l'aller, après l'atterrissage à l'aéroport de Tempelhof, je suis passé par Check Point Charlie où j'ai été soumis à un millier de contrôles. Trois jours plus tard, à mon retour d'un bref séjour à Dresde, Leipzig et Potsdam, il n'y avait plus aucun contrôle effectif entre Berlin Est et Berlin Ouest. J'ai trouvé la ville en liesse, les rues envahies par la foule, où l'on tombait parfois, même à l'Ouest, sur unes de ces petites Trabant venues de l'Est. Le Mur était tombé. Les Berlinois l'avaient fait tomber. Et ils ne nous avaient pas seulement restitué une Allemagne recomposée : ils nous avaient rendu une Europe réunifiée. Ce jour-là, nous avons tous senti que nous pouvions faire nôtre la phrase historique de John Kennedy : « *Ich bin ein Berliner* »²⁸.

Dans une fusion évocatrice d'histoire de l'Europe, d'éléments autobiographiques et d'analyse des défis du processus d'intégration, le discours de Ciampi insiste sur le « Projet de traité instituant une Constitution pour l'Europe », qui doit être présenté le 18 juillet 2003 à Rome, et qui sera repris lors de la Conférence intergouvernementale successive avec la seule insertion de « mécanismes d'évolution », pour assurer une relance complète du processus d'intégration:

27 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Allocution du Président de la République lors d'une visite à l'Université Humboldt de Berlin sur le thème : "L'amitié germano-italienne au service de l'intégration européenne"*, Berlin, 26 giugno 2003; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=22662>; 4 juin 2021.

28 Ibid.

« L'expérience historique, et plus récemment la crise irakienne, démontrent que le risque de marginalisation et de perte de poids de l'Europe est réel. Nous devons surmonter les divisions et les individualismes, héritages historiques des anciennes nations. [...] L'acquisition par l'Union européenne d'une pleine subjectivité internationale, avec une compétence non limitée à la dimension économique mais assumant pleinement un rôle politique, est nécessaire pour contribuer efficacement à la défense du système multilatéral, fondée sur des institutions qui soient la libre expression de la volonté des États de travailler ensemble : en premier lieu, l'Organisation des Nations Unies »²⁹.

Un vœu que la Conférence intergouvernementale de Rome ne sera pas en mesure d'exaucer³⁰. En effet, elle se terminera par un enlèvement, imputable entre autre à la présidence italienne ; un échec pesant pour le président Ciampi, qui reste toutefois convaincu de la nécessité de ne pas baisser les bras et de mobiliser les citoyens et les jeunes en faveur du destin de l'Union. Le discours aux Italiens du 31 décembre 2003 s'attarde alors sur le « réveil de l'amour de la patrie », alimenté par les « progrès réalisés sur la voie de l'unification européenne » :

« Ne nous laissons pas dérouter par le manque de succès d'une simple Conférence : ce n'est pas la première fois que cela se produit. Nous avons surmonté de nombreux obstacles, et nous surmonterons également ceux qui se présentent aujourd'hui. Pour cela, nous avons besoin d'un élan idéaliste et d'une volonté politique. Nous avons un rêve. [...] L'Union européenne signifie la paix en Europe. Les Italiens le savent, ils le sentent. Parallèlement au développement des institutions, et encore plus rapidement, le sentiment d'identification avec l'Europe grandit dans l'âme de nos jeunes. [...] En devenant plus européens, ils ne se sentent certainement pas moins italiens. Une identité plus complexe est aussi une identité plus riche et plus forte »³¹.

Dans la dernière partie de son septennat, le président Ciampi consacra toutes ses énergies à la réalisation de l'élargissement, à la réforme des institutions et à l'approbation du projet de Constitution européenne.

29 Ibid.

30 Rocco Cangelosi, "Il progetto di Trattato Costituzionale e la presidenza italiana, cronaca di un negoziato", in Umberto Morelli e Daniela Preda (eds), *L'Italia e l'unità europea dal Risorgimento a oggi. Idee e protagonisti*, Padova: Cedam, 2014, pp. 397-412.

31 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Message de fin d'année du Président de la République aux Italiens*, Palais du Quirinale, 31 décembre 2003; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/continuaciampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=23858>; 4 juin 2021.

3. *L'élargissement à l'Europe orientale, le rejet de la Constitution, les responsabilités de l'Union (2004-2006)*

La période 2004-2006 est marquée par l'engagement du président Ciampi en faveur de l'Europe, afin d'accompagner l'élargissement aux pays d'Europe orientale, de relancer la question de la Constitution, d'insister sur une Union soudée pour un gouvernement multilatéral du système international, de répondre aux inquiétudes des citoyens quant aux contradictions du processus d'intégration et aux signes d'une résurgence du nationalisme dans l'opinion publique européenne³².

La visite d'État en Hongrie et le discours du 26 mars 2004 au Parlement hongrois sur le thème « Renforcer et renouveler l'Union européenne », à la veille de l'élargissement du 1er mai 2004, coïncide avec une réflexion sur les difficultés de 2003 et la nécessité de continuer sur la voie de la Constitution, afin de revigorer la gouvernabilité de l'Union, d'encourager une véritable citoyenneté européenne et de contribuer à la structuration du système international :

« La Constitution est le point de départ indispensable pour assurer la fonctionnalité de l'Union européenne, pour permettre à l'Europe d'assumer ses responsabilités sur la scène mondiale. [...] Il y a trois ans, l'Europe a suscité dans le monde un sentiment généralisé de progrès et d'espoir. Je l'ai constaté lors de mes voyages en Amérique latine, en Afrique, au Moyen-Orient. Pour toutes ces populations, l'Europe unie est un modèle à imiter. Aujourd'hui, le moment est venu de se demander ce qu'il en est, de ces attentes. [...] Si l'Europe tarde à s'imposer comme un acteur reconnaissable et influent sur la scène mondiale, les espoirs placés en elle seront découragés une fois de plus, la marginalisation de l'Europe deviendra irréversible ».³³

Après avoir accueilli la signature au Capitole, le 29 octobre 2004, du traité portant adoption d'une Constitution européenne, comme « la naissance d'une Union politique, et non pas seulement économique et sociale », d'une « véritable communauté de peuples ; un espace de paix et de liberté [...] librement voulue par 25 États, 450 millions de citoyens, régie par des institutions démocratiques communes fonctionnant selon

32 Giuseppe Vacca (ed), *Dalla Convenzione alla Costituzione. Rapporto 2005 della Fondazione Istituto Gramsci sull'integrazione europea*, Bari: Dedalo, 2005.

33 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Allocution du Président de la République en visite d'État au Parlement hongrois*, sur «Le renforcement et le renouveau de l'Union européenne », Budapest, 26 mars 2004 ; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=24509> ; 4 juin 2021 ;

des règles fondées sur un équilibre dynamique entre coopération inter-gouvernementale et souveraineté partagée »³⁴, la remise du Prix international Charlemagne à Aix-la-Chapelle, le 5 mai 2005, est l'occasion d'un diagnostic attentif des limites à surmonter dans le processus d'intégration :

«Le traité constitutionnel approuvé par les gouvernements – l'Italie, premier des six pays fondateurs, l'a déjà ratifié, et j'en suis fier – vise à améliorer les structures de l'Europe unie, à renforcer ses institutions, à maintenir un juste équilibre entre elles. Si des imperfections et des insuffisances subsistent, elles peuvent être corrigées à mesure que les nouveaux mécanismes et organes institutionnels deviennent opérationnels. Mais sans une véritable volonté politique commune des peuples d'Europe, sans une communion d'esprit et de confiance en l'Europe, même la Constitution ne sera pas en mesure de garantir la gouvernabilité nécessaire »³⁵.

Au lendemain du rejet du projet constitutionnel signifié par les référendums français du 29 mai 2005 et néerlandais du 1er juin 2005³⁶, un moment de réflexion s'impose, imprégné d'un sentiment de déception et traversé par l'avertissement de ne pas tenir pour acquis les progrès de l'unification européenne, de ne pas faire de l'Union un paratonnerre contre les « carences des politiques nationales »³⁷, comme en témoigne le discours du Président Ciampi à l'occasion de la remise du Doctorat Honoris Causa de l'École Normale Supérieure de Paris le 15 juin 2005.

La déception et la mise en garde se traduisent par une initiative politique lors du discours du 5 juillet 2005 à la session du Parlement européen sur le thème « L'Union européenne face à ses responsabilités », par lequel

34 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Brindisi du Président de la République à l'occasion du repas en l'honneur des Chefs d'État et de Gouvernement signataires du Traité portant adoption d'une Constitution européenne*, Palais du Quirinale, 29 octobre 2004; <http://president.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=25694>; 4 juin 2021.

35 Idem, *Allocution du Président de la République à l'occasion de la Remise du Prix International Charlemagne*, Aix-la-Chapelle, 5 mai 2005; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=25694>; 4 juin 2021.

36 Sandro Guerrieri, «L'Unione europea e la 'pausa di riflessione'», in José Luis Rhi-Sausi, Giuseppe Vacca (eds), *Perché l'Europa ?*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2007; pp. 181-192.

37 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Allocution du Président de la République à l'occasion de la remise du Doctorat Honoris Causa de l'École Normale Supérieure de Paris*, Paris, 15 juin 2005; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=27303>; 4 juin 2021.

l'allocution de Ciampi sur l'Europe témoigne de sa capacité à être à l'écoute des citoyens et à critiquer de l'intérieur les limites de l'Union :

«Mais l'interprétation du résultat des référendums comme une manifestation de désaffection envers l'unité européenne est-elle vraiment justifiée ? Peut-on raisonnablement céder à la tentation de remettre en cause le projet même des Pères fondateurs ? À y regarder de plus près, le traité de Rome d'octobre 2004 apparaît plutôt comme le bouc émissaire d'un malaise généralisé qui tient moins au cadre institutionnel qu'aux politiques de gouvernance de l'Union. On constate même un paradoxe. L'appel insistant à un réveil politique de l'Union, plus urgent que les réformes institutionnelles nécessaires, témoigne de la prise de conscience de la communauté de destin sur laquelle repose matériellement une Constitution. C'est pourquoi nous devons maintenant réfléchir aux politiques futures de l'Union, sans pour autant abandonner le projet constitutionnel élaboré par la Convention »³⁸.

C'est là l'origine de l'appel lancé le 15 juillet 2015 par les chefs d'État d'Italie, du Portugal, d'Autriche, de Finlande, d'Allemagne, de Pologne et de Lettonie, « Unis pour redonner confiance en l'Europe », pour repartir de l'exigence d'une plus grande implication des citoyens dans les instances européennes, consolider le modèle social européen, rendre l'Union économiquement forte et solidaire, « proposer de parler d'une seule voix dans le monde », répondre à la nécessité d'une « Europe encore plus démocratique, transparente et efficace » et « affronter la globalisation »³⁹.

C'est par un bain de réalisme dans les méandres des nœuds non résolus du processus d'intégration, avant de passer la main aux nouvelles générations, que se conclut le discours aux Italiens du 31 décembre 2005, une anticipation de son retrait de la scène non exempte d'espoir sur l'avenir de l'Europe :

«Vous êtes notre espoir. Ma génération s'est engagée à préserver et à vous transmettre l'esprit qui nous a animés au lendemain d'une guerre horrible. Les nombreuses rencontres que j'ai eues avec vous m'ont donné des raisons d'avoir confiance dans l'avenir de notre Italie. [...] Vous êtes né et vous vivez dans une Europe de paix et de liberté. À vous de proclamer et étendre ses idéaux dans le monde. Il vous appartiendra de compléter et

38 Idem, *Allocution du Président de la République à la session Plénière du Parlement européen sur le sujet « L'Union Européenne face à ses responsabilités »*, Strasbourg, 5 juillet 2005; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=27405>, 4 juin 2021.

39 *Sept Présidents : unis pour redonner confiance à l'Europe*, dans « La Repubblica », 15 juillet 2005.

de renforcer ses institutions. Sans une Union Européenne de plus en plus soudée, il n'y a pas d'avenir pour les Européens »⁴⁰.

L'appel lancé à Dresde le 4 février 2006, pour compléter le processus de ratification par les pays qui ne se sont pas prononcés afin de décider en connaissance de cause « du sort du Traité constitutionnel » et décider des moyens de « faire avancer le processus d'unification politique de l'Europe »⁴¹, restera malheureusement lettre morte pour les partenaires européens, résignés après une longue phase de stagnation à se replier sur la voie plus rassurante du Traité de Lisbonne de 2007, laissant de côté la question de la Constitution européenne.

Conclusion

L'analyse du discours de Carlo Azeglio Ciampi sur l'Europe conduit à quelques considérations sur sa capacité à articuler son action sur la scène italienne et internationale avec une narration en faveur de l'Union et ainsi que sur l'historiographie italienne et le processus d'intégration⁴².

La fonction de Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat et garant de l'unité de la Nation, donne à ses allocutions sur l'Italie et l'Europe une profondeur institutionnelle ancrée dans une réflexion continue sur la réunification du continent après la guerre froide et sur le rôle de l'Union dans la mondialisation.

La vision politique du processus d'intégration qui a toujours accompagné Ciampi, en tant que gouverneur de la Banque d'Italie et dans les responsabilités de Premier ministre et de ministre du Trésor, devient discours public permanent et trouve la clé plus sensible pour attirer l'attention des Italiens sur les défis de l'Europe politique dans le binôme entre «patriotisme républicain» et «commune patrie européenne».

40 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, *Message de fin d'année du Président de la République aux Italiens*, Palais du Quirinal, 31 décembre 2005; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/continuaciampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=28351>

41 Idem, *Allocution du Président de la République lors de la rencontre avec les Chefs d'État signataires de l'article "Unis pour l'Europe" du 15 juillet 2005*, Dresde, 4 février 2006; <http://presidenti.quirinale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo=discorso&key=28590>; 4 juin 2021

42 Lorenzo Mechi, "Narrare la complessità, uscire dall'isolamento. La storiografia sull'Italia e l'integrazione europea", in *Rivista italiana di storia internazionale*, n.2/2018, pp.329-354.

Le discours public du Président Ciampi vise à exhorter les partenaires européens à procéder au renforcement de la gouvernance de la monnaie unique, à combiner réforme institutionnelle et élargissement à l'Europe de l'Est, jusqu'à l'approbation d'une Constitution européenne. Il en résulte un discours de vérité sur les contradictions de l'Union après le 11 septembre 2001 et la guerre d'Irak de 2003, l'aveu de la défaite du front pro-européen au référendum français et néerlandais de 2005 et la volonté de transmettre le «rêve européen» aux nouvelles générations.

Sa vision dynamique des relations entre l'Italie, la CEE et l'Union européenne constitue en même temps une mise en garde contre le risque de réduire l'histoire entière de la participation italienne au processus d'intégration à l'interprétation univoquement axée sur la «contrainte extérieure», mise en place par le ministre du Trésor Carli au moment de la signature du Traité de Maastricht et transformé en catégorie historiographique passe-partout par les études après les années quatre-vingt-dix⁴³.

Dans la vision de l'Europe de Ciampi, la participation au processus d'intégration pousse le pays à entreprendre de profondes réformes, dans le sens d'une culture économique de stabilité ; mais elle est liée aux meilleures saisons de l'europhisme italien, et identifie la CEE et l'Union comme l'espace supranational au sein duquel l'Italie républicaine peut exprimer au mieux son potentiel, tant dans le domaine économique que dans celui de la politique internationale⁴⁴.

Le difficile dialogue entre le Quirinale et Palazzo Chigi pendant le second gouvernement Berlusconi mène à thématiser les rapports entre la Présidence de la République et la Présidence du Conseil sur le processus d'intégration ; en effet, il peut être interprété comme une efficace clé de lecture de l'histoire de la République et, plus encore, de la transition de la « République des partis » à la « seconde République »⁴⁵.

La sensibilité de Ciampi quant au « patriotisme républicain » ainsi qu'à la « patrie européenne commune » introduit la dimension rituelle et symbolique de la politique dans ce cadre historiographique, la reliant à celle de

43 Roberto Gualtieri, "L'Europa come vincolo esterno", in Piero Craveri e Antonio Varsori (eds), *L'Italia nella costruzione europea. Un bilancio storico (1957-2007)*, Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2009, pp.313-331.

44 Antonio Varsori, *La Cenerentola d'Europa? L'Italia e l'integrazione europea dal 1946 ad oggi*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2009.

45 Pietro Scoppola, *La Repubblica dei partiti. Evoluzione e crisi di un sistema politico 1945-1996*; Bologna: il Mulino, 1997; Marco Gervasoni, Andrea Ungari (eds), *Due repubbliche: politiche e istituzioni in Italia dal delitto Moro a Berlusconi*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2014.

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la pédagogie civile, de la communication institutionnelle et de la construction de l'identité culturelle de l'Europe,⁴⁶ que l'on peut analyser aussi à travers un large éventail de sources imprimées et audiovisuelles

Dans cette optique, le discours de Carlo Azeglio Ciampi transforme les récits de l'Europe en un prisme captivant, en mesure de renouveler l'historiographie sur la participation italienne au processus d'intégration, sur le potentiel et la défaite de l'Union européenne en tant qu'acteur international dans la mondialisation et d'affiner, dans le cadre de l'analyse méthodologique, l'imbrication de dimensions de l'histoire apparemment lointaines et pourtant traversées par une surprenantes interdépendance.

46 Angelo Bolaffi e Guido Crainz (eds), *Calendario civile europeo: i nodi storici di una costruzione difficile*, Roma: Donzelli, 2019.

“The European Unification Process is the most Positive Legacy that the 20th Century Bequeathed to Polity”. Europe in Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa’s Speeches

Andrea Becherucci

1. Introduction

In the following pages, we will seek to highlight the continuity and divisions in Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa’s European speeches. We decided to select, among the hundreds of pages that this author dedicated to the construction of Europe, only his speeches, conference papers and printed articles (excluding books), with a singular exception, that of the first document with concerns his time in the European Commission in the early 1980s at the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. This choice was made necessary because during the aforementioned period, Padoa-Schioppa’s public sector appointments were rare, except when they concerned his specific interests in the monetary and financial policy sectors¹.

According to his elder brother Antonio, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa’s interest in Europe and the unification process began during his school years at the *Liceo Classico Petrarca di Trieste*². During this time, he had read, amongst other works, the epilogue to the *Storia d’Europa* by Benedetto Croce, where the philosopher writes “and in this way, over 70 years ago, a Neapolitan from the Kingdom of Italy, or a Piemontese from the

1 For the bibliography of his writings, see Rosanna Visca, Valentina Memoli, Silvia Musolin (eds.), <https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/altre-pubblicazioni-biblioteca/2014-spe/Tommaso-Padoa-Schioppa-A-preliminary-bibliography-of-his-writings.pdf> latest access 19 April 2022.

2 There isn’t veritable historical research on Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. You can see the bibliographical entries in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, Francesco Papadia, https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/tommaso-padoa-schioppa_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ and Alessandro Barbera, *Dizionario dell’integrazione europea*, latest access 19 April 2022. See also Andrea Becherucci, “Un civil servant italiano ed europeo. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa e le sue carte”, in Mario De Prosio (ed.), Salvatore Mura (ed.) *Il governo dei migliori. Intellettuali e tecnici al servizio dello Stato*, Verona: QuiEdit, 2020, pp. 403–424.

Subalpine Kingdom became Italians without disowning their past but by accepting this new identity, in the same way that the French, the Germans and the Italians accepted being Europeans and looked towards Europe with fervent hearts in the same way as they thought of their own homeland, without denying it but appreciating it all the more for being part of Europe". Padoa-Schioppa was born in Belluno, in 1940. At the time of the signing of the Treaties of Rome, he was an adolescent attending secondary school and was able to witness in person the second big step towards the unification of Europe.

There is also another element that should not be ignored: the peculiarity represented by Trieste in the post-War years, passed through by trembling nationalists destined to lead violent clashes in the town squares organised by neo-Fascists in 1953³.

Modelling his European identity on what he had read in the literature of Croce, Padoa-Schioppa moved to Milan to study at the Università commerciale Luigi Bocconi, from which he graduated in 1966.

He completed his education in the United States at MIT, alongside the future Nobel Prize winner in economics, Franco Modigliani. From 1970, he worked at the Banca d'Italia, starting in the Study Service and guided at that time by Carlo Azeglio Ciampi.

In the first half of the 1970s, the Italian economy suffered a moment of serious concern with public spending increases and inflation in double figures, while instead the European integration process was given a boost after The Hague Summit in 1969⁴. As justifiably observed, "it appeared there was growing evidence of the tension between the persecution of European ideals, which called for an economically healthier Italy to contribute to the European integration process, and the reality of a country that wasn't able to control costs and accounts"⁵. During this period Padoa-Schioppa

3 On the international context concerning the Trieste problem, see Massimo De Leonardis, *La diplomazia atlantica e la soluzione del problema di Trieste, 1952-1954*, Naples: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1992; on the riot of 1953, see the exhibition catalogue *I ragazzi del '53: l'insurrezione di Trieste cinquant'anni dopo*, Piero Del Bello (ed.), Italo Svevo edizioni, Trieste, 2003 and the essays by Massimo de Leonardis, Paolo Nello and Giuseppe Parlato in Giuseppe Parlato (ed.), *L'insurrezione di Trieste cinquant'anni dopo*, (Comune di Trieste Assessorato alla Cultura, Trieste, 2008).

4 See Maria Eleonora Guasconi, *L'Europa tra continuità e cambiamento. Il vertice dell'Aja del 1969 e il rilancio della costruzione europea*, Florence: Polistampa, 2004.

5 Francesco Papadia, *Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/tommaso-padoa-schioppa_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ latest access 19 April 2022.

was mainly involved in collaborating with the governor Paolo Baffi, with whom he worked on the drafting of the “Final considerations”.

The first occasion the young economist had to measure the European dimension was in 1979, when he had the opportunity to present his candidature to Brussels as Director General for Economic and Financial affairs of the European Commission, after the decision by both Paolo Savona and Mario Monti not to apply for the position. The President of the Commission at the time was the British Labour Party member, Roy Jenkins and the Vice-President with responsibility for Economic and Financial Affairs was the Gaullist, François-Xavier Ortoli. In Brussels, it was the moment when the introduction of the European Monetary System was being negotiated to replace the “Snake-in-the-tunnel”.

With this new instrument, it was hoped a viable European monetary policy could be put into place. In this new role, Padoa-Schioppa acted as right-hand man to Ortoli to ensure the policy of the realignment of values passed largely through the scrutiny of the Commission, at least more so than in the past when that prerogative was only applied to the central banks⁶.

2. The End of his Experience in Brussels (1983)

The document that most represents Padoa-Schioppa’s involvement in this phase is the report that he wrote on the 25 February 1983 at the end of his time in DG II. We are talking about a document with a limited circulation sent to his direct superiors and that yet was very meaningful. Firstly, he defines the Commission as ‘a dynamic structure’ in the sense that developments in the integration process determined a sense of character at a historic moment; for this reason, he wrote, “the management of assets can’t be considered the only vocation of the Community. This is true for all the Community institutions, but particularly for the Commission”.⁷

⁶ Eric Bussière, Ivo Maes, “Economic and monetary affairs: new challenges and ambitions”, in Eric Bussière, Vincent Dujardin, Michel Dumoulin, Piers Ludlow, Jan Willem Brouwer, Pierre Tilly (eds.), *The European Commission 1973–1986. History and memoirs of an institution*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014, p. 309.

⁷ Historical Archives of the European Union (hereinafter HAUE), Florence, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Papers, (hereinafter TPS), dossier 722, *La Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières de 1979 à 1983*, p. 4.

The words which follow are equally decisive: “The Community, with regard to the objectives which had been assigned to it by the Founding Fathers, has been on the defensive for many years. Despite progress being made, the simple affirmation of the final political objectives is rarely tolerated, if not only as rhetoric. The intangibility of national sovereignty has become a dogma. This dogma paralyses the Community of its dynamic vocation. This paralysis deforms the Community. This deformity is, in turn, invoked as a supplementary argument against the “old” plans for political integration. This situation and public opinion are a reality which has to always be taken into account”⁸.

Although taken from an internal document, one can already see in these sentences some considerations destined to reappear over and over again in the European speeches of Padoa-Schioppa: most importantly the concept of the Commission as a structure which finds its ‘raison d’être’ not in the prerogatives already acquired but in the constant search for new areas of action; the complaint about the empty pro-European rhetoric in terms of real political acquisitions; the need to understand that the fight for European construction would require a protracted and ambitious effort to break down the convictions of the policymakers, those that Luigi Einaudi called “The foul idol of the sovereign state”⁹.

3. *Il Mulino Annual Lecture (Bologna, 1998)*

On 17 November 1998, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa was asked to give the 14th Annual Mulino Lecture in Bologna by the homonymous cultural and political association. The title of the conference was *Che cosa ci ha insegnato l'avventura europea*, a title that came from the reflections that the author had matured in the nearly 50 years since the beginning of the European construction process¹⁰. The text of the lecture is ample and is divided into five parts: introduction, three chapters dedicated to policy, institutions, economy and currency, the nation and culture respectively and, lastly, conclusions.

Padoa-Schioppa begins by stating that “the European unification process is the most important positive legacy that the last century left in

⁸ Ivi, p. 5.

⁹ Luigi Einaudi, *Il mito dello Stato sovrano*, in «Risorgimento liberale», 3 January 1945.

¹⁰ Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, *Che cosa ci ha insegnato l'avventura europea*, Rome: Edizioni dell'Elefante, 1998.

the political order and the creation of supranational economic, judicial and political orders constitutes the most revolutionary event that the 20th century experienced; a revolution made up of a sum of technicalities but still a revolution because it was capable of permanently transforming the configuration of power and radically changing the course of history"¹¹. Order and peace between states had been guaranteed thanks to a process of pooling certain prerogatives that were previously exclusive to national sovereignty. This method succeeded where others failed, such as internationalism, socialism and the rights of peoples. Padoa-Schioppa starts the European adventure from the signing of the Treaty of Rome, to which he assigns the rank of a constitutional instrument "because it transforms our whole economic and legal order and integrated the Constitutional texts of the member states".

An elaboration of the author's thinking in relation to the effectiveness of political action in the European sphere is extremely interesting. Departing from the concept, which was close to Weber's heart, of *Beruf* (in German, a profession but also a calling, from the root *Ruf*) takes form in a new type of politician which has arisen alongside that of the professional politician. Padoa-Schioppa's belief is that this way of doing politics establishes a new form of liaison between those that practise it, which is completely different to traditional politics. Free from party constraints, interest groups, nationality, electoral requirements and profit, it offers tremendous freedom of action and therefore greater effectiveness¹².

For TPS, this new form of behaviour configures revolutionary action through the inclusion of a precise set of values to arrive at a definition of a new order; "disinterest, conspiracy, idealism; the combination of political activity with a different job description. European construction is a revolution, even if its revolutionaries are not *ex-carbonari* or *brigatisti* but employees and managers, bankers and professors"¹³.

On the legitimacy of the decision-making proceedings, which had advanced the European adventure, Padoa-Schioppa is clear:

Europe is formed in full institutional legitimacy. However, it is not conceived from a democratic movement, but from popular mobilisation around a constituent body: it did not have the 'five days' of uprisings,

¹¹ Ivi, p. 8.

¹² Ivi, p. 11. Padoa-Schioppa will adopt a similar attitude when he became Minister of Economics in the second Prodi government (2006–2008). On this point, see Andrea Becherucci, "Un civil servant italiano ed europeo. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa e le sue carte", pp. 403–424.

¹³ Ibid.

nor the Frankfurt Parliament nor the States-General. It was constructed thanks to three forces: the actions of enlightened leaders (from Adenauer to Kohl, from De Gasperi to Andreotti, from Schuman to Mitterrand); the inspiration of atypical politicians (Monnet, Spinelli, Delors and others); the profound support of Europeans to the objective pursued, well-known adherence to the antennae of politicians. Between the two extremes of popular consensus and the leadership of some politicians, Europe became a reality thanks to a method that we can define as *dispotismo illuminato*, a completely legitimate procedure, but only anchored in the democratic method by the enforcement of democracy between the states, and not by a European democratic process. We can speak therefore of a *limited democracy*¹⁴.

Padoa-Schioppa realises that for many years the limits of the democratic process in European integration also constituted the positive aspect that allowed it to progress without running into obstacles normally linked to the common political dialogue between parties or to deleterious clientele practices. Merit must be given to the European Union, according to Padoa-Schioppa, not only for creating a free trade area but also for having created “the infrastructure of state public affairs and the necessary powers for the good functioning of the new market which was being created”¹⁵.

The biggest gamble is, in any case, monetary sovereignty, not so much because in itself it doesn’t represent a milestone of extreme importance, but because “it is the first time that sovereign States renounced monetary sovereignty spontaneously and realised a monetary union before a full political union”¹⁶. The degree of transformation that would come about with the adoption of the single currency could only be understood when it became clear to all that the trust on which the exchange of currency against the supply of goods and service was based was no longer in the hands of the issuing state, but in Europe’s. This fact would slowly but profoundly change the same perception of the identity that the citizens themselves had.

14 Ivi, p. 12.

15 Ivi, p. 16.

16 Ivi, p. 17.

4. *A Lectio Doctoralis (Trieste, 1999)*

On 19 November 1999, Padoa-Schioppa was conferred with an honorary doctorate in the economics of international trade and the currency market from the University of Trieste. The economist and banker held a lecture entitled *Money, trade, institutions: experience and the prospects of European construction*. The fulcrum of this lecture was the Treaty of Rome, which lay at the origins of the EEC. He began with the consideration that the Treaty constituted the first example—since its precedent the ECSC, which he considered too sectoral and circumscribed—“where the member states undertook to gradually create the Common Market”¹⁷. The lesson that can be drawn was that to break down the obstacles to the free circulation of people, goods, services and capital, it was necessary to not only oppose the adoption of measures typical of a protectionist policy, but also to wage war against the legal rules which regulated economic activity: laws, contracts, technical rules, authorisations, and the classification of products and services. However, the model spawned by the Treaty of Rome was imperfect—from the point of view of economic *governance*—since monetary integration was provided with fixed exchange rates tied to the dollar or gold.

Over time, the European integration process was consolidated to finally arrive, from the 1980s onwards, at a formula that progressively got rid of “a long season of administered prices, currency restrictions, nationalisation, and limitations to competition” and made room for a time “in which competition had begun even in the field of public services [and in which] privatisations were common”¹⁸. From the adoption of the Treaty of Rome, for Padoa-Schioppa, the Community had already improved greatly compared with other international organisations; it could already rely on legislation which could be applied to its member countries and, if necessary, it could enforce obligations. In the same way, the Court of Justice applied Community law and the European Parliament elected by its citizens functioned with elements of democracy (albeit insufficiently) in the dialectic between the Commission and the Council of Ministers.

With the adoption of the single currency, the European Union finally moved from a system of interdependence to a model of a state entity even if, wrote the economist, the time to contemplate this process would

17 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, *Moneta, commercio, istituzioni: esperienze e prospettive della costruzione europea*, Trieste: Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2000, p. 20.

18 Ivi, pp. 20–21.

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be long because “the creation of a market is a social and cultural endeavour”¹⁹.

5. *The Hume Lecture (Edinburgh, 2000)*

Two years later, Padoa-Schioppa was invited to Edinburgh to give the Hume Lecture on 17 May 2000. The conference was entitled *The European Union and the Nation State*. Since 1998, Padoa-Schioppa had formed part of the Board of the European Central Bank. The European construction process had moved forward in the meantime: from 1983, Spain and Portugal had entered the European Community, the Single Act had been approved, the Berlin Wall had fallen and Germany was reunified, and the Treaty of Schengen had been signed, as had the Treaty of Maastricht, which saw the introduction of the Single European Market. Furthermore, Austria, Finland and Sweden had become members of the EU, and 11 countries had adopted the new single currency, the euro.

The central question which TPS addressed in Scotland dealt with a theme already raised in 1983, that is, how is it possible to put together joint elements of economic governance without this affecting the nature of a sovereign state. Most probably, it was not a coincidence that Padoa-Schioppa decided to address this theme in the United Kingdom. The director of the David Hume Institute, in his introduction to the Conference brochure, states that “when it was delivered, this lecture found an attentive and interested audience who were without exception, stimulated and invigorated by the arguments put forward”²⁰.

Padoa-Schioppa summarises the contents of the Treaties of Rome in achieving the four liberties: the free circulation of goods, services, people and capital. He notes that,

The Treaty of Rome acknowledged that a common market postulates not only the *freedom* to take part in the market, but also the *rule* of law for the market place. Actually, in modern Nation States a significant portion of the total Corpus Juris concerns economic activity and both political debate and government action are largely devoted to economic matters²¹.

¹⁹ Ivi, p. 25.

²⁰ Brian Main, Foreword to *The European Union and the Nation State*, The Hume Lecture 2000, 17 May 2000, delivered by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Hume Occasional Papers n° 58, The David Hume Institute, 2001.

²¹ Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, *The European Union and the Nation State*, p. 7.

Padoa-Schioppa notes how the enormous task carried out to create the Single European Market in Europe involved re-writing ample parts of the economic constitution of the single member countries, limiting, in this way, the sovereign prerogatives of the national state in the governance of the economy. On the other hand, legal experts also had to agree on the fact that “that the Community integration process had taken on a supranational dimension in relations between law and [the] economy”²² and that, specifically, “we can rightly say that Community order is based on the law–economy relationship. A priority that in this sector sees a major weakening of the sovereign state”²³.

TPS again highlights the necessity of an authority superior to that of the single nation states in achieving the classic tripartite divisions that we inherited from liberalism at a European level, namely those between the legislative, executive and judicial powers, and that only the unanimous abolishment of the agreement and the relative right to vote could have configured the beginning of a new era in the construction of Europe; after all, writes Padoa-Schioppa, “supra-nationality begins where the unanimity rule ends”²⁴.

In what, therefore, has the completion of the single market substantiated? For Padoa-Schioppa, it has been “a powerful driver of economic reforms within the member states”²⁵. Furthermore, he believes a powerful tool in its acceptance by many countries were its policies connected to the development of the free market, going so far as to write that: “the re-orientation of economic policies towards more competition, less state intervention, greater reliance on market mechanisms and private incentives, has been crucially linked to the re-launching of the single market programme”²⁶.

Padoa-Schioppa recognised that greater activism on the part of the European Commission was necessary. The agreements that created the single market had deeply affected the sector for the economic relations of single member states and had favoured privatisation and liberalisation

22 Eugenio De Marco, *Costituzione economica e integrazione sovranazionale*, p. 98, <https://www.federalismi.it/AppOpenFilePDF.cfm?artid=40505&dpath=document&dfile=25102019000026.pdf&content=%27Costituzione%2Beconomica%27%2Be%2Bintegrazione%2Bsovranaazionale%2B%2D%2Bstato%2B%2D%2Bdottrina%2B%2D%2B>

23 Ivi, p. 99.

24 Ibid.

25 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, *The European Union and the Nation State*, p. 8.

26 Ibid.

just about everywhere, even among public utilities and that this policy of containment and the limitation of the prerogatives of the ‘entrepreneurial state’ led to the decline of national sovereignty.

Continuing in his exposition, Padoa-Schioppa defines the condition of the European Union in 2000 as a form that possesses ‘a *partial* political union’.

Besides its competence in the economic, monetary and financial sectors, the EU, according to TPS, can depend on the embryos of power in the legislative, executive and judicial sectors. With regard to the claim that the European Union doesn’t have the characteristics to be defined as a complete political union and replying to those who accused the Community of ‘democratic shortcomings’, Padoa-Schioppa was adamant. He underlined that even if these findings were well founded, it was impossible to underestimate the differences which made the EU completely unlike every other international organisation, namely the opportunity to vote for the European Parliament every five years. To further emphasise his point, he stated, “Only political unions call their citizens to vote. Only political unions issue norms that are directly applicable to physical and legal persons and enforceable by the courts”²⁷.

6. *Altiero Spinelli Lecture (Turin, 2007)*

When a lecture dedicated to Altiero Spinelli was organised in Turin by the Centro Studi per il Federalismo, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa had been appointed Minister for the Economy eight months previously in the second Prodi government. The economic situation in Italy was worrying: the country was in huge debt and undercapitalised, and was unable to latch onto the global recovery that was taking place; moreover, it was experiencing a notable decline in the manufacturing sector. The sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States was also beginning to have an effect in Europe.

The European Union faced another of the many impasses that has marked its history. From one side, it tried to take the hit of the vote against the Treaty for a European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, and from the other side, it got ready to respond to the crisis with the approval of the Treaty of Lisbon.

27 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, *The European Union and the Nation State*, p. 15.

In his opening remarks at the Altiero Spinelli lecture, Padoa-Schioppa revealed his gratitude to people who had dedicated their lives to the idea of a united Europe, concentrating on Spinelli's personality, his thoughts and their friendship²⁸. His approach to the theme of the conference tended to overturn that which common sense requested: more Europe to overturn the aporias, which prevented the construction of the European Union to make progress. TPS writes:

It is not the *shortcomings* of the European Union that have caused the profound sense of impotence and alienation in the face of today's world; it is the *absence* of Europe itself. The confusion between these *shortcomings*—the mistakes, the gaps, the contradictions, and *the absence*—is at the heart of a growing spiral of delusion and progressive disengagement that constitutes the mortal danger that European society is facing today²⁹.

The rest of the conference continues with an accurate analysis of the faults – real or presumed—attributed by his opponents to the European Union that Padoa-Schioppa lists under the two categories *imagined shortcomings and real shortcomings*. First, he considers inventions or exaggerations and, second, contradictions or gaps which, objectively speaking, have an effect on the workings of the machine. Among the factors that TPS recognises as having had an impact on the quality of life of European citizens is the lack of a response to globalisation by the European institutions. After having exposed some examples of incomplete integration sectors (finance, energy, social policies), he alludes to some possible solutions; the first is the majority vote followed by the capacity to make the decisions taken effective. In closing, he takes up Spinelli's thinking, to ask himself what should the end of the European integration process be like in choosing between the possible models offered. For Padoa-Schioppa, the problem is the *absence of Europe*, which can only be remedied by referring to the principle of a federal union, which could reconquer, as a solid idea, the minds of those who have, over time, lost faith in a project which had seemed so attractive at the beginning.

28 From 1998, Padoa-Schioppa was intimately involved with the journalist Barbara Spinelli, the daughter of Altiero. Beforehand, he had separated from his wife, the economist Fiorella Kostoris, whom he married in 1966 and with whom he has three children.

29 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, "Mancanze d'Europa", in Carlo Maria Fenu, Antonio Padoa-Schioppa (eds.), *Due anni di governo dell'economia (maggio 2006-maggio 2008)*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011, p. 504.

7. Conclusions

As highlighted on the previous pages, an analysis of Padoa-Schioppa in his public speeches is not limited to economics but also delves into the fields of history, politics and the social sciences. There is no doubt that the roots of his endeavours in favour of European integration date back to his scholastic days. The fervour of his youth would remain under the radar during the years he dedicated to the State and to the European Community, to remerge during the late 1990s, when, after separating from his wife, he began a new relationship with Barbara Spinelli, the daughter of Altiero, recognising publicly the importance of the *Manifesto di Ventotene*. He even went so far as to write the preface for the edition published by Oscar Mondadori in 2006, reaffirming its validity above and beyond the specific circumstances in which it was written.

On this occasion he wrote:

Anyone who points the finger at the caduceus parts of a classic work so as to denigrate it and declare it obsolete has no idea how an idea is destined to endure nor understands what a classic is. It is indeed from his immersion in historical circumstances, which are by definition unique and unrepeatable, that a great person draws truth, a message that goes beyond the circumstances and is of value for other times and for other circumstances. Altiero Spinelli himself, who was not only the principle author of the *Manifesto*, but who throughout his life walked—with his writings and with action—on the path traced by it, was the first to remove pieces of plaster attached to the statue in 1941. The essay by Levi mentions some considerations by which, throughout the years, he returned to the *Manifesto* to point out evaluation and previsionary errors. A critical operation that Spinelli would not have done if he hadn't, at the same time and with the same urgency, been a man of action, a man of thought³⁰.

The importance to him of European integration never abated, even during problematic periods in its construction; above all, he identified the value of a “revolutionary moment” with the capacity to undermine the existing balance, stressing the part played in it by professional figures, which generally weren't identified as the vectors of change.

The point, however, on which Padoa-Schioppa insisted was the existing relationship between the economic *governance* of a complex reality, such

30 Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, *Il Manifesto di Ventotene*, with a foreword by Eugenio Colorni, a presentation by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa and an essay by Lucio Levi, Milan: Oscar Mondadori, , 2006.

as the European Union, and the necessity for the member states to carry out some real reforms of their respective “economic constitutions”. This result, even today, is the part of his reflections that is most criticised. Some legal experts, in particular, wanted to see the insidious penetration of ordoliberalism based on the German matrix, which, according to new schemes, would have remodelled the Constitutions that came with the Resistance, as in the case of Italy³¹. In the Hume Lecture in 2002, Padoa-Schioppa proudly demanded action from the European Commission in favour of privatisation and liberalisation; in this way, the “Entrepreneurial State” would have to yield a part of its sovereign prerogatives.

To complete these considerations, it is necessary to add that in 2009 in the book interview, edited by Beda Romano, *La veduta corta*, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa analysed the reasons behind the recession of 2007–2008, identifying the reasons, with regard to the EU, in the refusal by the States to impose market rules, which like all human constructions, are unable to auto-govern. The States still had the instruments to face economic emergencies head on; for this reason, he called on the European Union to make the resources and the instruments for vigilance and intervention available.³² Padoa-Schioppa was unable to participate in the evolution of the EU in the last ten years, but the sovereign debt crisis (2010–2011) and that caused by the pandemic led to the activation of European resources which only a decade ago seemed impossible to contemplate EU in the last ten years, but the sovereign debt crisis (2010–2011) and that caused by the pandemic led to the activation of European resources which only a decade ago seemed impossible to contemplate.

31 Alessandro Somma, *Economia sociale di mercato e scontro tra capitalismi*, DPCE Online, <<http://www.dpceonline.it/index.php/dpceonline/article/view/47>> latest access 19 April 2022.

32 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, *La veduta corta. Conversazione con Beda Romano sul grande crollo della finanza*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2009.

Restoring Trust. Prime Minister Mario Monti and Italy's Role in Europe

Daniele Pasquinucci

1. Context: from the Berlusconi Government to the Monti Government

On 21 May 2011, the rating agency Standard and Poor's downgraded the Italian economic and financial outlook from 'stable' to 'negative', and justified its choice with the inability of the centre-right government led by Silvio Berlusconi (in power since 2008) to encourage the reforms necessary to increase the country's low production capacity¹. About one month later, on 17 June, Moody's reported placing the rating of public bonds issued by Italy under review. According to Moody's analysts, the weakness of the government—paralysed by internal divisions—compromised the implementation of 'prudent' fiscal policies, which could no longer be postponed due to the terrible state of public finances². Just six days later, the same agency warned of the possible downgrading of a large part of the Italian banking system³. On 30 June, Standard and Poor's made headline news by sharing that the economic policy and plan for fiscal reform adopted by the government would be insufficient to prevent Italian debt being evaluated negatively⁴.

This series of successive announcements indicated that the eurozone crisis was about to hit Italy⁵. It is true that assessments by rating agencies, and more generally by international markets, of the stability of Italian public finances at that stage were (and today are still) disputed. Some have claimed that they were part of a conspiracy aimed at destabilising

1 Luigi Offeddu, "Standard and Poor's avverte l'Italia: stallo politico, voto sul debito a rischio", in *Corriere della sera*, 22 May 2011.

2 Giovanni Stringa, "Monito di Moody's a Roma, 'Voto sul debito a rischio'", in *Corriere della sera*, 18 June 2011.

3 Id., "Moody's avverte 16 banche italiane", in *Corriere della sera*, 24 June 2011.

4 Federico Fubini, "'Italia, attenta al debito'. Ma Vegas convoca le Agenzie", in *Corriere della sera*, 2 July 2011.

5 Cf. Riccardo Perissich, "Italy and the Euro crisis", in William R. Cline and Guntram B. Wolff (eds.), *Resolving the European Debt Crisis*, Bruegel: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012, p. 96.

the Berlusconi government and bringing about its downfall⁶. The fact remains that the agencies understood several of Italy's real weaknesses, either medium long-term or temporary: the enormity of its public debt, the stagnation of the economy, and the fragility of the political coalition that was supporting the government during a key phase of the Republic's history. As for the public debt, in 2011 that amounted to about a third of the entire eurozone's⁷. Italy's stasis in economic growth and productivity, compared to the rest of the European Union, dated back to the mid-90s and triggered Italian economic decline⁸. Of course, before the crisis hit, Italy was able to deceive itself—'not being Greece' and having better economic foundations than the PIGS (the famous acronym denoting Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain)⁹—into thinking it could overcome the economic and financial storm relatively unscathed. But the markets' lack of trust in Italy, even before economic factors, stemmed from political uncertainty and the belief that Berlusconi's political leadership was not capable of 'safeguarding' the country¹⁰.

This scepticism was shared by the entire international community, which was nervously witnessing the government's internal conflicts (in particular those between the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Economy, Giulio Tremonti¹¹), which undermined its already limited capacity for action, and the superficial way in which Berlusconi was handling the crisis. On 3 August 2011, in a speech to the Italian parliament, the Prime Minister guaranteed that the economic measures approved on 6 July by the government had been deemed adequate and sufficient 'by Europe and by all international observers'¹². But only two days later, Berlusconi

6 Cf. Valerio Castronovo, *L'anomalia italiana*, Venezia: Marsilio, 2018, p. 187. Cf. also Gianpaolo Rossini, "Una globalizzazione più debole", in *Il Mulino*, 5, September–October 2011, p. 834.

7 Cf. Martin J. Bull, "In the Eye of the Storm. The Italian Economy and the Eurozone Crisis", in *South European Society and Politics*, 23, 1, 2018.

8 Pietro Reichlin, "Economic stagnation and recession: the difficult Italian transition to the Monetary Union", in *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 3, 24, 2019, p. 403.

9 See Alessandro Plateroti, "Banche italiane linea del Piave", in *Il Sole 24 ore*, 22 July 2011.

10 Cf. Erik Jones, "Italy's Sovereign Debt Crisis", in *Survival. Global Politics and Strategy*, 1, 54, 2012, p. 94.

11 Andrea Benvenuti, "Between myth and reality: the euro crisis and the downfall of Silvio Berlusconi", in *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 4, 22, 2017, p. 516; see also Sergio Rizzo, "Scintille pubbliche tra il premier e il superministro", in *Corriere della sera*, 5 August 2011.

12 Atti parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Seduta di mercoledì 3 agosto 2011, p. 14.

received a letter from the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Jean-Claude Trichet, and from his designated successor, Mario Draghi. The letter urged ‘a comprehensive, far-reaching and credible reform strategy to liberalise professions and privatise local public services; reforms of the collective wage bargaining system to allow more local level agreements; and a thorough review of rules regulating hiring and dismissal of employees, together with establishing an unemployment insurance system’¹³. Trichet and Draghi’s intervention indicated (assuming that it was needed) that the crisis did not only concern Rome. Italy’s failure would drag the entire eurozone down with it. However, the ECB’s requests remained unmet¹⁴. The reform of the retirement system, one of the main points of Trichet and Draghi’s letter, found unyielding opposition from one government party, Umberto Bossi’s Lega Nord¹⁵. Italy was simply not able to keep its promises about growth and structural reform¹⁶.

This explains the international pressure (exerted, in particular, by the main partners of the European Union) for a change in the country’s leadership. At the end of the European Council on 23 October 2011, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy responded with wry smiles to a journalist who asked them for their opinion on Berlusconi’s ability to adopt the reforms necessary for Italy (and to save the euro)¹⁷. This episode, which was quite unusual for international diplomacy, received much commentary. It was generally interpreted as an unusual display of derision towards an *individual* political leader. In reality, it had a broader meaning: it betrayed a certain mistrust of Italy—and in particular of its *entire* political class. Not surprisingly, Merkel and Sarkozy’s attitude also rankled many representatives of the opposition parties, although they were involved in a very bitter political campaign against Berlusconi and his allies¹⁸. Those smiles, in other words, seemed to confirm the negative stereotypes among Italy’s European partners about the country, and in particular about its unreliable politicians.

13 “ECB letter shows pressure on Berlusconi”, in *Financial Times*, 29 September 2011, <https://www.ft.com/content/3576e9c2-eaad-11e0-aeca-00144feab49a>.

14 Cf. “Grasping hands and bleeding hearts”, in *The Economist*, 20 August 2011.

15 Andrea Benvenuti, “Between myth and reality”, cit., p. 521.

16 Susannah Verney & Anna Bosco, “Living Parallel Lives: Italy and Greece in an Age of Austerity”, in *South European Society and Politics*, 4, 18, 2013, p. 403.

17 “Big two show rare unanimity over Berlusconi”, in *Financial Times*, 23 October 2011, <https://www.ft.com/content/30bc980a-fd95-11e0-b6d9-00144feabdc0>.

18 Cf. Maria Teresa Mieli, “Casini: Parigi non può ridicolizzarci”, in *Corriere della sera*, 24 October 2011.

In November 2011, the spread between Italian and German bonds reached 570 points. Faced with the possibility of the country defaulting, Silvio Berlusconi was forced to resign; and Italian President Giorgio Napolitano called on Mario Monti to replace him. Before becoming Prime Minister, Monti had been (among other things) European Commissioner, a member of the Goldman Sachs Global Market Institute's Research Advisory Council, a member of Moody's Senior European Advisory Council, and one of the presidents of the Atlantic Council's Business and Economics Advisors Group. In brief, to use *Business Standard's* definition, Monti was an 'international technocrat'¹⁹.

His government was supported by a very broad coalition of parties and remained in office until April 2013. It is important to remember that during his experience in government, Monti operated in a setting that was often hostile to the European Union. In 2008, a significant wave of Euroscepticism, based on the belief that the European Union and the euro were the cause of the country's problems, began to spread throughout Italy. Italians, who were traditionally pro-Europeans, were suddenly discovered to be hostile to, or suspicious of, the EU²⁰. By agreeing to lead the government, Monti was not only taking on the task of re-establishing European partners' trust in Italy (and vice versa); he was also committing to restoring the Italians' lost 'faith' in the European unification project.

What is described above is the context to the four speeches by Monti that I will be examining in this essay. They were given between May and September 2012 at the Brussels Economic Forum (31 May, to mark the second Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Lecture), the Italian Parliament (26 June, in view of the important European Council two days later), the European University Institute in Florence (6 September, where Monti travelled for a conference organised by the European People's Party), and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (27 September, at which the Italian Prime Minister gave a talk on the challenges for the euro and the future of European integration).

19 Hugo Dixon, "Latin Flip", in *Business Standard*, 2 February 2013, https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/latin-flip-112030700106_1.html. (last consulted on 4 May 2021).

20 On this, cf. Daniele Pasquinucci, "The Historical Origins of Italian Euroscepticism", in *Journal of European Integration History*, 22,2,2016.

2. *In the Italian Parliament: restoring the mutual trust between Italy and the European Union*

The main objective of Mario Monti's speeches was to re-establish the mutual trust between Italy and the European Union, which had been compromised by the long economic recession and by the consequent political destabilisation. What was the methodology adopted by the Prime Minister to achieve this goal? First of all, we should note Monti's efforts to make the ideas and proposals in his speeches (that is, his communication) compatible with the values and identity of the audience he was addressing. This indicates that Monti did not intend to encourage cognitive change—that is, to produce new knowledge in his audience. Instead, he was seeking affective change (that is, to encourage new feelings about Italy on the part of its EU partners, on the one hand, and of Italian citizens about 'Brussels', on the other). Ultimately, he was aiming to promote behavioural change—namely, to elicit new behaviour both in Italy and in the European Union. For Italy, this meant respecting European rules and the fiscal discipline imposed by participation in the euro. For the European Union, however, it meant having a less suspicious attitude towards Italy and recognising the pro-European orthodoxy of the new government that had taken office in Rome.

His speech to Parliament is the only one—among those I have selected—addressed to an Italian audience²¹. It is of particular interest because it clarifies the understanding that Monti—and the technocratic circles that he represents—has of the European Union and of Italy's participation in it. In the first part, Monti reconstructed the path that had led the country to approve the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. Monti reminded those in Parliament who were accusing his Cabinet of signing what was known as the 'Fiscal Compact' that it was the previous government that had initiated the process of accession to the Treaty. In doing so, Berlusconi had agreed to restore the country's public finances, starting down a 'very strict' and 'very challenging' path because it implied economic sacrifices for all Italians.²² Monti did not at all hide the fact that the cumbersome nature of the challenges that lay ahead for the country hinged on the obligations arising from its participation in the EU. On the contrary, the terms that were

21 The text of Monti's speech to the Italian parliament is found in Mario Monti, *I discorsi*, edited by Achille Albonetti, Roma: Europa edizioni, 2013, pp. 116–126.

22 Ibid., p. 117. My translation.

most frequently associated with the European Union in his speech were ‘discipline’ and ‘rules’, along with ‘sanction’, (to be imposed in the event that the rules were not respected) and ‘commitment’ (which had to be extensive to stick to the guidelines required by the EU and keep public finances in order)²³. In one revealing passage, Monti confirmed that the ‘centrepiece of Italy’s European policy’ needed to be ‘the coexistence of an essential discipline of public finance’, on the one hand, and of growth policies, on the other. This concept of the European Union is founded on a specific pro-European ideology that conceives of the EU as a constraint—that is, as an external actor that Italy needs in order to introduce a series of rules into its society that its political class is not capable of adopting without external pressure²⁴.

Naturally, we might wonder how it was possible to make the Parliament accept this vision of Europe. To do it, Mario Monti used a double rhetorical device: on the one hand, he explained that a reliable Italian government (like his), with the support of a cohesive parliament and the entire nation, could contribute to the decision-making process of the European Union on an equal footing with other member states:²⁵

(...) I believe that today, at such an intense and worrisome time for the European Union, it is important for Italy to participate in European Council negotiations (...), with the strength of a tandem Government–Parliament, of the entire country, of a single engine that drives European policy more forcefully so that it moves in the right direction.

Before the members of the Italian parliament, Monti declared that his leadership had contributed “to drafting (...) a common European agenda. As has been recognised by other governments, the Italian government—thanks to this Parliament’s encouragement—has played a crucial role in achieving that goal”²⁶.

The vindication of Italy’s role in the EU was intended to lead to ‘affective change’: that is, it sought to challenge the idea, which was widespread throughout the country, of Italy’s marginality in the European Union. The prevailing conviction was that the EU was dominated by Germany, or

23 Ibid., pp. 116–121. My translation.

24 Cf. Daniele Pasquinucci, “La narrazione ambigua. Il vincolo europeo, il populismo e la critica all’Unione europea”, in *Rivista italiana di Storia internazionale*, 3, 1, January–June 2020, pp. 105–107.

25 Mario Monti, *I discorsi*, cit., p. 119. My translation.

26 Ibid., p. 118. My translation.

at most by France and Germany. Although not without substance,²⁷ this narrative was rejected by Monti; to this end, he used a second rhetorical device. Indeed, according to the Prime Minister, Germany and France had committed a sort of original sin. Although in the past Italy had often sidestepped the obligations imposed by participation in the European Union—as Monti recognised—, it should not be forgotten that “[it was] France and Germany who were the main perpetrators of the first major breach of the rules, which brought with it a destructive series of imitative behaviour”²⁸. This reference was to France and Germany’s lack of respect for the rule of 3 per cent as the maximum deficit threshold in 2002–2003. Paris and Berlin (thanks to a decision by ECOFIN and the political support of other heavily indebted EU countries, such as Italy and Greece) nonetheless managed to avoid the infringement procedure laid down in the Growth and Stability Pact²⁹. This recalling of the impunity granted to France and Germany in 2003 allowed Monti both to emphasise his commitment—as Prime Minister—to observing the common rules, and to encourage a sort of burst of pride in the country before its partners (even the most influential ones) in the European Union³⁰.

We should not have an [inferiority] complex: we respect the rules; if we don’t respect them, we are aware that this can be penalised.

After asserting the key role of his government in Europe and assigning initial responsibility for the economic and financial laxity that had led to the sovereign debt crisis to Paris and Berlin, Monti was able to move onto the demythicisation of the so-called Franco-German axis. In his opinion, the coalition between these two countries was “a necessary condition [but not] sufficient” for Europe to advance. There was ample room for Italy to play a decisive role—provided it was led by a trustworthy government.

27 There is a vast bibliography on the French–German ‘axis’ in the European Union/Community. See, among others, Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, *Le couple franco-allemand et les institutions européennes*, Brussels: Bruylant, 2001; Édouard Husson, *Paris-Berlin. La survie de l’Europe*, Paris: Gallimard, 2019. Recently, the axis between Paris and Bonn has been analysed from the double perspective of the weakening of France and Germany’s consequent supposed hegemony within the European Union: on this see, among others, Miguel Otero-Iglesias, “Still Waiting for Paris: Germany’s Reluctant Hegemony in Pursuing Political Union in the Euro Area”, in *Journal of European Integration*, 3, 39, 2017.

28 Mario Monti, *I discorsi*, cit., p. 120. My translation.

29 Cf. Wilfried Loth, *Building Europe. A History of European Unification*, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2015, p. 419.

30 Mario Monti, *I discorsi*, cit., p. 120. My translation.

Obviously, according to Monti, a government's credibility stemmed from its ability to contribute to defining the common rules and from its willingness to respect European legislation. The restoration of trust in the EU, according to the Italian Prime Minister, came from a specific combination of pro-European pedagogy and national pride in service of the European cause.

3. *"I am not one of them": Monti, Italy and the international community*

The objectives of the three talks Monti gave in Brussels, Florence and New York were different from those pursued in his speech to the Italian Parliament (and were probably even more important given the political and economic context of the time). They were obviously aimed at an international audience. But before I analyse their content and aims, it is worth saying that, on these occasions, Monti exhibited a natural empathy with the audience who was listening to him. His tone was academic—like the one used in the Italian Parliament (though not lacking ironic undertones, as we shall see). But in these settings, Monti introduced himself as an equal among equals, as a member of the same international milieu that was hosting him (and, in fact, he was). This natural empathy is important because, outside Italy, Monti has made an effort to depict himself as foreign to the Italian national character, as a man who could not be associated with the clichés and stereotypes that characterise his fellow citizens; stereotypes and clichés in which he, at least in part, seemed to believe. In his speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Monti said of himself: "I am a strange Italian, for some reason deeply contaminated by the taste for German discipline and order" (and the audience applauded and laughed at this declaration)³¹. This was a fairly eloquent turn of phrase. We can compare it with what Monti wrote in April 2003 to commemorate Guido Carli, who had died ten years earlier. Carli was a prominent figure in the Italian and international financial communities. In the Second World War, he had taken part in important diplomatic missions, he had been executive director for Italy under the International Monetary Fund, and he had played a key role in the European Payments Union. From 1960

31 The video of the speech is posted on the Council on Foreign Relations website, at the address <https://www.cfr.org/event/mario-monti-challenges-euro-and-future-european-integration> (last consulted on 4 May 2021). The website also provides the transcription of the speech, to which I refer in my quotations.

to 1975, he was Governor of the Bank of Italy, earning a good reputation among the members of the exclusive club of central bankers³². As Minister of the Treasury in the Italian government, he had negotiated and signed the Maastricht Treaty. In his memoirs, Monti wrote that the European elites considered Carli one of them, but “strangely coming from a country that barely resembled him”³³.

In his alleged foreignness (or, more precisely, otherness) to Italians, we can see Monti’s claim to Carli’s ideal legacy. This legacy also included a unique interpretation of the relationship between Italy and the European Union. In fact, Carli was the main supporter of the idea of Europe as an external constraint needed to impose respect for virtuous economic and monetary parameters on the country. He thought that the economic and monetary Union created in Maastricht had made that constraint permanent. Obviously, at the root of this idea there was strong mistrust of the political Italian class (and of Italians in general)³⁴. Monti, as we have seen, made this view his own. But how could he explain it to a foreign audience? Monti frequently compares the Italian political class, and that of other countries, with the aim of highlighting the former’s fragility. At the Council on Foreign Relations, his chosen term of comparison was Margaret Thatcher³⁵.

And if I can mention here a quick anecdote, there was a conference in Italy in 1992 where the keynote speaker was Mrs. Thatcher, who had resigned two years before from the position of British Prime Minister. And the discussion went [sic] on the Treaty of Maastricht, to [sic] the treaty which practically gave birth to the euro and set up all these constraints. And she asked in this [sic]—in a room like this, but why you Italians are so fond of the Maastricht Treaty? And I explained, because it forces us to do things that we knew in the first place were to be done but we didn't have the political strength to do. And she said, oh, I see. That’s interesting. But

32 Cf. Pierluigi Ciocca (ed.), *Guido Carli governatore della Banca d'Italia*, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2008, p. XXXI; Daniele Caviglia, “Arguing for a worldwide perspective: Italy and the reform of the international monetary system between transatlantic cooperation and European integration (1971–73)”, in *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 3, 20, 2015.

33 “Monti: Carli capì che l’Europa era l’unica salvezza per l’Italia”, in *Corriere della sera*, 23 April 2003.

34 Cf. Guido Carli, *Cinquant’anni di vita italiana*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1993.

35 <https://www.cfr.org/event/mario-monti-challenges-euro-and-future-european-integration> (last consulted on 4 May 2021).

then you should not be surprised that the British people is not interested at all in the Maastricht Treaty (laughter) because they had me [...]

As can be seen from this quote, after hearing this anecdote, the people in the room laughed once again; we can assume they did so because they found confirmation in Monti's words of their own stereotypes about Italy—not the best way, incidentally, to re-establish trust in the country. Similarly, we can observe how full of irony this story was: Monti often resorts to this rhetorical device to distance himself from his fellow citizens.

Monti might perhaps lament the fact that Margaret Thatcher was born in the county of Lincolnshire instead of in an Italian region. Nonetheless, his preference is for Germany and the Germans. This comes, primarily, from the great appreciation that he has always shown for the social market economy. His pro-Germanism³⁶, fed also by his (more contingent) admiration for Chancellor Angela Merkel, pushed him to seek “to persuade Italian citizens to take up aspects of the German way of thinking”³⁷. This was not a one-time statement; in January 2012 (shortly after being appointed Prime Minister), in an interview for the German newspaper *Die Welt* (later published by *Corriere della Sera*), Monti declared: “I have always worked to make Italy a country that resembles Germany as much as possible”³⁸. But there is more. Monti believes it is necessary to adopt the interpretative keys of the German *mentality* and economic culture to assess the European Union's policies. In the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Lecture in Brussels, Monti defended the choices made by the European Central Bank during the economic crisis and rejected the proposal to include “an explicit reference to the growth as in the case for the US Federal Reserve System” in the ECB's statute. At the end of this declaration of support for the ECB, he observed (with a certain complacency): “Maybe I am too German”³⁹—as if it were impossible for an Italian to credibly defend the European Central Bank and monetary rigour (incidentally, at that time, the ECB was headed by Mario Draghi).

36 Cf. Daniele Pasquinucci, “Le conseguenze inattese. Mario Monti, il ‘guanto di Maastricht’ e l’antieuropeismo”, in Elena Calandri, Giuliana Laschi e Simone Paoli (eds.), *L'Europa adulta. Attori, ragioni e sfide dall'Atto Unico alla Brexit*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2020, pp. 109–110.

37 Ibid.

38 Mara Gergolet, “Da sempre lavoro perché l'Italia assomigli il più possibile alla Germania”, in *Corriere della sera*, 11 January 2011.

39 *Transcript of PM Monti's intervention at the 2nd Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Lecture*, Brussels Economic Forum, Brussels 31 May 2012, available at the link https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/bef2012/media/files/speeches/bef-speech-mario-monti-s1.pdf, p. 7 (last consulted on 4 May 2021).

As I have already shown, Monti's admiration for Germany—and, to some degree, his underestimation of his fellow citizens—was accompanied by him clearly distancing himself from Italian politicians. In his speech in New York, at a certain point Monti confessed his surprise at feeling—unexpectedly—at ease in the Italian Parliament; this surprise came from the fact that he perceived himself as 'so different and so strange [in comparison to] the members of the parliament, as 'one not of them'—and perhaps for this very reason 'there was a form of mutual respect'⁴⁰.

These were not just empty words. On the contrary, they implied a political position—or perhaps an anti-political one, although it was not populist but technocratic. Their aim was to foster a cognitive shift with respect to the traditional image of Italy as an untrustworthy country. The message that the technocrat Monti wanted to convey during a moment of crisis for the country was, 'I am different; I am an expert; I'm not a typical Italian politician. You can count on me and the country that I am now leading'. But naturally he knew he could not remain at the country's helm forever. Therefore, in both his speech in New York and the one at the European University Institute of Florence, he asked for a return to normality: in other words, a government of politicians.

But then how could a return to normality that would lead Italy to fall back into the hands of untrustworthy politicians be avoided? By limiting their discretionary power with European rules. What follows is a telling exchange of opinions about the role of the single European currency between David Rubenstein, who was moderating the Italian Prime Minister's talk at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Monti⁴¹.

Rubenstein: (...) let me ask you about the euro for a moment. On the euro, do you have any doubt that Europe is better off for having had the euro created than had it not had the euro? Suppose the euro had never been put into place. Would Italy or Europe be better off today or worse off?

Monti: Worse off. And that goes for Italy, but it also goes for Germany and for everybody else, in my view. Why? Although the euro has been associated with a number of turmoils recently, take the case of Italy. Euro – the euro brought to Italy a single currency shared with all the others. That is very important economically, simplifying life for businesses and citizens. That's all for the good.

⁴⁰ <https://www.cfr.org/event/mario-monti-challenges-euro-and-future-european-integration> (last consulted on 4.5.2021).

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

But that is not the most important part. The most important part is that the euro is the tip of the iceberg, and underneath, you have a whole set of rules of governance, budgetary discipline, one central bank conducting monetary policy in a spirit of independence, targeted against inflation. You have rules about budgetary stability and so on and so forth. Many of the problems that a country like Italy had experienced in the decades before derived from the fact that these simple and crucial elements of a model of a market economy which were observed, for example, in Germany, were not observed in Italy.

Therefore, the constraints—the constraints sometimes are perceived as being the unpleasant part of the euro. And I can assure you sometimes they are unpleasant. But nevertheless, they modernise a country. They make it more disciplined and so on.

This is the meaning of the European constraint, in Monti's view—and it was for the preservation and reinforcement of this particular relationship between Italy and the European Union that he worked throughout his premiership between 2011 and 2013.

During the speech he gave on 6 September 2012 at the European University Institute of Florence, Mario Monti said he felt a “special affinity” with the European People's Party (EPP). That was not simply a polite nod to the organisers of the conference. Monti explained that his closeness to the People's Party stemmed from his predilection for the social market economy, whose intellectual roots are found—he claimed—in the political culture of European Christian democracy. It is, in his words, an “intellectual link” between him and Christian democrats.⁴² This observation allowed him to offer his perspective on the meaning of the European integration process. In short, according to Monti, the story of European unification should be interpreted as a gradual march towards Europe's adoption of the social market economy implemented in Germany:⁴³

(...) we Europeans, given the brilliant results that the social market economy produced in post-war Germany, have almost been competing to transpose the essential features of that recipe on a European-wide scale. First with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 [with] openness, competition, the single market. Then with the Maastricht Treaty, 1992 [with] the struggle against inflation, budgetary discipline, the independent Central Bank. Fi-

42 Monti's speech at the European University Institute of Florence can be heard at the link <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKd8jAMB1p8&t=336s> (last consulted on 4 May 2021). The passage in which Monti explains his intellectual link with the EPP is at minutes 5:28–6:46.

43 Ibid., minutes 6:44–7:45. My translation.

nally with the Treaty of Lisbon [with] the explicit assertion that being a highly competitive social market economy is the goal of the European Union.

On the other hand, when Mario Monti talks about the past of the European Community, he only rarely cites the ‘fathers of Europe’; instead, he often praises Ludwig Erhard, the ‘father’ of the German economic miracle. This is unsurprising if we consider the fact that Erhard was one of the founders of the social market economy⁴⁴ so respected by Monti. But we should remember that Erhard was not actually a supporter of the European Community; he preferred a free-trade zone.⁴⁵ According to Monti, however, what really counts is the internal European market, which he considers (as he stated in his speech at the Brussels Economic Forum on 31 May 2012) “the key factor for European growth”.⁴⁶

At any rate, as in his speech to the Italian parliament on 2 June, Monti defended Italy in Florence, too, this time challenging the legitimacy of the image it had as a ‘debtor country’. A sort of stigma projected by the countries that considered themselves ‘virtuous’ and that⁴⁷

are almost convincing themselves that they are the sole bearers of virtue; [a] rather dangerous attitude. And [I see] something revealing about this: the recurrence in conversation of [the expression] ‘debtor countries like Italy’. Now I say this not because I am Italian: Italy, at the moment, is not even one euro in debt with respect to the financial stability funds (...).

Moreover, Monti added, Italy ranked third in the list of EU countries most involved in the bailout of Greece—an involvement that would especially have benefited the French banks and German creditors to Athens⁴⁸. Just as he did before the Italian parliamentarians, in Brussels Monti wanted to challenge the legitimacy of a moral (and political) hierarchy within the

44 Cf. James C. Van Hook, *Rebuilding Germany: the creation of the social market economy, 1945–1957*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

45 Cf. Quinn Slobodian, *The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018, pp. 188–189; Guido Thieme, “The ‘Social Market Economy’ and its Impact on German European Policy in the Adenauer Era, 1949–1963”, in *German Politics and Society*, 2, 25, 2007.

46 *Transcript of PM Monti’s intervention at the 2nd Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Lecture*, cit., p. 2. My translation.

47 Monti’s speech at the European University Institute of Florence, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKd8jAMB1p8&t=336s>, minutes 15:41–16:20 (last consulted on 4 May 2021). My translation.

48 *Ibid.*, minutes 16:25–17:06.

European Union, in this case based on the dichotomy between ‘saints’ and ‘sinners’ (creditor countries and debtor countries)⁴⁹.

3. Conclusions

Restoring mutual trust between the European Union and Italy was Monti’s main undertaking during his time as Prime Minister. In his speeches, he tried to foster a new image of Italy (on the outside) and of the European Union (in Italy)—a kind of affective change.

At an international level, Monti endeavoured to restore trust in Italy, both proclaiming his country’s merits (above all Rome’s contribution to bailing out Greece) and recalling the errors committed by France and Germany (by their governments and banking systems).

At a national level, the economic recession—in a certain sense—provided Monti a supportive environment for implementing his peculiar ‘idea of Europe’. In fact, the EU increased its body of rules and constraints (the Fiscal Compact is a good example). The slogan adopted in Brussels was ‘to put the house in order’. To this end, painful sacrifices were needed that—according to Monti—would still be beneficial to Italy, a country in serious need of reform. At the same time, he promoted a narrative that emphasised his distance from ‘politics’. Precisely because it consisted of technocrats, who did not have to worry about being re-elected,⁵⁰ his government was in the ideal position to promote unpopular reforms. In short: the perfect setting for promoting the idea of Europe as a constraint. That this idea unintentionally encouraged Eurosceptical propaganda—according to which Europe, precisely because it is a constraint, is ‘other than Italy’, and therefore does not protect the country’s interests—is a fact that Monti did realise, albeit belatedly. This is clear in the following passage from his speech in Brussels, which seems like a sort of unsolicited excuse⁵¹:

49 Kenneth Dyson, *States, Debt, and Power: Saints and Sinners in European History and Integration*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

50 ‘(...) a government, especially if it is a very atypical government, like the current Italian government—which does not have the prospect of facing the electorate, because it will disappear once the Parliament is over next spring—can afford the unpopularity, because we are not here to pay a political price for that, but we have to be mindful about the sustainability of fiscal discipline and of the reform processes’: quotation found in *Transcript of PM Monti’s intervention at the 2nd Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Lecture*, cit., p. 2.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 5. My italics.

We are achieving the consequence that, month after month, the uninformed as well as the highly informed public opinion in [Italy] are turning against the European recommendations for discipline and structural reforms, although we take particular care in never saying that we have to do these things because Brussels wants us to. *As a devoted European (...) I have never once used the argument.* But it is obvious that sooner or later there will be a backlash against fiscal and structural discipline.

Significantly, Monti had said similar things at the meeting in Florence organised by the European People's Party⁵².

My ministers and I, each time that we have spoken to Parliament or to the Italian public about European constraints, about the Stability Pact, about the Fiscal Compact, about the Six Pack, we have been careful never to say that we have to make certain sacrifices because Europe is asking us to. This is the worst mistake that a politician can make because it destroys trust [in the European Union].

The process by which the external constraint was transformed from a pro-European narrative into a Eurosceptical counter-narrative is a subject that should be tackled elsewhere.⁵³ But naturally, this foreshadows another limitation (other than the ones that I have tried to bring to light in this essay) of the vision of European integration promoted by Mario Monti and by the technocratic circles that he represents.

52 Monti's speech at the European University Institute of Florence: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKd8jAMB1p8&t=336s>, minutes 19:44–20:16 (last consulted on 4 May 2021). My translation.

53 Cf., on this, Daniele Pasquinucci, "From narrative to counter-narrative: the European constraint and the rise of Italian populist Euroscepticism", in *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 20 October 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2020.1839396>.

Matteo Salvini's Nationalist Vision of Europe. The Conte I Cabinet (2018–2019)

Guido Levi

3 February 2021. The President of the Italian Republic Sergio Mattarella, having noted the impossibility of rebuilding the majority that had supported the second government led by Giuseppe Conte¹, summoned Mario Draghi—the former President of the European Central Bank (ECB)—to the *Quirinale* to give him the task of forming a new executive. In fact, it was an unexpected turning point after the move from Matteo Renzi, who a few days earlier, in a way considered irresponsible by analysts, had left the country without political leadership in the middle of a health, economic and social emergency.

The news then created different reactions among the parties. The *Partito Democratico* (PD) and other centrist parties immediately offered their support to the appointee Prime Minister, while *Liberi e Uguali* (LeU), *Forza Italia* (FI) and the *Movimento 5 Stelle* (M5S) declared their support the following day. But the real twist happened on 5 February, when also Salvini's *Lega* sided with Draghi after having fought him for years, even defining him as an “accomplice of a European Union that massacres [the] Italian people and economy”².

How was that possible? What happened inside the most nationalist and Eurosceptical party in the Italian Parliament? At the base of the decision, which was surely more difficult than it looked, there was a tactical discourse, in which, with no doubt, the following played a significant role: Draghi's experience, the risk of political isolation, the competition in the right electorate by *Fratelli d'Italia* (FdI), and the need for participation in the Recovery Fund management and in the vaccination campaign. Moreover, the pressure put on Salvini by the moderate and pragmatic side of the party, especially by the vice-president Giancarlo Giorgetti and by the

1 The Conte II government, in office from 5 September 2019 to 13 February 2021, was supported by a coalition composed of *Movimento 5 Stelle*, *Partito Democratico*, *Liberi e Uguali*, *Italia Viva* and *Movimento Associativo Italiani all'Estero*, and enjoyed the external support of some minor political parties.

2 Declaration on 6 February 2017, see <https://video.repubblica.it>.

governors of the Northern regions, starting from the President of Veneto Luca Zaia, played a major role.

Last, a major factor was his need for international recognition as the future leader of a centre-right coalition, clearly having in mind, as we will see, what happened in the summer of 2019³.

These hypotheses perhaps explain the context in which the turn occurred, but they do not make the decision taken by Salvini any less surprising, given that Draghi is certainly a ‘technocrat’—in the sense expressed by Mattarella and not by the parties, and meaning that he was chosen for his experience at the top of the *Banca d’Italia* first, and then as leader of the European Central Bank (ECB)—but his career is studded with political decisions anyway, starting from the creation of the *Quantitative Easing* plan that, according to experts, not only helped the poorer countries in the eurozone but also probably saved the currency itself.

The interviews rashly released by Salvini do not help us to gain an understanding in this respect. On 7 February, on Radio 24, the *Lega* leader had in fact dismissed the issue: “I leave labels to others: fascist, communist, pro-European. I am a pragmatic and concrete person”. And again “We are hand, feet, heart and brains in Europe, but of course I want a different Europe, able to protect enterprises and Italian agriculture”.

He then concluded the argument claiming that with Draghi “we can hold our head high in Europe. I don’t talk about immigration because they wanted to label us, but caring about national interests corresponds to caring about those of other members”⁴.

There is, however, a big question still to be solved in this story. How would the basis of the party react, that basis which in recent years had been ideologically fed with a Eurosceptical narrative, against technocrats and high finance?

1. *Lega Nord and Europe*

To begin with, in the early nineties, *Lega Nord* was not a hostile party towards the European Union at all. Its repulsion for Rome and the central State was, in fact, accompanied by an interest in Brussels, with a special

3 See, among the different journalistic interpretations, Antonio Polito, “La svolta di Matteo (ispirata da Giorgetti) che spiazzava un po’ tutti”, in *Corriere della Sera*, 7 February 2021, p. 6.

4 Marco Cremonesi, “Salvini si dà una “scadenza”: noi ci siamo per i mesi che servono”, in *Corriere della Sera*, 8 February 2021, p. 5.

predilection for the federal model and with the desire for the rise of a Europe of Regions as an alternative to the national States. This ideological plan was inherited from the *Lega Lombarda*, *Lega Nord*'s ancestor, which had already used these programmatic points in the European electoral campaign in June 1989.⁵

However, the *Lega*'s position on Europe was not particularly clear, perhaps also because of the existence of an internal party dialectic on this particular point. In 1993, Ilvo Diamanti tried to summarise this point of view: "The *Lega* speaks of a Europe of peoples, focused on the regions (and, better still, on macro-regions), based on relations of reciprocity and affinity, rather than unity and community. It thinks of a Europe that goes far beyond its present borders [the European Community, which was about to become a European Union, was then made up of 12 States], which, in contrast, does not have too rigid external borders. The real Europe, built above the EEC, is, on the other hand, a community of mostly national States, based on relations between the political systems and the economic forces which govern each context."⁶

According to Diamanti, however, the Europe of Regions desired by Umberto Bossi and Gianfranco Miglio was not only a confused project but above all a utopian proposal, a proposal that could work in terms of propaganda but remained outside the European political agenda. The Europe of Regions could only have been achieved by radically reforming the Community's institutions by adopting a new treaty—that is, transforming the European Parliament into a bicameral Parliament, with a representative House of Regions—but this prospect found no supporters either within the European Parliament or, even less, among the governments of the Member States.

5 Massimo Piermattei, *Crisi della Repubblica e sfida europea. I partiti italiani e la moneta unica*, Bologna: Clueb, 2012, p. 30. On that occasion, the *Lega Lombarda* had actually created an electoral coalition with other autonomist forces, the *Alleanza Nord*, which really prefigured the future Lega Nord. The electoral slogan was "Più lontani da Roma, più vicini all'Europa" (Further from Rome, closer to Europe), and this pro-European choice was brilliant, allowing the new formation to obtain its first electoral success and to gain two seats. It must be considered though that Lega had given voting suggestions against the concurrent referendum for the granting of a constituent mandate to the new Assembly in Strasbourg promoted by the European Federalist Movement, not out of repulsion at a more integrated Europe, but because it was afraid of political exploitation of the referendum by the traditional parties.

6 Ilvo Diamanti, "L'Europa secondo la Lega", in *Limes*, 4, Sept.–Dec., 1993, pp. 161–171, with particular reference to pp. 170–171.

During the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty, the legislators had in fact taken into account the need to involve local and regional institutions in the decision-making process of the European Union in order to try to bring Europe closer to its citizens, but this requirement had simply resulted in the establishment of the European Committee of Regions, a body with only advisory functions and lacking real powers⁷.

Despite this, the *Lega* had, at that time, continued to look carefully to the new European Union, while having many doubts about Italy's ability to meet the parameters set for full membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). At the end of 1991, Bossi had commented—indeed with some recklessness—that the crisis of the old national States had begun at Maastricht and the foundation stone had been laid for the creation of a future federal Europe⁸.

The deputies and senators of the Lega, the fourth political force in the country after the success it achieved in the 1992 elections⁹, therefore voted in favour of the Maastricht Treaty together with all the other political forces except for the *Rifondazione Comunista* and the *Movimento Sociale Italiano*¹⁰. Europe was a construction site and therefore the new Treaty did not, in its view, close the discourse on a federal Europe, the only possible institutional architecture for a politically united Europe, or the somewhat related one on the transformation of Italy into a federal Republic. The governance responsibilities in the first executive led by Silvio Berlusconi and then in the government chaired by Lamberto Dini strengthened this approach towards Europe, an approach that we can certainly not call Eurosceptical and that, after the 1994 European elections, would lead to the entry of the *Lega*'s parliamentarians into the Group of the European Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Party. There was therefore still hope for the federal development of the EU, as it was also desired at the beginning of

7 Cfr. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/it>

8 Cfr. M. Piermattei, p. 82. At that time, the Lega was in favour of the Maastricht Treaty also because, thanks to the convergence criteria—the famous parameters—, it would have made undelayable those reforms that no Italian government had dared to make and that, in its opinion, would have favoured the financial and economic recovery of the country.

9 *Lega Nord* obtained notable success in the political elections in April 1992, with 8.7% of the votes and 55 seats in the Camera and 8.2% of the votes and 25 seats in the Senato.

10 Leopoldo Fabiani, "L' Italia approva Maastricht", in *La Repubblica*, 30 October 1992.

the process of European integration by the founding fathers themselves¹¹, while there was clear closure to the hypothesis of a multi-speed Europe circulating in German circles.

From 1995, however, the *Lega* took up more radical positions, which became more evident after the end of its experience of government in May 1996, which led it, as far as Italy was concerned, to abandon both its autonomist and federalist lines and to adopt openly independence positions. The symbolic act was represented by the Declaration of Independence and Sovereignty of Padania, approved on 15 September 1996, with a unanimous vote by the *Lega*'s members gathered along the Po river¹², and then by the referendum in May 1997, which involved almost five million voters.

On the European scale, this approach resulted in the idea of a Padania easily able to choose the euro, of managing to respect Maastricht parameters thanks to its economic solidity, and of an Italy, now split from Padania, forced instead to maintain the *lira* due to its backwardness. In concrete terms, this approach implied an extension to the regions involved in the project that would be hardly feasible, since a two-speed Europe had originally been conceived for states only¹³.

The following year Bossi called on the European institutions to verify the possible accession of Padania to the EMU, but the Commission's response was, of course, no, since no such eventuality was included in the Treaties. However, the independence narrative was pursued in the May 1997 referendum, in which nearly five million voters participated and the proposal's supporters won 97% of the votes.

However, the *Lega*'s affection for Europe decreased from 1998, when Italy was accepted into the eurozone: according to Bossi it was a political decision by Brussels¹⁴.

That opened the path for Padanian Euroscepticism, even if that phase was mainly marked by Europe's loss of importance in the *Lega*'s programmes. The 'national' issue of Padania's sovereignty prevaricated over 'international' issues, naturally combined with other traditional *pièces de résistance* such as the fight against illegal immigration and crime, tax

11 On the distance between the pro-Europe movement of the forties and the fifties and the current European Union, see Alessandro Somma, *Quando l'Europa tradì se stessa. E come continua a tradirsi nonostante la pandemia*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2021.

12 Cfr. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WHnSa2buvmw>

13 Cfr. M. Piermattei, p. 155.

14 Ibid., p. 186.

protests, criticism of the party system, the defence of the interests of small and medium-sized enterprises, and measures to protect families¹⁵.

Settled on the right side, except for its brief support of Dini's government, the *Lega Nord* was characterised by its populism. According to the political scientist Marco Tarchi in the motivations that determine its birth, in the forms of expression, in the style of action, in the characteristics of leadership and organisation, in the issues enhanced to attract consensus, as well as in the strategies adopted in the various periods of evolution that led it to be, from a marginal group as it was originally, the first opposition movement and then governing party in three different periods, *legghismo* appears as an almost idealistic embodiment of populism, of which it offered its first mass manifestation in Italy since the *qualunquismo* (*laurismo* remained confined to quite narrow geographical borders), but with definitely stronger stability¹⁶.

According to Tarchi, populism was detectable in the rhetoric of the anti-politics shown towards the parties, the institutions and the parasitism of the South, and towards the bureaucracy's inefficiency, the power of the confederal trade unions and the establishment's threats.

The symbols and slogans used—the best known was “*Roma ladrona la Lega non perdona*” (*Lega* is not forgiving “Rome the Thief”)—, the colourful language of its leaders, even the scruffy way of dressing of many of its leaders and militants, boosted a narrative that sought both populism and liberalism, two approaches that can only appear contradictory¹⁷.

Consequently, the distinction between Northern Italy and Padania, between autonomism and independence, and between centre, right or left alliances was of little interest to his constituents. It was thus possible for it to mend its relations with Berlusconi and Fini after the failure reported by *Lega* in the 1999 European elections, with the party collapsing to 4.5% of the votes compared to 10% in the 1996 political elections and 6.6% in the 1994 European elections.

The right-wing alliance allowed *Lega* to return to government, in an executive again led by Berlusconi, albeit with a considerably reduced number of seats (30 in the *Camera* against 59 in the previous session, and only 17 in the *Senato*).

15 Cfr. “*Lega Nord*”, a. III, no. 5; May 1999, special edition for European elections. See also Roberto Biorcio, *La rivincita del Nord. La Lega dalla contestazione al governo*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2010, pp. XIII–XIV.

16 Marco Tarchi, *Italia populista. Dal qualunquismo a Beppe Grillo*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2015, p. 243.

17 Ibid., pp. 243–277, with particular reference to pp. 245–251.

Federalism and devolution prevailed over separatism as new keywords, while Europe was now perceived as a problem associated with centralisation, globalisation and the creation of a multi-ethnic society. In particular, the *Lega Nord* opposed the EU's enlargement to Eastern Europe and the negotiations with Turkey, but also questioned the euro itself at that stage¹⁸. The illness of Umberto Bossi, who suffered a stroke in March 2004, also deeply complicated this phase of transformation of the party.

The Eurosceptical narrative, however similar to those of the other populist forces present in Europe, was further accentuated in the years in which the party was relegated to the opposition in the years of the second Prodi government and especially in those of the hated Monti government, which was interpreted as an expression of the economic and financial lobbies that dominated in the EU. A partial turning point in this area occurred during the short duration of the Maroni Secretariat (July 2012–December 2013), with the attempt to recover the Europe of Regions project in the context of a broader moderate change. But it was, in fact, a very short season, because the abandonment of populism by a party that had long since taken this path involved a consensus hemorrhage¹⁹.

And populism also allowed the party to respond to the scandals and legal issues which, since 2012, had heavily involved the Bossi family and the treasurer Belsito, shifting media attention from their alleged crimes to the political and judicial plots²⁰. These were well-tested defensive strategies that some protagonists from Italian political life, such as Bettino Craxi and Silvio Berlusconi, had made extensive use of not many years earlier.

This approach favoured Salvini's rise in the *Lega Nord* and his election as federal secretary of the *Lega Nord* in December 2013. Although he presented himself as a new man in the party, thanks also to his 40 years of age, Salvini was actually a long-time *Lega Nord* member—he had been a city councillor in Milan in the early nineties—and had a long political career in the party, which, for over twenty years, had led him to be nominated as the director of Radio Padania Libera, as the Province of Milan's secretary

18 Cfr. Valeria Tarditi, "From the Europe of the Regions to the Europe of Technocrats: the EU according to the Lega Nord", in Guido Levi and Daniela Preda (eds.), *Euroscepticisms. Resistance and opposition to the European Community/European Union*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2019, pp. 219–231, with particular reference to p. 226.

19 Cfr. M. Tarchi, p. 270.

20 See Giovanni Tizian and Stefano Vergine. *Il libro nero della Lega*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2019.

of the *Lega Nord* (1998–2004), as an MEP and then, since 2008, as the Deputy at *Montecitorio*.

And with Salvini, who even had a past as a self-styled ‘Padan Communist’²¹, the right-wing position of the party was further accentuated. The programme he presented as a candidate for the Secretariat emphasised the need to block illegal immigration, introduce a flat tax on income at 15%, restore six months of compulsory civil or military service, and, above all, to proceed with the full recovery of limited national sovereignty from the European Union. Great attention was paid to the EU, as the Union was accused of favouring multinationals and the interests of some Member States at the expense of others, as well as blamed for the economic damage caused by the single currency. The plan was to radically revise the Treaties to move from the current Union “to true, new, peaceful and free cooperation between sovereign states”²².

At the time of the investiture, in the speech delivered off the cuff at the Lingotto festival, the tone became even more critical. The euro was, in fact, defined as no less than “a crime against humanity” and the EMU a system “to fool our agriculture, to curb our economy, which is ninety per cent based on small and medium-sized enterprises, on companies that have fewer than ten employees and that Europe would like to cancel”²³.

Italy's exit from the eurozone therefore became one of the characterising points of Salvini's *Lega Nord*, which used the theses of the economist Alberto Bagnai, who argued that the common currency could not work due to the irreconcilability of interests between different national states, as a point of reference²⁴. In this battle, Salvini was able to intercept the mood of that part of public opinion (and therefore of the electorate) which was particularly disappointed by the way in which the EU had responded to the sovereign debt crisis, and to exploit the role of an opposition party to the governments led by Matteo Renzi (February 2014–December 2016) and then by Paolo Gentiloni (December 2016–March 2018).

21 The reference is to the experience of the first “electoral” Padanian Parliament. The vote was expressed in gazeboes set up by the party in many Northern Italian municipalities.

22 *Programma per la candidatura alla Segreteria Federale della Lega Nord per l'Indipendenza della Padania*, in www.leganord.org

23 Matteo Salvini, *Secondo Matteo. Follia e coraggio per cambiare il Paese*, Milano: Rizzoli, 2016, p. 22.

24 Alberto Bagnai, *Il tramonto dell'euro. Come e perché la fine della moneta unica salverebbe democrazia e benessere in Europa*, Reggio Emilia: Imprimatur, 2012.

The discourse on Europe was part of a broader narrative on international relations mainly based on establishing privileged relations with Putin's Russia. Salvini's admiration for the Russian president was extraordinary and expressed from their first meeting: "his way of doing things, his firm voice, his handshake: everything confirmed that I was facing a true leader". And his political proposal was very clear and translated into the wish to "reopen relations with Russia, not only by scrapping the sanctions that only harm us (more than four billion euros of non-exports of Italian products), but by strengthening the partnership at all levels: from companies to culture"²⁵. A line for Salvini to be pursued even at the cost of having to redefine the role of NATO itself. Undoubtedly, the lack of empathy with President Obama, whom he bluntly defined as "the worst US president in history", weighed heavily in this vision²⁶.

This criticism of Europe, and basically of what remained of the old Atlanticism, brought the party dangerously closer to the far-right formations present in the EU, starting with Marine Le Pen's *Front National*. In Italy, this line instead resulted in an approach to Giorgia Meloni's *Fratelli d'Italia* and even in some contact with the neo-fascists of *Casa Pound*. In short, a metamorphosis of the party was underway, passing from regionalist positions to ultra-nationalist positions²⁷. However, it was not easy for a political formation with such a history to be able to win support outside the strongholds of the North: the first step in this direction was represented by the foundation of the *Noi con Salvini* party in December 2014. In 2017, the year of reconfirmation of Salvini as federal secretary, the Lega Nord was then transformed into the Lega, and in March 2018 the party stood in the elections as *Lega - Salvini Premier*.

As is well known, the party achieved an extraordinary electoral result on that occasion, exceeding 17% of the votes in both the *Camera* and *Senato* votes, and obtaining the leadership in the centre-right coalition at the expense of *Forza Italia*. However, this success was driven by the Northern regions, especially by Lombardy, Veneto and Piedmont, demonstrating its difficulties in endeavouring to transition into a national party²⁸. Further-

25 M. Salvini, pp. 208 & 214. However, it was not a completely new position for the Lega Nord. On that occasion, political commentators remembered that in 1999 Umberto Bossi was against the NATO intervention in Kosovo and in agreement with Russia.

26 Ibid., p. 209.

27 cfr. V. Tarditi, p. 229.

28 Cfr. Gianluca Passarelli, "La "Lega di Salvini" e il sogno nazionale", in Marco Valbruzzi (ed.), *L'Italia sovranista e la sfida all'Europa. Le elezioni amministrative*

more, the centre-right coalition did not obtain an absolute majority of seats, stopping at 37%, with the *Movimento 5 Stelle* establishing itself as the first Italian political force with over 32% of the votes.

With this result, the *Lega* became the third most popular party in the country after the *Movimento 5 Stelle* and the *Partito Democratico*, and after a troubled negotiation process with Beppe Grillo's party, it assumed government responsibilities in support of the executive led by Giuseppe Conte. For one of the leading international scholars of the ultra-right, the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde, it was yet further confirmation not only of the acceptance, but also of the institutionalisation of the radical right in the Western world, the end of its marginalisation, which had lasted decades²⁹.

2. Salvini's *Lega* in government (June 2018–August 2019)

The government of 'change' gained the trust of the two branches of Parliament in June 2018³⁰. Thus, a new adventure for Salvini's *Lega* began, as the party was called upon to translate electoral programmes and promises into laws and provisions. Salvini was, however, aware that many of the proposals made in recent years were still difficult to implement, and he was also aware that he could not hide behind the finger of the coalition government for too long.

In this situation, therefore, political communication assumed a fundamental role, as a narrative addressed primarily to militants and voters, but indirectly to all Italians³¹. The 14 months of government will therefore be

2019, Bologna: Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, 2019, pp. 198–205. See also Gianluca Passarelli, Dario Tuorto, *La Lega di Salvini: estrema destra di governo*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2018.

29 Cas Mudde, *Ultradestra. Radicali ed estremisti dall'antagonismo al potere*, Roma: Luiss University Press, 2020 (ed. or. *The Far Right Today*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019).

30 The term "change" was preferred to the more conventional term "reform" probably because the latter was considered ideologically placed in leftist terminology. But "change" was clearly a generic term, incapable of showing a direction, let alone a political perspective.

31 On the attention reserved by the Lega's leader to communication, see the report *Matteo Salvini e «La Bestia»: come catturare 4 milioni di fan sui social*, realised by Milena Gabanelli and Simona Ravizza for the "Corriere della Sera": <https://www.corriere.it/dataroom>, 20 October 2019. See also Filippo Zattin, *Comunicazione politica, social network e populismo: due strategie, un partito. Il caso della Lega di*

retraced through three speeches delivered by Salvini in three completely different contexts but which are equally significant and characteristic of this political phase.

The first speech taken into consideration can only be the speech given by Matteo Salvini on 1 July 2018, in Pontida, a town near Bergamo known in the history books for the oath sworn in the twelfth century by the Lombard municipalities against the emperor Frederick Barbarossa, and, in more recent times, known to many as an annual meeting place for the militants of the *Lega Nord*. Why is this important? Because this is Salvini's first important meeting in his new role as Minister of Domestic Affairs and Vice President of the Council of Ministers. President Conte had been endorsed by the *grillini*, a party with a relative majority, but Salvini's party in the government was represented by as many as 6 ministers, 3 deputy ministers and 15 undersecretaries. The programme was then defined in the unusual 'Contract for the Government of Change', as a commitment to the Italians but also to avoid clashes between the *Lega* and the *Movimento 5 Stelle*.

For all these reasons, that speech was eagerly awaited. The speaker at the event announced Matteo Salvini's speech with great emphasis, stating that the whole world was watching the event and that for this reason it was important to let Macron, Merkel, Saviano and all the enemies of the *Lega* feel the people's affection for Salvini. And Salvini was presented as "a decisive, determined, indefatigable, proud guide, a guide who made an entire people raise their heads"³².

But the speech delivered by Salvini in front of his militant supporters and the wider audience that followed him through social networks was objectively disappointing. The tones were the traditional ones of the rally aimed at galvanising the militants, but there was not even an embryo of what we could define as 'a political vision', even if the speech lasted almost an hour. The fact that Salvini had also deliberately chosen to speak off the cuff, in comfortable clothes and with an aggressive tone only partially justifies the weakness of his speech. Even when referring to the government programme, he just listed the priorities of the *Lega* (cancellation of the Fornero law, introduction of the *quota cento* to calculate the retirement

Matteo Salvini e Luca Zaia, Quaderno dell'Osservatorio DANE, 2020, in <http://www.centrostudiregionali.unipd.it>

32 For the video of the entire meeting in Pontida in July 2018, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=T1WDIIo0cmQ. Last accessed 22 June 2021.

age, a lowering of taxes, and decisive action to combat illegal emigration)³³ without, however, deepening any of the points covered.

But what is notable in Salvini's speech in Pontida—a place symbolic of Padanian independence—is the explicit nationalism it exhibited, even cloaked in a rhetorical reference to the First World War on the hundredth anniversary of its conclusion. As is well known, the Great War had, in fact, represented a moment of fundamental importance in the definition of Italian national identity³⁴, but it certainly did not contribute to the creation of a Padanian identity: “In 1918 the Great War ended, a war in which our grandparents and their grandparents died to defend our borders. And we, in honour of that sacrifice, have a government that returns to defend the borders, so that we won't negate the sacrifice of many young men who left their lives for the sake of their family and their homeland”³⁵.

But how was it possible to keep Piave and Pontida together? Those who had sacrificed themselves for their country and a party whose founder, Umberto Bossi, had been condemned a few years earlier for insulting the tricolour flag? It was not objectively easy, and by widely forcing the history of his party, Salvini argued that the *Lega*, born to change cities and regions, was now consistently committed to changing the country. Even more curious was the second argument Salvini used: a reference to Gianfranco Miglio, an ideologue of the *Lega* and, for a long time, a promoter of a federal or confederal Italy, who happened to be born in Como just in 1918³⁶! With these words, and taking advantage of the absence of a confrontation he claimed a coherence of political action that is really difficult to demonstrate beyond vague references to an Italy and a Europe both respectful of all identities and in harmony with a world that was changing. The absence of Bossi on the Pontida lawn, and the shadowy presence of

33 The Fornero law, or more correctly the Fornero reform, is the Italian retirement system's reform carried out in 2011 by the minister of labour and social policies of the Moni executive. In particular, Salvini contested its increasing of the retirement age, proposing instead his quota cento (the one hundred quota, summing up the worker's age and the years of legal work).

34 See, among a wide bibliography. Aldo Schiavone, *Italiani senza Italia. Storia e identità*, Torino: Einaudi, 1998, pp. 21–22. Si veda inoltre Ernesto Galli della Loggia, *Identità italiana*, Bologna. Il Mulino, 2010.

35 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T1WDIIo0cmQ>

36 On his theories, see Gianfranco Miglio, *La regolarità della politica. Scritti scelti raccolti e pubblicati dagli allievi*, Milano: Giuffrè, 1988; Giovanni Di Capua, *Gianfranco Miglio scienziato impolitico*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006; Davide Gianluca Bianchi, *Dare un volto al potere. Gianfranco Miglio fra scienza e politica*, Sesto San Giovanni: Mimesis, 2012.

Roberto Maroni, however, marked the distance between the old and the new Lega by more than a thousand words³⁷.

There are several references to the EU contained in his short speech. Also in this case, these are very generic references, but they are still meaningful: "Our goal is to change Europe, our goal is to give a voice in Europe to those peoples who have been crushed by those who only cared about the fate of finance, of the multinationals, [and] which has offered us a future of precariousness, of fear, where a permanent job is a dream, where even retiring after a life of work is a dream". And then again, with growing emphasis: "Tearing the Berlin Wall down would once have been unthinkable. And the next wall we'll demolish is that of Brussels, giving back to the European peoples the right to work, the right to life, the right to health, the right to safety"³⁸. The EU is clearly shown as Italy's problem, because of its economic and social policy, and probably as the only real centre of power which the new government would have to deal with, given the weakness of the Italian opposition parties. This was nothing new, given that the party had been in the field of Eurosceptical parties for some time, even before Salvini's arrival at the secretariat. In Pontida, however, Salvini, in his new role as a member of the government, was able to launch a challenge to Europe: the challenge of not respecting the budget constraints resulting from the Maastricht parameters, the Stability and Growth Pact, up to the Fiscal Compact. To put it in his own words: "if in order to make our people feel better, I have to ignore a 'zero point' imposed by Brussels, for me that 'zero point' counts less than zero. The happiness of a people, the happiness of the peoples comes first. Go and ask the Greeks how happy they are, go and ask the victims of fiscal, banking, insane laws"³⁹.

Moreover, Salvini did not like the economic policy of Europe even for its political implications: "They tell me: this European Union cannot be

37 See "Il Senatùr resta a casa, Maroni c'è ma non si vede", in *La Repubblica*, 2 July 2018, p. 6.

38 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T1WDIIo0cmQ>

39 In Salvini's speech, the "zero point" referred to the 3% threshold on the deficit/GDP imposed by Brussels on the member states in order to force them to contain the public debt. For some weeks, however, Salvini had not talked of "exceeding" the balance limits anymore, but rather of "adjusting" them, giving better flexibility to their application. Excluding the aggressiveness of his tone, this was the substance of his speech. Moreover, it was an unpopular law, contested not only by the Eurosceptical parties but also by most of the economic and social forces, because its rigidity did not allow valuation of the different scenarios in which the financial laws were carried out.

touched because it guarantees us peace and friendship between peoples. The peoples of Europe have never been as in conflict as they are today!” The *Lega Nord* liked even less the attitude of Europe towards migrants, the Europe of those who do not believe there are borders⁴⁰. To support his thesis, Salvini, in a completely arbitrary way, quoted Simone Veil—a survivor of internment in Auschwitz, as well as the first president of the European Parliament directly elected by the citizens—, who in a completely different context had argued that “everything that has as the effect of uprooting a human being or preventing him from making roots is criminal”. But, according to Salvini, this was exactly what Brussels, Paris and Berlin had tried to do in recent years: “taking away our roots from underground, transforming women and men in numbers and consumers at the service of those multinationals such as Coca Cola which then sponsor [gay] pride parades in various cities⁴¹”.

To change Europe, Salvini aimed to create a sort of Leagues’ *Lega* in Europe capable of politically organising the various sovereign movements present in the states of the Old Continent⁴². The conditions already existed thanks to the international alliances made with Marine Le Pen’s *Front National* and with the Eurosceptical parties of various countries, which had sat in the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group in Strasbourg since 2015. And in some ways, there was already a rough programme, given that for Salvini and Marine Le Pen the nation states would have to regain their lost sovereignty and be united in Europe only by a thin confederal bond. In Salvini’s intentions, the sovereign International should have embraced other parties, starting with the Hungarians of *Fidesz*, the party chaired by Viktor Orbán, at that time a member of the EPP. The rally therefore ended with a sort of collective oath “not to give up until the peoples of Europe are freed”.

The perspective of the sovereign International would have been resumed the following year, on the occasion of the elections for the renewal

40 Cas Mudde recalls that the opposition towards mass immigration represents a common trait in the radical and extreme right, such as the opposition to all the international organizations, from the UN to the EU. C. Mudde, with reference to pp. 45–53.

41 Criticism of globalisation and the LGBT community was another common trait among the European far right.

42 Newspapers’ headlines the following day highlighted how this passage represented the most important political point of his speech. See Carmelo Lopapa, “Salvini, crociata nella UE. “Lega dei populistici per vincere le europee”, in *La Repubblica*, 2 July 2021, p. 6.

of the European Parliament. But on that 1 July in Pontida, observers were struck even more by the absence in Salvini's speech of any reference to the hypothesis of Italy's exit from the euro, the theme that had stirred up the Italian political debate during the negotiations for the formation of the Conte I government. On closer inspection, however, this point was wisely evaded by Salvini since it was a point that had in fact already been removed from the government's agenda, not being foreseen by the 'contract' between *M5S* and the *Lega*. Or in better words, it had disappeared in the latest version of the contract, due to the explicit aversion of the *grillini*, since actually a first draft of the agreement had not ruled out the possibility of abandoning the single currency. This background was revealed by Claudio Borghi, the *Lega's* economic advisor, who then tried to play it down: "If you put the spare wheel on, it doesn't mean you wish to drill"⁴³. And subsequently Borghi, interviewed by Bernard Guetta, would also add that, in those weeks, the exit from the euro had even been rejected by Marine Le Pen, who represented an international point of reference for Salvini and for all sovereigntists⁴⁴. Put at stake, there were very delicate international balances with which the *Lega* and the sovereigntists could not certainly joke, given that a departure from the EU would probably have implied a further approach to Russia, and even then, Eugenio Scalfari considered Salvini to be Putin's bridgehead in Europe⁴⁵.

But this is a subject for political analysts, while on this occasion Salvini certainly did not dwell on such a background and, vice versa, with triumphalist tones, on the one hand, he pitted the results already achieved by the new government, starting with the event of the ships loaded with migrants who had been prevented from disembarking in Italian ports and, on the other, had ventured to predict that the new yellow-green majority would rule Italy for the next thirty years. Even in the following months, migrants and Europe continued to be at the centre of the *Lega's* attention, up to the point of representing almost a real political obsession for Salvini. And in September, in Vienna, at the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the European

43 Goffredo De Marchis, "Il grande inganno di Salvini quel fallimento pilotato che copriva il piano No Euro", in *La Repubblica*, 29 May 2018, p. 3.

44 Bernard Guetta, *I sovranisti. Dall'Austria all'Ungheria, dalla Polonia all'Italia, nuovi nazionalismi al potere in Europa*, Torino: Add, 2019, pp. 153–154.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 158.

Union, a tough battle between Salvini and Jean Asselborn, Luxembourg's foreign minister, would take place precisely on the issue of migrants⁴⁶.

Soon Salvini's project of putting himself at the head of the European sovereigntists, even gathering parties outside the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group such as the Poles of Law and Justice, who sat in Strasbourg in the Group of European Conservatives and Reformists, or the already mentioned Hungarians of *Fidesz*, however, came up against a very different reality from the one he had imagined. Indeed, the sovereigntists of Northern and Eastern Europe were the most uncompromising opponents of the distribution of migrants in the EU member countries and the loosening of budgetary rules. The project of a sort of International of nationalists, or of sovereigntists if you prefer, was therefore subject to an abrupt halt⁴⁷.

In the autumn, the clash between Rome and Brussels focused mainly on the Economics and Finance Document, as it deliberately violated European rules on budgetary discipline. This clash ended up isolating Italy within the EU, although an agreement with the Commission was reached at the last minute in December, thus avoiding the start of an infringement procedure. However, the tensions with Europe did not damage the image of the *Lega*, which was, in fact, flying in the polls in those months and further strengthened Salvini's leadership⁴⁸. Moreover, with the approach of the European elections, scheduled at the end of May, the project of the single group of sovereigntists in Strasbourg accelerated.

Even the agreement's memorandum with Xi Jinping China on the Silk Road, signed in Rome by the government in March 2019, aroused averse reactions in the EU because, according to Brussels, it did not take into account the more prudent European position. But just in those weeks, a big political tile was breaking down on Salvini. An investigation by Giovanni Tizian and Stefano Vergine, published in the form of an essay by Laterza⁴⁹

46 Asselborn, *chi è il ministro degli Esteri del Lussemburgo che ha litigato con Salvini: fu il primo a criticare l'Ungheria di Orban*, in <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2018/09/14>.

47 See Alberto D'Argenio, "Conti pubblici, i sovranisti già pronti a scaricarci", in *La Repubblica*, 12 October 2018, p. 4.

48 A poll commissioned by the European Parliament on 23 January 2019 predicted the growth of sovereignist MEPs, the loss of seats for Populists and Socialists, who for the first time would no longer have an absolute majority, and success for Salvini with almost 32% of the votes. See "Europa senza maggioranza nello scontro con i sovranisti," in *La Repubblica*, 15 February 2019, p. 6.

49 Giovanni Tizian and Stefano Vergine, *Il libro nero della Lega*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2019.

and anticipated in an article for the weekly *L'Espresso*, revealed, in fact, that the *Lega* would receive substantial funding from Putin's Russia. The article opened with harsh words: "a millionaire deal to finance the *Lega* ahead of the European elections. Russian money for the vice-president Salvini's Italian nationalists. The same man who publicly declared that he was not interested in Vladimir Putin's money, but who supported him out of pure political sympathy"⁵⁰. The funding process was quite complex, but Putin's plan to subsidise Eurosceptical parties to boycott an EU deemed as hostile was clear.

Salvini responded to the accusations by denying any wrongdoing and calling the investigation an invention, an amenity, a story to be published in *Topolino*. But these were generic answers, not sufficient to clarify and dispel doubts⁵¹. This incident did not, however, affect Salvini's popularity, with electoral polls indicating that the *Lega* was the most popular party in the country with over 32% of votes for the entire month of March. A small decrease was found, but it was completely marginal, almost an irrelevant percentage, in a range between 1 and 2%⁵².

Salvini anxiously awaited the European elections on 26 May to collect the results of his party's predicted success. In view of that important deadline, many meetings, demonstrations and rallies were organised. The most significant, however, was held in Milan, in Piazza del Duomo, on 18 May 2019. Preceded by the greetings of many nationalist leaders from various European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Germany and Austria)⁵³, the words of Geert Wilders, the founder of *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV), who indicated him as "an example for all of us", and by Marine Le Pen, who reiterated her criticisms of a Europe that promotes savage globalisation, Salvini appeared on the stage radiant in thanking the crowd of militants ("people who do not resign themselves to a future of poverty, precariousness, fear and slavery", to quote the famous aphorisms of Gilbert Keith Chesterton) for being in the

50 Giovanni Tizian e Stefano Vergine, "3 milioni per Salvini", in *L'Espresso*, 24 February 2019, p. 16.

51 Marco Damilano, "Capitano fragile", in *L'Espresso*, 3 March 2019, p. 8.

52 <https://www.youtrend.it/2019/04/05>.

53 For a concise picture of Eurosceptical parties and movements present in the old continent, see Carlo Muzzi, *Euroscettici. Quali sono e cosa vogliono i movimenti contrari all'Unione Europea*, Firenze: Le Monnier, 2019.

square with him to “change history”, “build a dream” and complete “the revolution of good sense and smile”⁵⁴.

At that moment, Salvini felt strong, particularly secure, comforted by the polls and sovereigntists of half of Europe. However, the outline of the speech, pronounced once again off the cuff (even though, in this case, Salvini was holding a sheet with a schedule in his hand), was not very different from the one held in Pontida, even if the invectives against his opponents, politicians who “talk about the past because they have no idea of the future”, and against a press that, in his opinion, was almost completely aligned against him, sounded even stronger. The praise of his government’s actions, especially the fight against illegal immigration—moreover with a distinction between the immigration of peoples culturally extraneous to our identity and others, such as Latin Americans, who are more welcome because they are more similar to Italians—, the approval of *quota 100* for the calculation of pensions and the reform of the law on self-defence⁵⁵, echoed equally strong.

And even more radical than in the past was his criticism of the European Union, against which—he declared with contempt—we should fight vigorously “to free this country and this continent from the illegal occupation organised by Brussels in recent years”. In his opinion, the European Union had betrayed the Europe of the founding fathers, which was a Europe of peoples and nations, in the name of the interests of finance, multinationals, lobbies and the ‘God of money’. And as if that was not enough for Salvini, Europe was also an accomplice of the smugglers and their alleged ‘trade’ in human beings, not to mention the obsession with the rigour of budgets, with what followed in terms of social and fiscal policies. For the Captain, as he was called by his supporters, the culprits for this situation were not only institutions or treaties, but also, and perhaps above all, people with names and surnames: Jean-Claude Juncker, Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel and George Soros, who, according to him, were representatives of an elite guilty of starving the peoples. The key word which recurs several times in the speech is, in this case, the word

54 On the attention reserved by Salvini for political communication and the use of his image, see Marco Mazzoni and Roberto Mincigrucci, “Il superleader (“ordinario”). Matteo Salvini e il suo corpo”, in *Ocula. Occhio semiotico si media*, vol. 21, no. 22, “Be cool: come nasce un’icona culturale”, by Andrea Bernardelli and Eduardo Grillo, April 2020, pp. 96–117.

55 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fh1jVLHg5qg>

'betrayal', since a united Europe was, in fact, a beautiful project betrayed by those who should instead have brought it to completion⁵⁶.

In the meantime, Salvini had, however, become a man of government: this circumstance did not, however, determine any moderation of his language, least of all in front of an applauding crowd, but made him more prudent in making proposals, because in his new role, he ran the risk of someone really taking them into consideration. And so, if on the one hand he supported the idea of the Charter of the rights of the European peoples, which had been presented a few weeks earlier by the philosopher Paolo Becchi in the pages of *Libero*⁵⁷, on the other hand, he overlooked the thorny issue of Italy's exit from the euro. In Salvini's speech, the criticisms of the EU were accompanied by references to another Europe, a Europe that never existed but which, in his opinion, would have been prefigured by some great figures of the past: from John Paul II to Alcide De Gasperi, from Charles de Gaulle to Margaret Thatcher. But they were protagonists of the past with ideas on Europe that were not only very different, but above all irreconcilable with each other: De Gasperi, who in the last phase of his life had converted to European federalism and had been a protagonist in the negotiations for the European Community of Defence (EDC)⁵⁸; de Gaulle, who despite having carried his own vision of Europe based mainly on political cooperation, is remembered in this area mainly for his opposition to the EDC in the early 1950s, for his veto against the entry of Great Britain into the European Community in the 1963 and 1967 and for his clash with the European Commission in 1965⁵⁹; and finally Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister between 1979 and 1990, to whom the term Euroscepticism was attributed for the first time for its declared hostility towards the European Community⁶⁰. This singular political pantheon was completed by the journalist Oriana Fallaci,

56 See A. Somma, *Quando l'Europa tradì se stessa*.

57 See *Manifesto sovranista per i diritti dei popoli europei*, <https://paolobecchi.wordpress.com/2019/04/08/manifesto-sovrannista>.

58 See Daniela Preda, *Alcide De Gasperi federalista europeo*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2004; e Id.,

59 See Riccardo Brizzi, "Scetticismo e opposizione gollista all'integrazione europea (1950-1969)", in Daniele Pasquinucci e Luca Verzichelli (eds.), *Contro l'Europa? I diversi scetticismi verso l'integrazione europea*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2016, pp. 115–136.

60 See Eva Garau, *Margaret Thatcher: la formazione e l'ascesa*, Roma: Carocci, 2020. See also Cary Fontana and Craig Parsons, "'One Woman's Prejudice': Did Margaret Thatcher Cause Britain's Anti-Europeanism?", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 53, 2015, no. 1. pp. 89–105.

who, as is known, had railed against the so-called ‘Eurabia’, an alleged process of Islamisation of Europe⁶¹, and who for Salvini represented one of the founding mothers of the Europe the *Lega* would have liked to build.

In his speech, of course, a reference to the theme of tax reduction could not be omitted, especially to the flat tax at 15%, because in those weeks that proposal had become the political flag of the *Lega*: a proposal to be financed out of debt, breaching compliance with budgetary parameters. The example to follow was provided by Trump's America—which, in that phase, however, was particularly hostile towards the EU⁶²—, which had chosen the path of liberalism to try to restart the economy.

The rally ended with praise, indeed self-praise, for the *Lega*'s loyalty: loyalty to their constituents in the first place, but also loyalty to the government chaired by Conte. It was 18 May, but only eight days later, with the wide electoral victory that had brought Salvini's party to a historic 34.3%, the context would quickly change, also because the 5 Star Movement had not achieved the same good results, dropping to 17% and almost halving its votes compared to the triumphal political elections of 2018. In commenting on the outcome of the vote, analysts have stressed that the Italian government as a whole emerged strengthened by the elections, because the overall approval obtained by the majority parties had grown, but they immediately underlined the fact that, within it, a greater weight should have been given to the *Lega*⁶³. And, in fact, the *Lega*, as evidence of the new equilibrium redefined by the vote, almost immediately began to talk about the High Speed Train (TAV), the new Turin–Lyon line, a tremendously divisive topic within the government majority.

Within a few weeks, therefore, the idea of trying to take advantage of this result matured among the *Lega*'s leaders, putting a premature end to the Conte government and leading the country towards new elections. The first step in this direction was represented by a sort of ‘time schedule’ in six points addressed by Salvini to the Executive and accompanied by a threatening request for the assumption of concrete commitments, to be formalised by the summer, on autonomy, unblocking construction

61 See *La rabbia e l'orgoglio* (Milano: Rizzoli, 2001), *La forza della ragione* (Milano: Rizzoli, 2004) e *Oriana Fallaci intervista sé stessa – L'Apocalisse* (New York: Rizzoli International, 2004).

62 See Adriana Castagnoli, *Il lungo addio. La fine dell'alleanza tra Europa e Stati Uniti*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2019.

63 Among various comments, see Concetto Vecchio, “Vince Salvini, tonfo 5S, il Pd spera nel sorpasso”, in *La Repubblica*, 27 May 2019, p. 2.

sites, tax reduction, justice reform and TAV (High Speed Train)⁶⁴. Luigi Di Maio, vice president of the Council and political head of the M5S, indirectly answered him, holding back on autonomy and relaunching instead the theme of the moral question, which became topical with the condemnation of the *Lega's* deputy minister Edoardo Rixi for the improper use of public funds in the past, as regional councillor of Liguria.

The tension in the government grew rapidly in the months of June and July, with the European Commission asking for additional information on the deficit and debt, arousing the fear of the opening of an infringement procedure; the Minister of the Economy and Finance, Giovanni Tria, calling for a more collaborative relationship with the EU, which for the *Lega* recalled the idea of minibots and was stopped by Mario Draghi, the then president of the ECB; and *The Economist* defining Salvini as the most dangerous leader for the euro⁶⁵, not to mention the story of the Sea Watch 3 case and the new details that were being added to the Italian Russiagate⁶⁶.

This led to the so-called *Papeete* crisis, taken from the name of the bathing establishments in Milano Marittima frequented by Salvini during the summer. On 7 August the Captain publicly declared that "something had broken" within the majority and, drawing the necessary consequences, he announced the end of the *Lega's* support for the Conte I government and a return to the polls. The next day Conte therefore went to the *Quirinale* to report on the situation to the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella. This political uncertainty dragged on until 20 August, when Giuseppe Conte reported on the crisis at Palazzo Madama.

But things did not go as planned for Salvini, who, in the meantime, realising that he had triggered a crisis with unpredictable outcomes, had dampened the tone of the controversy and had even timidly tried to mend relations with the 5 Star Movement and with Conte himself. But it was too late, the fracture had become incurable, despite some voices outside the chorus, such as that of Alessandro Di Battista, advocating the resumption of dialogue. And Conte's words in the Parliament would have immediately dispelled all doubts, with a reference to the sense of institutions that made it necessary to discuss the crisis in the places where democratic sovereignty is exercised, with accusations against Salvini of hav-

64 See Carmelo Lopapa, "L'ultimatum di Salvini a 5S: subito sei sì o tutti a casa", in *La Repubblica*, 28 May 2019, p. 2.

65 "Will Matteo Salvini wreck the euro?", in <https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/07/11>, accessed 4 May 2021.

66 Giovanni Tizian and Stefano Vergine, "La trattativa. Ecco i documenti", in *L'Espresso*, 21 July 2019, pp. 12–20.

ing interrupted an effective government and having violated the contract between *Lega* and *5 Stelle*, with the denunciation of him triggering a crisis at an inopportune moment due to the upcoming economic and financial deadlines for the country and due to the formation of the new European governance⁶⁷.

And the subsequent steps would no longer be diplomatic, with the Minister of Domestic Affairs accused of having pursued 'personal and party interests' to the detriment of the country, of having revealed 'a serious lack of constitutional culture' and 'political opportunism', of having flaunted an illiberal inclination to evoke full powers for himself and having mobilised the masses in support of it. Conte also reproached Salvini for having repeatedly invaded the spheres of competence of other ministers, for his reluctance in clarifying the Russian affair in the appropriate places, and for having made political and instrumental use of religious symbols, thus violating that spirit of secularism that is the foundation of the modern state⁶⁸.

Conte's speech ended with the announcement of his resignation, after he had complained that the abrupt interruption of this experience of government did not allow him to carry out the many reforms initiated, and after having indicated the priorities of the country for the present and the immediate future. Salvini listened to the words of the Prime Minister sitting to the right of Conte, as vice president of the Council, alternating between expressions of embarrassment with others of annoyed dissent, and using some gestures, exhorting the parliamentarians from his group to keep calm. His shirt, jacket and tie, which were rather unusual for his way of dressing, indicated the solemnity of the moment, the delicacy of the political transition in progress⁶⁹.

Immediately after, it was up to Salvini to take the floor to explain his point of view and respond to Conte's heavy accusations. He chose not to speak from the benches of the government but from those of the parliamentarians, in order to plastically accentuate the distance that now separated him from the executive. His tone was apparently the usual one, confident and bold, but it was a bluff, because the *Lega* leader knew perfectly well that he was approaching a resounding defeat, with negotiations being underway between the *Partito Democratico* and the *M5S* on the formation of a new government.

⁶⁷ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gpB6_XUprAU, accessed 4 May 2021.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

He was therefore aware that it was an important speech, delivered in front of Italians watching on television screens. “Thanks, and finally!”—were the first words spoken by Salvini— “I'd do everything I've done again. Everything”⁷⁰. But Salvini knew he was lying to his colleagues, to his constituents, perhaps even to himself. The time available to him was short, with the President of the Senate, Elisabetta Casellati, having granted him only twenty minutes for his reply, but Salvini took the opportunity to retrace his work as Minister of Domestic Affairs once again and to boast of the results he had achieved in the field of security and the fight against illegal immigration, calling for new elections as a way out of the impasse of the government crisis, despite knowing that his proposal had no hope of being accepted, to again propose the traditional workhorses of the flat tax, a big plan for infrastructure and aid to families.

The most interesting passages, however, were those dedicated to Europe, because he believed that the change of government was due to an international political operation orchestrated by Brussels, omitting that he had actually begun the crisis. He had suspected it for a few weeks, starting with the election of the *M5S* deputy Fabio Massimo Castaldo as vice president of the European Parliament. And his suspicions had grown stronger a few days later, when the *M5S* MEPs not only voted for Ursula von der Leyen as President of the European Commission, but resulted in even being decisive in that vote due to the presence of dozens of turncoats in the ranks of the majority⁷¹.

Consequently, some significant passages of his speech were dedicated to Europe and formulated in his pure sovereigntist style: “Freedom does not consist in having a just master, but in having no master. I don't want an Italy that is a slave to anyone. I don't want chains like dogs: I don't want chains! We are the most beautiful and potentially richest country in the world. And I am fed up that every step we take, whether by governments, regions, municipalities, companies or workers, must depend on the signature of some European Union officials. Are we or aren't we a free, sovereign country, free to defend its borders, its companies, its beaches?”⁷².

Salvini therefore presented the Lega, its leaders and its ministers as ‘free people, who respond only to the Italian people’, whom he defined as a ‘proud’, ‘free’, ‘dignified’ and ‘sovereign’ people, and not subordinate to

70 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q7OePyRo964>, accessed 4 May 2021.

71 See Carmelo Lopapa, “Europarlamento, Sassoli ce la fa. Un vice ai 5S, beffa per la Lega”, in *La Repubblica*, 4 July 2019, p. 4.

72 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q7OePyRo964>, accessed 4 May 2021.

Angela Merkel or to the French President, Emmanuel Macron. He therefore demanded freedom from Europe especially in the economic field, because, in his opinion, Brussels with its 'rules' prevented Italy from enacting those courageous economic measures that could have favoured recovery. Moreover, he recalled—and not without some reason—that France and Germany, which controlled Italian public accounts with such rigour, had disregarded the European budgetary rules in the past. But, in his opinion, these judgements on the EU had brought him many enemies, and so he considered himself at that moment to be a sort of sacrificial victim of a denigration campaign: "Have you chosen the target? Here I am! Here I am! Have you chosen the danger to Italy and Europe? Here I am! Ready to sacrifice myself!"⁷³.

It was certainly not a memorable speech, indeed. Having spoken off the cuff with only a few notes in hand hastily taken during Conte's speech constitutes a mitigating factor, but it did not prevent listeners from measuring the difference between the precise words, rigorous reasoning and accurate references contained in the President's speech, and the vagueness of Salvini's words and his improvisation in many passages. He spoke directly to Conte using few words, saying that he had learned only a few minutes before that Conte disliked him, since the adjectives used in the House towards him 'dangerous', 'authoritarian', 'worrying', 'irresponsible', 'opportunist', 'ineffective' and 'unconscious'—left no doubt in his mind in that respect. He told the 5 Stars that he was willing to vote for a reduction in the number of parliamentarians to return to the polls immediately afterwards, but it was a desperate move, which would not even be taken into consideration by his interlocutors. On the other hand, he reserved some effective sarcastic notes for the new government being established: "I feel amused seeing you carrying out the reform law on banks and compensating cheated savers with Maria Elena Boschi; I feel amused seeing you reforming the CSM (Superior Council of the Magistrature) with Lotti; I feel amused seeing you redoing the labour reform with Matteo Renzi, father of the Jobs Act! I feel amused [at] you! I feel amused!"⁷⁴.

Even today, two years after the events unfolded, the background to that operation is not entirely clear. However, it is clear that the Italian events of the summer of 2019 were followed with great attention, even at the international level, and that many powers were not limited to the simple role of observers. And so, when the first frictions between Conte and Salvini

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

emerged, Angela Merkel and Ursula von der Leyen, increasingly intolerant of the Euroscepticism of the *Lega's* leader, sided more or less openly with the former, and so did the American President Donald Trump, worried about Salvini's gravitation towards Putin's Russia, Pope Francis, who had repeatedly marked his distance from the *Lega* in terms of migrants, hospitality and solidarity, a large part of the Italian and international press, the opposition parties, who were capable of putting aside old divisions with the M5S, the trade unions and the *Confindustria* itself⁷⁵. In short, the ambush against Conte translated into a political boomerang for Salvini, with the formation of the Conte *bis* government in September, and his demotion as leader of the opposition. On this occasion, commentators recalled the Disney image of the sorcerer's apprentice unable to control the events that he had provoked.

⁷⁵ See Susanna Turco, "Le larghissime intese", in *L'Espresso*, 1 September 2019, pp. 16–24.

V.2 Reactions and Counter-Reactions by Russian Leaders and Statesmen

Two Europes for Yeltsin? United Europe and “Greater Europe”

Elena Dundovich

Between 1992 and 1999, the year in which Boris Yeltsin retired from political life, and especially during the first part of that decade, with Andreij Kozyrev's tenure at the Foreign Ministry until 1996, the Russian Federation opted for a clearly pro-Western policy that moved along three lines: relations with the United States, which were made extremely favourable by Clinton's benevolent attitude and the country which the Kremlin considered its main interlocutor; relations with NATO, which were characterised by a reciprocal desire for collaboration; and finally those with the European Union. In other words, Yeltsin decided to continue the “new course” inaugurated by Gorbachev aimed at improving relations with the West. But as far as the European Union in the strictest sense is concerned, the work of Yeltsin is not easy to evaluate: all his initiatives began to bear fruit either when his foreign policy began to change, with the replacement of Kozyrev by Primakov in 1996, or when his presidency was almost at an end. Moreover, precisely in the light of Primakov's theory of multivectoralism, between 1997 and 1999 the President became more attached to the vision of a “Greater Europe”, parallel to the integrated one, whose central axis was to be the privileged relationship between Moscow, Berlin and Paris.

Both the ‘pro-European’ policy and the promise of a special relationship with France and, above all, with the now reunified Germany at times clearly echoed the vision elaborated by the last Secretary of the PCUS, within whose entourage Yeltsin had operated before its break-up. As regards the first point, after 1985 the Kremlin had proposed the idea of creating a new Europe through the construction of a ‘Common European Home’, a project that had taken on different connotations over the years as perestroika¹, in whose context it was born, had gradually changed. The ‘Common European Home’ project found its most complete theoretical

1 Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and European Integration from Stalin to Gorbachev” in *Journal of European Integration History*, 1, 1996, pp. 85–98 and Marie-Pierre Rey, “Gorbachev's New Thinking and Europe, 1985–1989”, in Frédéric

formulation in Gorbachev's most famous book, *"Perestroika. New thinking for our country and the world"* (1987): according to the Secretary of the PCUS, it was wrong to claim that Europe could only be identified with the western part of the continent: "We are Europeans. The history of Russia is an integral part of the history of Europe [...] Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is a historical and cultural entity united by the common heritage of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment". The hope was therefore to give the continent a leading role in the global developments of the 21st century: "No one can replace Europe [...] [which] can and must play a constructive, innovative and positive role"². This was a Eurocentric conception of history that Yeltsin too would have made his own, albeit with a different dose of pragmatism and many more concessions to the United States, given the economic and political difficulties in which the Russian Federation found itself in the early 1990s and of which the President was much more aware compared to the illusions of his predecessor about the resilience, despite everything, of the Soviet system.

The vision of a 'special relationship' in the European framework with France and especially Germany was also of Gorbachev's matrix. As Andrea Borelli points out, the very definition of the 'Common European Home' and the expression 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' had been coined by de Gaulle. It is no coincidence that one of the politicians who most welcomed Gorbachev's proposal was François Mitterrand³, the same president who, a few years later, would enthusiastically welcome the prospect of greater involvement from the Federation in the European context⁴. As far as Federal Germany was concerned, Gorbachev was convinced that it was Bonn and Moscow that would have to decide the future order of the European continent in the tradition of that 'spirit of Rapallo' together, and the project of a neutral Germany outside the blocs had always been present in Soviet thinking. This project had definitively faded away by then, but the 'spirit of Rapallo' would not be slow to reappear even in the Yeltsian

Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, Piers Ludlow, Leopoldo Nuti (eds.), *Europe and the End of the Cold War. A reappraisal*, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 23–35.

2 Andrea Borelli, "Un'occasione mancata? Michail Gorbačëv e la Casa comune europea", Paper presented to the Conference "Integrazione europea e crisi esterne prima e dopo Maastricht. Punti di vista della storiografia italiana", Pisa, 10–11 June 2021, forthcoming, pp. 1–2.

3 Julie Newton, "Gorbachev, Mitterrand, and the Emergence of the Post-Cold War Order in Europe" in *Europe-Asia Studies*, 2, 2013, pp. 290–320.

4 Andrea Borelli, "Un'occasione mancata? Michail Gorbačëv e la Casa comune europea", p. 4.

years. As early as in December 1992, just one year after the fall of the USSR, during a visit by Kohl to Moscow, the Russian President stated that:

The peoples of the continent face both regional and global challenges. Stability on the European continent is being seriously tested. Democracy is also threatened by nationalism and extremism. In today's Europe it is not possible to solve these problems alone. Therefore a rapprochement between those states that previously belonged to different camps in Europe is called for. Russia and Germany have a major role to play here. As Europe's largest states, we can only be the driving force behind such a union. Our states have been able to overcome the difficult legacy of the past in their relations and have shaken hands amicably. This has a special significance for the destiny of the continent. We in Russia believe that our common goal should be the formation of a European Community of States. In our opinion, the European Community institutions with their functions, which were formed during the confrontation, need a profound transformation. To paraphrase the great European Willy Brandt, one could say that history has taught us that without Germans and Russians, peace in Europe is unimaginable⁵.

As regards the relations between Moscow and Brussels more specifically, there were essentially five stages that marked Euro-Russian relations in the 1990s: in 1992 the Federation put forward a request to join the Council of Europe, opening a long and troubled debate that would end only four years later, not only because of the not always easy dialogue that characterised the work of the three Commissions in charge of the procedure, but above all because of Yeltsin's decision to attack Chechnya in 1994. Suspended in January 1995, the issue returned to the agenda only in early January 1996 and the following month Russia became a full member of the Council of Europe. In June 1994, shortly before the war in Chechnya began, the new Russia signed a 'Partnership and Cooperation Agreement' in Corfu with the heads of state and government of the European Community, which came into effect in 1997, again because of the tensions caused by the war in the northern Caucasus. On the wave of optimism in the early years, Yeltsin agreed, again in 1994, to start a dialogue on possible cooperation with the Western European Union in certain areas of common interest. But again it was not until 1999 when, on the eve of the European Council meeting in Cologne on 3–4 June,

5 Eltsin Centr, Fond 1 (henceforth F.), opis' 1 (henceforth op.), delo (henceforth d.) 1569, Dokumenty o vizite kanclera Germanii G. Kolja v RF – Tekst vystuplenija prezidenta RF B.N. Eltsina na obede v chest' G. Kolja, 15.12.1992, pp. 3–5.

during which it was decided to dissolve the WEU within the EU, the WEU Assembly institutionalised the presence of a permanent Russian delegation in order to intensify Moscow's participation in European military and defence projects. Furthermore, at the Summit held in Brussels on 27 January 1998, the 'Cooperation Council between the European Union and the Russian Federation' was created, which was defined as "a very important milestone" in relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation, which was expressly recognised as an equal strategic partner in the management of stability, freedom and prosperity in Europe, expressly in terms of their shared responsibility for the future of the continent. Finally, in the light of the emergence of new tensions caused both by the collapse of the rouble in August 1998 and the NATO bombing of Serbia between March and June 1999, Germany relaunched the issue of relations with Moscow through the creation of a 'Common European Economic Space' (CEES) with the Federation at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. On this occasion, an articulated and long-term action plan was adopted, which was given the name of '*Common Strategy towards Russia*' (CS), to support the reintegration of Russia into the European political and economic area through the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions.

Of the five stages mentioned above, the one that perhaps most truly opened up the possibility of real cooperation between Moscow and Brussels was the 1994 agreement signed on 24 June on the occasion of Yeltsin's visit to Greece and his participation in the meeting of the EU heads of state and government. This was because the agreement was part of a foreign policy that was still firmly pro-Western, a policy that would later be set aside with Primakov and his theory of multi-vectorialism, which would then consider the European Union and the United States to be two of the many actors animating the international context.

The signing of the Agreement was preceded by many expressions of optimism on the part of the President of the Federation, who, also in this case, always kept an eye on the role that Russia's 'German ally' could play in favour of Moscow. During the negotiation phase, on the occasion of another visit by Kohl to Moscow, Yelstin had stated that "we hope to conclude the preparation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Communities shortly. We hope for Germany's help when the discussion of the Agreement reaches the Communities. We need to lift the considerable restrictions on Russia's trade with Europe; we want to enter the global market for goods and services in those areas where we are competitive (space, military technology). A part of the revenue generated in this way will go towards covering our debt. Germany must

understand our ambitions"⁶. The following day, this time in the presence of the Finnish president, Yeltsin had stressed that the Kremlin was "oriented towards a stable partnership with the European Communities, towards Russia's continued inclusion in the European Economic Area. We are working on a Russian-European partnership and cooperation agreement. It should be a document that takes into account the strategic development perspectives of both Russia and the Communities. In the agreement with the EC, we aim to establish the principle of not damaging Russia's bilateral relations with the candidate countries for accession to the Communities. We view with understanding Finland's plans to become a full member of the EC. It is important that this step does not lead to a reduction in political and economic and trade relations between Russia and Finland. We hope that the principles of partnership contained in this agreement will extend to Finland even after it joins the EC. Europe [is] progressively adapting to a new situation. The development of integration processes, the close cooperation between the West and the East of the continent are in the interests of all countries. Russia also intends to play an active role in the formation of a single economic area in the future and, subsequently, a (single) political area in Europe. Already in the near future the Russian-Finnish border may become the border between Russia and the European Community. It is in our common interest to ensure in good time that this does not hinder bilateral relations, but is a further factor in strengthening cooperation"⁷. Again with President Kohl, this time in July, Yeltsin had insisted on a rapid and positive conclusion to the negotiations because "a serious aid to our reforms would be first of all the conclusion of a partnership and cooperation agreement with the EC [...] We hope that the EC will eventually consider our positions and it will be possible to sign the agreement in the second half of 1993"⁸.

The enthusiasm shown by the President of the Federation at the moment of the signing of the first "Political Declaration" in Brussels on 9 December 1993, which was promoted by the Council and the European Commission with Russia, a clear prelude to accelerating the stipulation of

6 Eltsin Centr, F.1, op. 1, d. 1594, Tezisy prezidenta RF B.N. Eltsina k peregovoram s kantslerom Germanii G. Kolem vo vremja ego vizita v RF, 3.3.1993, pp. 2–3.

7 Eltsin Centr, F. 1, op. 1, d. 1595, Tezisy dlja besedy prezidenta RF B.N. Eltsina k peregovoram s prezidentom Finljandij K. Kojvisto 4.3.1993, pp. 11–13.

8 Eltsin Centr, F. 1, op. 1, d. 1634, Dokumenty o vizite kanclera Germanii G. Kolja v RF (Tezisy prezidenta RF B.N. Eltsina k besedam s G. Kolem, programma vstrechi B.N. Eltsina s G. Kolem na Bajkale) 10.7.1993, pp. 2–3.

the first Russia–EU agreement, was therefore remarkable. Indeed, Yeltsin commented on the moment with a tone of great approval:

Today an event of pan-European significance happened. The East and the West of Europe have taken a big step towards each other. For decades, if not for centuries, Europe was divided not only by national borders. It was divided by visible walls and an invisible confrontation. Now we can say that this era has certainly been relegated to the past. The Declaration we have signed is a commitment that from now on, we will no longer be separated, but brought closer together. The same concept of ‘Europe’ has now gained its true and original meaning. The right to be European is not given to us by someone and is not retracted. We are all Europeans because we were born and live here. And the sooner we overcome the consequences of past tensions, the better it will be for all of us, and the greater the benefit to our peoples and to all humanity. The new democratic Russia is pervaded by the will to eliminate the remnants of totalitarianism, to return to its own history and national identity, to become a true partner of Western Europe. The agreement reached today is clear confirmation that Russia and the European Union have chosen the path of cooperation. We are ready to cooperate with the EU in order to avoid new rifts in Europe. This can be the division into spheres of influence, or according to the “rich–poor” criterion. Together we will organise the Europe of the end of this and the beginning of the next millennium. United by common values, we will overcome the difficulties of the present and prevent the problems of the future. Today is the moment to take stock and, at the same time, the start of a huge task ahead. Moved by ambitions and rules of cooperation, the important thing now is to implement what is written in the documents and said in the speeches. There are those who try to remove Russia from the sphere of European cooperation. This is not a forward-looking practice. You cannot eliminate Russia from Europe. Just as you cannot eliminate it from Asia. We need a new image of Russia. A real image. The new Russia can bring a worthy contribution of both material and intellectual capital to Europe. It is sad that discriminatory restrictions remain in our scientific and technical and commercial relations with the European Union. It is historical nonsense. Let us overcome it together! We propose to proceed swiftly with the formation of a pan-European transport, telecommunications and energy system. For the unification of technical and scientific research. For the training of management and youth. For the protection of health, the environment, the guarantee of high standards in the defence of individual rights, the fight against criminal organisations. However, we do not intend to build Russia–EU relations to the detriment of other countries. Russia welcomes the strengthening of

EU cooperation with all Eastern European countries. We are opposed to only one thing: the pitting of one state against another⁹.

The President was equally enthusiastic when the long-awaited agreement was actually signed. As the then Swedish Prime Minister, Carl Bildt, recalled in his article, “On midsummer’s eve, 1994, on the island of Corfu in Greece, we signed the treaties of accession of Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Norway to the EU. At the very same occasion, the far-reaching Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Russia and the EU was signed. I vividly remember the dinner that evening with the 16 leaders of the EU and the accession countries as well as Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The atmosphere was warm, open, and truly forward-looking. President Yeltsin was very clear in his vision of a Russia that would reform, democratise, and integrate with the rest of Europe. There was no reason to doubt his seriousness when he promised to do “everything possible to support European integration”. I remember that France’s President François Mitterrand went so far in holding out the prospect that Russia could become a member of the EU that Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who had an even stronger belief in the necessity of embracing Russia, had to somewhat restrain his French counterpart”¹⁰.

In his official speech,¹¹ Yeltsin said the agreement was of “historic importance”, noting that it signified the first step in a Russian economic come-back to Europe. The agreement—the President underlined—marked the end of ideological and economic conflicts that had prevailed during the Cold War era: “We all felt the symptoms of an economic Cold war, but this threat is abolished with this agreement. Today, Russia becomes a significant partner of the Europeans, and we will do everything possible to support European integration”. He added that “Moscow would back efforts aimed at enlarging the 12-nation bloc, which will extend formal accession treaties to four new members later today. Referring to developments in the Balkans, the Russian president said the agreement would also contribute to security and stability in Europe and that the twenty-first

9 Eltsin Centr, F.1, op. 1, d. 1655, Rechna obedo ot imeni glav gosudarstv i pravitel'stv ES, 9.12.1993, pp. 6–16.

10 Carl Bildt, *Russia, the European Union and the Eastern Partnership* [https://ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/Riga_papers_Carl_Bildt.pdf], 3.5.2021 consulted. Carl Bildt was prime minister of Sweden from 1991 to 1994 and Sweden’s Minister for Foreign Affairs from 2006–2014.

11 Excerpts of Yeltsin’s speech on that occasion can be found at *Athens News Agency Bulletin* 1994 [<http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/1994/94-06-25.ana.txt>], consulted 12 June 2021.

century would be the first century of peace in the European continent. After two years of intense negotiations, Russia agreed to the accord, hoping that it would open a new chapter of improved relations with the EU. According to the President “it lays the basis for consistent political dialogue and opens several doors of cooperation in various fields”.

In terms of content, it was a framework agreement which, by institutionalising relations between the EU and the Russian Federation at the level of heads of government, ministers, officials and parliamentarians, set out a number of possible forms of cooperation between the EU and the Russian Federation in a variety of fields: trade, human rights and democracy, science and technology, education and training, customs matters, the fight against crime, transport, energy and communications, the environment and culture. In fact, under the PCA, an elaborate structure of cooperation and integration was set up that was much more extensive than the EU had originally envisaged, because Moscow wanted to be more ambitious. At the highest level, there were to be two summit meetings every year between Russia and the EU. And at lower levels, a network of different committees and councils was foreseen to cover different areas¹². But, as Carl Bildt always observed, “things did not work out entirely as intended. The two annual summits continued [for a long time]: these meetings provided the opportunity for comprehensive dialogue at the highest level. But many of the other working structures never actually materialised; the Russian side insisted on dealing with all issues at the highest level. However, in those early days, it was probably mostly Moscow’s own habits, experiences, and internal institutional arrangements that made it hard for it to engage fully. Moscow had been a dominant power in a different world, so it was inexperienced when it came to horizontal relationships and to dealing with multilateral structures as complex as the EU. But it did not dispute either the structure, or, more importantly, the values-related foundations of the relationship that were detailed in the PCA”¹³.

But in the years that followed, expectations were progressively disappointed and the EU–Russia relationship went through schizophrenic alter-

12 Agreement on partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part - Protocol 1 on the establishment of a coal and steel contact group - Protocol 2 on mutual administrative assistance for the correct application of customs legislation - Final Act - Exchanges of letters - Minutes of signing, European Commission DG Trade [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114138.pdf], 24.04.2021 consulted.

13 Carl Bildt, *Russia, the European Union and the Eastern Partnership*, p. 1.

nations between antagonism and cooperation. Nobody doubted that it was Yeltsin’s genuine desire and priority to be accepted by Europe and the West. Above all, the war in Chechnya, initiated by the Kremlin in 1994, led to a cooling of relations between Moscow and Brussels with the consequent suspension of the “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement”, which only came into force in 1997.

In that year, the climate seemed to have calmed down, mainly due to the European will to avoid isolating Russia at a time when several Central and Eastern European countries were moving towards joining the EU (and, some of them, also NATO), and Moscow had not hesitated to express its fears. A statement by the EU Presidency on the entry into force of the “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement”, dated 1 December 1997, expressed this sentiment by reiterating that “the agreement consecrates (among other things) the integration of Russia into the European family”¹⁴.

The possibility of deepening relations further seemed to become apparent on 27 January 1998 with the first meeting of the ‘Cooperation Council between the European Union and the Russian Federation’ in Brussels, which had been foreseen by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement¹⁵. Compared to the idealism that had marked the previous

14 Central to the smooth functioning of the Agreement was the TACIS programme, which was designed to provide technical assistance to Russia to accelerate its transition to a market economy and a democratic society, and to encourage the establishment of political and economic links with the EU, Russia’s main technical cooperation partner at the time. From 1991 to 1996, the EU provided ECU 1060.79 million in aid under the TACIS programme. The restructuring of public enterprises and the development of the private sector, as well as the reform of public administration bodies, social services and education were the priority areas. In February 1996, another joint programme of the European Commission and the Council of Europe was launched for aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia, which was granted aid of ECU 1,202,000 for 1996–97. A second contract with Russia was signed in February 1997 for ECU 2,551,000 for 1997–1998. See in this connection the document *Nota informativa n. 14, La Russia e l’Unione europea*, Parlamento europeo, Gruppo di lavoro del Segretario generale, Task Force “Ampliamento”, Lussemburgo 1999 [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/pdf/14a1_it.pdf], consulted 20 April 2021.

15 The EU–Russia Cooperation Commission, responsible for implementing the work programme adopted by the Cooperation Council, met for the first time in Brussels on 22 April 1998. In order to ensure the implementation of the programme, the Commission set up nine sub-commissions to deal with a variety of issues, such as obstacles to the development of trade between the two sides, the status of the Russian economy in the Community’s anti-dumping procedure,

phase, the new multi-sectoral orientation of the Kremlin's foreign policy had reset relations according to the yardstick of Russian national interests, which was no longer an almost uncritical vehicle for the European (and American) model, but the search for agreements that respond to the Federation's specific economic or strategic needs. The meeting in question, which was described as "a very important milestone" in relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation, which was expressly recognised as an equal partner, should be interpreted in this sense. The significance Moscow attached to the Cooperation Council was reflected in the large delegation sent to the meeting. Led by Primakov, it included Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Nikolaevich Afanas'evskij, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Abdulaevich Vasil'ev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Ronal'd Ferdinandovich Piskoppel' and Deputy Minister of Justice Liudmila Nikolaevna Zavadskaja. During the talks, the EU and Russian representatives reaffirmed their mutual status as strategic partners for peace, stability, freedom and prosperity in Europe, expressly talking about sharing responsibility for the continent's future. After reaffirming their attention and support for Russia's ongoing reform processes to strengthen political and economic freedoms and confirming their willingness to promote Moscow's integration into a wider European economic area, the delegations focused on a wide range of concrete dossiers, including cooperation in the fight against crime, trade relations and economic cooperation, which included creating the necessary conditions for the future establishment of a free trade area, assistance programmes such as TACIS, regional cooperation and potential new areas of common interest such as space research, environmental protection and armaments conversion. The smooth progress of the negotiations on Russia's accession to the World Trade Organisation in the same period was seen as a further positive factor¹⁶. Confirming this renewed optimism, during the EU–Russia summit of 15 May 1998 in Birmingham, the participants declared themselves satisfied with the progress achieved in economic and commercial coopera-

trade in nuclear products, product standards and certification, and market access problems, to name but a few. The third institution created on the basis of the 1997 Agreement was the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, composed of members of the European Parliament and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, *Nota informativa n. 14, La Russia e l'Unione europea*, p. 16.

¹⁶ In fact, these negotiations would take a long time and the Federation only joined the WTO in 2012.

tion¹⁷, hoping for further consolidation of bilateral cooperation to deal with drug trafficking and money laundering, as well as to guarantee the safety of nuclear power stations and the destruction of chemical weapons, and to start tackling the thorny issue of Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic States¹⁸.

Despite these successes, however, Yeltsin remained—as Maurizio Masari wrote—“fundamentally constrained by his bipolar worldview. He believed that Russia’s international standing hinged mostly on its relationship with the US and particularly on his friendship with President Clinton. Europe and the EU were seen mostly as ‘surrogate’ partners in those days when relations with Washington went sour, as in the case of the first NATO enlargement. Furthermore, there was little time for Yeltsin to develop a deep relationship with the EU—he left office less than two years after the PCA entered into force—nor did his Foreign Minister Primakov’s emphasis on multipolarism and Russia’s Eurasianism encourage an EU-first policy”¹⁹.

In fact, within the framework of the new approach of Russian foreign policy, Europe itself ended up being reconsidered from the perspective of multipolar relations. At that point, relations between Moscow and the old continent became twofold: on the one hand, those between the Kremlin and Brussels, which, albeit with their ups and downs, were in any case marked by the important steps mentioned above and experienced their greatest success in 1998; on the other hand, however, there were also legitimate Russian initiatives that would bring Moscow into the centre of particular ‘understandings’. This is borne out by Yeltsin’s speech at the end of the meeting with Chirac and Kohl held in Moscow on 26 March 1998, which the Russians had called for, not by chance, precisely at a time when the adoption of the euro was fast approaching. The agenda included numerous topics, including cooperation between the three countries in the fields of space, transport and human sciences, the security of the continent and the Kosovo crisis. It is interesting to note that the meeting took place at a positive moment for Moscow as the rouble crisis was still some months away and relations with the West had not been spoilt by the NATO bombing of Serbia.

17 For example, on 28 March 1998, an agreement was signed on the liberalisation of trade in textiles between the EU and Russia.

18 *Nota informativa n. 14, La Russia e l'Unione europea*, p. 17.

19 Maurizio Massari, “Russia and the EU Ten Years On: A Relationship in Search of Definition” in *The International Spectator*, 42, 1, 2007, p. 3.

At the end of that meeting, Yeltsin's enthusiasm was so great that he went so far as to speak of the existence of a troika among what he said were the most important powers in Europe (including Russia): "The great European troika has begun its work well. A kind of troika was born, it exists, and it happened here in Russia. I believe that life itself has forced us to find new forms of communication between the leaders of the most important states in Europe. The leaders of Russia, Germany and France have come together as friends. Of course, we always have something to say to each other because at the moment we are witnessing a process of globalisation of economic development. Russia, which has become a market economy, is participating in this global integration. I am convinced that Russia [has found] support from Germany and France". The way in which the various topics had been dealt with now pointed, according to the President, to established trilateral cooperation: "We talked about trilateral cooperation. We talked about future plans, our working plans. We talked about the 20th century transport plane based on the Antonov 70 model [...] We decided to speed up our projects in the motorway sector, i.e. transport between Paris–London–Berlin–Warsaw–Moscow. I would go further and say that in the long term we will reach Ekaterinburg and go even further than the Urals [...] We will develop cooperation especially in the field of space research [...]". But it was not only on space and infrastructure that attention was focused. Natural and technological disasters and humanitarian crises would see the troika activated: "I think we are going to develop a project that will enable us to fight against certain natural events, against certain technological disasters. We have decided to set up a trilateral group which will be responsible for dealing with this type of disaster, so that if a disaster occurs, a team made up of representatives of the three states, which will obviously have powerful technical means at its disposal, will immediately meet on site and try to solve the problems linked to this disaster. And again in relation to the humanities: "We have, for example, decided to develop our cooperation in the humanities. We will train the best cadres in both France and Germany. We will reflect on the possibility of creating a Russian–German–French university. We will also think about how to bring the peoples closer together. To this end, we would like to organise a large exhibition Paris–Berlin–Moscow by the year 2000. We have also planned for historians to meet, historians from our countries, in order to draw up a project for a 'Common History' manual, i.e. a manual which will deal with the history of Europe in the 20th century". Yeltsin's last comment at the press conference expressed his great enthusiasm for the event: "In general, I consider the meeting of the great European troika as an extremely relevant and positive event. Because

I think it will have spin-offs. This event will certainly have a historical resonance in the world. [...] So I am very grateful to my colleagues. I am happy that they are also satisfied. We hope that together we will be able to realise this global project, in my opinion the project of the century, the project for Europe. All of us, the troika, must show firmness, tenacity, but we must also—I believe—show inventiveness, wisdom, imagination to try to find a solution to all the problems that will certainly make their effects felt in the 21st century [...] I believe that all this is really useful for the greater Europe. I believe that you are looking at the Greater Europe. This Greater Europe will certainly not be a hegemonic Europe [...] In fact, Russia has practically entered this Europe, this Greater Europe. Without Russia, Europe would be a little less big, let's say [...].”

It was Chirac's task, and above all Kohl's, to restore the president's enthusiasm for a large but integrated Europe. Chirac, for his part, underlined the importance of the meeting, given the unprecedented co-presence of the highest French and German authorities in Moscow, but also how “it [was] an event that had all its symbolic value and that well demonstrates that, at a time when the European Union is committed to necessary and ambitious enlargement, we are fully aware of the importance of a genuine, friendly and constructive relationship of trust between the European Union and Russia, which will be two of the great poles of political, economic and cultural development in the multipolar world of tomorrow”. Kohl was even more explicit: “This event takes place in the context of the discussion that is currently taking place everywhere in Europe, since yesterday the launch of the euro became a reality. We have come together today with the French and Russian Presidents and the German Chancellor to make it clear that the future of the European Union and Europe will always pass through a very close friendship with Russia”²⁰.

But in reality, many things would change shortly thereafter: on 17 August 1998, the Russian economy suffered a strong setback following the crisis of the Asian Tigers; the NATO bombings on Kosovo, starting in March 1999, brought relations between Russia and the West to their lowest level since 1991 and, despite the efforts made by Germany to mend

20 Conférence de presse conjointe de Mm. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, Boris Eltsine, Président de Russie, et Helmut Kohl, Chancelier d'Allemagne, sur les projets de coopération entre la France la Russie et l'Allemagne dans le domaine spatial, des transports et des sciences humaines, sur la sécurité du continent européen et la crise du Kosovo, Moscou le 26 mars 1998 [<https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-8926-fr.pdf>], accessed 20 April 2021.

fences, the Common Strategy promoted in 1999 would not bring great results and died a natural death in 2004 without being renewed. With regard to the first point, the economic crisis and its consequences, the European Union obviously took care of the Russian situation, but made the question of granting possible aid, especially food aid, very much dependent on Moscow adopting a credible economic reform programme²¹. On 30 October 1998, the European Commission approved funding of ECU 30 million for the 1998 TACIS cross-border cooperation programme, and in December the European Parliament gave its urgent approval for the allocation of EUR 400 million in food aid. But despite this, the decision of most European governments to support the NATO attack on Serbia between March and June 1999 against Russian wishes and without UN authorisation contributed profoundly to the deterioration of relations.

Precisely in the light of the emergence of these new tensions, it was Germany that attempted to mend fences by proposing the creation of a “Common European Economic Space” (CEES) with the Federation. The idea, already hinted at in the 1994 Agreement, was taken up again at the Cologne European Council on 4 June 1999, during the last phase of the Yeltsin presidency: on that occasion, an articulated and long-term action plan was adopted, which was given the name “Common Strategy towards Russia”. It was the first application of a new instrument provided for in the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, which, in the CFSP sphere, was intended to launch “common strategies” to make up for the European Union’s lack of effectiveness in foreign policy. It envisaged specific initiatives in the political and security field, economic issues, trade and investment, energy, etc. Each new EU presidency was to present a plan to improve the strategy in question, the ultimate aim of which was to make the already many beneficial instruments of the ‘Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’ tangible and to maximise them. In this case, the primary objective of this Common Strategy, lasting four years, was to support the reintegration of Russia into the European political and economic area through the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions; to integrate the country into the European economic and social space with the objec-

21 On 27 October 1998, at the EU–Russia summit in Vienna, the European representatives again emphasised the need for the Russian government to adopt a “credible and sustainable” economic programme and committed themselves to facilitating Russia’s accession to the WTO, to reviewing the TACIS programme in accordance with Russia’s actual needs, and to consolidating cooperation to deal with the problem of radioactive waste, an issue close to the hearts of the Europeans, *Nota informativa n. 14, La Russia e l’Unione europea*, pp. 17–18.

tive of realising a future free trade area; to cooperate to strengthen security and stability in Europe and in the areas of common strategic interest; to cooperate to respond to international challenges in the nuclear sector, organised crime, international terrorism and environmental security. Of great interest was the idea of promoting joint initiatives in the field of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations not only in Europe, but also in non-European areas of common interest²².

In reality, this initiative did not yield great results. After Putin's appointment as Prime Minister in August 1999, Russia did not miss a chance to underline its fears about the consequences of the eastward enlargement of the European Union for the economy of the Federation. At the EU–Russia summit in Helsinki on 22 October 1999, the last under Yeltsin's presidency, Putin presented Russia's new strategy for the development of relations with the EU in the period 2000–2010, in response to the common strategy towards Russia adopted by the European Union in June 1999. Moscow felt that the Federation would be deprived of a large market share in its trade relations with the former communist candidate countries because of European technical standards, particularly in the field of equipment, pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs, which they would have to adopt. On the other hand, the Russian delegation not only pointed out that EU enlargement would lead to a significant increase in the prices of imported foodstuffs from Central and Eastern Europe, but also that the EU had not yet managed to improve the lot of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia, who were still suffering discrimination, especially with regard to language.

Inevitably, the entry of so many new member states highly complicated relations between Moscow and Brussels²³. As Massari noted, the main EU players were reluctant to sacrifice their bilateral interests with Russia in the name of European collective interests, the definition of which has, in any case, remained too abstract. The Union's enlargement to include 12 new members (ten from central, south and eastern Europe) further exacerbated the existing divisions in the EU's policy towards Moscow. On the one hand, the major EU states (in particular Germany, France and Italy) tend to have a more articulated and nuanced approach to Russia; the medium-sized and

22 *Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, European Council, 1999* [<https://op.europa.eu/it/publication-detail/-/publication/38943c06-7e5d-4ca3-acc3-c5154bd9c04e/language-en>], accessed 15.04.2021.

23 On 22 September 1998, Russia's ambassador to the EU, Vasily Likhachev, requested a detailed review of the impact of the enlargement of the European Community on Russia.

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small central eastern European states (including the Baltic states and some established northern EU members, such as the Netherlands and Denmark), on the other hand, tend to be particularly critical and defensive²⁴.

24 Maurizio Massari, *Russia and the EU Ten Years On*, pp. 5–6.

Putin's Attitude Towards the EU (2000–2020)

Mara Morini

1. Introduction

The political relationship between the European Union and its largest neighbour, the Russian Federation, has been marked by many ups and downs and a diversity of opinions and strategies about the future and clarification of its role in international foreign and security policies.

The starting point of a new 'rapprochement' between the two parties began at the beginning of the nineties, during the period of Perestrojka and Glasnost, which paved the way for a first concrete attempt at establishing the *Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States* (TACIS) programme designed to promote the transition towards a market economy and democracy, to reinforce democracy and the rule of law, and to ensure the observance of democratic principles and human rights.

Nevertheless, the institutional basis of the EU–Russia relationship is related to the signing of a *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement* (PCA), which was prepared during Boris Yeltsin's presidency within the framework of previous 'Europe Agreements' signed with the newly independent Central and East European countries that were seeking admission to the EU.

The PCA was based on a mutual commitment to "strengthening political and economic freedoms", to support for Russia in its political and economic consolidation, the creation of a *Free Trade Area* (FTA) and the promotion of common values and interests, as well as the assumption of compatibility between the parties in a continuous process of cooperation, resulting in a growing similarity between them.

This goal implicitly meant that it was expected that Russia would achieve Western democratic standards and would do its best to make this cooperation concrete.

Opening the summit in Samara in 2007, President Vladimir Putin said that he wanted to discuss everything openly and sincerely, without any 'taboos'; there is no conflict of interests between his country and the European Union, but mainly differing viewpoints on how to reach solutions on various issues. No formal agreement was drawn up because both actors

were divided on a number of issues, including Russia's ban on Polish meat imports, the dispute over Estonia's removal of a Soviet war memorial from central Tallinn, US plans to deploy elements of its missile defence system in Eastern Europe, the status of Kosovo and concern about Russia's human rights issues.

In his public speeches, President Putin has always stressed that Russians share the values and principles of the vast majority of Europeans, such as respect for international law and rejection of force as a means of settling international problems. A stable, prosperous and united Europe is in Russian interests because European integration is an integral part of the emerging multipolar world order, although they do not have any intention of either joining the EU or establishing any form of institutional association with it.

It thus seems quite obvious that there is a gap between the importance of economic cooperation (i.e. bilateral cooperation and agreements) and a weak political and cultural partnership, as it has been so far.

The EU for its part uneasily faces up to political and foreign policy developments in Russia, which are perceived to be increasingly divergent from the EU's conception of European values. This 'values gap' is deemed to have widened, especially during President Putin's second term in office (2004–2008).

Firstly, Putin tried to strengthen the Kremlin's 'vertical power' and to create a political system characterised by the absence of pluralistic party politics, by the erosion of media and NGO freedoms, and by the lack of an independent judiciary and rule of law. President Putin is now perceived in Europe as having gone unnecessarily and undesirably far in reverting to an authoritarian and only pseudo-democratic state. These tendencies have interacted with the huge incentives presented by Russia's oil and gas resources to create a rent-controlling and distributing regime.

Consequently, the second, external but related development has been the emergence of the new Russian geopolitics, in which the Kremlin–Gazprom complex exerts pressure on former Soviet states that border on both Russia and the EU and combine commercial energy and diplomatic pressures.

Last but not least, there are other political events which have spread concern and pessimism throughout political elites in Europe, e.g. Putin has suspended observance of the *Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty* and he has called for more 'transparency' to end 'abuses' in election-monitoring missions by the OSCE's *Office For Democratic Institutions and Human Rights* (ODIHR), and the Kremlin's repressive policies in the field of the

‘promotion human rights’, which is strongly supported by the US (the Navalny case, Tichanovskaya in Belarus, and the Donbass conflict).

Several times Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned that Russia could ‘bring down’ the international system based on NATO, the OSCE and the CFE if it wanted to, which would force the creation of an unspecified “new system”.

Secondly, Foreign Minister Lavrov said that “new fragmentation” is threatening Europe unless the OSCE changes, because unspecified “group interests” and the application of “double standards” could bring down “the whole European security architecture”.

Lavrov defended Russia's draft proposal to reduce the ODIHR's monitoring activities and argued that the “OSCE has become a tool used for political purposes by one group of nations against another group of nations”. Russia is very isolated on this issue. No country has the right to dictate the conditions of how the ODIHR should monitor elections even if the Russian proposals are aimed at “defending the OSCE” from the “danger” of being turned into an organisation of first- and second-class members.

There is no doubt that the relationship between Russia and the EU has become weaker because of certain political events which have adversely influenced both the European and the Russian elites. There is a general feeling that a New Cold War has developed now that President Putin has underlined the need to revert to those years in which Russia was considered a strong and powerful country in a bipolar system. During his last twenty years of political leadership and presidency, Putin has proved to have implemented various important policies which have given Russians a better standard of living, a dynamic economy and an important role in the world bound up with the war on international terrorism.

What seems a concrete political result is that the stronger Russia has become, the worse EU–Russia relations have become, the direction and development of which are uncertain at the moment. Most probably Putin's strategy will become evident in the next few months as soon as the end of the Russian electoral cycle guarantees him a stable government and leadership. In the meantime, the European Union should go on searching for a common strategy to apply with “a single voice” among European members in order to de-dramatise the recent political climate.

In such an international and domestic setting, this article aims at providing some evidence of Putin's attitude towards the EU during his presidency, taking into consideration his most important speeches and leadership style. In the first section, there is evidence that the first terms of ruling are characterised by Putin's positive attitude towards the EU and Europe, in general. This approach demonstrates Putin's will and thought

that Russia is part of a Europe with whom he shares values and cultural issues. But starting from the enlargement of both the EU and NATO and his speech in Munich in 2007, there has been a shift towards more pessimistic and distant behaviour with the EU.

With reference to the Arcimavičienė's work¹, the second section deals with the type of rhetoric used by President Putin in dealing with Western issues (the EU included) in the theoretical framework of populism.

This article therefore analyses hundreds of speeches and interviews given by Putin in his three terms as Russian president from 2000 to May 2008 and from May 2012 up to April 2016, which are published on the official Kremlin.ru website, as well as several articles published under his name.

2. *From a positive attitude to leaving the West: 2000–2012*

Reading a thousand of Putin's speeches, articles, and interviews, it is possible to contextualise Putin's statements to better understand his rhetoric and thoughts on both domestic and international issues. The latter is strongly connected to Putin's concern with the enlargement of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). That's why we can see a gradual shift towards the East when he speaks of China and the Eurasian Economic Union. Nevertheless, Putin's rhetoric has always been positive with Europe when he underlines the need for a 'single security space' stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, all of which he has described as being part of 'Europe': "European culture and mentality [extend] as far as Vladivostok and the Pacific Ocean"².

This does not come as a surprise since all the Russian Presidents have shared the same opinion: Russia is a European country. In his terms, Putin

1 L. Arcimavičienė, *Self and Other. Metaphors as facilitating features of Obama and Putin's speeches*, in M. Macaulay, *Populist discourse. International Perspective*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, 83–116.

2 V. Putin, 'Vystuplenie i otveti na voprosy na vstreche s predstavitelyami i studentami Kolumbiiskogo universiteta', 26 February, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22129>, 2003a, accessed 7 March 2021.

has described Russia as ‘one of the centres of European culture’³ and stated that ‘Russia is a country with deep European roots and traditions’⁴.

In 2013 and 2014, he remarked that: “our law has enormous historical roots, it is part of the continental law of Europe”⁵, “all Europe [...] from Lisbon to Vladivostok should unite to be able to compete and survive in a rapidly developing world”⁶; “nowadays we hear assertions that Russia is supposedly turning away from Europe [...] it is searching for other business partners, especially in Asia. I want to say that this is absolutely not the case”⁷. On the contrary, Putin has expressed a different attitude towards the US when he admitted: “But sometimes one gets the impression that America doesn’t need friends. We have got the impression that the US needs vassals whom it can command”⁸.

Indeed, Putin’s main frustration with the West is driven by the West’s refusal to share this vision and its insistence on retaining the system of blocs. In Putin’s eyes, only a multipolar world order can guarantee the stability which he seeks both domestically and internationally. A combination of such views fits within liberal conservative and pragmatic conservative models more than an ultranationalist one.

We have other evidence of Putin’s talk of Russia’s Europeanisation when he agreed with to the adoption of Russia’s own medium-term EU strategy (2000–2010), and when speaking in the Bundestag in Germany on 25 September 2001, he underlined the unity of European culture and declared that when it comes to “European integration, we do not just sup-

3 V. Putin, ‘Vladimir Putin: Ya stal dobree i terpimee’, *Gazeta Trud*, 22 March, available at: http://www.trud.ru/article/22-03-2001/21455_vladimir_putin_ja_stal_dobree_i_terpimee.html, 2001^o, accessed 10 March 2021.

4 V. Putin, ‘Zayavleniya dlya pressi i otveti na voprosy po itogam XX sammita Rossiia-Evrosoyuz’, 26 October, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24624>, 2007e, accessed 15 March 2021.

5 V. Putin, ‘Interv’yu Pervomu kanalu i agenstvu Associated Press’, 4 September, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19143>, 2013b, accessed 10 March 2021.

6 V. Putin, ‘Zayavleniya dlya pressi i otveti na voprosy po itogam XX sammita Rossiia-Evrosoyuz’, 26 October, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24624>, 2007e, accessed 15 March 2021.

7 V. Putin, ‘Interv’yu Vladimira Putina radio “Evropa-1” i telekanalu TF1’, 4 June, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/45832>, 2014b, accessed 10 March 2021.

8 V. Putin, ‘Interv’yu zhurnalu “Time”’, 19 December, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24735>, 2007f, accessed 15 March 2016.

port these processes, but we are looking to them with hope”⁹. Common values and shared interests are the main principles which paved the way to the creation of four Common Spaces at the St. Petersburg EU–Russia Summit in May 2003. But afterwards Putin started to take steps away from the idea of Russia and Europe sharing the same values due to some political events: the so-called ‘Colour revolutions’.

At the domestic level, Putin consolidated his ‘vertical power’ and more repressive policy, which was not seen positively by Russia’s Western partners, especially the EU because the Russian political regime was considered too distant from ‘European values’.

The most famous and important of Putin’s speeches was held at the Munich Security Conference, where he criticised American unilateralism¹⁰ and accused the West of unleashing a new arms race and trying to gain access to Russia’s natural resources¹¹.

Example a) “I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s—and precisely in today’s—world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilization”.

This speech had a negative reaction on Russia’s political relations with both Europe and the United States, although economic ties with the West became robust. It is after this speech that many scholars affirmed that Russia had ‘left the West’ without allies and relying only on commercial policies.

Example b) “In any case, I understood that the use of force can only be legitimate when the decision is taken by NATO, the EU, or the UN. If he really does think so, then we have different points of view. Or I didn’t hear correctly. The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the de-

9 V. Putin, ‘Esli cheloveka vse ustraivaet, to on polnyi idiot’, 24 December, available at: <http://www.gazeta.ru/2001/02/27/esli4eloveka.shtml>, 2000k, accessed 10 March 2021.

10 V. Putin, ‘Interv’yu mezharabskomu sputnikovomu telekanalu “Al’-Dzhazira”’, 10 February, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24035>, 2007a, accessed 10 March 2021.

11 V. Putin, ‘Ezhegodnaya bol’shaya press-konferentsiya’, 14 February, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24835>, 2008°, accessed 10 March 2021.

cision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. When the UN truly unites the forces of the international community and can really react to events in various countries, when we leave behind this disdain for international law, then the situation will be able to change. Otherwise the situation will simply result in a dead end, and the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied. Along with this, it is necessary to make sure that international law has a universal character both in the conception and application of its norms.”

Example c) “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee”. Where are these guarantees?”

Example d) “In conclusion I would like to note the following. We very often—and personally, I very often—hear appeals by our partners, including our European partners, to the effect that Russia should play an increasingly active role in world affairs. In connection with this, I would allow myself to make one small remark. It is hardly necessary to incite us to do so. Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy”.

It is possible to argue that Putin's presidency has revealed a growing rift between the EU and Russia. At least three reasons can be detected for these developments. First, both actors had strong ties in the nineties, which continued under Putin's first term with economic cooperation and sharing common policies. The two decades of EU–Russia relations can be considered a learning process in which both the EU and Russia have respected each other with commercial opportunities from both sides. The negative shift has demonstrated that the EU and Russia have, in fact, large-

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ly incompatible interests because they rely on different political principles: democracy vs. an undemocratic regime.

Generally speaking, it seems that little has changed since 2011, when the Russian Ambassador to the EU, Chizhov, said:

“[...] the modern world is an arena of ever-deepening and widening globalisation [...] no country, or even a group of countries, can succeed in social, economic, scientific and technological developments alone [...] Under these circumstances, the optimal alternative is to move forward jointly through mutually reinforcing diversity. And in the case of the Russian Federation and the European Union, there is every reason and opportunity to achieve this.

It is also worth remembering that the EU–Russia relationship is made up of individual member states to Russia relations. To date, 24 of the 28 member states have signed Modernisation Partnerships with Russia.”¹²

The divide between the EU and Russia is wider than it has ever been, but Russian cooperation with individual states is stronger than ever. What it is necessary to underline is that from a Russian perspective, the EU did not take into consideration Russian feelings and its will to cooperate, with the result that it was rejected by the West in the 1990s. From an EU perspective, it is Putin’s strategy and vertical axis of power which cannot allow a permanent partnership between the two. Pragmatism is the key concept to better understand such a kind of relationship: Russia remains strategically important for Europe.

3. *Times of trouble: 2012–2020*

In Liudmila Arcimavičienė’s work (2019, 89–124) Putin’s speeches are analysed with respect to the populist dichotomy of the people and its other. She takes into consideration the following speeches addressed to his Duma and nation: the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the 70th UN anniversary session, during which President Putin discussed the UN’s historic importance, the current situation in the world,

12 W. Laqueur, *Putinism: Russia and its Future with the West*, New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 2015.

and necessary future achievements. The date and word count for each speech are provided in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Research data

Leader	Occasion 1	Occasion 2
President Putin	Crimea address	UN 70th Anniversary address
Date	18 March 2014	2 October 2015
No. of words	5251	2970

Source: L. Arcimavičienė (2019, 98).

President Putin's metaphor use describes a frame based on identity construction with strong populist metaphors (the domains of War, a Personified Relationship and Strength), which are needed in the case of the Crimea speech for a strategy of legitimisation, while his UN address (referred to the international community) is more antagonistic. In his Crimean address (18 March 2014), Putin's speech is both ideologically and politically motivated due to the need to foreground Russia's legitimacy, credibility and moral appeal in reference to the Crimean referendum¹³.

Example 24 "More than 82% of the electorate took part in the vote. Over 96% of them spoke out in favour of reuniting with Russia. These numbers speak for themselves. To understand the reason behind such a choice, it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have always meant to each other (*Personified Relationship*)".

Example 25 "Let me say one other thing too. Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means (War, Personified Relationship)".

Example 26 "Our concerns are understandable because we are not simply close neighbours but, as I have said many times already, we are one people.

13 The referendum held on 16 March 2014 in which the Crimeans had to express their choice on joining Russia as a federal subject. The referendum was regarded as illegitimate by most members of the EU, the United States and Canada.

Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other (Personified Relationship)”.

Example 27 “Residents of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the whole of Russia admired your courage, dignity and bravery. It was you who decided Crimea’s future. We were closer than ever over these days, supporting each other. These were sincere feelings of solidarity. It is at historic turning points such as these that a nation demonstrates its maturity and strength of spirit. The Russian people showed this maturity and strength through their united support for their compatriots (*Personified Relationship, Strength*)”.

These examples show that the legitimization of the annexation of Crimea is described as the reunification into “one nation, one people” (“Ancient Rus is our common source) due to their close historical relations (“Kiev is the mother”) e.g. a long-lasting which gives legitimacy to Russia to protect Crimea by all means, including militarily. Thus, Relationship and the War metaphors are used ideologically and in the framework of defence: “Russia will always defend their interests” (Example 25).

This approach creates emotions in the audience, sentiments of brothership but, at the same time, the War metaphor underlines the function of legitimacy and strength to react as ‘victimised people’ to ‘victimised nations against the idea of “privileged Western people”’. The West did not recognise such legitimization and the EU started to implement economic sanctions on Russia in 2017. To delegitimise his opponents, President Putin uses the source domains of War, Strength and Personified Relationship to create antagonism towards the West by setting a clearly marked division between the ‘self’ and its ‘other’. Moreover, Putin defines the European Union as Western partners “led by the United States of America” which cannot make the EU more independent in policy areas such as international, security and defence ones.

Example 28 “Our Western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right. They act as they please: here and there, they use force against sovereign states, building coalitions based on the principle ‘If you are not with us, you are against us’. To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from international organi-

sations, and if for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall”.

Example 29 “We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration. And all this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West. We are constantly proposing cooperation on all key issues; we want to strengthen our level of trust and for our relations to be equal, open and fair. But we saw no reciprocal steps. On the contrary, they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us before an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing: ‘Well, this does not concern you’. That’s easy to say”.

Example 30 “Obviously, we will encounter external opposition, but this is a decision that we need to make for ourselves. Are we ready to consistently defend our national interests, or will we forever give in, retreat to who knows where? Some Western politicians are already threatening us with not just sanctions but also the prospect of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front”.

Example 31 “At the same time, we will never seek confrontation with our partners, whether in the East or the West, but on the contrary, will do everything we can to build civilised and good neighbourly relations, as one is supposed to in the modern world”.

Table 1.2. summarises the dichotomy of ‘the self’, which is represented positively through the use of the Relationship frame, and “the other” with a negative description reframed via the lexis of war: ‘the rule of the gun’ ‘force’, ‘aggression’, ‘threaten’ and ‘deployment’ (Arcimavičienė 2019, 113).

Putin, showing himself to be a ‘good partner’, states that “(we will) do everything we can to build civilised and good neighbourly relations”, while ‘the other’ is depicted as “guided by the rule of gun”: consequently, President Putin’s negative view of US foreign policy (and that of the West in general) is clear, with a clear distinction between ‘the moral self’ and the cynical and callous ‘other’ (Arcimavičienė 2019, 112–113).

Table 1.2 Negative populist scenario and its metaphorical representation

Source domain	The self (good partner)	The other (amoral enemy)
Relationship	Strive to engage in dialogue	Guided by the rule of gun
	Never seek confrontation	Decide the destinies of the world
	Do everything to build civilised and good neighbourly relations	Think they are always right
	Defend our national interests	Act as they please
Outcome	Partnership is impossible	Use force
	Necessary and justified defence against the other	Lie to us behind our backs
		Deploy military infrastructure at our borders

Source: Arcimavičienė 2019, 113

All these examples show that Putin's speeches are based on the idea of an aggressive West paving the way to a polarisation and ideological division between Russia and the West: an antagonistic narrative in which Russia is represented as a good partner provoked by the other's aggressive expansionism and righteousness. As Arcimavičienė points out, "the so-called commercialised relationship between Russia and the US and the EU is ideologically reconstructed into one of conflict, where 'the self' is represented as a victim defending its own right to being. In Putin's rhetoric, the US and EU are 'otherised' through the concept of total disorder and amorality, as in the examples above: "guided by the rule of the gun", "decides the destinies of the world" and "lies." His use of an otherising strategy gives self-legitimacy to opposing the other as a means of self-defence and a moral right to being.

We can find the same dichotomy—the 'self' and the 'other'—in Putin's UN address, even if his now international audience obliges the President to have a more constructive and politically correct attitude in comparison

with the domestic audience during his speech on Crimea. Some examples follow:

Example 32 “We all know that after the end of the Cold War the world was left with one centre of dominance, and those who found themselves at the top of the pyramid were tempted to think that, since they are so powerful and exceptional, they know best what needs to be done and thus they don’t need to reckon with the UN, which, instead of rubber-stamping the decisions they need, often stands in their way (Personified Relationship, Strength)”.

Example 34 “Sadly, some of our counterparts are still dominated by their Cold War era bloc mentality and the ambition to conquer new geopolitical areas (War)”.

Example 35 “Russia is ready to work together with its partners to develop the UN further on the basis of a broad consensus, but we consider any attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the United Nations as extremely dangerous. They may result in the collapse of the entire architecture of international relations, and then indeed there will be no rules left except for the rule of force. The world will be dominated by selfishness rather than collective effort, by dictate rather than equality and liberty, and instead of truly independent states we will have protectorates controlled from outside (Personified Relationship, Strength)”.

Here, we can find the War metaphors of the ‘Cold War era bloc mentality’ and ‘extremely dangerous’, which recall the bipolar system during the USSR and the idea of Western antagonism. There is no doubt that these examples show Putin’s negative characterisation of the West as the other or ‘Western partners’ e.g. an enemy (West) against a victim (Russia).

Tab. 1.3 Putin’s populist framing

Features	Putin’s populist discourse	
Legitimisation	Metaphorical extension of the people onto the victimised nations	The self metaphor
	Via the personified relationship metaphor	Russia as a victim
		Russia as a defender/protector of the good/the oppressed

Features	Putin's populist discourse	
Delegitimisation	Its privileged other	The other metaphor
	Via the West metaphor	US as an enemy/bully/oppressor

Source: Arcimavičienė 2019, 116

This is clearly represented in table 1.3, where we can find President Putin's style of populist framing to create a political identity and an ideological clash between the victimised nations (i.e. Russia, Ukraine, Syria) and their privileged signifiers (the US and the EU).

So, President Putin more frequently uses both transactional and hard leadership styles and appeals to nationalism and patriotism to effect power¹⁴. As argued by Sakwa¹⁵, Putin's leadership is based on the key principles of hard power with a pure pragmatism in international relations, and a rhetoric of an external enemy to be competed with and defeated to guarantee nations' stability.

4. Conclusion

Historically, Europe has been considered an idea, a model and a geopolitical space by Russia¹⁶, but its approach has been ambivalent: is Russia a part of Europe or apart from Europe? As far as the type of their political regimes is concerned, Russia can be labelled as a 'sovereign democracy' which differs from Europe in different arenas: political competition, rule of law, freedom of the media, the role of political opposition and so on.

In contrast, the relationship between Europe and Russia is marked by an economic and technological model which makes their cooperation permanent and positive.

Nevertheless, as Putin's speeches have shown, Russia's strategy and priority are to defend its sphere of interests, and its nation and people from unwanted Western encroachments. For example, in his 'victory speech' after the successful reunification of Crimea, Putin stated that "(...) they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us

14 R. Sakwa, "Putin and the oligarchs". *New Political Economy*, 2008, 13(2), 185–191.
R. Sakwa, "The dual state in Russia". *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 2010, 26(3), 185–206.

15 R. Sakwa, "Putin and the oligarchs". *New Political Economy*, 2008, 13(2), 185–191.

16

before an accomplished fact. But there is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our Western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally". So, the Grand Narrative of EU–Russia relations since their inception in the early 1990s has been replaced by a different Russian attitude towards the EU due to European attempts at 'constructive engagement' with the aim of 'tying' Russia into an EU-centric—or, alternatively, US-concentric—order. The special 'strategic partner' status which characterised EU–Russia relations has been replaced by more assertive Russian foreign policy relations that simply reflect the general pattern of relations between Russia and the West.

V.3 Impulses and Statements but Even More Groundbreaking Proposals by Top Representatives of the EU Member States

Throwing a Stone into the Pond: Joschka Fischer's Federal Proposal to Relaunch European Integration

Giorgio Grimaldi

1. Introduction

The profile of Joschka Fischer as a politician is totally linked to three fundamental elements:

- a policy of ecology, of which he was one of the protagonists after his militancy in the spontaneous extra-parliamentary left, emerging as being among the most pragmatic German Greens and oriented towards assuming governmental responsibilities;
- his participation in the national government of the Federal Republic of Germany as a foreign minister, with a focus on developing—from a European perspective—a greater assumption of responsibility by Germany with regard to both European collective security and German participation in international military intervention missions, within the framework of Euro-Atlantic cooperation but also adopting a critical multilateral approach;
- his intention to transform the European Union (EU) into a federation of nation states, capable of facing global challenges as well as of ensuring peace and security within an international system undergoing profound change.

Since the 1980s, Joschka Fischer has been the most prominent political figure of the German Greens, who, under his leadership, got to enter a federal government for the first time, in an alliance with the SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, 'Social Democratic Party of Germany') in a red-green coalition that lasted from 1998 to 2005.

After providing essential biographical information, this contribution will analyse two important speeches given by Fischer during his mandate as German Foreign Minister in two radically different contexts, both of which are indicative of the peculiar oratorical qualities and the charismatic style that distinguished the German Green Party leader, especially at the height of his political career. In both speeches, Fischer proposed urgent

and necessary stances and gave voice to a reformist vision of Europe aimed at building peace, security, inter-ethnic coexistence and ecological sustainability in the context of an insecure and unstable world. His political action was particularly characterised by the desire to offer the newly independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe the prospect of entering the EU after the end of communism, in order to counter nationalism and the wars tearing apart the Balkans.

2. *From popular movements to institutions and from opposition to government*

Born in 1948 in the small town of Gerabronn, Baden-Württemberg, to a German mother and a Hungarian father—a butcher by profession, whose family had been expelled from Hungary in 1946, following the Soviet occupation—, Joseph Martin Fischer did not finish his studies and, from 1967, began to take part in the German student movement and in the left-wing post-1968 groups known as Spontis, at first in Stuttgart and, after 1968, in Frankfurt am Main. Here, Joschka (from the Hungarian Jóska, a diminutive of József), moving from one job to another (factory worker, taxi driver, bookshop clerk), joined the militant group *Revolutionärer Kampf* ('Revolutionary Fight') and was involved in several street battles and clashes between the police and the *Putzgruppe* (literally 'cleaning squad', an acronym for *Proletarische Union für Terror und Zerstörung*, that is, 'Proletarian Union for Terror and Destruction'), the radical branch of the *Revolutionärer Kampf*. Fischer's adherence to violent struggle during this period was later challenged, especially in 2001, when he was foreign minister, without, however, damaging his popularity. Actually, Fischer, while not denying his participation in violent street protests and apologising for his past mistakes, never disavowed these experiences¹. In the mid-1970s he distanced himself from violence and in 1982 he joined the German Greens (*Die Grünen*), which had been formed in 1980 in the wake of the mobilisation against nuclear power and military installations. The following year, he was one of the first Greens who, after being elected to the *Bundestag*, displayed unconventional behaviour, with the clear aim of pointing out their difference from the other parties in the Federal

1 I wish to thank Dr. Lucilla Congiu for her careful revising and editing of this paper.

On this topic, see M. Anne Sa'adah, "'Ein Staatsmann mit Geschichte'. Joschka Fischer's German Past", in *German Politics & Society*, Issue 60, vol. 19, no. 3, Fall 2001, pp. 56–79.

Republic of Germany. The German Greens described themselves as a party-movement or a 'party-anti-party' which called for the closure of nuclear power stations, the dismantling of the 'Euromissiles' and the exit of the Federal Republic of Germany from NATO, as well as for disarmament and for a reduction in working hours. From his parliamentary seat, Fischer distinguished himself as a witty speaker, endowed with a good sense of humour and also with a frank and confrontational debating style. In 1985 he was elected Environment and Energy Minister in Hessen, in the first red-green coalition between the German Social Democratic Party and the Greens, thus becoming the first Green Länder-level minister in German history. At the swearing-in ceremony, he appeared in jeans and trainers, attracting media attention with his non-conformist performance². From then on, Fischer became a charismatic informal political leader in the German Green Party and a reference point for the Realos, the reformist wing of *Die Grünen*, willing to compromise and cooperate with the political system in order to promote their ecological goals. Besides this, he wrote several books on different subjects such as the crisis of the left, Germany's role in the world, the possibility of a new economic and social policy, as well as on his own political experiences and on European integration.

During the 1990s, Fischer promoted a significant change in the German Green Party: in fact, in cooperation with the grassroots East German organisation Alliance 90—which, in 1993, merged into the German Greens (now called *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*)—a progressive, pragmatic shift away from radicalism began. Fischer himself abandoned the German Greens' anti-German reunification stance, which had penalised them in the 1990 elections, where they had focused on calling for an ecological policy able to tackle climate change.

3. Peace and war

In the face of the rapid spread of the conflicts that broke out in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Fischer both witnessed and originated the German Greens' departure from their traditional stance on war, based on strict abstention from the use of force. In the summer of 1995, he argued that accepting a policy of war and murder in Bosnia would have far-reaching consequences for Europe. The key question he posed to his party was:

² These trainers have become a political symbol and are now kept in the German Leather Museum in Offenbach.

“Can pacifists, especially from a position of non-violence, accept the victory of brutal violence in Bosnia?”. He compared the position of the West in the 1990s to the appeasement of the 1930s³. His rhetorical question was whether the Greens could put principles before human lives. At the party conference held in Kassel in the autumn of 1997, however, Fischer did not succeed in persuading the German Greens to adopt a more pragmatic and possibilist position on the use of armed forces⁴. Nevertheless, without stating it explicitly, on that occasion he practically supported the idea of a military intervention in Bosnia.

After the 1998 parliamentary elections, the German Green Party (GGP) Alliance 90/The Greens joined the SPD as a junior partner in a coalition government and Fischer was appointed both Foreign Minister and vice-chancellor of the German federal government. Soon after, a dramatic period began for the German Greens, who were torn by deep divisions on the strategies used to deal with the new wars on Europe’s borders. Amidst many difficulties, Fischer led the party to support the NATO air raids in Kosovo against Serbia, which were carried out without UN approval. Besides this, he actively promoted a federal reform of Europe that could counterbalance the Eastern enlargement of the European Union, which, in his view, represented a great opportunity for stabilisation and the promotion of peace on the European continent. The two famous speeches that will be analysed here are mainly devoted to these two issues. In the rest of his mandate, Fischer also supported the participation of German troops in the 2001 military intervention in Afghanistan. At the same time, he tried to promote global multilateralism in order to deal with international crises and within the general context of the global war on terrorism, involving the United Nations and contributing to developing an EU foreign policy. As a result of his efforts, the international conference on the future of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime—which led to the signing of agreements for the establishment of an interim administration in the

3 Joschka Fischer, “Die Katastrophe in Bosnien und die Konsequenzen für unsere Partei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen”, 30 July 1995, reprinted in *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, vol. 40, 1995, p. 1148; Maja Zehfuss, “Kosov@ and the Politics of Representation”, in Peter van Ham, Sergei Medvedev (eds.), *Mapping European Security after Kosovo*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2002, pp. 113–114; Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force: the Evolution of German Security Policy 1990–2003*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 68, <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-271218>, accessed 17 May 2021.

4 See “Die Annäherung der Grünen an die Realität vollzieht sich im Scheckentempo”, in *Handelsblatt*, 17 November 1997, p. 2, cit. in Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force: the Evolution of German Security Policy 1990–2003*, p. 76.

country—was held in Bonn in November 2001⁵. However, Germany did not participate in the 2003 war in Iraq led by the US and the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’. During the 2003 Munich Security Conference, Fischer famously confronted US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld by stating, about the alleged evidence of Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction: “Excuse me, I’m not convinced”. After his electoral defeat in 2005 and the formation of a government led by Angela Merkel, who succeeded Gerhard Schröder as Chancellor of Germany, Fischer abandoned political life, and has since worked extensively as a political consultant, columnist, lecturer and contributor to non-profit organisations.

4. “No more Auschwitz”: Fischer’s speech at the extraordinary congress of Alliance 90/The Greens in Bielefeld 1999

In May 1999, Fischer faced a difficult test at the German Green Party's special congress on the subject “Bringing together human rights and peace”, which was held in Bielefeld and convened specifically to discuss the opportunity for the Greens to support military operations in Kosovo. After the failure of diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire, Fischer tried to convince his party that military intervention in Kosovo was the only way to “stop a second Bosnia”.

Shortly before giving his speech, while sitting near the stage table, Fischer was violently hit in the ear by a bagful of red paint that stained the right side of his face, his neck and his jacket, causing an injury to his eardrum⁶. Fischer refused medical treatment and waited for his turn to speak. Under the circumstances, and in front of an audience of militants divided between supporters and protesters who were making themselves heard with booing and shouting, Fischer confronted this situation with firmness and authority. With a severe frown on his face and a red stain clearly visible on the right side of his dark jacket, he started a very challenging and sensitive speech⁷, taking into account his dual role as party

5 See Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force: the Evolution of German Security Policy 1990–2003*, p. 83. For an autobiographical account of the years of red–green government cf. Joschka Fischer, *Die rot-grünen Jahre. Deutsche Außenpolitik - vom Kosovo bis zum 11. September*, Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch Verlag, 2007.

6 Cf. Andrew Nagorski, “The Paint Attack,” *Newsweek*, 23 May 1999, <https://www.newsweek.com/paint-attack-166840>, accessed 17 May 2021.

7 This was probably the most awkward speech of his life since May 1976, when he pleaded with the West German left to renounce violence; see Paul Hockenos, *Josch-*

leader and foreign minister and alternating considerations and reflections on the situation in Kosovo with clear-cut expressions of criticism towards the most turbulent part of the audience. He commenced by addressing his listeners alternately as “dear friends” or “beloved opponents”, ironically repeating some of their statements or emphatically reproaching the most radical of them for considering him a warmonger, even though he had only been in government positions for six months. First of all, before getting to the heart of the matter and reminding the Greens of their newly acquired responsibility as a governing party as well as of the need for them to make difficult choices, he tried to exaggerate and dismantle the negative image his opponents had attributed to him, by juxtaposing it with the positive judgement they implicitly gave on the Serbian leader Milošević. According to them, Fischer retorted sarcastically, Milošević should be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Then, referring to the injury he had suffered at the hands of some demonstrators and to the police force deployed to prevent clashes between militants, Fischer concluded his opening remarks by saying that he had never expected to see a Green Congress where bagfuls of paint were used instead of counterarguments, and that all this was was clear proof of a lack of willingness to confront each other. With his bifocals on and his arms resting firmly on the lectern, he did not shy away from confrontation; on the contrary, he addressed everyone directly with harsh and incisive phrases, admitting that they were

ka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 272. For the original German text of the speech, see *Rede Joschka Fischers auf dem Außerordentlichen Parteitag in Bielefeld, 13.5.99*, Transkription nach der Direktübertragung vom Ereigniskanal Phoenix (“Vor Ort”), (Transkription: Dr. Wolfgang Näser, 13.5.99/19:40), <https://web.archive.org/web/20170924001517/http://staff-www.uni-marburg.de/~naeser/kos-fisc.htm>, accessed 18 May 2021; Joschka Fischer, *Rede des Außenministers zum Natoeinsatz im Kosovo*, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis, Hannover 1999, https://www.lmz-bw.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Downloads/Handouts/2018-06-13-fischer-kosovorede.pdf, accessed 18 May 2021 reprinted in Eberhard Rathgeb, *Die engagierte Nation. Deutsche Debatten 1945-2005* [The Engaged Nation. German Debates, 1945–2005], Munich, Carl Hanser Verlag, 2005, pp. 415–16. For an abridged version, see: *Der Kosovo-Krieg und die Grünen* (13. Mai 1999), *Rede des Außenministers zum NATO-Einsatz im Kosovo*, in German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), *Ein Deutschland in Europa* (1989-2009), https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3723&language=german (also available in English: *The Kosovo War and the Greens* (13 May 1999), https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3723&language=english). The video of the speech can be found on You Tube: see *Joschka Fischers Rede auf dem Kosovo-Sonderparteitag in Bielefeld 1999*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jsKCOTM4Ms>, accessed 17 May 2021.

actually at war, and not only since the beginning of the repression in Kosovo, but rather ever since 1992, when the conflict first broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and since then hundreds of thousands lives had been—and were still being—sacrificed⁸. With raw and realistic considerations of this kind, Fischer continued to urge his audience by pointing out the seriousness of the situation, until he started receiving not only boos but also applause. After recalling that his role as foreign minister required him to hold back, he set the stage for the debate by briefly brushing off the protests (“No, I will not stop! I will not do you this favour”[...]), and adopted an increasingly strong and provocative tone—though always within certain limits—in order to emphasise both the escalation of the ex-Yugoslav wars and the responsibility of the international community to put an end to long-lasting violence. Fischer’s approach resembled that of a severe educator who tries to recall his pupils to their duty: passionate but not extreme, ready to pick up ideas from the audience but, at the same time, constantly focused on consolidating his position and involving his listeners emotionally in order to have them understand and accept his own reasons.

After reviewing the many crises that had affected Europe in the first months of 1999, including that of the European Commission—which had to resign owing to allegations of misappropriation of funds by some commissioners—and the escalation of war in the former Yugoslavia following the failure of the Rambouillet Agreement, Fischer stressed that there was one thing he was not willing to accept: a false peace, since the real peace is that which guarantees the security of people’s lives. In his own words: “The prerequisite for peace is that people are not murdered, that people are not expelled, that women are not raped—that is the prerequisite for peace!”⁹.

8 “[...] Now there is war, yes. And I never would have dreamt that the red-green government would have a part in this war. But this war did not just start fifty-one days ago; it has been going on since 1992, dear friends, since 1992! And let me tell you, in the meantime, it has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands, and that is the point where Alliance 90/The Greens is no longer a protest party. We decided to be part of the federal government, in a situation where it was clear that the absolute culmination of the Yugoslavian war of succession could take place. I can still remember [...]”; GHDI *The Kosovo War and the Greens* (May 13, 1999).

9 “Nur ich kann euch nochmals sagen, was ich nicht bereit bin zu akzeptieren: 'Frieden setzt voraus, daß Menschen nicht ermordet, daß Menschen nicht vertrieben, daß Frauen nicht vergewaltigt werden. Das setzt Frieden voraus!'; Fischer, *Rede des Außenministers zum Natoeinsatz im Kosovo*, p. 2.

On admitting his own mistakes and shortcomings, the Green politician took full responsibility for them and stated that, owing to the short time he had been in charge and the pressure he had been subjected to, he had not managed to do all he would have liked to, but then reiterated, also on behalf of the government in power, that everything possible had been done to avoid war. Next, though amidst growing protests, Fischer went on to say that, despite the fact he was not “a delicate flower”, he was really upset at being personally accused of dragging Germany into the war, while he had done everything he could to avoid it. Then, after challenging those who believed they could take blameless positions on the subject to confront him, he responded head-on to the accusations of “moral overkill” and of “trying to eradicate Germany’s history”, by asking himself a rhetorical question: why, in the light of Germany’s history and Nazism, was it impossible to counteract not only internal racist violence, but also the expulsions and ethnic warfare taking place in Europe? In his opinion, this juxtaposition was totally justified; moreover, it was even possible to apply it to the experience of the death camps. So, although he believed that what had happened in Auschwitz could not be compared to any subsequent event, he emphatically declared that the two fundamental principles inspiring his political struggle in the ranks of the Green Party were: no more Auschwitz and genocide; no more fascism and war¹⁰.

At this pivotal point of his speech, while an audience aflame continued pelting him with boos, hoots and outcries occasionally interspersed with applause, Fischer asked his opponents, who defined themselves as left-wingers and radical leftists, why they would not agree to openly discuss the issue and clarify their views on nationalism and ethnic wars, since they believed that the position taken by NATO and the government was totally wrong. According to him, the return of nationalism and ethnic wars had to be fought at any cost, so as not to betray the values on which post-war peace was based. In order to build peace—he continued—moral indignation was not enough. It was necessary to carry out a detailed political analysis of the causes that had led to the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation after Tito’s death, and especially after the end of the Cold War. As a result of the Serbians’ aspirations to maintain central power and

10 “Auschwitz is beyond comparison. But I believe in two principles: never again war and never again Auschwitz. Never again genocide and never again fascism. Both belong together for me, dear friends, and that is why I joined the Green Party [...] Let me tell you that with the end of the Cold War there has been a return to ethnic warfare and to nationalistic policies that Europe must not accept”; GHDI *The Kosovo War and the Greens* (13 May 1999).

to expand, the former Yugoslavia had been plunged into an increasingly acute crisis, since the Serbs claimed the right to annex all the territories where Serb minorities lived. In this regard, Fischer directly addressed some of the most prominent members of the Greens' pacifist wing such as Annelie Buntenbach and Christan Ströbele, who were strongly opposed to NATO bombings and deeply convinced that diplomatic efforts to avoid an international military intervention were far from being exhausted, pointing out that both the 18 ceasefire agreements signed by Milošević and the 73 UN resolutions had had no effect except to allow the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in other areas of the former Yugoslavia. Then Fischer scathingly asked them what trust could be placed in Milošević after he had ordered the massacre of Muslim refugees in the UNPAs (United Nations Protected Areas), and how they planned to defend populations in danger, who might continue to die and be thrown into mass graves, as had happened in Srebrenica¹¹. The Green Minister, after reiterating that he had done his utmost to maintain the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia by avoiding secessions, accused Milošević of pursuing a criminal policy of hostage-taking towards the civilian population in order to destabilise the states of the former Yugoslavia. Next, he invited those who criticised him to face up to the reality of displaced persons, as he had done by visiting the refugee camps in Macedonia, a country which, in a sort of domino effect, could be the next victim of the Serbian nationalist project of a 'Greater Serbia'. But the break-up of the former Yugoslavia had given rise to other nationalist schemes (such as that of a 'Greater Albania'), particularly among displaced people, and the clash among rival forms of nationalism had generated a situation similar to that of the Palestinians. So, in order to build a concrete, albeit frail, prospect of peace and head off permanent instability in Eastern Europe, it was necessary to stop Milošević.

At the end of the speech, Fischer decided to demand a clear choice from the German Greens. To back up its call for peace, Germany had put forward a plan that had been accepted by the G8 and implied the in-

11 "Ich frage euch, liebe Freundinnen und Freunde: Woher nehmt ihr euer Vertrauen bei Milošević, daß ohne massiven bewaffneten Schutz es den Menschen nicht genau so wieder gehen wird wie den Männern in Srebrenica, die kalt im Massengrab liegen bis auf den heutigen Tag? Woher nehmt ihr das?" [I ask you, dear friends: Where do you get your confidence from Milošević that without massive armed protection the people will not be like the men in Srebrenica, lying cold in a mass grave to this day? Where do you get that from?]; Fischer, *Rede des Außenministers zum Natoeinsatz im Kosovo*, p. 4.

volvement of the UN and Russia. But “a robust international peacekeeping force” was needed so as to ensure the return of displaced persons, which was the *sine qua non* for building peace. Fischer emphasised this point by making it clear that the party could neither shirk this responsibility in order to clear its conscience, nor exhibit pacifism and, at the same time, leave the dirty work to a few MPs and ministers. Fischer concluded his speech with an appeal for collective commitment, especially addressed to those pacifists who, like Ströbele, wanted him to stay on as foreign minister. If they really wanted this—he openly declared—it was essential that they allowed him to be a successful foreign minister and that the whole party gave him the strength to go ahead with the choice he had made. He also announced that, in the absence of an explicit vote in favour of the military intervention in Kosovo, he would draw the conclusions and resign, because he thought it essential that the entire party should pronounce its stance on this matter democratically. So, a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote was needed and everyone had the moral duty to make a choice. Even though he understood his opponents’ emotions and reasons, Fischer urged them to show responsibility and unity, and asked for their support in order to continue his work inside the government.

In an atmosphere pervaded by malaise and reciprocal hostility, as well as by a palpable, albeit contained, dramatic tension, sharpened by the presence of the police forces deployed to protect the stage, Fischer gathered all his energy, repeatedly appealed to his interlocutors by addressing them as “Dear friends” and in the end took off his bifocals and went back to the speakers’ table, as boos and applause continued to overlap.

His speech had lasted little more than 21 minutes, and yet it was to play a crucial and historic role for the German Greens. In fact, by declaring that the campaign of ethnic cleansing carried out by the Serbs in Kosovo left no alternative but the military option to them and the country, Fischer finally led his restive party to support it. Indeed, there were rifts and defections, and his call for confidence, as well as his choice of convening a congress for this purpose, were seen as blackmail by several party members opposed to the Kosovo war, but in the end he and the Realos (the pragmatic, pro-European wing of the German Greens) managed to prevail by blocking a compromise resolution advocating an unconditional halt to NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, thus preserving the unity of the red–green coalition. By taking responsibility for being part of the first post-war German government to send its own military aircraft into combat, the German Greens made their first really difficult choice, and this helped them come out of adolescence and learn to face up to (harsh) reality.

Throughout his speech, Fischer made clever use of a wide range of rhetorical devices, such as hand gestures and movements—frequently employed to stress or accompany the most significant passages—, but also gaze direction and mobility: in fact, he often turned his eyes in all directions in order to engage the audience and catch their attention. Besides this, he always adopted measured intonation, that is to say, a volume loud enough to be heard above shouting, but not too loud so as not to give the impression that he was losing control of the situation. Finally, he occasionally resorted to brief pauses in order to enhance the effect of some statements and help his listeners absorb their meaning. All in all, he gave an example of effective and persuasive political oratory.

5. *'Quo Vadis Europe?': Fischer's speech at the von Humboldt University in Berlin 2000*

In January 1999, in his speech to the European Parliament inaugurating the six-month German presidency of the EU, Fischer declared that the institutional reforms contained in the Amsterdam Treaty were not enough and that a stronger impetus was needed to adopt a European Charter of Rights and to consolidate European legitimacy and identity. The ambition of the German government was therefore to get a decision taken on convening a further intergovernmental conference—a necessary step before EU membership expanded beyond twenty members. This effort was successful: at the Cologne Council held in June 1999, it was decided that negotiations on the future composition of the Commission and the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers would take place the following year. Later, in the course of 2000, a Convention chaired by Roman Herzog, former President of the Federal Republic of Germany, drew up a list of the fundamental civil, political, economic and social rights of European citizens: the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

More or less in the same period, Fischer resolved to take a stand for a “comprehensive” revision of the composition and working methods of the European institutions to allow Europe to make a major qualitative leap towards political integration. To this end, he drew up a keynote speech aimed at giving the policy of European unification a strong impetus, which would steer the intergovernmental negotiations in the direction he wanted, somewhat as Hans-Dietrich Genscher had done in 1981 and 1987.

The result of a personal initiative, but also of cooperation with other influential European leaders such as Jacques Delors, Fischer's speech “Quo

vadis Europe? From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration”—delivered at the Humboldt University in Berlin on 12 May 2000, almost to the day of the 50th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration—did not only relaunch the debate on European integration, but, like a pebble thrown into a pond, had the effect of shaking up the European political landscape¹². The fact that it was the German Foreign Minister who did it was a very important signal¹³. So was the fact that he was an emerging ecologist leader who had become extremely popular in his own country.

Fischer began his speech by describing European integration as both a peace process and the “rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the transfer of nation state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions”. Fifty years later, the process of European integration constituted “probably the biggest political challenge facing the states and the peoples involved”, since the common future, and especially that of the new generations, depended on its outcome. By declaring that he wanted to divest himself, for the duration of the speech, of “the mantle of German Foreign Minister and member of the Government—a mantle which is occasionally rather restricting when it comes to reflecting on things in public”, Fischer meant that he wanted to reach beyond short-term, contingent choices concerning European policies, the enlargement process and the intergovernmental conference that

12 For the English text of the speech, see: Joschka Fischer, *From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration*, Humboldt University, Berlin, 12 May 2000, <https://ec.europa.eu/doric/fileDownload.do?docId=192161&cardId=192161>, accessed 17 May 2021; *Speech by Joschka Fischer on the ultimate objective of European integration (Berlin, 12 May 2000)*, CVCE, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/speech_by_joschka_fischer_on_the_ultimate_objective_of_european_integration_berlin_12_may_2000-en-4cd02fa7-d9d0-4cd2-91c9-2746a3297773.htm, accessed 17 May 2021.

13 In 2007, Fischer revealed that he had originally sought a Franco-German initiative on the future of Europe, but his attempt had failed because the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine, was hampered by the difficult cohabitation between the Socialist government in France and the centre-right Presidency of Jacques Chirac. As a result, he had decided to go it alone; cf. Fischer, *Die rot-grünen Jahre. Deutsche Außenpolitik – vom Kosovo bis zum 11. September*, p. 302 (quoted in Simon Bulmer, “Germany: from Launching the Constitutional Debate to Salvaging a Treaty”, in Maurizio Carbone (ed.), *National Politics and European Integration. From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty*, Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2010, p. 57 (pp. 51–69).

would lead to the Treaty of Nice, and adopt a broader perspective including the future of the European institutions. In other words, he intended to focus on the “finality” (the inverted commas are his) of the process of European integration, which is also implied in the title of his speech. In the light of the multiple and complex “problems and challenges facing Europe”, connected with the very history of our continent, the question “Quo vadis Europe?” was meant to draw attention to the goal still to be achieved, that is to say, “the completion of European integration”. In fact going backwards or remaining in the current situation would be detrimental to the future of the community and of each nation¹⁴.

Considering the two main challenges to be faced after the end of the Cold War, that is, “eastern enlargement and the completion of political integration”, he pointed out that they depended decisively on France and Germany. Functionalism and gradual achievements—starting from the European Coal and Steel Community—had shown that European integration had been successful. But the goal to be achieved was even more ambitious. First of all, it was necessary to extend this process to the peoples of Eastern Europe, as advocated by Schuman in a speech that appeared in 1963¹⁵. After quoting it, Fischer remarked that the end of communism had made this development both possible and necessary, in order to avoid wars and nationalism as well as to prevent uncertainty and instability, especially in the age of globalisation. Then, after lingering on the developments in European foreign and security policy and also on the steps taken since the Maastricht Treaty, Fischer concluded that the two aforementioned aims—enlarging the EU “as quickly as possible” and reforming its institutions so that its “capacity to act” was preserved even after the accession of a large number of member states—were now to be achieved in parallel. With the bulk of his introduction over, Fischer reiterated his intention to take off his hat as a foreign minister and proceed to set out his “personal vision of a solution to the European problems”.

After wondering aloud about the ways and times required to achieve the two aforesaid goals, Fischer stated that there was “a very simple answer” to all those questions, the same one already put forward by Schuman at the beginning of the process, namely “the transition from a union of states to full parliamentarisation as a European federation”. In other words, the

14 And Fischer added: “This is particularly true for Germany and the Germans”.

15 The speech was in fact delivered in 1956: cf. Graham Avery, “Robert Schuman on Hungary and Europe”, in *The Hungarian Quarterly*, vol. 198, Summer, 2010, pp. 3–16, <https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/14315?show=full>, accessed 18 May 2021.

solution to all the problems of the European Union was to have a European parliament and a European government, respectively invested with legislative and executive powers. However, Fischer realised that it would be impossible to carry out this project against the will of nation states, and that the only way out for Europe was to provide for a division of powers between the national and the European levels by resorting to the principle of subsidiarity.

At that point, Fischer outlined two possible developments for both the European Parliament and the European government. The former should be made up of two chambers, one composed of “elected members who are also members of their national parliaments”, thereby representing the national level, and the other consisting of a Senate of members directly elected at national level or representatives of member states (based on the example of the German *Bundesrat*). The latter, instead, would be an evolution of the European Council or the European Commission; in the second case, it would be led by a president who was directly elected, possibly by universal suffrage. But there were also other intermediate options. Fischer put forward the hypothesis of a “lean European federation”, in which the democratic principle would be extended and powers and responsibilities would be reorganised both horizontally and vertically. Besides this, in order to achieve these goals, it was necessary to adopt a European Constitution. Then, Fischer recalled that other European politicians had already, to varying degrees, envisaged new solutions: Jacques Delors had proposed a “federation of nation states” made up of the six founding countries¹⁶; Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard D’Estaing had also envisioned a federal solution, involving the 11 countries of the euro area¹⁷, and even before then Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers had suggested creating a small “hard core” of five nations, which, however, excluded one of the founding countries of the EC, namely Italy¹⁸. As for the difficulty of reconciling the idea of a federation of states with the consequences of Eastern enlargement, Fischer observed that “within the next ten years” the EU would have to decide whether European integration should be carried out by “a majority” or “a smaller group of member states”, a sort of avant-garde or “centre of gravity”, including only those states “which are [...] in a position to push ahead with political integration”. Then he went so far as

16 Jacques Delors, “Interview” in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 30 May–6 June 1998.

17 Helmut Schmidt, “Valéry Giscard D’Estaing”, Interview in *Le Figaro*, 10 April 2000.

18 Wolfgang Schäuble, Karl Lamers, ‘Reflections on European policy’, Bonn: CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag, 1994.

to imagine the possible future of European integration as a process in three stages, that is: 1. “the expansion of reinforced cooperation” between those states that intended to pull together more closely, cooperation that had already showed up with both the Economic and Monetary Union and the Schengen Treaty; 2. the creation of a centre of gravity that was to be “the avant-garde, the driving force for the completion of political integration” and was to include “all the elements of the future federation” from the outset, while remaining open to further accessions¹⁹; 3. “the completion of integration in a European Federation”, a step requiring “a deliberate political act to reestablish Europe”.

This act was especially necessary because, as Fischer pointed out, “closer cooperation does not automatically lead to full integration”; a conscious choice to refound Europe was therefore needed. The explicit goal of the European federation outlined by Fischer was to replace the communitarian approach typical of the “Monnet method” with differentiated integration, because functionalism had exhausted all its potential with the creation of a single currency.

Fischer’s discourse was dense but relatively simple and clear in its formulation, except for one point: the meaning given to the term “federation”, which was deliberately used in an ambiguous way and therefore left different theoretical interpretations and concrete realisations open.

It was not long before the main political leaders of the member states and the other European institutions responded, each presenting their own view and possible solutions to the challenges ahead. Thanks to Fischer’s vision of European integration, the intellectual and cultural debate on the future of Europe finally intensified, and received wide media coverage and public attention²⁰.

19 “Such a centre of gravity must also have an active interest in enlargement and it must be attractive to the other members. If one follows Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s tenet that no member state can be forced to go farther than it is able or willing to go, but that those who do not want to go any farther cannot prevent others from doing so, then the centre of gravity will emerge within the treaties. Otherwise it will emerge outside them”; Fischer, *From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration*, p. 15.

20 For some reflections on Fischer’s speech by European intellectuals, cf. Christian Joerges, Yves Mény, J.H.H. Weiler, *What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer*, Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico di Fiesole, Firenze. European University Institute, 2000, open access at <https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/17255>. The book contains the text of the original speech in German: *Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation: Gedanken über die Finalität der Europäischen*

According to the German Foreign Minister, the European project was doomed to fail unless it managed to implement major reforms and, first and foremost, abandon consensual decision-making in the fields of security, justice and home affairs in order to replace it with qualified majority voting, as well as to eliminate the right of veto, which would create a deadlock in a body consisting of more than two dozen countries. In addition to advocating a revision of the composition of the Commission and the weighting of votes, also in the Council of Ministers, Fischer identified three new general and important goals: peace, the improvement of well-being and coexistence among the Eastern European countries, and their integration with Western Europe. To this end, he prepared a kind of Marshall Plan for the Balkans, aimed at avoiding the outbreak of wars and nationalism caused by economic and social problems. On the whole, Fischer's federalist project was realistic, cautious and respectful of the role of nation states. Yet, not only was it strongly rejected by the Green politicians more reluctant to accept supranational integration, but it also attracted some criticism from the most Euro-federalist members of European Green parties, such as the MEPs Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Monica Frassoni, as well as the then president of the Italian Greens, Grazia Francescato (later to become the female spokesperson for the European Greens), who, while appreciating his initiative, challenged some aspects of his proposal, especially the idea of a European Parliament partly made up of members appointed by individual states²¹.

Afterwards, still in his capacity as a foreign minister, Fischer took over representing the German government in the Convention on the Future of the European Union, where in November 2002, together with the French Foreign Minister Dominique Villepin, he put forward a proposal for the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) into a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) capable of planning and running military missions in crisis areas where NATO as a whole was not involved, as well as of guaranteeing the security of the EU's territory and people and contributing to the stability of the European continent²². But

Integration (pp. 5–17), as well as its translations into English (pp. 19–30) and French (pp. 31–43).

21 Cf. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Grazia Francescato, Monica Frassoni, "La Ue ha spento l'Europa", *La Repubblica*, 6 June 2000, p. 17.

22 Cf. *Joint Franco-German proposals for the European Convention in the field of European Security and Defence Policy*, put forward by Dominique de Villepin and Joschka Fischer, Brussels, 22 November 2002 (CONV 422/02); Ulrike Guérot, Kirsty Hughes, Maxime Lefebvre, Tjark Egenhoff, *France, Germany and the UK in the*

the Franco-German proposal also provided that, in order to become fully capable of military action, the EU should not only increase its efforts to modernise its armaments, but also develop its own command structures parallel to NATO.

6. Conclusions

Despite adaptations and changes, Fischer always confirmed his Euro-federalist stance; in fact, he is one of the most influential members of the Spinelli Group, a federalist think tank created in 2010. He partly modified his ideas in the course of time as a result of the opportunities and obstacles he has experienced over the years. In 2014, in his book *Scheitert Europa?* [Is Europe Failing?]²³, Fischer reiterated once again his criticism of the EU's shortcomings in its foreign and security policy, but above all he highlighted its mistakes in the management of the euro crisis. According to Fischer, the financial crash of 2008 had not only pushed the EU into a deep and long-lasting existential crisis, but also reopened the historic question of Germany's European role. The consequent bailouts of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland had been the result of large macroeconomic imbalances that had been building up within the euro area over many years. Moreover, the Maastricht criteria had failed to nurture real economic convergence and were based on the 'illusion' that an agreement on paper could replace the effective centralisation of power. In this regard, Fischer stated: "The future of the whole EU and the European integration project will be decided within the Eurogroup and nowhere else". While, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU had been generally seen as a model of freedom, security and prosperity, during the long economic crisis that broke out in 2008 it became a symbol of financial expropriation in the North and lasting misery in the South, with a consequent rise in Euroscepticism

Convention. Common Interests or Pulling in Different Directions?, EPIN Working Paper no. 7, July 2003, http://aei.pitt.edu/1879/1/EPIN_WP7.pdf, accessed 30 May 2021; Manuel Vázquez Muñoz, *The Convention: The Solution to Reinforce ESDP?*, UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 3, October, 2003, <https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/767/76711279010.pdf>, accessed 30 May 2021.

23 Joschka Fischer, *Scheitert Europa?*, Cologne, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2014 [Italian translation by Alessandro Cavalli, *Se l'Europa fallisce*, Milano, Ledizioni, 2015]. For a synthesis cf. Nicole Koenig, *Is Europe Failing? (A Book by Joschka Fischer)*, Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, 10 November 2014, <https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/iseuropefailing-fischer-jdi-b-nov14-1.pdf>, accessed 30 May 2021.

and xenophobic right-wing populism across Europe. In fact, nation states seemed to provide trust and security, whereas the EU was now perceived as “the source of all evil”, which increased the doubts about its legitimacy. Besides this, while the European Central Bank and the heads of state and government had moved to the centre stage of economic governance, the European Commission had been relegated to the role of a bureaucratic support structure and the European Parliament had become a marginal institution. On the other hand, in Fischer’s opinion, the EU continued to suffer from strategic shortcomings in foreign and security policy, especially in relation to Russia. In particular, he hoped that the Crimean and Ukrainian crises would prompt the Union to develop widespread strategic thinking about its geopolitical situation and energy dependence²⁴, as well as to understand the need to complement “soft power” with “hard power”, for instance by implementing new forms of “containment policy”, or reducing investments in Russia, or else revitalising the European Neighbourhood Policy. Finally, in the light of the multiple crises which Europe was facing, he advocated the necessity of “overcoming the small-state mentality and forging European political unity”, and believed that deeper political integration would eventually lead to the creation of a “United States of Europe” based on the Swiss model, i.e. a federal system able to unify but also to maintain cultural differences. This federation should be characterised by a real European government, a common parliament including delegated members of national parliaments, a common fiscal policy, a common debt mechanism capable of implementing debt cuts in European economies in trouble, an energy union able to unify at least the external dimension of European energy policy, a common foreign and security policy and the possibility of referendums in cases of a substantial transfer of sovereignty. In the end, Fisher reiterated his call for a “vanguard” of states, preferably consisting of the eurozone countries, which would pursue deeper integration through intergovernmental agreements to be later incorporated into the Treaties. Lastly, the heads of state and government would form a “euro area government”, whilst a “Eurochamber” composed of delegates from national parliaments would manage economic and financial policy.

With the start of the 2021 Conference on the Future of Europe, an initiative by the European Union with the purpose of analysing what reforms should be made to its policies and institutions, looking at the medium and

24 In 2009, Fischer became a consultant for the Nabucco international gas pipeline project (later cancelled), which was supposed to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian gas.

long term, to enable EU citizens to share their ideas, it may be useful to return to some ideas and reflections set out by the former leader of the German Greens in the two speeches examined. In fact, they are both a faithful mirror and a powerful record of a difficult transition, which left us with a number of still untied knots regarding how to build lasting peace and a strong continental union, as well as how to face the challenges of a rapidly changing international system.

Tony Blair and his speech at Saint Antony's College on 2 February 2006

Laura Wolf

Introduction

This paper analyses Tony Blair's speech at St. Antony's College, Oxford University, on 2 February 2006.

Blair gave this speech on the occasion of the annual European Studies Centre Lectures. It was published through the European Studies Centre itself, but without providing a further publication date. As the occasion of the speech suggests, the event was also hosted directly by the European Studies Centre. Prime Minister Blair delivered it in English.

For the analysis, the first step is to consider the context. This includes Blair's biography as well as his time in administration and the political and historical situation in Europe. After that, the development process looks at medium—as well as genre-specific peculiarities. Thereby, it draws primarily on insights from Blair's previous speeches. Following this, the speech is examined and analysed in more detail in terms of content and language. Finally, the results are summarised in an interpretation and related to each other.

Before we examine the context in more detail, we need to summarise the speech.

The introduction begins with an account of Blair's experience of Holocaust Remembrance Day on 27 January, the day the Auschwitz concentration camp was liberated. In his transition to the present and the themes of the speech, Blair takes the audience through a historical transition from the Second World War and the fight against fascism to the reorganisation of Europe after the end of the war. The subsequent outline of the speech itself begins thematically again with the history of Europe, which is followed by the current situation and the position of Great Britain in Europe. In his historical review, Blair takes up the difficult start of the relationship between Great Britain and the European Community. Thus, he describes the relationship from the British point of view up to his country's accession in 1973. This is followed by the change to the European Union with topics such as qualified majority voting, the single market

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and the Euro as the single European currency. Blair also talks about the previous Constitutional Treaty for Europe and the problems the European Union is facing after its failure. However, Blair also mentions the EU and Britain's opportunities today to get out of this crisis. This leads Blair to the second topic of his speech, but he also mentions personal problems with which he is confronted as prime minister. In doing so, he mainly addresses the dilemma of not being able to do justice to Europe and Great Britain and the dichotomy in which he finds himself as a result. An attempt to come to terms with this balancing act is the agenda he presents afterwards. In this regard, Blair tries to combine solutions to the difficulties the Union is facing and British interests in several topics. He addresses the issues of economic reform, security, energy (production) and defence and foreign policy. This is followed by a transition in which he explicitly refers to already successful examples of reform and Europe's relations with the USA. He ends his speech with a stronger focus on Great Britain. Blair explains Britain's chances in the European Union and what opportunities could arise from it. During this section, he also discusses his time in office and his achievements at the European level. At the end of the speech, Blair emphasises that Britain's place is in Europe. However, he points out that it can and must co-decide as long as it is part of the Union.

The context of the speech and the speaker

Tony Blair was born in Edinburgh on 6 May 1953 to Leo and Hazel Blair¹. He was particularly influenced by the 1960s, making him a member of a new and younger generation of politicians². He spent most of his school years at Fettes College in Edinburgh, where he went from 1966³. However, he was not remembered by former classmates and teachers as a possible young politician. This was probably also because his interests tended to focus on other issues and he was more conspicuous as a rebel against overly strict school rules⁴.

After leaving school, Blair went to France for a year and started studying law at St. John's College, Oxford, in 1972⁵. Even at that time, Oxford was one of the best places to launch a possible political career. There were vari-

1 Cf. Jon Sopel, *Tony Blair. The Modernizer*, London: Michael Joseph, 1995, p. 2.

2 Cf. *ibid.* p. 2.

3 Cf. *ibid.* p. 12.

4 Cf. *ibid.* p. 20.

5 Cf. *ibid.* p. 21.

ous political student newspapers and party networks locally, but Blair did not join them⁶. He became much more involved with different political and social thoughts and ideas during his time at Oxford. Through friends, he also came into closer contact with Christianity⁷. Even though his personal faith is important to him, Blair lives it out in private⁸. This is rather untypical for politicians. His first political activities were demonstrations in which Blair participated. These were directed against the National Front (NF)⁹. After graduating from Oxford and moving to London, he decided to become politically active. He joined the Labour Party, which at that time was going through a challenging political phase¹⁰. Through connections, Blair got in touch with Alexander Irvine. With him, he found jobs as a lawyer and a teacher, and Irvine became a supporter of his political goals¹¹. Blair also met his future wife, Cherie Booth through Irvine, whom she worked for as a lawyer as well. His father-in-law, Tony Booth, was also a Labour Party supporter. As a result, he was able to help Blair develop his political career through contacts¹². In the early 1980s, Labour faced significant political problems. These culminated in the Social Democratic Party (SDP) trying to replace it as the strongest opposition force¹³. Calls for reform became louder within the party as well. As a result, there were different groups formed within the left and right-wings¹⁴. In 1983, Blair was able to enter parliament as an MP by being elected in the new constituency in Sedgefield, where he also met Gordon Brown¹⁵. Five years later, he was initially given a place in the party leader Neil Kinnock's shadow cabinet¹⁶. The following year, Blair became his Employment Minister¹⁷. After Neil Kinnock lost the 1992 election to be Prime Minister to John Major, he resigned as leader of the Labour Party. He was followed in office by John Smith as the new leader¹⁸. Blair also continued his political involvement under Smith and was appointed Shadow Cabinet Minister

6 Cf. *ibid.* p. 21f.

7 Cf. *ibid.* p. 29ff.

8 Cf. *ibid.* p. 33.

9 Cf. *ibid.* p. 34.

10 Cf. *ibid.* p. 36f.

11 Cf. *ibid.* p. 38ff.

12 Cf. *ibid.* p. 46.

13 Cf. *ibid.* p. 47.

14 Cf. *ibid.* p. 49ff.

15 Cf. *ibid.* p. 69.

16 Cf. *ibid.* p. 99f.

17 Cf. *ibid.* p. 106f.

18 Cf. *ibid.* p. 130f.

for Home Affairs¹⁹. In 1994, only two years after he had become leader of the party, Smith died suddenly in May, just months before the election for the Prime Ministership²⁰. Shortly after Smith's death, a new leader had to be found for the party. Brown and Blair seemed to be the primary candidates for the job. However, after Brown declared that he would not run for office, Blair officially announced his candidacy on 11 June²¹. In the election for the leadership of the Labour Party, Blair was finally able to assert himself against two other candidates. He ran as Labour's candidate for Prime Minister in the 1994 elections to the House of Commons²².

On 1 May 1997, Tony Blair was elected Prime Minister of Great Britain, thus gaining political responsibility at a time when the world and, equally, Europe had to reorient themselves. With his election, not only was the long period of Conservative leadership ended, but Labour also achieved one of its best historical election results since 1945²³. A few years earlier, also under Blair's leadership, the party had embarked on a new path. Labour became New Labour, which clearly distinguished itself from the labour movement and demanded more reforms²⁴. The aim was to reach out to the British middle class through the so-called 'Third Way', which Blair envisaged by keeping some aspects of Thatcherism, but without further nationalisation and more equality of opportunity²⁵. In addition, New Labour was also a way of adapting the party to the new realities of the twenty-first century. This related particularly to foreign policy and European policy²⁶. With this new orientation, however, there was also a move towards primarily conservative ideas. The period from 1983 to 1997 is therefore described as a 'dramatic drift' for Labour²⁷. However, it was also associated with moving away from the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and towards employers' organisations²⁸. The TUC was confronted with a problem by Blair. It was traditionally pro-Labour, but the realignment

19 Cf. *ibid.* p. 140.

20 Cf. *ibid.* p. 171.

21 Cf. *ibid.* p. 197.

22 Cf. *ibid.* p. 215.

23 Cf. Heinrich August Winkler, *Werte und Mächte, Eine Geschichte der westlichen Welt*, München: Verlag C.H. Beck oHG, 2019, p. 680.

24 Cf. Franz-Joseph Brüggemeier, *Geschichte Großbritanniens im 20. Jahrhundert*, München: Verlag C.H. Beck oHG, 2010 p. 341.

25 Cf. Heinrich August Winkler, *Werte und Mächte*, p. 680.

26 Cf. Michael Melcher, *Awkwardness and Reliability, Die britische Europapolitik von 1997 bis 2013*, Marburg: Tetum Verlag, 2014, p. 163.

27 Cf. *ibid.* p. 163.

28 Cf. *ibid.* p. 165.

of the party reduced the influence of the unions²⁹. For Blair's intended policy without renewed nationalisation and tax increases, a strong market became crucial. Thus, the EU also became the focus of the Prime Minister's attention³⁰. This initially caused a split in the TUC into two camps, but ultimately, the TUC changed its stance on the EMU³¹.

Despite the good election result, Blair had a difficult start, especially in national politics. On the one hand, he had to step out of Thatcher's shadow, but at the same time, he wanted to retain some of the reforms of her time. In addition, there was also social inequality among the citizens, which New Labour tried to fight³². The ongoing Northern Ireland conflict and demands for more autonomy from Scotland and Wales were also on his agenda³³. With the Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement), Blair conceded the autonomy rights demanded for Northern Ireland. Its affiliation to Great Britain was also secured, for which there was also great support among the citizens³⁴. Concessions were also made to Scotland and Wales under Prime Minister Blair. Therefore, he put the so-called "devolution" back on the agenda of his government³⁵. The term 'devolution' describes the establishment of "the partial autonomy of the peripheral regions" of Britain, such as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland³⁶. The particular interest in this issue came not least from the electoral success Labour had in some of these regions³⁷. Other reasons were the regional movements. Through their political rise in the twentieth century, they had become a rival, especially to the Labour Party, which was actually close to the workers³⁸. After referendums, new demands could be met for both Scotland and Wales, although they were clearly different.

29 Cf. Steve Coulter, *Signalling Moderation: UK Trade Unions, 'New Labour' and the Single Currency*, in: LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series, LEQS Paper No. 121/2016, p. 3.

30 Cf. Franz-Joseph Brüggemeier, *Geschichte Großbritanniens im 20. Jahrhundert*, München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2010, p. 341ff.

31 Cf. Steve Coulter, *Signalling Moderation: UK Trade Unions, 'New Labour' and the Single Currency*, p. 5.

32 Cf. Franz-Joseph Brüggemeier, *Geschichte Großbritanniens im 20. Jahrhundert*, p. 345.

33 Cf. *ibid.* p. 354.

34 Cf. Heinrich August Winkler, *Werte und Mächte*, p. 681.

35 Cf. Thomas Mergel, *Großbritannien seit 1945*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005, p. 171.

36 See *ibid.* p. 40.

37 Cf. *ibid.* p. 40.

38 Cf. *ibid.* p. 170.

Scotland, for example, was given the right to decide on taxes itself in its own parliament. In Wales, however, the parliament had to be regarded more as an “executive administration”, which still had to act on instructions from London in several areas³⁹.

Not only did Blair and Great Britain have to assume a new leading role in Europe after the end of the East–West conflict, but so did the EU as a whole⁴⁰. For this mission, Blair had made demands on Brussels in which he primarily represented the opinion of the Conservatives in Britain⁴¹. He was essentially concerned with economic developments such as the internal market. But the further enlargement of the European Community through new structural funds for candidate countries and the strengthening of national representation of the people and the European Parliament were also of interest⁴². Nevertheless, there were also three demands that were contrary to those of the Tories. First, Blair wanted to end Britain’s opting-out of the Social Charter. Second, he demanded that Britain entered the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union. Thirdly, qualified majority voting should apply in certain areas, but with a new weighting of votes which would have to be in favour of the large states⁴³.

These demands aimed not only to lead Britain out of its isolated position within the EU, but were also intended to allow it to take on a leadership role in Europe. This was to compensate for the weakened position of the former empire on the world political stage, which had now been primarily claimed by the USA⁴⁴.

Just one year after Blair took office, the St. Malo Summit took place in 1998, at which Blair began to upgrade Britain’s role and connect his country more intensely inside the EU⁴⁵. His enthusiasm to improve the British position within the Union was also supported by the other member states, in which mainly social democratic governments had emerged at that time⁴⁶.

39 Cf. *ibid.* p. 171.

40 Cf. Werner Weidenfeld, *Die Europäische Union*, Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2015, p. 88.

41 Cf. Michael Melcher, *Awkwardness and Reliability*, p. 166.

42 Cf. *ibid.* p. 166f.

43 Cf. *ibid.* p. 167f.

44 Cf. *ibid.* p. 172.

45 Cf. *ibid.* p. 186.

46 Cf. *ibid.* p. 188.

Blair was able to achieve his first demands only two years after taking office with the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. He did so by realising Britain's 'opting-in' to the Social Charter⁴⁷. The Amsterdam Treaty emerged from the Amsterdam Summit as a revision of the Maastricht Treaty. This had been ratified only a few years earlier and aimed to optimise the Union's capacity to act⁴⁸. Nevertheless, discrepancies arose over employment policy and the Stability Pact even before the summit⁴⁹. Although they clearly shifted the focus in the negotiations, the resulting Treaty of Amsterdam also contributed to further deepening the EU. Even if Amsterdam's so-called 'left-overs' were only to be addressed again with the following revision⁵⁰.

In the same year, Blair suffered the first setback in his first term in office. The Tories had scored an unforeseen success with their clearly more Eurosceptical course in the 1999 European elections. As a result, Blair had to slow down his European policy⁵¹. This led to the discarding of Britain's fundamentally forced entry into the euro, a significant demand in Blair's own policy⁵². Furthermore, Blair had to accept that the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was quite popular among the British electorate, although, or perhaps precisely because, it adopted a far more Eurosceptical or anti-European stance than the Tories⁵³.

As early as the following year, the Intergovernmental Conference started the revision of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which ended in the Treaty of Nice. Despite its previously known objectives and points of processing by the 'left-overs', the Treaty of Nice was not a complete success either. It was decided the size of the European Commission should be reduced, but this reduction could only begin in 2005 and in stages⁵⁴. In addition, the weighting of votes in the Council of the European Union became less transparent, and majority decisions could only be taken by a double majority (majority of votes, of states and of the people)⁵⁵. Although a charter was introduced to protect the people's fundamental rights, it had no legally

47 Cf. Thomas Mergel, *Großbritannien seit 1945*, p. 177.

48 Cf. Werner Weidenfeld, *Die Europäische Union*, p. 93.

49 See *ibid.* p. 93.

50 Cf. *ibid.* p. 93f.

51 Cf. Michael Melcher, *Awkwardness and Reliability*, p. 193.

52 Cf. *ibid.* p. 194.

53 Cf. *ibid.* p. 194f.

54 Cf. Werner Weidenfeld, *Die Europäische Union*, p. 94f.

55 Cf. *ibid.* p. 95.

binding force⁵⁶. To sum up the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, the term patchwork is often used. This expression arose above all from questions about the lack of comprehensibility in responsibilities and working methods, which had not been resolved, even though the treaties were revisions of the previous Treaty⁵⁷.

However, what was also attached to the Treaty of Nice was “Declaration No. 23 on the Future of Europe”. Through this, the future working communities were to be created in the form of a future workshop for Europe⁵⁸. Four overarching goals were formulated for future cooperation: firstly, the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; secondly, the delimitation of powers and responsibilities in the multi-level system; thirdly, the future role of national parliaments and fourthly, the simplification of the Treaties⁵⁹. The Convention on the Future of the European Union should also become such a future workshop. This should be a form of communication through members from politics and citizens. In addition, there was also a new concept of using the Convention as an opportunity for European politics.

Blair's slowed down European policy was also made clear in the Convention by the British representatives. Although Labour had won Blair's re-election as British Prime Minister in 2001 and with it the majority of the votes, his foreign policy and predominantly European foreign policy had little influence on this result⁶⁰. He was still pro-European, but for him, as for some of his predecessors, more profound integration was not an option⁶¹. Therefore, the British representative at the Convention, Lord Goldsmith, was clearly opposed to the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a new and legal framework⁶². The Convention also negotiated a constitution for the EU. However, Great Britain was favourably disposed towards a treaty regarding this. This was not least due to the fact that the ‘red lines’ of the British government’s representatives were not affected by this Treaty⁶³. Furthermore, the regulations for the charter were kept more general and had to be in line with national laws, especially on social welfare⁶⁴.

56 Cf. *ibid.* p. 95.

57 Cf. *ibid.* p. 96.

58 See *ibid.* p. 95.

59 Cf. *ibid.* p. 95.

60 Cf. Heinrich August Winkler, *Werte und Mächte*, p. 682.

61 Cf. *ibid.* p. 681.

62 Cf. Michael Melcher, *Awkwardness and Reliability*, p. 204.

63 Cf. *ibid.* p. 233.

64 Cf. *ibid.* p. 204.

However, this was not solely the result of British negotiations. Other countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic also thought the Charter of Fundamental Rights went too far. These states, like Britain, 'opted out' of the Charter. Despite the softening and generalisations, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed in Rome in 2004⁶⁵. Although the states had now signed it, the ratification process became a problem⁶⁶. However, before referendums exposed these complications, the British course of action had caused irritation. This was equal to a 'U-turn' to the talks that had taken place in advance with other national leaders about a possible referendum in Great Britain⁶⁷. The background to this change, of course, lay primarily in the upcoming European elections and the election campaign of the Tories, who were making the lack of a referendum the main issue. However, reporting and Blair's own reputation, which was no longer uncontroversial, were also part of the reasons⁶⁸.

Blair's tarnished reputation was not least the result of his unconditional support for the USA, both in the invasion of Afghanistan, but above all in his support for the Iraq war after the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. Nevertheless, the reorientation of foreign policy under Blair, which limited 'the principle of non-interference', had already become apparent in the Kosovo war⁶⁹. In this war, military dependence on American support became apparent. At the time, this also led to a further rapprochement between Britain and Europe⁷⁰.

His controversial endorsement of American action also led to the EU splitting into two camps on this issue⁷¹. With the emergence of the Iraq conflict, Blair supported former US President Clinton in his threats of attacks against Saddam Hussein. Although he was also concerned about the credibility of the United Nations, whose influence was otherwise in danger of dwindling, he was the only permanent member of the UN Security Council to still back the USA⁷². In doing so, Blair not only placed

65 Cf. Michael Gehler, *Europas Weg. Von der Utopie zur Zukunft der EU*, Innsbruck: Studienverlag Ges. m. b. H., 2020, p. 91.

66 Cf. *ibid.* p. 92.

67 Cf. Michael Melcher, *Awkwardness and Reliability*, p. 235.

68 Cf. *ibid.* p. 236.

69 Cf. Franz-Joseph Brüggemeier, *Geschichte Großbritanniens im 20. Jahrhundert*, p. 356.

70 Cf. Thomas Mergel, *Großbritannien seit 1945*, p. 207.

71 Cf. *ibid.* p. 240.

72 Cf. Kelly McHugh, Bush, Blair, and the War in Iraq: Alliance Politics and the Limits of Influence, in: *Political Science Quarterly: The Journal Public and International Affairs* 125, No. 3, 2010, pp. 465–492, p. 469.

himself in an isolated position in the Security Council, but he also broke a crucial political rule of his party. Until then, Labour had regarded the UN Security Council as the highest authority⁷³. When George W. Bush took office as President of the United States, Blair gained a new political partner. However, unlike Bill Clinton, Bush came from a different political background than Blair⁷⁴. Both statesmen came to the same assessment of the danger posed by Saddam Hussein. However, they differed considerably in their evaluation of the United Nations⁷⁵. Blair did not want to bypass the UN on principle. On the contrary, he saw himself in an important role as a mediator between the USA and the European states⁷⁶. The aforementioned division of the European states into war sceptics and supporters of the USA also led to a break between Schröder and Blair. However, as late as 1999, both had a good relationship with each other, which also resulted from the political common ground of their parties. In the same year, the so-called “Schröder/Blair paper” emerged from this relationship⁷⁷. The paper aimed to create an “activating welfare state” that would drive the return of the unemployed to the employment market⁷⁸. Germany's position on military intervention by the USA placed Schröder and Blair in different camps. This probably also created irreconcilable differences⁷⁹.

However, despite the reasons just summarised for the diminution of his political standing, Blair did not have to have a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in his own country. The negative results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands had led to a kind of shock and the paralysis of the ratification process⁸⁰. The results of these referenda can be explained by the national political frustration of citizens. They saw the vote as an opportunity to strike back at their country's politicians⁸¹. Another important aspect of the British approach may have been the prospect of a possible constitution. After all, compared to other states, the

73 Cf. *ibid.* p. 471.

74 Cf. *ibid.* p. 477.

75 Cf. *ibid.* p. 477f.

76 Cf. *ibid.* p. 491.

77 Cf. Christoph Butterwegge, *Krisen und Zukunft des Sozialstaates*, 5th. edition, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014, p. 335.

78 Cf. *ibid.* p. 335.

79 Cf. Kelly McHugh, *Bush, Blair, and the War in Iraq: Alliance Politics and the Limits of Influence*, p. 483.

80 Cf. Thomas Mergel, *Großbritannien seit 1945*, p. 239.

81 Cf. Werner Weidenfeld, *Die Europäische Union*, p. 99.

UK does not have a written constitution⁸². In addition, citizens had little insight into the workings of the EU, which resulted at least in them fearing loss of control⁸³.

By the end of Blair's second term, the assertion of British interests in the European Union was apparent. However, 'British leadership' could not be achieved, as the country's entry into the euro failed the economic tests. The results of the tests saw it as too high a risk with too little benefit for the country⁸⁴.

In 2005, Blair won the general election for the third time, although his majority diminished with each re-election⁸⁵. Losing the vote again led to a change in leadership in the Tory camp, with the future prime minister David Cameron becoming the new party leader. He wanted to lead the British MEPs out of the EPP/ED group as the party's goal⁸⁶.

Blair used the UK's second presidency in the same year as a pause for reflection on the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. In this way, he was able to defuse his national political situation⁸⁷. In 2007, Blair resigned. The reasons for his resignation were not least poor opinion polls results, both among the British people and within his own party. He handed over the party chair to Gordon Brown, who was elected Prime Minister in the same year⁸⁸.

The previously discussed context shows that Blair's speech is difficult to classify thematically as a reaction to a specific event. However, with its temporal origins at the beginning of 2006, it can be classified in terms of European policy in the redefinition of and efforts on the Constitutional Treaty between 2005 and 2009. Thematically, however, the speech is much more an evaluation of Blair's achievements, especially in European policy, during his time as British prime minister. There was little response to it in the media landscape, even though it was his first speech after his announcement that he would not run again in the next election. Blair's prominent critics were William Hague, then leader of the Tories, and Roger Knapman, the leader of UKIP. The Frankfurter Allgemeine

82 Cf. John Parry, „Die europäische Verfassung – eine britische Sicht“, In: Heiner Timmermann, *Eine Verfassung für die Europäische Union, Beiträge zu einer grundsätzlichen und aktuellen Diskussion*, Opladen: Lecke + Budrich, 2001, p. 103.

83 Cf. *ibid.* p. 105.

84 Cf. Michael Melcher, *Awkwardness and Reliability*, p. 243ff.

85 Cf. *ibid.* p. 255.

86 Cf. Michael Gehler, *Europas Weg*, p. 249.

87 Cf. Michael Melcher, *Awkwardness and Reliability*, p. 257.

88 Cf. Heinrich August Winkler, *Werte und Mächte*, p. 746f.

wrote a brief article about the speech under the title “Speaker Blair”. The article emphasised his quality as a good speaker, especially for the EU. However, they also stressed his contrarily hesitant action⁸⁹. In addition, they noted that Blair criticised the current lack of discussion about Europe in Britain⁹⁰. Yet, he did not initiate any discussions himself, although he had had the opportunity to do so with his nine years in government.⁹¹

BBC News also wrote an article about the speech on the same evening. However, it focused mostly on retelling Blair's main reasons for being optimistic about Europe's future⁹². The article also included the critical voices of William Hague and Roger Knapman. Hague criticised the course of Blair's European policy, saying that the mistakes made by Blair and other politicians could lead to new ideas for a more open Europe in its future⁹³. Knapman attacked Blair's attitude towards Europe as an opinion of the elites. This, he said, moved further away from the will of the British people⁹⁴.

The article by the online news portal Euractiv.com was also mostly a summary of the main contents of Blair's speech. Although it too dealt with Blair's vision of the future of Europe, it also addressed the dilemma in which Blair, according to his own statements, had found himself between British and European politics⁹⁵.

A more critical article was written by *The Irish Times*. It focused no less on recounting certain positions, but devoted some attention to William Hague, who has already been mentioned in this contribution⁹⁶. He mainly attacked Blair's alleged projects, the euro and a Constitution for Europe, which had failed. He stated that it was not a coincidence that the EU would do well without these projects⁹⁷. He also added that Blair had failed

89 Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH, *Redner Blair*, in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Issue 30, 2006, p. 14.

90 Cf. *ibid.* p. 14.

91 Cf. *ibid.* p.14.

92 Cf. BBC News, *Blair 'optimistic' over EU future* 2006 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4672602.stm], accessed 17 August 2021.

93 Cf. *ibid.*

94 Cf. *ibid.*

95 Cf. Euractiv.com, *Britain's European dilemma: "isolation or treason", says Blair* 2006 [<https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/britain-s-european-dilemma-isolation-or-treason-says-blair/>], 17.08.2021.

96 Cf. Frank Millar, *Blair hopeful about future of Europe* 2006 [<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/blair-hopeful-about-future-of-europe-1.1010410>], accessed 17 August 2021.

97 Cf. *ibid.*

to create a vision of Europe that would have been acceptable to the British people⁹⁸.

In the following section, we will now look at peculiarities in Blair's use of language and terminology in political speeches.

Looking at speeches more closely, it is essential to know that they are always dependent on the person writing and delivering them⁹⁹. Speakers' rhetorical and linguistic skills are also linked to their social background, which influences them¹⁰⁰.

Blair uses different forms of expression in his speeches. Depending on where he appears and speaks, he can adapt his speaking style to various conditions of conversation and conversational situations¹⁰¹. Particularly notable are the changes between him as an ordinary British citizen and his persona as Prime Minister Blair, which sets him apart from other politicians¹⁰². Blair also includes the ordinary citizen Blair in his political speeches and is able to convey personal emotions and a closeness to the audience¹⁰³. Norman Fairclough has also highlighted three other features in Blair's speeches. For example, Blair expresses his "toughness" mainly through modal verbs and frequently advocates positions by incorporating personal convictions¹⁰⁴. To convey moods, Blair also uses literary devices and characters¹⁰⁵.

Jonathan Chattersis-Black recognised a direct contrast to 'Old Labour' in Blair's communication.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, Chattersis-Black also notes the use of various linguistic mechanisms in Blair's speeches, such as the ethical terms 'good' and 'evil'¹⁰⁷. In addition, he also uses reification to dramatise or express feelings¹⁰⁸. Chattersis-Black also discovered the use of personification as a stylistic device and the use of specific phrases in various speeches by Blair. Through these techniques, Blair is able to establish a

98 Cf. *ibid.*

99 Cf. Norman Fairclough, *New Labour, New Language?* London: Routledge 2000, p. 95.

100 Cf. *ibid.* p. 95.

101 Cf. *ibid.* p. 96.

102 Cf. *ibid.* p. 98.

103 Cf. *ibid.* p. 103.

104 Cf. *ibid.* p. 108ff.

105 Cf. *ibid.* p. 115.

106 Cf. Jonathan Chattersis-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric. The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*, 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2011, p. 226.

107 Cf. *ibid.* p. 228.

108 Cf. *ibid.* p. 237.

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relationship with the audience much more quickly than through the use of arguments¹⁰⁹.

The following analysis shows how far Blair also used these stylistic devices in the speech of 2 February 2006.

Analysis of textual and linguistic features

Argument structure

A unique feature of Blair's speech is its structure, which on closer examination, has different levels. He begins with a historical introduction. He uses the Holocaust Remembrance Day as a kind of transition to the history of Europe starting in the Second World War and thus explains from which past today's Europe has grown. This introduction ends with Blair's personal assessment of what Europe must also take to heart in the 21st century from the development process. Blair uses this form of introduction in many other places. Mostly, he tries to draw attention to problems by describing previous steps in European politics. Thus, a common thread is reflected throughout the entire speech. This relates to the speech as a whole but also individual topics with regard to the past. This is followed by the current situation and ends with demands and reform proposals for a future Europe.

Within his speech, Blair uses different patterns of argumentation. He presents his hypothesis or opinion on a certain topic in a first step. He then uses the correct arguments to support them.

On the other hand, he also uses examples that he draws on after making a claim. In this way, his thesis is much more like an important observation. Blair also highlights and compares a supposed actual state and the target state of the EU.

Another element of the structure of his argument is "first one thing, then another". In using this device, he does not directly portray the reforms of other heads of state as wrong but merely criticises the way the reforms should be realised. However, he also uses easily understandable arguments starting with "because". At some points in the speech, Blair also switches his position of justification and appeal. For example, the reasons he gives for a subsequent appeal seem like an introduction ending with the only possible conclusion.

109 Cf. *ibid.* p. 243ff.

When looking at the written speech, we can see that his argumentation is often short and concise. It rarely goes on for more than three paragraphs. Thus, even when reading the speech and despite the jumps in content, a common thread in the argumentation can be discerned.

Intertextuality and intercultural references

In his speech, Blair uses several intertextual references to other speeches or protagonists in addition to various argumentation structures.

Two of these references can already be found at the beginning. First, Blair reports his impressions of the Holocaust Memorial Day at his children's school through an indirect rendering in the form of a report:

"I listened to the teacher tell the children about the Holocaust and, of course, about Anne Frank; about her life in hiding, how she was discovered, was taken and died in a concentration camp. He read from her diary".

He also reproduces a passage from Anne Frank's diary in a direct quotation:

"Shortly before she was captured she wrote: 'It's utterly impossible for me to build my life on a foundation of chaos, suffering and death. I see the world being slowly transformed into a wilderness, I hear the approaching thunder that, one day, will destroy us too, I feel the suffering of millions. And yet, when I look up at the sky, I somehow feel that everything will change for the better, that this cruelty too will end, that peace and tranquillity will return once more. In the meantime, I must hold on to my ideals. Perhaps the day will come when I'll be able to realize them'".

With this quote, Blair reinforces his feelings and impressions about Remembrance Day. He then uses them to connect the speech's historical introduction more strongly with the audience. Whether a stronger emotional approach to the history of Europe would have been necessary is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, both quotes show how important the topic is to Blair on a personal level.

However, he also uses references as a way to draw attention to certain aspects. In doing so, he often refers to things that, in his opinion, are not going well in terms of European policy. An example of this is his attitude to the Constitution of the EU:

"And yet I remind you the Constitution was launched under the title of "Bringing Europe closer to its citizens".

Blair uses intertextuality to describe Britain's difficult path into the EU. Thereby, he also directly addresses important actors at that time for him: "Many times—and I did this myself in Birmingham 5 years ago—people have lamented Britain's absence from the founding conference of Europe. Many times, the wooing by Macmillan of France and the "Non" of General de Gaulle have been described".

However, as already shown at the beginning, he also uses them for personal experiences. With the following reference, for example, he presents his experience of the negative referendums in France and the Netherlands. He also shows the audience that despite his work as Prime Minister, he does not sit in an ivory tower but engages with citizens on issues:

"The evening of the French result, I remember being in Italy with friends, and someone saying, in despair at the vote: "what's wrong with them?" meaning those who voted 'no'. I said, I'm afraid the question is: "what's wrong with us?" meaning "us" the collective political leadership of Europe."

In his speech, Blair also refers to his own speeches, such as the one he gave on 23 June 2005, which he summarises to make clear that he had already addressed his demands for reforms last year:

"Most of all, the speech tried to say: face the challenge of change first and then talk about rules to get there. Don't think that talking about the one is a substitute for doing the other."

Blair does not only use intertextual references to portray personal emotions. He also uses them to lash out at political opponents. For example, by addressing Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech in 1988, he shows the Conservatives' aggravated and clearly Euro-critical attitude:

"The fascinating thing is that if, today, you dusted down the Bruges speech of Mrs Thatcher and put it in the mouth of one of the Conservative leaders, it would almost certainly be seen as a sell-out to Europe, so far along the path of hostility to Europe have they moved."

In addition, his account of a conversation with a UKIP MEP pushes this party into a corner. The MP's question, "Why should we pay for the sewers of Hungary?" as one of the UKIP MEPs put it to me", is taken up by Blair in the section on xenophobic Euroscepticism.

He also uses statements from different politicians to underline his statements and attitudes. To accomplish this, as the following two quotations show, he mainly uses indirect rendition and the report form of narration:

“Yet as President Chirac said recently, we in Europe have no clear common policy to define our own needs and interests”.

“France, as recent speeches by both Dominique de Villepin and Nicolas Sarkozy show, is talking up a new agenda for European action”.

Blair's final intertextual reference in this speech is the following:

“Re-reading my speeches about Europe over the years, at the beginning, the task was to put Britain back at the centre of the European debate. We did so but it was never easy”.

With this, he takes the audience back to the beginning of his first term in office and thematically also to Great Britain. It is followed by him taking stock, with which he leads to the appeal to Europe and Great Britain at the end of the speech.

Linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms

It is interesting to note that Blair does not use any specific language, such as military jargon, in his speech. Nevertheless, it can be seen that he certainly changes his language depending on the topic's content. For example, he speaks much more pathetically and figuratively when he talks about the history of Europe and the EU.

In addition, it can be seen that he does concede a certain professional competence to his audience. This is particularly evident in his use of abbreviations, which have a European political background and are not necessarily understood by the general citizen.

If we look at Blair's speech from a grammatical perspective, some aspects are particularly eye-catching.

For example, the pronoun “we” occurs a total of 44 times in the speech, whereas Blair uses the pronoun “they” only 16 times. However, he uses “we” both in a common European sense and in a specifically British context. He uses “they” similarly, but more often in the context of political dissenters. The more frequent use of the pronoun “we” gives the speech a more unifying communal overtone.

Modal verbs are expressions of what the speaker considers possible or even necessary. In this speech, Blair uses the modal verb “will” or “would” disproportionately often, almost 30 times. In contrast, the

modal verbs “can” or “could” are used only nine times and “shall” or “should” only ten times. The frequent use of the modal verbs “will” and “would” gives the speech a strong appeal. This is further emphasised through the verbs used in the present.

Blair also uses various linguistic and rhetorical devices. Here, mainly enumerations, anaphors, di-, tri- and tetracolons, synecdoches, metaphors, rhetorical questions and phrases can be identified.

Blair uses enumerations principally in descriptions. Thus, for example, he applies the following stylistic device to describe the life of Anne Frank:

“about Anne Frank; about her life in hiding, how she was discovered, was taken and died in a concentration camp”.

But Blair also uses a stylistic device to depict the challenges of recent years and future challenges:

“As for Britain in Europe, globalisation, enlargement and the new security threats Europe faces, not only make the case for engagement not isolation more powerful [...]”.

“The irony is that after the shock of enlargement, the crisis of the referendums, the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey and the agreement of the Budget, with a firm process of reform midway through the next financial term [...]”.

In the same way, he also uses enumerations to formulate expectations and demands on the EU:

“[...] a Europe that is open, free, Atlanticist and ready, willing and able to compete”.

“The Services Directive. The Commission De-regulation Initiative. The 2008 Budget Review. University Reform. R&D. Science and Technology”.

Anaphors are repetitions of words in consecutive sentences. Blair often uses these to reinforce his own statements for the audience:

“I know that, today, this is not enough to justify the EU to a different generation living in different times. I know, too, that an appeal to sentiment is an unsatisfactory basis on which to solve the practical, contemporary challenges Europe faces.”

“This is practical scepticism. This is a genuine, intellectual and political concern about Europe as practised; not about Europe as an ideal or a vision or even a set of values. This is not xenophobia, nor devotion to

undiluted national sovereignty, but a worry about Europe's economy being uncompetitive [...].”

“It does so because of the number of countries that are new members or set to join. It does so because the new members are themselves the product of a history that impels them towards a Europe that is open, free, Atlanticist and ready, willing and able to compete.”

With this application, he underlines his demands. In addition, the rhythm of the anaphora makes them much more memorable for the audience.

He also uses this stylistic device to build up a sense of community. For this purpose, he uses the anaphora together with the pronoun “we”:

“We all say we want it. We all know it is important.”

“Gradually we changed that. We achieved enlargement. We took over, with France, the shaping of European defence. We formulated the economic reform programme from Lisbon onwards.”

Dicolons, tricolons and tetracolons are also found in speech. This stylistic device describes two, three, or four clauses that together form a mostly rhythmic speech unit. They resemble the enumeration already mentioned. Blair uses them within the speech to reinforce representations in their description:

“[...] human evil, human suffering and human good.”

The previous quotation, as a tricolon, reinforces Blair's perception of the Holocaust as he recounts it on the occasion of Remembrance Day.

In the following quote, he uses a tetracolon to heighten the impact of his description, adding a certain dramatic quality to it. In doing so, he describes how he is fully committed to British interests without regard for losses:

“So there I was, stuck in Brussels, doing what was manifestly in our country's interest, resisting what would have been a mad alienation of everyone else, not for a good reason but a thoroughly unjustified one; and batting off absurd arguments from our opponents that we should have negotiated [...].”

In the following two quotations, Blair not only uses a tricolon. He supplements it with a climax, an intensification, in his choice of words:

“[...] Central and East Europeans who come to work in our countries are a source of energy, ambition and drive [...].”

“[...] the EU is enlivened by their countries' new influences, ideas and experiences.”

"[...] reflect on Europe: what it came from, what it is and what it should be." With this tricolon, he subliminally picks up the main thread of the speech. He started in history at the beginning of the speech and led the audience through current challenges to essential changes and Britain's role in the future EU. The following tricolon, in contrast, reinforces Blair's call to action for a new EU:

"Get a functioning internal market in place; complete a common EU infrastructure and make energy policy a priority in external relations."

A fascinating aspect of his speech is his use of synecdoche. This stands for the substitution of one term for another to relate them to each other. It turns out that Blair uses them in two ways. On the one hand, he uses synecdoche to avoid having to name specific terms. Thus, "[...] more Europe [...]" stands for the deepening of the EU. But, on the other hand, he also prefers to use the paraphrases "The French and Dutch "Nos" [...]" and "[...] when France and Holland voted no [...]" for the referenda in France and the Netherlands on the Constitutional Treaty.

"So there I was, stuck in Brussels [...]" can be identified as a synecdoche for the European Parliament in Brussels and "[...] Atlanticist [...]" is used here for an EU that is close to NATO or the USA.

However, Blair also uses this stylistic device in a more classical sense. Synecdoches are also used as personifications, as in "[...]a political decision was taken by France and Germany [...]" or "France [...] is talking up a new agenda for European action. Spain [...] is leading the way on the agenda of illegal immigration and organized crime."

Blair also uses the most famous stylistic device in his speech, metaphors.

With the following metaphor, he presents the problematic relationship between Britain and the EU as a disease that needs to be cured:

"[...] an historic opportunity to cure the sickness that has afflicted Britain's relationship with the project of European integration [...]."

However, according to Blair, there must be reforms and changes within the Union for this healing to take place.

Another metaphor is strongly reminiscent of Churchill's rhetoric and is an appeal that the time for a change in Europe has now arrived: "Europe has emerged from its darkened room."

The last metaphor of the speech is also the most visual. With it, Blair formulates a demand for Britain to take on a new role in a new Europe. This demand is strongly reminiscent of his efforts during his first term in office to make Britain a leading country in Europe. At the same time,

however, this metaphor can also be a criticism of the British European policy pursued until the beginning of his term in government:

“[...] the British role was to be the pebble in the shoe; the thing that made others stop and think; but not the one that did the walking.”

Throughout his speech, Blair also uses the stylistic device of rhetorical questions in three places. First, although there are questions in several paragraphs, they are less rhetorical. Instead, they are part of the reporting style in some sections of the speech.

In the following quotation, he uses two rhetorical questions as an exaggerated description of the negotiations on the budget debate. They illustrate the agitated atmosphere between the individual member states:

“What's more, secondly, though the Budget debate was portrayed here as: 'why should Britain pay when others aren't?': the reality was the opposite. Because the overall budget was staying roughly at the same amount, but being re-distributed west to east, the issue was: 'why should others pay and Britain, through the rebate, refuse to pay?’”

He formulates the third rhetorical question in such a way that he can give the actual point he wants to make as a logical answer. The question is rather advanced, which makes his argument seem far more provocative, even if he defuses it in the following paragraph:

“Why has it happened? Of course, the fevered frenzy of parts of the British media doesn't exactly help. I have long since given up trying to conduct a serious debate about Europe in certain quarters.”

The last central question relates to European citizens' perception of the Union and that which they will continue to have of it in the future. Blair uses this question to make a warning appeal for a more citizen-friendly Union:

“People will not buy more Europe as an end in itself. They will ask; why and what for? But answer those questions well and they will buy it as a means to an end they understand.”

In his speech, he uses a variety of different phrases to reinforce his arguments. On the one hand, he uses phrases that reflect his arguments as his opinion, such as: “But I also think that”, “I have no doubt that”, and “I know that”. On the other hand, he uses sentence fragments to underline his arguments, like “For example”, “The best example lies”, “offers a classic study in point”, “because” and “The reason why”. However, Blair also uses filler words that directly imply a more substantial truth and correctness in

his argument: “The fact that”, “But it is worth recalling”, “In truth”, “of course”, “In fact”, “To be frank”, “The reason why”, “But we shouldn't ignore an obvious truth” and “In other words”. It should be noted that with the last phrases listed, he has a strong influence on the effectiveness of his statements. His position as the Prime Minister further strengthens this.

In the last step of this analysis, the speech is examined for possible principles of persuasion, which Robert Cialdini has elaborated in his book “The Principles of Persuasion”.

The principle most often used by Blair is scarcity. It is usually used as a scarcity of goods or time. Blair uses it here by depicting challenges and dangers. This implies a potentially unstable security situation. He also emphasises the fragility of peace that terror could challenge:

“At this moment, however, for Europe to succeed, it needs to reconnect its priorities and pre-occupations with the challenges its people face; demonstrate visibly the 21st century relevance of Europe [...]”

“There is a real issue about the pace of economic reform in Europe; and a real anxiety, which I share, that it's not sharp or quick enough.”

However, he also uses this principle for a political side blow against the Tories:

“The baleful lurch of the Conservative Party into an almost wholly negative view of Europe compounds the problem.”

Moreover, Blair knows how to use scarcity in the same way for the importance of the EU and his reform proposals:

“The world is more interdependent than ever. Policy on trade or climate change or war cannot be conducted alone. Statesmanship is shared or, all too often, futile. Nations are obliged to cooperate. If the EU didn't exist, we would have to invent it.”

“The nature of globalisation; the emergence of China and India; the fact that no European country will in time be large or powerful enough to be a major power on its own [...]”

He also uses the principles simultaneously so that their properties strengthen each other.

“There is something to me, at least, very solemn, moving and right about recalling those days and giving thanks for the idealism and faith shown by Europe's founders. I know that, today, this is not enough to justify the EU to a different generation living in different times. I

know, too, that an appeal to sentiment is an unsatisfactory basis on which to solve the practical, contemporary challenges Europe faces. But I also think that the awesome nature of what the founders did, the depths of the passion and inspiration it took to do it, should invoke in us a little of their spirit; and create in us a suitable humility, when we turn our attention to Europe, in the year 2006, in the era of globalization.”

In this paragraph from his speech, Blair uses both reciprocity and social proof. He conveys what he feels on this subject. His choice of words makes it hard for the audience to disagree with him. Thus, they are far more likely to agree with his opinion.

“So there I was, stuck in Brussels, doing what was manifestly in our country's interest, resisting what would have been a mad alienation of everyone else, not for a good reason but a thoroughly unjustified one; and batting off absurd arguments from our opponents that we should have negotiated, there and then, radical CAP reform—when not merely France but 12 other EU members had said they would not negotiate on that basis and the other 12 weren't interested in pursuing it at the expense of a Budget agreement.”

Here, sympathy and reciprocity are used. The wording and the use of specific stylistic devices evoke more than sympathy with Blair in the audience. In standing up for Britain's interests, he appears in Brussels without regard for possible losses. In other words, he is doing the British people a favour, for which they should be grateful to him.

Otherwise, he plays out the principle of sympathy mainly through his actions. Thus, right at the beginning of the speech, he shows that he is not only the Prime Minister but also a father:

“But the next day, I went to my child's school, to the Holocaust Day Assembly: altogether different, more low key, more simple and there I was, as a parent.”

At another point, he takes the alleged responsibility of European citizens for the failed referendums off their shoulders:

“People aren't anti-Europe. The French and Dutch “Noes” weren't anti-Europe. They were anti a Europe whose relevance and dynamism they felt was in question.”

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Social proof comes through particularly strongly in two places in Blair's speech:

“I am struck by the empathy I feel for Macmillan—in my judgement, a very considerable and perceptive leader. He pushed, as far and further than he thought he could go, to land the prize; but it wasn't quite far enough. Reading the account of it, I can feel the calibration he was making in trying to calculate the balance between the overwhelming need for Britain to be part of Europe and the compromises of policy needed to do it.”

At this point, he uses the principle in connection with his authority as Prime Minister. He describes his feelings to the audience about the idea of Britain joining the EU. Through his choice of words, he influences the audience's view of this issue.

In the second passage, Blair takes a similar approach, using his skill of figurative narration. In this way, he tries to build up a critical attitude towards the development process of the Constitutional Treaty among the audience:

“[...] we locked ourselves in a room at the top of the tower and debated things no ordinary citizen could understand. And yet I remind you the Constitution was launched under the title of “Bringing Europe closer to its citizens.”

At one point in the speech, Blair uses reciprocity:

“Re-reading my speeches about Europe over the years, at the beginning, the task was to put Britain back at the centre of the European debate. We did so but it was never easy.”

He makes it clear that an important goal of his has been fulfilled and that through him, Britain is once again more involved in the EU and its debates. He adds that this has not always been easy. This is precisely the supposed favour which he has done for the British people. He has fulfilled his election promise, even though it was not easy.

Blair also uses the principle of commitment and consistency in three places, independently of others. Through the following request, he suggests unity and a common Europe to the audience:

“We all say we want it. We all know it is important. Our people need it.”

With these last two quotes, he appeals to the other heads of state and also to European citizens. Action and reforms must now take place:

“Europe has a strong common imperative to make our presence, values, and objectives felt. Let us re-invigorate it.”

“Each of us had similar concerns and often a similar agenda but drew different conclusions about Europe's capacity to change. That capacity is now there. Let us capitalise on it.”

Conclusion

One thing that has become clear in my analysis is the argumentative character of the speech. Blair uses stylistic devices and phrases at many points to lend force to his arguments. Therefore, it is surprising that he did not use any particular jargon in his choice of words. This is probably because the audiences at the college can be pretty diverse. Not only many students have been present, but also teachers, acquaintances and politicians.

In some other places, his change between Blair as prime minister and him as a “normal citizen” has also become clearly visible. Especially with the portrayals of his personal feelings, he shows that he can also empathize personally as a prime minister. This includes his role as a father, which he used mainly at the beginning of the speech to form a bond with the audience. Far more people can identify with the role of a father, or more generally, with the role of a parent. This makes him more approachable to the audience.

On other points, he comes across as very conciliatory, mostly when he talks about the failed referenda on the Constitutional Treaty. However, it is essential to note that this reconciliation refers to the people of the countries which voted ‘no’. Furthermore, there is an evident change in his view of the EU in the speech.

He describes the history of the Union in a much more euphoric and pathetic way than the current situation. According to Blair, the present situation is mainly characterised by problems and inefficient practices. He analyses the signs and the general atmosphere in Europe very accurately. The Euroscepticism of the people, both in Great Britain and throughout Europe, makes him sit up and listen. He also explains the Eurosceptical tendencies that are evident on the part of national leaders and politicians. How far this might develop could hardly be foreseen at the time. Nevertheless, it is still a major problem for the EU today.

Even though Blair also takes stock of his European policy in this speech, he practises very limited self-criticism. Aspects that seldom feature in his speech are the Iraq war and the American–European relationship. The period from 2001 onwards especially is hardly discussed. He briefly notes

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that relations have recovered and that the USA is still an important partner of the EU. Nevertheless, this chapter of his premiership is not explored further. This raises the question of why he does not address this further. Blair also mentions the UN and its relationship with the EU only once. At the same time, he formulates demands for a new Union, which, among other things, should be “Atlanticist”. However, it remains open whether this means an intensification of the relationship with the UN or a rapprochement between the EU and the USA.

Blair's speech is probably more an assessment of general European policy than of his own political decisions. Nevertheless, it remains an appeal and a call for a more extensive, more open and reformed EU with a more present Britain.

The Pragmatic European. An Analysis of Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte's EU Discourse

Jan van der Harst

For the 'Narrating EU integration' project we analyse the speech Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte held at the Bertelsmann-Stiftung (Foundation) in Berlin in March 2018¹. It was the first in a series of three EU-related public lectures Rutte presented for an international audience within the space of a year: the other lectures took place at the European Parliament in Strasbourg in June 2018² and the University of Zürich in February 2019 (Churchill Lecture³). This sequence within such a short time span was remarkable, because in the period before 2018 Rutte had not profiled himself with any important public statements on Europe, either at home or abroad. But this changed all of a sudden in 2018 and 2019. Some observers speculated that Rutte was doing this because of his ambition to succeed Donald Tusk as president of the European Council, a position which had become available exactly during this period⁴. According to this view, Rutte needed to present himself to the European public in order to demonstrate who he was and how he thought about pressing European issues. However, Rutte himself always denied his interest in a European position, saying that he preferred to stay in The Hague as prime minister of the third government coalition named after him⁵. Rutte had led the

1 "Underpromise and overdeliver: fulfilling the promise of Europe", Bertelsmann-Stiftung, Berlin, 2 March 2018.

2 "A deal is a deal: a Union of rules in an unruly world", European Parliament, Strasbourg, 13 June 2018.

3 Named after the famous "United States of Europe" lecture held by Sir Winston Churchill in Zürich on 19 September 1946. Rutte's speech in 2019 was entitled: "The EU: from the power of principles towards principles and power", University of Zürich, 13 February 2019.

4 Donald Tusk was president of the European Council from 2014 till 2019 and was succeeded by the Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel.

5 The Rutte I cabinet (2010–2012) was a coalition of the VVD (conservative liberals) and CDA (Christian democrats) with parliamentary support from the PVV (right-wing populists); Rutte II (2012–2017) was supported by the VVD and PvdA (social democrats); and Rutte III (2017–2021) by the VVD, CDA, D66 (social liberals) and

country for almost a decade, since October 2010, but he strongly felt that his political work in the Netherlands was not finished yet⁶.

The main reason for his decision to deliver the three speeches—starting with the Berlin lecture—was a desire to communicate the Dutch view on the state of the European Union to a foreign audience. For a long time, the Dutch EU position has been perceived as harsh and inflexible, especially as far as financial and budgetary issues are concerned, which is illustrated most visibly by The Hague's fierce insistence on respect for the rules of the Stability and Growth pact. Ever since the introduction of the euro, Southern European countries such as Italy, Portugal and Greece have felt offended by the unilateral emphasis the Dutch government and other 'frugal' governments have placed on the need for economic reform, austerity policies and budget reductions. With his speeches, Rutte apparently wanted to convey his deeper motivations to a European-wide public⁷. More in particular, he presented his views as part of the Dutch government's efforts to make 'effective coalitions' with other countries⁸.

This was deemed all the more necessary because of a fundamental change in the European context during the preceding years. The Brexit decision of June 2016 had confronted the Netherlands with a new reality. Apart from the expected negative economic consequences for the Dutch economy, Rutte came to realise that Brexit took away the possibility of him hiding comfortably behind the Netherlands' big British ally in heated European Council discussions on issues like membership fees, free trade arrangements, competition rules, the Atlantic dimension of European security, etc. With the British out of the EU, there was much more need for the Netherlands to show what it stood for and to try and convince its partners of the validity and reasonableness of the Dutch point of view⁹.

Shortly before holding his international speeches, Rutte had managed to build up credibility among most of his European colleagues because of his active role in concluding the refugee deal with Turkey in March 2016,

CU (Christian democrats). In January 2022 Rutte IV was inaugurated, consisting of the same political parties as Rutte III.

6 Petra de Koning, *Mark Rutte*, Leiden: Uitgeverij Brooklyn, 2020, pp. 110–113.

7 Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harst, "Hij is erover gaan *denken*. Premier Mark Rutte en de Europese Unie tijdens Rutte III", in: Jan Schinkelshoek and Gerrit Voerman (eds.), *Niet stoffig toch? Terugblik op het kabinet-Rutte III*, Den Haag: Montesquieu-reeks no. 16, 2021, pp. 97–98.

8 "Rutte wil met Europa-rede meer steun krijgen", in *Leeuwarder Courant*, 21 February 2018.

9 Harryvan and Van der Harst, "Hij is erover gaan *denken*", pp. 96–97.

during the Dutch presidency of the European Council. Despite serious doubts about its legal validity, the so-called ‘return arrangement’ succeeded in reducing the number of migrants and refugees coming to Europe. The other major actor in realising the Turkey deal from the European side was Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, confirming the good relationship Merkel and Rutte had built up during their long periods in government¹⁰. Germany and the Netherlands worked together on many issues and the personal bond between Merkel and Rutte was the personification of this warm cooperation. Another reason for Rutte’s improved standing in the European Council was his impressive record of winning national elections and keeping Eurosceptical populist parties from taking up government positions¹¹. Against this background and helped by his seniority and experience in the European Council—after Viktor Orbán he is the longest serving prime minister in the EU—, Rutte was able to feel confident about bringing his views into the open in the speeches he held in 2018 and 2019.

Rhetorica of Aristotle

How can we relate this to Rutte’s use of discourse and, more in particular, his rhetorical qualities? What kind of public performer is he? First of all, we should note that Rutte is generally known as an excellent debater. What stands out in political debates is his sense of timing: he is able to make his interventions quickly and convincingly and he punctuates his arguments with the use of data and numbers. Rutte makes impression and sometimes causes confusion by displaying abundant factual knowledge—or semi-factual knowledge presented as factual. He is one of the best debaters in the national political arena, and also in Europe he is known as an active and influential contributor to the discussions in the European Council. From a very young age, Rutte has been an admirer of the debating culture in the British Lower House, and during his career he tried to apply the lessons learnt from there to his own presentations¹².

10 Mehreen Khan, “Rutte and the ‘Merkelisation’ of Dutch politics. The political parallels between the pair are striking”, in *Financial Times*, 10 October 2018.

11 Naomi O’Leary, “Mark Rutte, North’s quiet rebel”, *Politico*, 8 June 2018; Benjamin Dodman, “Dutch PM Mark Rutte, the thrifty Europhile holding Europe hostage”, in *France24.com*, 20 July 2020.

12 Martijn van der Kooij and Dirk van Harten, *Mark Rutte. Alleen voor de politiek*, Arnhem, Terra Lannoo, 2010, pp. 36–37.

However, debating is a different skill than holding lectures and giving public presentations. At first glance, he excels in this latter area of rhetorical ability too. In the Netherlands, Rutte is known for giving lengthy presentations from memory, for example during conferences of his own political party, the liberal conservative VVD, where he tends to speak freely without checking his notes. But let us try to delve a bit deeper into this matter.

In his treatise *Retorica* the Greek philosopher Aristotle mentions three tools a speaker has at their disposal to convince or persuade their public: ethos, logos and pathos. *Ethos* refers to the individual qualities of the person in question, both outwards (How does he/she look?) and inwards (Is he/she a reliable person?). Trusting the speaker makes the audience more willing to accept their point of view. *Pathos* refers to the capacity of the speaker to stir up emotions in order to influence the judgement of the audience. And, thirdly, the instrument of *logos* concerns the speaker's ability to convince the public on the basis of arguments, with an important role for logic and ratio. Logical reasoning plays an important role if a speaker wants to prove something. We could say that where pathos makes an appeal to the heart, logos appeals to the head.

How does this apply to Rutte? In Rutte's case—also if we look at his speech for the Bertelsmann-Stiftung (to which we will come back later)—it comes out that the elements of ethos and particularly logos are better represented than pathos. The information presented here is partly borrowed from the work of the Dutch philosopher Marijn Moerman, a specialist in rhetorical skills who has done research on Rutte¹³.

Firstly, *ethos*, the means of persuasion grounded in the speaker's credibility and authority. The Dutch prime minister has a certain charm and charisma and his public presentations radiate qualities such as craftsmanship and professionalism. Rutte is a business-like person, averse to trivialities, and he generally masters the topics he is talking about. What further helps is his presentable appearance. Rutte is tall—much taller than most of his colleagues in the European Council—he has an average face with regular features, dark hair and wears light-rimmed glasses. He is not equipped with distracting features such as protruding ears or a conspicuous haircut, which could harm his dignity. Rutte is generally well-dressed and has white teeth. This is seen as an important attribute. A specialist in the study

13 Moerman's assessment of Rutte's rhetorical skills has been reflected in Sheila Sitalsing, *Mark. Portret van een premier*, Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2016, pp. 127–132.

of political marketing once pointed out: ‘White teeth can make you win elections’¹⁴.

What particularly belongs to ethos is the question: Is he a reliable person? Is he ‘credible’, can he be trusted? What helps here is Rutte’s domestic image of a person who lives a sober life and is averse to arrogance, pomposity and outward appearances. Many Dutch people trust the prime minister for being modest and devoted to the public cause, although they often criticise his slick way of manoeuvring in times of controversy and crisis. Rutte’s nickname in the Netherlands is Mr Teflon: where dirt or cooking fat does not stick to an authentic Teflon frying pan, so do problems not stick to Rutte. The prime minister seems untouchable; he is a master in avoiding the blame for political trouble, which is partly an asset—it has contributed to Rutte’s successes and long period in office—but it could also be considered a liability because people may wonder: is our prime minister not too much of a smooth operator?

Connected to this, some observers doubt Rutte’s trustworthiness and his respect for principles, which also seems to be the case in the European arena. European Council expert Peter Ludlow has referred to this several times in his *European Council Studies*¹⁵. Ludlow writes about Rutte’s ‘split personality’—you never know whether the ‘good one or the bad one’ will turn up at summit meetings¹⁶. A potential problem with respect to ethos is that Rutte does not shy away from directly confronting his political opponents, which is sometimes perceived as rude behaviour. In international comparisons, Dutch people are often portrayed as being more prone to being direct and blunt—tactfulness is not seen as their most conspicuous national character trait. Colleagues in the European Council sometimes feel highly offended, for example, when Rutte calls the EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania a ‘big mistake’—in the presence of the prime ministers concerned—or when he ostentatiously brings a Chopin biography to the negotiations on the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework, in order to show that he finds the whole event a complete waste of time¹⁷.

¹⁴ Sitalsing, *Mark*, pp. 128–129.

¹⁵ See, for example, Peter Ludlow, “Pre-summit briefings & European Council notes 2020/04-05”, *European Council Studies*, Louvain: Leuven University Press, 2020, pp. 17, 18 and 53.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁷ Stéphane Alonso and Clara van de Wiel, “Rutte in Europa. Naar Brussel in een hoody”, in *NRC Handelsblad*, 3–4 October 2020.

Wrapping up these observations, we could conclude that with regard to ethos (or ethical appeal) the verdict is not entirely clear: Rutte combines positive elements with distinctly negative ones.

Then *logos*, which refers to persuasion grounded in patterns of reasoning and cognitive engagement. We could be brief on this element of the *Retorica*. In his speeches, Rutte concentrates on the use of arguments and logical reasoning, buttressed by facts and statistics. He gives the impression of being a rational person and aims to persuade his public with argumentative deliberations. And most times he successfully manages to do so. Therefore, speech analysts have concluded that the logos dimension is sufficiently represented in the rhetorical toolbox of the Dutch prime minister¹⁸.

It should be added that this article's use of logos is necessarily biased. Logos, as posited here, suggests rationality and thus a non-subjective, reliable and generally valid way of communicating. This is, of course, not always realistic because such rationality could also be perceived as pure rhetorical strategy with a less reliable connotation, provoking suspicions among the audience. We always have to 'navigate uncertainties regarding the extent to which people actually mean their words'¹⁹. This also affects the area of ethos. Whether an argument is seen as valid and/or a speaker is perceived as sincere highly depends on the (political) culture and context we start from, in Rutte's (and this author's) case one impregnated with pragmatism, Protestantism/Calvinism, etc. In other words, what counts as an appropriate ethos varies according to the social situation and changes over time²⁰. This should be taken into consideration when reading the speech's analysis.

The third *Retorica* element, *pathos*, is considered Rutte's weak spot. The prime minister has difficulty when it comes to voicing the public's emotions: giving people a good feeling, confirming sentiments of joy or sadness, enchanting the audience. These are the situations where Rutte is not at his best. He is much more at ease when he has to announce cabinet measures or sell policies, even controversial ones. But speaking with pathos is another matter. This is particularly important when norms and values are at stake, but also in times of national tragedies, which stir up a lot of emotion. In technical–physical terms we could say that Rutte speaks

18 Sitalsing, *Mark*, p. 129.

19 Liesbeth Korthals Altes, *Ethos and narrative interpretation. The negotiation of values in fiction*, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2014, p. viii.

20 Korthals Altes, *Ethos and narrative interpretation*, p. viii.

from the head rather than from the belly. When a person speaks from the belly, their breathing is low and it is easier to express emotions. But Rutte's resonance is mostly in the head and throat, a bit in the chest and hardly in the belly. A bit jokingly one could argue that the Dutch prime minister is a talking head²¹.

The lack of pathos also manifests itself in his aversion to developing a vision beyond the current horizon on policy issues he really believes in. Famous Rutte quotes are: 'In politics, a vision is like an elephant who blocks the view' and—even more dismissive—'if you are looking for vision, you [had] better visit an optician'. Rutte wants to be known as a skilful manager, not as a shepherd who walks his flock towards new lands.²²

Rutte's lecture for the Bertelsmann-Stiftung in Berlin, March 2018

How does this come back in the speech Rutte gave for the Bertelsmann-Stiftung in Berlin in 2018? We will first take a look at the organisational background to the speech and then consider how the lecture and discourse are constructed²³. In the next section, we analyse the speech's reception in the Netherlands and abroad and in the Conclusion we apply the above-mentioned elements of Retorica to Rutte's presentation in Berlin.

In terms of organisational context, the Bertelsmann-Stiftung is a reputed international non-profit think tank with several offices, one in Berlin, and it is active in the area of international policy and trans-Atlantic relations. At the time of Rutte's speech, the Stiftung was led by a Dutchman, Aart Jan de Geus, a former minister in the Netherlands and a former colleague of Rutte's. Although they belong to different political parties, their acquaintance and shared experiences must have made it easy to organise the lecture. The audience consisted of representatives of the business community, the political arena, civil society and the media, mostly German. The speech lasted for 43 minutes, and it was preceded by an introduction by

21 Sitalsing, *Mark*, pp. 129–130.

22 Victor Broers, "Mark Rutte: a lost manager in times that require real leadership", *Aspenia online*, 28 July 2020.

23 The information supplied in this section is derived from: "Underpromise and overdeliver: fulfilling the promise of Europe", Speech by Prime Minister Mark Rutte at the Bertelsmann-Stiftung, Berlin, 2 March 2018, <https://www.government.nl/documents/speeches/2018/03/02/speech-by-the-prime-minister-of-the-netherlands-mark-rutte-at-the-bertelsmann-stiftung-berlin>, accessed 4 May 2021.

the Stiftung's chairman De Geus and followed by a Q&A session with the audience. The speech is in English. Rutte speaks a bit of German, but he prefers to use the English language for international occurrences like this one. The whole event can still be watched on YouTube²⁴.

How is the speech constructed? Rutte starts his presentation with a positive welcoming note and by charming his audience: 'You had a choice today. You could have listened to a speech in the UK [held on the same day by British Prime Minister Theresa May] about a future without Europe. Or a speech in Berlin by someone who believes in Europe and wants to talk about the best way to move forward with Europe. I am glad you're here'. Then Rutte quickly comes to the core question: how does the Dutch prime minister see the European Union? 'As a community of values and a partnership of 27 states that make each other stronger when a joint approach is needed, and keep to the agreements they make'. He immediately adds what he does *not* want: 'the EU should not be an unstoppable train speeding towards federalism'. Ever closer cooperation should not be the aim. Instead, Europe should focus on 'turning high ideals into practical action'.

Later in his speech, Rutte indicates three guiding principles for the future of the EU:

1. The EU needs to deliver on its basic promises: prosperity, security and stability—not in words, but in action.
2. It begins and ends with the member states. Brussels serves the member states, not the other way around.
3. A deal is a deal. All of the compromises we have to make apply to everyone and in full. You can't just pick out the ones that are easy to sell back home. Solidarity demands responsibility.

The first principle concerns the EU's fulfilment of its basic promises. The title he gave to his Berlin speech is characteristic of Rutte's analysis of the European Union: 'Underpromise and overdeliver'. Rutte finds that Europe tends to make too many promises she is not able to keep. In his view, this is harmful for the reputation of the EU. It also alienates her from the public, stimulating the spread of Euroscepticism in the member states. To quote Rutte: 'Lofty visions do not create jobs or security. Nor does shouting from the ends of the political spectrum.' Here he voices

24 <https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=youtube+rutte+bertelsmann+March+2018&docid=608000944101853431&mid=4EB6B61A63A84A66F6EB4EB6B61A63A84A66F6EB&view=detail&FORM=VIRE>, accessed 4 May 2021.

simultaneous criticism of two opposite groups in the EU: the integrationist idealists with their 'visions' and the Eurosceptical populists with their 'shouting'. Implicitly, Rutte reserves a position in the middle for himself and his country, in the more pragmatic, 'realistic' centre.

Rutte's second guiding principle, which is mentioned in the Berlin speech, is that Brussels should serve the member states, not the other way around. Rutte argues that the EU is able to fulfil its promises only if the individual member states are strong enough to maintain their own identity. He praises the individuality of the member states, because 'it is the seedbed of new ideas, innovation and creativity'. Europe has become prosperous 'not by compensating for each other's weaknesses', but 'by pulling our assets and making each other stronger'. Rutte warns: 'If we lift national failures to the collective level, we will create a giant with feet of clay, in danger of toppling over'. To illustrate this danger he uses a metaphor: 'the fact that the Dutch national football team won't be competing at the next World Cup [in the summer of 2018] is not a reason to send a European team in 2022. But I guarantee you: The Netherlands is going to get there on its own'. This is one of the very few moments that the speech provokes a bit of laughter from the audience.

Then, the third guiding principle: 'a deal is a deal'. Rutte argues that the member states should stick to the agreements made in the EU, because 'this has given us so much' in the past. However, Rutte also observes that there is an increasing tendency on the member state level to 'believe that agreements can be set aside when things aren't going so well at home'. The Dutch prime minister implicitly points his finger here at both the Southern European member states for failing to respect the rules for financial stability and at Eastern Europe for not doing enough to fight corruption and respect the rule of law. He warns: Europe is not a 'menu from which you can choose what you like and refuse what you don't like.' We need to rely on 'yes' really meaning 'yes', Rutte adds. Here, he sees an important role for the European institutions. The Commission and the Court of Justice are key actors in guaranteeing a level playing field and in checking and enforcing compliance with agreements.

The rest of his speech covers nine more detailed proposals on issues where the EU should be able to book results and achieve more prosperity, stability and security, as well as a strong rule of law. They range from completing the single market to a common asylum system and an increased reduction of CO2 emissions. After the nine proposals, he comes to his conclusion.

Here he starts by saying that he is an optimist and that he knows from experience that in the EU 'we always manage, together, to find a way for-

ward'. The achievements made in the past rest on a foundation of 'shared values, mutual trust and a willingness to compromise', which has 'made us stronger as individual member states and as a collective'. However, Rutte continues by stating that the process is fragile and not self-evident. He warns that public sentiment towards the EU is vulnerable and that Brexit shows that the EU is not an irreversible certainty. Complaining about the rise of extremist parties does not help, in his view. He adds that centrist parties in the member states have a 'great responsibility to prove that cooperation pays and creates added value'. Because, 'if we don't deliver on that basic promise of the EU, people will start believing the false promises and pipe dreams of the political extremes'; which leads us to the final words of the speech: 'Only hard work, *Schritt für Schritt*, produces results that benefit people in their daily lives. If we do that, and keep encouraging and calling each other to account, I have no doubt that we [will] fulfil the basic promise of Europe'.

The terms 'promise' and 'basic promise' occur many times in Rutte's speech, meaning that member states should work together to bring each other to a higher level of prosperity, security and stability. This should be done through 'practical action' and by 'working towards a more perfect Union, not an ever closer one'.

Domestic and foreign reception

Rutte's Berlin speech received substantial coverage in the national press²⁵. Dutch newspapers praised the prime minister's initiative and the effort he had made to explain the Dutch government's view on Europe to a wider audience. Until then, Rutte had not really attracted attention by presenting his views on European integration and the European Union. For years, he had been known as somebody with little affection for Europe. In his first cabinet (2010–2012), relying on parliamentary support from the Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders, he had proved to be more of a sceptic than an adherent of the EU. Rutte appreciated the economic benefits of cooperation, but considered further European entanglement—of whatever sort—undesirable. For a long time, his focus tended to be on domestic

25 See, for example: "Rutte presenteert de EU een nuchtere Nederlandse visie", *De Volkskrant*, 2 March 2018; "Rutte zet EU-visie uiteen in Berlijn", *De Telegraaf*, 2 March 2018; 'Stiekem toch een visie van Rutte: pragmatisch pro-EU', *NRC Handelsblad*, 2 March 2018; 'Toespraak Rutte: "Naar een steeds perfectere EU"', *EWMagazine*, 7 March 2018.

rather than external policy issues²⁶. However, a sudden transformation seemed to be manifesting itself in the years 2018 and 2019. When Rutte decided to hold his three international speeches on Europe (in Berlin, Strasbourg and Zürich), one observer remarked ironically: Rutte has not started to think *differently* about Europe, he has started to *think* about Europe²⁷.

This may be somewhat exaggerated, because it could very well be argued that by 2018 he had indeed begun to think *differently* about Europe, in that some of his former reservations had disappeared. Dutch commentators noticed that in Berlin Rutte spoke of the EU as a community of values and as a promoter of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms for the first time. They observed that his economic perspective was still dominant, but that the prime minister also and emphatically included references to security, migration and the environment. And where in the past Rutte had only very reluctantly spoken about cross-border togetherness, he now openly stated that he was ‘more aware than ever of the importance of unity’. At the same time, it was clear that the economic benefits of integration remained crucial and that member states should keep observing the European laws and regulations, particularly in areas of public expenditure: ‘European funds are a last resort, not first-aid’. Moreover, ‘marching towards a federal system’ was not on the Dutch government’s agenda, according to Rutte. The (perceived) national interest was never far from the prime minister’s thoughts. The general conclusion therefore was that the ‘picture drawn of a convert declaring his love for Europe was exaggerated’²⁸.

This was also—and even more so—the tenor of the comments in the German media, the country where the speech was held. There, the emphasis was clearly put on Rutte’s reluctance to embrace the need for expanding integration, rather than on his European confessions, as is shown by the headlines ‘Premier Rutte gegen mächtigere EU’ (Prime Minister Rutte against a more powerful EU)²⁹, ‘Brussel dient die Mitgliedstaaten’ (Brussels serves the member states)³⁰, and ‘Für Rutte ist Europa vor allem ein

26 Harryvan and Van der Harst, “Hij is erover gaan *denken*”, pp. 95–96.

27 De Koning, *Mark Rutte*, p. 104; Harryvan and Van der Harst, “Hij is erover gaan *denken*”, p. 96.

28 Femke van Esch, “Tussen beleefdheidsbezoek en liefdesverklaring: De ontwikkeling van de Europese visie van Mark Rutte”, Den Haag: Montesquieu Instituut, 25 June 2018.

29 *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2 March 2018.

30 *Der Tagesspiegel*, 2 March 2018.

“Deal” (For Rutte Europe is primarily a “deal”)³¹. Also in the Q&A session immediately following Rutte’s speech, most of the comments concerned the prime minister’s lack of European enthusiasm and his reluctance to add supranational solutions to his diagnosis of existing problems. *Handelsblatt* was one of the few voices which diverged from this frame by focusing on the Dutch striving for more ambitious European climate goals³².

This survey of reactions should not give the impression of widespread publicity. All in all, German media attention for Rutte’s Berlin lecture was modest. British prime minister May’s speech on the same day about the UK’s future outside the EU received wider coverage³³.

The same was true for other EU countries, where the press reports were also fairly limited. In that sense, we could say that Rutte failed to realise the aim he had set himself initially, namely to convey the Dutch point of view to a wide international audience and to disseminate the government’s ambitions to make effective coalitions with other countries. All in all, the speech’s impact was more domestic than European: what Rutte *did* achieve was a better appreciation of his European ideas and priorities in his home country, where the speech was generally well received.

Conclusion

Prime Minister Rutte’s speech in Berlin in March 2018 is a typical Rutte product; we could even say a typical Dutch product. The tone is predominantly pragmatic and business-like. The well-known and widely read French author Michel Houellebecq once wrote, somewhat maliciously, that ‘Holland isn’t a country, it’s a business at best’³⁴. He seems to imply that the Dutch are smart salesmen, but rather deficient in contemplating non-material issues and thinking in terms of abstractions. In his speech, Rutte does not seem to make much effort to refute Houellebecq’s allegation, nor does he sketch visions or wide horizons; the emphasis is on

31 *NTV Politik*, 2 March 2018.

32 “Niederländischer Ministerpräsident für schärferes EU-Klimaziel”, 2 March 2018.

33 “Rutte houdt Europa-lezing bij Bertelsmann Stiftung in Berlijn”, *Duitsland Instituut*, *Duitslandweb*, 2 March 2018.

34 Quoted from: Michel Houellebecq, *Serotonin: A Novel*, Straus and Giroux, New York: Farrar, 2019.

results to be booked, deals to be respected and promises to be fulfilled³⁵. Rutte shows himself to be particularly interested in the process: governing as the art of accommodating and finding solutions. For him, Europe is important, but not in an emotional way, and there are limits to the powers to be given to Brussels³⁶.

If we go back to Aristotle's *Retorica*, Rutte's speech is strong on the notion of *logos*, the use of arguments and logical reasoning. The Dutch prime minister wants to be seen as a rational person, who has craftily constructed a well-structured speech, which is easy to follow and full of concrete proposals, priorities and recommendations. However, the speech is much weaker in terms of *pathos*: looking at the YouTube video registration of the lecture confirms the earlier observation that Rutte speaks from the head, rather than from the belly. Rutte's resonance is more in the throat than in the chest, which makes it difficult for him to excite emotions, voice the public's feelings or enchant the audience. This is also caused by his sterile way of ordering the speech—three guiding principles, nine proposals, etc.—and by his lack of gestures in support of his arguments.

A mitigating circumstance is that Rutte did not speak in his native language. Although his command of English is good, he is not as comfortable and confident as when he gives a presentation in his native Dutch. At the Bertelsmann-Stiftung, he has eye-contact with the audience, but he sticks literally to the prepared text, not allowing himself deviations or elaborations. This certainly differs from the way he addresses his public in the Netherlands, with generally more humour and witticism, with a freer style of speaking and a looser form of argumentation.

For a long time, this way of behaving and presenting himself served him well, especially on the domestic level. Rutte's popularity in the country seemed unabated and even enhanced during the COVID-19 crisis, which was illustrated by another victory for his party, the VVD, in the national elections of March 2021. However, in politics, reputations are fragile and can easily be broken. Immediately after the elections, during the start of the formation of a new government, Rutte got himself into trouble by not publicly speaking the truth about his political intentions and by trying to hold back and cover up important information. It was not the first time Rutte had been blamed for doing this and it brought back doubts about

35 This lack of scholarly depth and visionary thinking in Rutte's oral presentations is also reflected in: Mathieu Segers, "Kroniek van een jeune premier", in *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 13 January 2021.

36 Harry van and Van der Harst, "Hij is erover gaan *denken*", p. 102.

Jan van der Harst

his integrity and ethical appeal. Old suspicions resurfaced, such as: Is this prime minister reliable, is he not too much of a Mr Teflon, a smooth operator who survives crises, but hides the truth at critical moments? The uproar caused by it taught an important lesson: Lack of pathos may be problematic for Rutte's credibility, but it is a faltering ethos that could really bring him down.

“Pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique”.¹
President Macron’s “New European Initiative” Speech at
Sorbonne University, 26 September 2017²

Sabine Russ-Sattar

1. *Introduction*

“Emmanuel Macron— saviour of Europe?” —with this cover of its June 2017 edition, the world-renowned magazine *The Economist* greeted the election of the youngest ever French President in June 2017. Astonishingly, Macron had succeeded in his ascent to power without the support of the major French parties, relying on his own *En marche* movement, which he had founded only one year earlier. Even more stunning was the fact that he had done so while making a strong sovereign Europe the core of its political message, braving the rising wave of anti-EU sentiment in France and Europe.

Indeed, at the time, the European project was undergoing its worst political turmoil since its beginnings. Even though the EU had survived the Great Recession of 2008 and the eurozone crisis, its effects were still hurting Europe, especially the Southern European economies, and fuelling political divisions between the richer countries of the North and the poorer ones of the South. In addition to that, the refugee crisis of 2015 had demonstrated the lack of solidarity and coordination in the EU member states’ migration policies, a key issue shaping Europe’s future. For almost half a century, the European integration project had been synonymous with the promise of prosperity and freedom. It seemed to have reached its apogee in the years following the historical watershed moment of 1989,

1 Elysée, *Discours d'Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique*, 26 September 2017, <https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-795-fr.pdf>, accessed 15 July 2021. English version: Présidence de la République. Service de Presse, Initiative for Europe speech by Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic, Paris 26 September 2017, <https://www.dfa.ie/media/English-version-transcript--Initiative-for-Europe--Speech-by-the-President-of-the-French-Republic.pdf>, accessed 15 July 2021. In the following chapter, all direct citations of this speech use this source.

2 I am grateful to Andrew L. Yarrow for his insightful comments on this chapter.

when it attracted ten new members from Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's dissolution and saw its territory expand from Lisbon to Tallinn.

Since then, it had dramatically lost its lustre. In 2005, the integrationist drive was put on hold when a majority voted 'no' to establishing a Constitution for Europe in referendums in France and the Netherlands. In the second decade of the 21st century, crisis-driven economic insecurity eroded trust in national and European institutions and helped the success of anti-EU parties and movements all over Europe³. The integration process appeared to have dangerously shifted into reverse. The governments of the two largest Eastern member states turned to an illiberal form of governance (Hungary since 2010, Poland since 2015), thus violating the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership and shattering the normative basis of the community. The most violent blow came in 2016, when the British—with a slim majority—voted to leave the EU on 23 June. At the same time, in the Netherlands, one of the six founding members of the European Community, the Dutch right-wing nationalist Geert Wilders, a staunch voice for a referendum on 'Nexit', was leading in the opinion polls and his victory in the next national elections in spring 2017 seemed within reach⁴—a scenario that didn't happen in the end but showed the imminent risk of European disintegration⁵.

This crisis opened up a window of opportunity for redirecting the process of European integration, resulting in "two broad trajectories, the first of which leads to the fragmentation and weakening of the EU (the centrifugal trajectory); and the second, which leads to greater EU cooperation, and the strengthening of the European integration process (the centripetal trajectory)"⁶. Against the backdrop of the anti-EU chorus of

3 Yann Algan et al., "The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism", in *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Fall 2017, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., pp. 309–382, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/90019460>, accessed 15 July 2021.

4 Marton Dunai, "Dutch anti-immigrant party chief urges 'Nexit' referendum for Netherlands", in Reuters, 24 June 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/cnews-us-britain-eu-outers-idCAKCN0ZA2AB>, accessed 15 July 2021.

5 At this point in time, public opinion in the EU showed clear "E.U. fatigue". See James McAuley, "It is not just Britain: A new poll shows Europeans elsewhere are tired of the E.U.", in *The Washington Post*, 7 July 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/07/beyond-britain-dissatisfaction-with-e-u-spreads/>, accessed 15 July 2021.

6 Michelle Cini, Amy Verdun, "The Implications of Brexit for the Future of Europe", in Benjamin Martill, Uta Staiger (eds.), *Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe*, London, UCL Press, 2018, pp. 63–71.

the new nationalist movements⁷, Emmanuel Macron took up the mantle of the second choice, arguing for a renewed ambition for Europe. As an economy minister under President Hollande, Macron expressed his view that Brexit constituted as much a window of opportunity as a crisis⁸. On 27 September 2017, after his conquest of the Elysée in May, President Macron presented his political vision for 'A New Initiative for Europe' at the Sorbonne. He challenged his compatriots and his European peers, in particular Germany and Chancellor Merkel, whom he addressed explicitly, to get rid of taboos that were hindering further European integration, like revising treaties (a general taboo for the European elite), subsidies for farmers (a French taboo) or financial transfers among member states (a German taboo). Macron did so by raising the banner of securing 'European sovereignty'. This novel and audacious concept constitutes Macron's major innovative contribution to the European narrative.

The following chapter will elaborate on this concept as it is key to understanding Macron's political vision and reform proposals. It forms the core of Macron's strategic narrative contained in the Sorbonne speech⁹. After introducing the reader briefly to Macron's political biography and placing the speech in its institutional and political context, I will analyse the Sorbonne speech by deconstructing its rhetoric and concepts and locating its arguments in the context of France's European policy and the European debate on integration. Indeed, the Sorbonne speech comprises two main messages, and accordingly plays with different rhetorical registers. First, it expresses Macron's outspoken intention to renew the European narrative in the face of waning support for the European integration project, operated through the eloquent construction of a genuine European civilisation. Second, Macron urgently calls for action in view of a dramatically chang-

7 At the beginning of 2017, there was even a meeting of leaders of far right anti-EU parties, called by Marine le Pen, Macron's far right rival for the French Presidency. Other meetings, headed by the Italian right-wing leader Salvini, would follow. See Nicola Swanson, "Marine Le Pen leads gathering of EU far-right leaders in Koblenz", in *The Guardian*, 21 January 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/21/marine-le-pen-leads-gathering-of-eu-far-right-leaders-in-koblenz>, accessed 15 July 2017.

8 "My view is that we should propose a new, very bold and visionary scheme for the E.U. and the Eurozone", Economy Minister Macron, cited in "French Economy Minister Warns Brexit Vote Could Splinter E.U.", in *Time*, 20 June 2016, <https://time.com/4374548/brexit-eu-referendum-emmanuel-macron/>

9 For the analytical approach of this chapter, see Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, Laura Roselle, *Strategic narratives. Communication Power and the New World Order*, New York: Routledge 2014.

ing geostrategic environment and global challenges like climate change and migration. Therefore, Macron pleads for multi-speed integration and the opening-up of cooperation beyond the institutional frame of EU membership, with the aim of safeguarding European sovereignty.

2. Emmanuel Macron and his quest for leadership in France and Europe

2.1. Becoming Europe's "re-founding son"¹⁰: the career of Emmanuel Macron

Born in 1977, Emmanuel Macron is the first President of the "Erasmus Generation". In contrast to the European founding fathers, like Robert Schuman, whose commitment to European integration had its roots in the traumatic experience of war, he came of age in the post-Maastricht era of free movement to become one of Europe's 're-founding sons'¹¹.

Having grown-up in the northern French town of Amiens in a family of medical doctors, Emmanuel Macron went to some of the most prestigious French schools and colleges. His academic education corresponds to a common pattern to be found in the recruitment of the administrative and political elite of the French Fifth Republic, which is generally seen as a cause of its technocratic features. After going through the two years of prep-class at the Lycée Henri IV in Paris, Macron studied international relations, public administration and philosophy. During this time, he also worked for two years as an editorial assistant to the philosopher Paul Ricœur. In the view of his biographer François Dosse, some of Ricœur's philosophical concepts marked the future President's political vision¹². In Dosse's view, it is above all the concept of 'consensus dissensus', the idea that is possible to gain creative energy and strength out of the tension between opposing ideas, that shaped Macron's thinking¹³. By contrast, other commentators describe Macron's approach to be at best non-dogmatic and pragmatic, or at worst ambiguous on purpose and opportunistic¹⁴.

10 Sandro Gozi, *Generation Erasmus. Ils sont déjà au pouvoir*, Paris: Plon, 2016.

11 Ibid.

12 François Dosse, *Le Philosophe et le Président*, Paris: Stock 2017. Ricœur's influence has also been discussed by Olivier Duhamel, "Inside Macron's Mind: A Tint of Ricœur", in Blog *Institut Montaigne*, <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/inside-macrons-mind-tint-paul-ricoeur>, accessed on 15 July 2021.

13 François Dosse, *Le Philosophe et le Président*, op. cit.

14 As an example, see Marc Endewald, *L'ambigu Monsieur Macron*, Paris: Flammarion, 2015.

In 2001, Macron got his master's degree in philosophy from the University of Paris-Nanterre, and a diploma from the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques* (known as "*Science-po*"), one of France's *Grandes Écoles*, an elite type of university in the French higher education system. Subsequently, Macron succeeded in the highly selective admission contest for the *École Nationale D'Administration* (ENA), the graduate school founded by Charles de Gaulle after World War II to form a loyal republican meritocracy for public service. With his graduation from ENA in 2004, Macron followed in the steps of the numerous ENA alumni ("enarches") who have governed France during the Fifth Republic, among whom are former Presidents, Prime Ministers and numerous ministers¹⁵. However, Macron would also be the *énarche* who would abolish the ENA¹⁶.

Even if Macron's political classification gave rise to controversy, he appears to be, in international comparison, a quite typical member of the French administrative elites, in so far as he represents the contradictory "statist liberalism" (Mark I. Vail) at the ideological core of the French variety of capitalism, "embracing both the state's leading role in economic policy making and a substantively (but constrained) liberal vision of the content of economic policies".¹⁷

Macron's post-ENA career took an unusual turn from the traditional path of enarques. After serving as a finance inspector for the French Ministry of the Economy and Finance for four years, he entered the private sector and became an investment banker for Rothschild & Co.¹⁸. Macron's political opponents often point to this period of his professional experi-

15 Macron, as President, chose two Enarches as his Prime Ministers: Édouard Philippe and Jean Castex.

16 In response to the Yellow Vest protest movement against his reforms and a series of citizens' debates organised to reconnect with the pulse of the nation, President Macron decided to abolish the ENA, which had become the symbol of a technocratic elite detached from reality. Claire Gatinois, Benoît Floc'h, "Emmanuel Macron annonce la disparition de l'ENA, remplacée par l'ISP", in *Le Monde*, 8 April 2021, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2021/04/08/emmanuel-macron-annonce-la-suppression-de-l-ena_6075996_823448.html, accessed 15 July 2021.

17 Mark I. Vail, *From Paradox to Missed Opportunities: French Statist Liberalism and the Euro Crisis*, Paper presented at the EUSA's Fourteenth Biennial Conference, Boston, 5–7 March 2015, p. 5, <https://www.eustudies.org>, accessed 15 July 2021.

18 Even if this shifting between sectors is eyed with suspicion by the French public, it has become more common. The phenomenon has been discussed under the name of "*pantouflage*". See Ariane Ferrand, "Aux origines du 'pantouflage'", in *Le Monde*, 23 June 2021, https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2021/06/23/aux-origines-du-pantouflage_6085272_3232.html, accessed 15 July 2021.

ence to label him a neoliberal investment banker with an open ear for business interests, and a lack of sensitivity for social injustice.

Nevertheless, Macron's political engagement started out on the left. During his studies at *Sciences-po*, he attended meetings of the '*Mouvement des Citoyens*' (citizens' movement) of the French Socialist Jean-Pierre Chevènement, and even campaigned for Chevènement's presidential bid in 2002.¹⁹ Interestingly, Chevènement, a left-wing sovereigntist who had left the French Socialist party in opposition to its support for the Maastricht treaty in 1993, had campaigned with the slogan 'Beyond left or right', a slogan which Macron would claim for his own policies years later in his election campaign in 2016 and 2017. In an interview in 2020, Macron himself credited Chevènement with having influenced the intellectual construction of his political thought. In the same interview, Macron's emphasis on the importance of "taking back control" is not only reminiscent of the political rhetoric of Chevènement, but also of the Brexit campaign of Boris Johnson—albeit transforming Johnson's anti-EU argument into one for the necessity of a stronger Europe: "We (French) are now *taken by our fierce, absolute desire to regain control* (emphasis in italics by the author) over our life, of our private life and of France as a nation. This is what we must support (...) Including by fighting for Europe, which is both an ideal and a formidable tool for regaining control of our economic, military and cultural destiny"²⁰.

It was not Chevènement, but Jacques Attali²¹, a former advisor to Socialist President François Mitterrand, who finally brought Macron back to politics, introducing him to the Socialist Presidential candidate François Hollande in 2012, who would make him his economic advisor and deputy chief of staff. Without ever having been elected—which is not uncommon in the semi-presidential practice of the Fifth Republic—Macron was named finance minister in 2014 and, together with Prime Minister Manuel Valls, his political rival, promoted business-friendly economic and financial reforms, including the *Loi Macron* (Macron Bill)²².

19 Bruno Tertrais, "The Making of Macron's Worldview", in *World Politics Review*, 19 January 2021, worldpoliticsreview.com, accessed 15 July 2021.

20 Laureline Dupont, "Interview with President Macron. What Macron never said about the French", in *L'Express*, 23 December 2020, accessed 15 July 2021.

21 In 2007, Macron had joined the *Attali Commission*, a bipartisan group created by the then President Nicolas Sarkozy to research how to spur growth in the French economy. He essentially wrote the group's report.

22 According to Macron's supporters (and contradicted by Valls), Macron had almost gained sufficient votes across the board, when Valls decided to apply article

A decisive experience for him were, beyond any doubt, the eurozone crises, which began with the 2008–09 world financial crisis. France became the advocate of the southern member states and their demand to deepen and expand the eurozone in the direction of a transfer union. In April 2016, he founded a pro-European movement ‘En marche’ (‘Onwards!’) with the proclaimed aim of “reopening the political debate and finding out what is blocking French society”²³.

In his programmatic book ‘Revolution’²⁴, which was published in November 2016, Macron claims to be both leftist and liberal (in the European sense).²⁵ In the book’s chapter on ‘Re-founding Europe’, Macron describes the European integration process as stuck in bureaucratic details and not serving the wealth of the European population any more. Above all, and in line with the tradition of French European policy, he pleads for a truly political union beyond the common market.

2.2. *Macron’s commitment to Europe: key to the Elysée in 2017*

Indeed, Macron not only succeeded in conquering the Presidency in May 2017, but also in securing a broad majority of the overall 577 seats in the National Assembly in the legislative elections in June 2017, allying the 308 deputies of his newly founded *La République en Marche* party with the 42 centrist deputies of *Modem*²⁶. In terms of political personnel, this was indeed the “revolution” that Macron had promised: With the two old pres-

49.3. See Lauren Collins, “Can Emmanuel Macron stem the populist tide”, in *The New Yorker*, 24 June 2019, July issue, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/07/01/can-emmanuel-macron-stem-the-populist-tide>, accessed 15 July 2021.

23 Laurent Bigorgne, Macron’s collaborator (my translation), cited by Nathalie Raulin, “En marche: le bébé du ministre fait ses premiers pas”, in *Liberation*, 20 April 2016, https://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/04/20/en-marche-le-bebe-du-ministre-fait-ses-premiers-pas_1447557/, accessed 15 July 2021.

24 Emmanuel Macron, *Revolution*, Paris: Scribe Publications, 2016.

25 This claim has been contested about his reform policy in the field of labour, economics and pension reform. As an example, for a critique from the political left, see Philippe Askenazy, “The Contradictions of Macronism” in *Dissent Magazine*, Winter 2018, <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/emmanuel-macron-contradictions-neoliberalism>, last accessed 15 July 2021 and Bruno Amable, Stefano Palombarini, *The Last Neoliberal: Macron and the Origins of France’s Political Crisis*, Paris: Verso, 2021.

26 *Mouvement démocrate*, a centrist party under the leadership of the former presidential candidate François Bayrou.

idential parties shattered, most of the incumbents outed and a stunning 75 per cent of the deputies new to parliament, the national elections of 2017 have been aptly designated ‘disruptive’²⁷.

Macron’s success and the overhaul of the French party system are to be explained by a whole range of factors²⁸. In France, as in other Western democracies, there was growing alienation between political elites and the electorates, creating a political conjuncture for populism and *dégagisme* (‘all politicians out’) campaigns. Remarkably, not only were the right-wing populist Le Pen and the left-wing populist Jean-Luc Mélenchon were peddling this theme, but, to a certain degree, so was Macron. All three candidates were distancing themselves from the established parties, sharing this populist moment of revolt against the political elites in power²⁹.

In addition, there was also a macro sociological factor at play, directly linked to the politics of European integration, which must be taken into consideration. Because of the structural transformations and strategic repositioning of parties, the traditional left–right divide, which had so long been the axis of the French fluctuating multiparty system, lost its clout. In France, the referendum on the EU Maastricht treaty in 1992 marked a watershed moment, when Eurosceptic and Pro-European positioning cross-cut party lines. In addition, in the last three decades, the unequal effects of globalisation and denationalisation on different groups in society had resulted in a political challenge to the existing parties, in particular to social democrats. As a comparative study³⁰ on the development of political attitudes and the sociodemographic of electorates since the 1980s in West-

27 Pascal Perrineau (ed.): *Le vote disruptif. Les élections présidentielle et législatives de 2017*, Paris: Les Presses de Sciences Po 2017. See also Sabine Russ-Sattar, Sara Jacob, “Unruhe im System. Seit Macrons Wahl wandelt sich die französische Parteienlandschaft“, *DGAPanalyse*, no. 2, May 2018, Berlin, <https://dgap.org/de/forschung/publikationen/unruhe-im-system>, accessed 15 July 2021.

28 First, there was a change on the institutional level. Republicans as well as the Socialist party had selected their presidential candidates by primaries, which had resulted in the nomination of the candidate with the most conservative (François Fillon) and the most leftist views (Benoit Hamon), which had resulted in opening political space in the centre. In addition, there was contingency at play: François Fillon, the conservative candidate, who had started out as a front runner, finally had to drop out of the race, disgraced by a nepotism scandal.

29 Yves Sorel, “How to stay Populist? The Front National and the changing French party system”, in Manuela Caiani, Paolo Graziani (ed.), *Varieties of Populism in Europe in Times of Crises*, Routledge, New York 2021.

30 Hanspeter Kriesi et al., *West European politics in the age of globalization*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008. The study compares the cases of Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK.

ern European countries has shown, a new cleavage³¹ has been emerging, translating the conflict between integration versus demarcation, mainly politicised through the issues of immigration and European integration³². Political sociologists like Hanspeter Kriesi argue that this has resulted in a tripolar configuration of party politics, comprising the left, the moderate right and the new populist right. In France, this polarisation clearly manifested itself in the Presidential elections in 2017: after the first round of elections, the self-proclaimed leftist liberal Macron came in first with 24.01 per cent of the votes, while the other three each collected roughly a fifth of the votes: The right-wing leader Le Pen (*Front national*) gained 21.30 per cent, the conservative Fillon 20.01 per cent and the leftist sovereigntist Mélenchon (*La France insoumise*/ ‘France unbowed’) 19.58 per cent.³³ In this new tripolar configuration, Mélenchon represents the left pole, Fillon and Macron the moderate right or centre, and Le Pen the pole of the populist right. Both Le Pen and Mélenchon were in favour of renegotiating the EU treaties and organising a referendum on leaving the EU.

Since only the two top-ranked candidates are allowed to run in the decisive second round, Macron confronted Le Pen, and did everything he could to frame this as a battle for and against Europe. As Joachim Schild has convincingly argued, Le Pen finally lost her duel against Macron because she did not grasp the prevailing ambiguous attitude of the French electorate on Europe: Notwithstanding the fact that French Euroscepticism has always been above the European average, a clear majority in France wanted to stay within the eurozone in 2017³⁴.

In a comparative analysis of the campaign discourse of Macron and Le Pen, Claire Demesmay and I have shown that both candidates used similar key concepts of the traditional French foreign policy discourse, like “independence”, with the same frequency but embedded in contrasting semantic fields and world views. For both candidates, Europe constituted a central talking point. Whereas Le Pen called European integration a

31 The macro sociological term “cleavage” has been defined by Stein Rokkan as a division within a society which aligns voters in parties in long-term alliances. These divisions are caused by historic moments of structural transformation (or revolutions), such as the industrial revolution or nation-state building. Stein Rokkan 1969.

32 Hanspeter Kriesi et al., *West European politics*, pp. 59-60.

33 France, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Résultats de l’élection présidentielle 2017, 23 April and 7 May 2017, [https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecresult_presidentielle-2017/\(path\)/presidentielle-2017//FE.html](https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecresult_presidentielle-2017/(path)/presidentielle-2017//FE.html)

34 Joachim Schild, “Französische Europapolitik unter Emmanuel Macron. Ambitionen, Strategien, Erfolgsbedingungen”, in *integration* 3/2017, pp. 177–192, p. 181.

menace to sovereignty and an instrument of implementing “globalism”³⁵, Macron positively framed Europe as a winning project for protecting the French social model and political sovereignty in the era of globalisation³⁶. Accordingly, on the evening of his electoral victory over Le Pen on 7 May 2017, Macron, with a Mitterrand-like sense for staging, chose to play “Ode to Joy,” the European anthem, as a prelude to his victory speech in the majestic court of the Louvre.

2.3. *The French President: A singular position and perspective*

When President Macron addressed his audience in the Grand amphitheatre of the Sorbonne on 26 September 2017, he not only expressed his personal take on the European project but also spoke in his institutional role as a French President with all the special authority of this office. As head of state, the President is expected to articulate national interests, embodying the singular perspective of France as an international actor with national interests defined by geography, history and economic dependencies.

There is no other political office in Europe which conveys its incumbent more political and constitutional power in the field of external policy than the French presidency does³⁷. When French presidents speak, they do

35 According to Le Pen, “Monsieur Macron is the candidate of wild globalization, of Uberization, of precariousness, of social brutality, of war of all against all, of economic ransacking, in particular by our big companies” Marine Le Pen, cited by Lauren Collins, “Can Emmanuel Macron stem the populist tide?”, in *The New Yorker*, 24 June 2019, July issue, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/07/01/can-emmanuel-macron-stem-the-populist-tide>, accessed 15 July 2021.

36 “L’Europe, elle est notre chance dans la mondialisation, et notre responsabilité est ici immense. La France doit retrouver confiance en elle et bâtir son projet.”, Emmanuel Macron, Déclaration de candidature Bobigny, 16 November 2016. See Claire Demesmay, Sabine Russ-Sattar, “Worte und Weltbilder: Außenpolitik und Sprache im Wahlkampf von Emmanuel Macron und Marine Le Pen“, in Deutsch-Französisches Institut (eds.), *Frankreich Jahrbuch 2017*, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2018, pp. 61–80.

37 Certainly, the Fifth Republic has a semi-presidential regime, institutionalising an executive dyarchy at the top with a Prime Minister who is accountable to the parliament and the directly elected president, who is not. However, since the Constitutional reform of 2003 cut back the Presidential term from seven to five years and synchronised the national elections calendar, parliamentary and presidential majorities tend to collide in an operatively loyal monolith, and the President, as head of the state, also becomes the de facto super-chief of their prime minister and government.

so from the pulpit composed by the power resources of the French state. In the foreign policy domain, these resources notably include, after Brexit, the only permanent seat in the UN Security Council and the only nuclear military force held by an EU member state. It is the French President who controls this nuclear force as the commander-in-chief of the French army.

However, the actual power of the French president is not only defined by the constitutional powers of the office but also by informal bases of legitimation. In particular, French presidents gain their credentials by also connecting with a traditional narrative of their nation's collective self-image and an understanding of its role in the world. This frame is widely shared across party lines and part of the long-time pattern of political culture in foreign policy³⁸. In this vein, Macron explicitly linked himself to a "Gaullo-Mitterrandist tradition"³⁹. This formula doesn't imply a coherent strategic concept, but stands, *in nuce*, for the enduring French insistence on strategic autonomy and sovereignty. This implies the refusal to bind herself to one of the hegemonic powers of the moment, be it the USA and Soviet Union during the Cold War, or the USA and China in current international politics. The former great power still follows her ambition to play a global role. The goals of "tenir un rang mondial" and securing "independence" are part of France's political DNA⁴⁰. The European integration project has long been considered instrumental in this regard by the French presidents. For a long time, the leading French narrative on European integration corresponded to that of "Europe puissance"⁴¹. It stands for the idea that France could preserve her international power thanks to the European framework. This legitimised the transfer of a part of her sovereignty to the European level. Apparently, this seemed acceptable under the condition

38 In the sense of "Außenpolitische Kultur" as defined by Knut Kirste and Hanns W. Maull, "Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie" in *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*, vol. 3, no. 2, 1996, pp. 283–312, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40844107, accessed 9 August 2021.

39 In the TV duel with Marine le Pen on 3 May 2017, Macron said: "La ligne que je veux avoir pour la France, c'est une ligne gaullo-mitterrandienne. C'est l'indépendance de la France." Also see: Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, Jeremy Shapiro, "La politique étrangère de Macron: invoquer la tradition", *European Council on Foreign Relations*, 5 May 2017, https://ecfr.eu/paris/article/la_politique_etrangere_de_macron_invoquer_la_tradition/, accessed 15 July 2021.

40 Frédéric Bozo, *French Foreign Policy since 1945: An Introduction*, Berghahn Books 2016, p.17.

41 Olivier Rozenberg, Jérónimo Barbin, „Frankreichs Suche nach einem europäischen Narrativ“, in *integration*, vol. 37, No. 4 (2014), pp. 309–319.

that France always considered herself to be the pioneer and political leader of the European project⁴².

Furthermore, the international ambitions of France must be seen in context with her specific territorial and geographical position. Indeed, France is the only EU member state comprising a continental European mainland (the French hexagon) as well as overseas territories and overseas departments in all oceans. In addition, France strives to expand her international soft power by participating in intergovernmental cooperation as in the *International Organisation of La Francophonie* (OIF), which currently unites 83 member states⁴³. It also pursues her interests using classical diplomacy in a national “going it alone” way. After decolonisation, France was particularly committed to keeping close ties to her former colonies in Africa, on which she also focuses by far the biggest part of her funding for development and cooperation⁴⁴, but also military involvement.

In the process of European Integration, France has repeatedly tried to shift the strategic focus south. Thus, it teamed up with other southern European member states to start the Barcelona process in 1995 to build up a partnership within the Mediterranean region. In addition, as France and other Southern member states struggle with similar economic problems like high unemployment among young people and high public debt, France has taken over the role as a mediator between the rich North and the less well-off South. Thus, during the eurozone crisis, France became an advocate of less austere monetary policy.

By contrast, France has always been rather reluctant to reach out to Eastern Europe. It had already been sceptical in the face of the Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004, in part due to a strategic concern about the shifting of gravity towards Germany. This also stemmed from French economic concerns during the debate on the *Bolkestein* directive from 2004, which opened up the European market for services, symbolised by

42 Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*, New York: Penguin, 2006 [2005, p. 153. Due to its economic power, Germany and its chancellor Merkel became the de facto leader inside the European bloc, in the aftermath of the eurozone crisis, at least in the time period 2009 until 2017].

43 With regard to the global reach of their soft power, their international position (seat in UN Security Council) and their military resources (nuclear arms), France and the United Kingdom share evidently similar power resources, but have traditionally differed with regard to their strategic orientation towards the European continent and the United States.

44 The darker, clientelist and military side of this special relationship to Sub-Saharan Africa has been criticised under the term of *Françafrique* in more recent times.

the stereotype of the ‘Polish plumber’, standing for the menace of cheap labour coming from Eastern Europe.

By the time that Macron delivered his ‘New Initiative for Europe’ speech in 2017, the narrative of ‘Europe puissance’ had been undermined by European disagreements on foreign and defence policy, as in the case of the traumatic split with regard to the American invasion of Iraq and later by divisions on Libya and Syria. In addition, in the eyes of many, the European membership of France had all but resulted in political and economic gain: It was often the French governing politicians themselves who blamed Brussels for the incapacity to fight unemployment and stir economic growth, in particular targeting the restrictions imposed by the Growth and Stability pact of the eurozone⁴⁵. As the so-called ‘sovereignists’, Marine le Pen⁴⁶ on the right and Jean-Luc Mélenchon⁴⁷ on the left didn’t get tired of repeating that France had, in fact, “submitted to Berlin” and abdicated to the German model of austerity and dogmatic budgetary discipline. Thus, in their view, France’s EU membership had lost its legitimacy.

3. “*The New Initiative for Europe*”—*Speech at the Sorbonne on 27 September 2017*

During his electoral campaign, Macron, in a speech at *Humboldt University* in Berlin, had already deplored the last “lost decade” with regard to the promotion of European integration: “The financial crisis, which has become a Euro crisis, precipitated us in emergency management. The migrant crisis and Brexit added another lot of last-chance summits to the monthly schedule of European leaders. As Jacques Delors said, for Europe we need a vision and a screwdriver. Unfortunately, we currently have a lot of screwdrivers, but we are still lacking a vision”⁴⁸.

45 Olivier Rozenberg, Jérónimo Barbin, „Frankreichs Suche nach einem europäischen Narrativ“, op. cit.

46 For Le Pen, see, for instance, her arguments in the TV duel against Macron on 3 May 2017.

47 For Mélenchon, see his book *Le hareng de Bismarck: Le poison allemand*, Paris: Plon, 2015.

48 EM!, Emmanuel Macron, Discours de Berlin 10 janvier 2017, Retranscription du discours d’Emmanuel Macron à la Humboldt Universität, website *En Marche*, <https://en-marche.fr/articles/discours/meeting-macron-berlin-discours>, accessed 15 July 2017. Macron announced his intention to reconnect with the “inspiring tradition” of the German Foreign Minister Joseph Fischer and his speech at *Hum-*

Nine months later, in front of the students in Paris in September 2017, Macron took the initiative to fill that void: “[t]oday, I take responsibility for making proposals, forging further ahead, being bold enough to talk about Europe and finding words of *affection and ambition* for it again. Not imposing, forcing, or seeking to reinvent everything—many things have already been said—but taking the risk of proposing a coherent, ambitious vision, proposing a way forward, an objective, rather than discussing instruments, and taking the vital risk of proposing initiatives (emphasis in italics by the author)”. This speech at the Sorbonne was the third that Macron delivered on his vision for Europe after he was elected president. He had already presented his ideas about France’s role in the world to the French ambassadors on 29 August 2017⁴⁹ and celebrated European civilisation and democracy in his grand speech on Pnyx hill in Athens on 7 September 2017⁵⁰. However, in the long series of Macron’s public speeches on the subject, the Sorbonne speech stands out because Macron explicitly meant it to be the official relaunch of the European integration project under his leadership.

This highly elaborated speech offers a clear and condensed version of Macron’s reinterpretation of the traditional French narrative on Europe he is offering to the whole of Europe. Indeed, the Sorbonne speech conveys a complex message, comprising two dimensions. First, it appeals to all fellow Europeans as a “community of destiny”, exhorting them to recall their common values and historical experience of nationalist wars. Building on this normative and affective base, Macron secondly argues for the European Union as a level of action without an alternative and promotes the concept of European sovereignty. This part of the message is more specifically addressed to European political leaders, in the first place to Germany and, by naming her directly, to the German Chancellor, Merkel.

boldt University in 2000, the paper by Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble from 1994—all three had called for reforms, pleaded for a differentiated integration process and warned about the reduction of the European project to a zone of common trade.

49 France. Diplomatie, *Speech by President Emmanuel Macron – Ambassadors’ Week 2017*, 29 August 2017, <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-and-its-network/news/ambassadors-week/prior-editions/ambassadors-week-edition-2017/speech-by-president-emmanuel-macron-ambassadors-week-2017/>, accessed 15 July 2021.

50 France. Elysée, *Discours du Président de la République, Emmanuel Macron, à la Pnyx, Athènes*, 7 September 2017, <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/11/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-a-la-pnyx-athenes-le-jedi-7-septembre-2017>, accessed 15 July 2021.

According to the (very schematic) forms of classical oratory techniques, the first dimension corresponds to the epideictic type of speech (*genus demonstrativum*), which essentially aims at expressing political values and thus mobilising the underlying consent of a certain community. In contrast, the second level can be categorised as linked to a more deliberative kind of speech, which is more related to the future and concerned with decision-making and the choice between different options⁵¹. In fact, the last sentence of the Sorbonne speech reads: “I have made my choice.”

In this heuristic frame of ancient political rhetoric, it is not surprising that Macron’s message is composed of a peculiar mix of high-flown ideas and concrete policy proposals. As *Politico* has aptly written, that mix equals the challenging rhetorical task of “weaving poetry into a laundry list”⁵². Indeed, the classic Aristotelian categorisations already indicate amplification as the most appropriate form of argumentation in epideictic speech, whereas building an argument on concrete examples is recommended for the deliberative genre⁵³.

Obviously, it would be beyond the scope of this volume to meticulously comment on every policy measure mentioned in Macron’s ‘laundry list’. As regards the limited time since its delivery and the extraordinary circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic, it would furthermore be premature to evaluate the impact of Macron’s ideas on the actual integration process. Instead, the following section will concentrate on the narrative patterns, rhetorical means and political concepts conveyed by the Sorbonne speech. In a first step, the speech is analysed in terms of its epideictic dimension, linked to Macron’s broad vision of Europe and to building and mobilising a collective “us”. As political sociology has shown, building a common “us” and forming an identity is linked to a binary code of “us vs. them”. From the perspective of the political theory of decisionism, the core of politics itself is constituted by the dynamics of dissociation and association and the distinction between friend versus foe/

51 See Martin Reisigl, “Rhetoric of political speeches”, in Ruth Wodak, Veronika Koller, Martin Reisigl (eds.), *Handbook of Communication of the public sphere*, Berlin, New York: De Gruyter Mouton, 2008, pp. 243–270. p. 244/5.

52 Pierre Briançon, “5 takeaways from Macron’s big speech on Europe’s future”, in *Politico*, 26 September 2017, <https://www.politico.eu/article/5-takeaways-from-macrons-big-speech-on-europes-future/> accessed 15 July 2021.

53 See Martin Reisigl, “Rhetoric of political speeches”, op. cit, p. 245.

enemy⁵⁴. Thus, the first part of the next section is concerned with identifying the political collective (and its qualification) the speaker is addressing and focusing on the politics/polity aspects of Macron's European narrative.

Consequently, I consider the deliberative dimension of the speech, analysing the political concepts, and institutional and programmatic propositions which Macron presents in his speech to map the route to European sovereignty. Thus, in a second step, the analysis focuses mainly on policy/politics aspects of Macron's European narrative.

As the next section will show, President Macron's European discourse presents a shift in the history of narrating Europe

- with respect to the role the speaker ascribes to himself (while blurring the borders between domestic/national and European politics and polity).
- with respect to the form of this legitimisation and the way it is presented (as an emotional appeal to unity, a passionate credo, a political battle cry and a demonstration of leadership in the context of rising nationalist populism)
- with respect to the substantial arguments presented for promoting the European project (as a project to ensure *European sovereignty* in a new geopolitical and technological era).

3.1. *Speaking up for Europe: "Our history, our identity, our horizon"*

3.1.1. *Shifting the centre of the political narrative from the nation to Europe*

Unmistakably, with the very first words of his speech, Macron introduces himself as a man with a mission: "I have come to talk to you about Europe. 'Again', some might exclaim. People will just have to get used to it, because I will not stop talking about it. Because this is where our battle lies, our history, our identity, our horizon, what protects us and gives us a future."

54 In political theory, this perspective was represented most prominently by the very controversial Carl Schmitt in the first part of the 20th century, whose allegiance to national socialism has discredited his concepts in the eyes of many. Still, the idea that antagonistic relationships lie at the heart of the political phenomenon can also be found in contemporary theory, most prominently represented by Chantal Mouffe.

These first sentences point to the role that Macron ascribes to himself: He is speaking for Europeans, and the “me/I” of the political leader equates to the “us/we” of the collective he represents. As Anja Thomas observes because of her comparison of President Macron’s speeches on Europe, Macron extends the constitutional role that article 5 of the French constitution confers on him on the domestic level—to represent France and guarantee her union—to the European level.⁵⁵ Macron uses “we/us” more than 300 times and “our” more than 200 times on the 26 pages of the official English version of the transcript. This peculiarity of Macron’s European discourse becomes even more striking when compared to the discourse of other European leaders. Choosing a highly valid indicator, Thomas compares the use of “we/us” in the acceptance speeches of European leaders that have been awarded the Charlemagne prize for their achievements in the field of European integration, selecting Macron (2018), Merkel (2008) and Juncker (2006). Indeed, Macron uses “us/we” twice as often as the other two European leaders.^{56,57} Thomas elaborates on this rhetorical detail to argue that Macron is performing “nation-building”, striving to construct a collective European identity.

This plausible interpretation can be further consolidated by looking at the results of Damon Maffayre’s computer-based discourse analysis of the corpus of 1,000 speeches by French presidents—including 100 of Macron’s speeches—in the period from 1958 to 2020.⁵⁸ A particularly striking finding is linked to the use of the key political terms “nation” and “Europe”. As shown by the specificity indicator in the table below, in Macron’s speeches, “Europe” is used to a much higher degree than in the other Presidents’ speeches, whereas “nation” is used significantly less.⁵⁹

55 Anja Thomas, “Ein Paradigmenwechsel im französischen Europadiskurs – Auswirkungen für das deutsch-französische Tandem in der EU?” in *integration*, issue 2, 2018, pp. 128–139.


56 Elysée, *Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, on receiving the Charlemagne Prize*, <https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2018/05/10/speech-by-m-emmanuel-macron-president-of-the-republic-on-receiving-the-charlemagne-prize-1>, accessed 8 August 2021.

57 Anja Thomas, “Ein Paradigmenwechsel im französischen Europadiskurs“, op. cit.

58 Damon Mayaffre, *Macron ou le mystère du verbe: Ses discours décryptés par la machine*, L’Aube, 2021.

59 Interestingly, in this regard, Mitterrand’s discourse comes closest to Macron’s. As Andrew L. Yarrow commented on this text, the use of certain terms not only reflects a politician’s personal view, but is also due to historical circumstances and the state of the integration process.

Table 1 “France” and “Europe” in French Presidential speeches (1958–2020)



Source: Damon Maffayre 2021, table 57, p. 286.

Damon Mayaffre calls Macron’s European discourse a “rupture historique”,⁶⁰ and rightly so. Macron’s discourse is a remarkable rhetorical undertaking in political transformation, in which the political lexicon formerly linked to the nation state is transferred to Europe as the new polity. In this regard, the sentence “Europe alone can enable us to take action in the world, in the face of the big contemporary challenges” constitutes one of the key phrases in the Sorbonne speech. Taken out of context though, one could misinterpret this sentence as a pure repetition of the instrumental legitimization of the EU in the frame of the French ‘Europe-puissance’ narrative. Indeed, the paragraph that follow this sentence deserves to be cited in total because it clarifies the core of Macron’s Sorbonne message and reveals its novelty: “Only Europe can, in a word, guarantee *genuine sovereignty* or our ability to exist in today’s world to *defend our values and interests*. European sovereignty requires constructing, and we must do it. Why? Because what constructs and forges our *profound identity, this balance of values, this relation with freedom, human rights and justice* cannot be found anywhere on the planet. This attachment to *a market economy, but also social justice*. We cannot blindly entrust *what Europe represents*, on the other side of the Atlantic or on the edges of Asia. It is *our responsibility* to defend it and build it within the context of globalization [emphasis in italics by the author].”

Clearly, Macron attributes a distinctive identity to Europe. Consequently, it is on this substantial, but not instrumental, argument that he bases his demand to build up Europe as a political, sovereign entity. Macron

60 Damon Mayaffre, *Macron ou le mystère du verbe*, p. 286.

himself confirms this substantial quality of his legitimising argument in an interview: “I think it is vital that our Europe finds the ways and means to decide for itself, to rely on itself, not to depend on others, in every area, technological, as I said, but also health, geopolitics, and to be able to cooperate with whomever it chooses. Why? Because I think that we are a cohesive geographical space in terms of values, in terms of interests, and *that it is good to defend it, in itself* (emphasis in italics by the author)”⁶¹.

As Mayaffre observes on the discursive corpus of Macron’s public speeches, “Europe” is, indeed, most often linked with “sovereignty” and “ambition”. Both terms happen to be a very common pairing in French foreign policy discourse. However, they were traditionally connected to “nation”, and historically rooted in the characteristic style and lexicon of General de Gaulle, the first President of the Fifth Republic. As is widely known, Macron has demonstratively presented himself as inspired by de Gaulle in his own official Presidential portrait. It shows President Macron with de Gaulle’s book “War Memories”, open on his desk. Surprisingly, the computer-based discourse analysis reveals that ‘sovereignty’ is even more prevalent in Macron’s discourse than in De Gaulle’s⁶².

As historians have pointed out, the term “sovereignty” carries an eminently positively charged connotation in France. It is commonly more perceived in the sense of a political claim (and ambition!), not mainly in the sense of a legal or constitutional concept⁶³. It is heavily vested with historical significance and connected to the immaterial “lieu de memoire” (site of memory) “Revolution” in popular French collective memory⁶⁴.

Thus, Macron is over-performs the traditional political French discourse, and, at the same time, reverts it and uses it as a carrier-concept for the future Europe. As Maffayre’s data show, Macron introduces unique and new syntagms: no French president except him has ever used the syntactic constructions “souveraineté européenne”, “Europe souveraine” or “souveraineté des Européens”⁶⁵. The Sorbonne speech illustrates this

61 Emmanuel Macron, in Groupe d’études géopolitiques, “The Macron Doctrine. A conversation with the French President”, in *Le Grand Continent*, 26 November 2020, <https://geopolitique.eu/en/macron-grand-continent/>, accessed 15 July 2021.

62 Damon Mayaffre, *Macron ou le mystère du verbe*, op. cit., p. 287.

63 See Jean Michel Blanquer, “La Ve République et la souveraineté. Débat entre Bertrand Badie et Stéphane Pierré-Caps”, in *L’Europe en Formation* 2013/2, no. 368, pp. 21–32.

64 Pierre Nora (ed.), *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French past*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

65 Damon Mayaffre, *Macron ou le mystère du verbe*, op. cit., p. 287.

new discursive quality. In its text, “sovereignty”, “Europe/European” and “ambition” form the semantic basic chord. On 26 pages of the official transcript, “ambition” figures prominently with 36 uses, often explicitly linked to the European “we/us”, at times formulated as an imperative (“Europe’s ambition must be ours”), very often formulated as an affirmative (“our ambition”). Through the notion of “ambition”, Macron challenges his fellow Europeans to revitalise the idea of the European project, which is contained in the formula “sovereignty, union, democracy”. For him, it is the only way to master the new challenges—geopolitical, technological, environmental—and give Europeans the chance to shape the frame of their lives [for the policy dimension of the concept see 3.2.]. Finally, as Macron, in his Humboldt speech in January 2017, had pointed out himself, he was fighting a kind of Reconquista when placing the concept of sovereignty at the centre of his European vision, after the radical right had “launched a semantic take-over of democratic, even leftist keywords”⁶⁶ years before: “I cannot accept leaving the idea of “sovereignty” to far-right or far-left populists and their lies. No, security will not be better ensured by closing our national borders. No, controlling immigration will not be better achieved at the national scale”⁶⁷.

3.1.2. *The European Sisyphus and his enemies*

In Benedict Anderson’s seminal book on nationalism⁶⁸, the author describes nations as “imagined communities”. Their members’ sense of belonging results from a politically mediated process in which common attributes are selected and combined into a shared identity, forming the base of common collectivity⁶⁹. It is telling that, in the Sorbonne speech,

66 Alduy, Cécile, “The battle for the soul of France” in *The Nation*, vol. 298, no. 24, 2014, p.18.

67 EM!, Emmanuel Macron, Discours de Berlin 10 janvier 2017, Retranscription du discours d'Emmanuel Macron à la Humboldt Universitat, website *En Marche*, <https://en-marche.fr/articles/discours/meeting-macron-berlin-discours>, accessed 15 July 2017.

68 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, New York: Verso, 1983. As Anderson explains, the generation of horizontal bonds of solidarity was historically of key importance as a foundation for the modern state since they substituted the role traditional kinship had played in feudalism. Politically, these “national” bonds were necessary to provide legitimization and guarantee loyalty, obedience, and the will to sacrifice.

69 Ibid.

Macron speaks of Europe as “our history, our identity, our horizon”—terms that are commonly linked to the notion of “nation”. Macron insists that there is such a thing as a collective European identity, and that, despite its multilingual diversity, its “fragmentation is only superficial”. According to Macron, there are shared political attitudes in Europe (pro-market economy and pro-social justice, see above) and a quest for fraternity “which rose from the ruins” of war.

In this identity-related discursive string of the speech, Macron’s case for European unity is not solely based on rational arguments, but mainly made by emotionally evoking common experiences and images. As a rhetorical device, he uses amplification and incantatory anaphora (This Europe..., this Europe, ...), revelling in the imagery of European culture: “This Europe, where every European recognizes their destiny in the figures adorning a Greek temple or in Mona Lisa’s smile, where they can feel European emotions in the writings of Musil or Proust, this Europe of cafés that Steiner described, this Europe that Soares called “a law, a spirit, a custom”, this Europe of landscapes and folklores, this Europe of Erasmus, the continent’s preceptor, who said every young person should “travel the continent to learn other languages” and “unlearn their natural boorish ways”, this Europe, which has lived through so many wars and conflicts: what holds it together is its culture.”

However, Macron concedes that, because of Europe’s multilingual diversity, “[O]ur political debates are always more complicated in Europe than in the rest of the world.” As a metaphor for this permanent challenge for European cooperation, he introduces the figure of “the European Sisyphus”, who always has “his untranslatable burden to roll up the hill”. Again, here he uses a non-rational, non-instrumental kind of argumentation to talk about European union: “It is the *mysterious part inside each of us*, and it is *the part of us that trusts in the European project*. It is the fact that at a given moment, despite not speaking the same language and having these unfamiliar and complex differences, *we decide to move forward together instead of letting those things drive us apart* [emphasis in italics by the author].” Using this rhetorical technique, Macron invokes the willingness to cooperate and form a community as a genuine, authentic wish of Europeans. With “we decide”, Macron is conjuring up the European collective self he imagines for Europe’s future. It is an “imagined community” in the sense of Benedict Andersen, but also a political entity reaching beyond national borders. The attribute “mysterious” for this cooperative impulse towards union has almost the romantic ring of the very literary

French “je ne sais quoi” topos for speaking about love⁷⁰. In a further unconventional turn, Macron translates his vision of a unified Europe into an emotional, personal, poetic wish: “I want to see the European Sisyphus happy.” Macron personalises Europeans, who are permanently striving for mutual understanding, in the mythological Greek figure by combining this classical element of European imagery with the adjective “European” in an innovative, ear-catching way.

Using such a colourful and imaginative rhetorical strategy, Macron doubles down on his non-instrumental legitimation for European union and fulfils his promise to find “words of ambition and *affection*” for Europe. As he has explained himself in interviews, his rhetorical choices are a conscious part of his politics. Thus, his rhetoric serves—at least in part—to distance himself from the populist discourse: “The populist project contains a linguistic project which, very thoughtfully, rests on a drying up language [...] This is why I adopt a large lexicon, sometimes demanding phrases, public interventions that exceed 240 characters.”⁷¹ During Macron’s 2017 election campaign, observers noticed his elaborate and, at times, mannered way of speaking⁷².

As more profound discursive analysis reveals, Macron’s general political style of communication is, basically, a combination of different semantic and rhetorical registers, comprising technocratic, literary, voluntarist and almost populist⁷³ elements. In his Sorbonne speech, he excels in pressing

70 In his book *Revolution*, Macron tells his readers that his first ambition was to become a novelist. He prides himself on writing his speeches himself, unlike his predecessors President Sarkozy and President Hollande. As the *New Yorker* points out, “In France, the world of literature stands close to that of politics, as a source of borrowed credibility, in the way that the world of business does in America.”

71 “Interview exclusive: Emmanuel Macron et le choix des mots”, in *Le Point*, 16 December 2020. Video Le Point, https://www.lepoint.fr/video/interview-exclusive-emmanuel-macron-et-le-choix-des-mots-16-12-2020-2406195_738.php, accessed 15 July 2021.

72 Romain Baheux, “Debat: «poudre de perlimpinpin» et «galimatias», les expressions désuètes de Macron”, in *Le Parisien*, 4 May 2017, accessed 15 July 2021.

73 “Populist” regarding the typical populist binary rhetoric of “us” versus “them”, “them” meaning the “elites”, and in the context of this chapter the “main parties”, “Brussels bureaucracy”, which are also negatively connoted in the Sorbonne speech; for anti-establishment discourse in Macronism, see Michel Perottino, Petra Guasti, “Technocratic Populism à la Française? The Roots and Mechanisms of Emmanuel Macron’s Success”, in *Politics and Governance*, vol 8, no. 4, 2020, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i4.3412>.

all the buttons and modes of persuasion known in Aristotelian rhetoric⁷⁴, and switches to *pathos*-mode, when talking about European identity. Without doubt, this non-rational, passionate way of speaking serves the goal of persuading the audience that the speaker is not a representative of the technocratic elites, and the European project is not a technocratic project directed by economic lobbies and their interests. Remarkably, the term “interest”, which is normally among the most used terms in political speech, can only be found six times in this speech, in contrast to the use of “project” (18 times) and “idea” (28 times).

Indeed, in his Sorbonne speech, Macron responds to the critique of the Eurosceptic forces on an argumentative and rhetorical level. He even adopts some elements from the Eurosceptics’ discourse, but uses them to plead for the necessity of refounding the European project (“the Europe of today is too weak, too slow, too inefficient”). To strengthen his own credibility, Macron, adopting the “*Ethos*-mode of persuasion”⁷⁵, concedes to the critique of the EU’s democratic shortcomings and calls the elite-driven integration policy of recent decades a mistake: “[...] I think we were wrong to move Europe forward in spite of the people. There was a time when we thought we had to, in a way, shake up our democracies by pushing Europe forward despite everything. That was a mistake”.

In his Sorbonne speech, he identifies two main groups of adversaries or outright enemies of the European project: the most serious menace is, obviously, presented by the political forces that proclaim the ideas of “nationalism, identitarianism, protectionism, isolationist sovereignism”. Nonetheless, Macron also names “lethargy” or “indifference” inside the European Union itself as an existential threat, echoing his own words in his book “*Revolution*”: “We are less the victims of our enemies than of our own inertia”. In his speech of 26 September 2017, he urges his audience in a long asyndeton chain that “we cannot allow ourselves to keep the same habits, the same policies, the same vocabulary, the same budgets”. For Macron, only under the condition of undergoing transformation, will there be a future for Europe and the European Union. Hence, the demand for transformation and call for action are woven into the entire Sorbonne

74 For its key concepts, see Jack Selzer, “Rhetorical Analysis: Understanding How Texts Persuade Readers”, in Charles Bazerman and Paul A. Prior (eds.), *What Writing Does and How It Does It: An Introduction to Analyzing Texts and Textual Practices*, ed. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004, pp. 279–308.

75 Jack Selzer, “Rhetorical Analysis: Understanding How Texts Persuade Readers”, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

speech through an impressive amount of “we cannot”, “we must” and imperative clauses like this one.

In addition to his intellectual arguments on the necessity of transformation (to adapt to a new international environment, climate change, etc.) and his normative arguments (for a value-based political entity calling for sovereignty), he postulates that the European integration process has come to a critical moment and uses a kind of “finding opportunity in adversity” argument to argue that “it is the right moment” to act. This argument is emphasised by expressions and notions of urgency, necessity, danger, threat. In rhetoric, this persuasive technique is called “*Kairos*-mode”⁷⁶. At the Sorbonne, Macron draws a parallel between the dramatic situation in which the European project has been founded (an “idea raised from the ruins”) and the current situation where the “sad passions” of Europe rise again, signifying the return of nationalism and the risk of war: “I am thinking right now of Robert Schuman, who, in Paris on 9 May 1950, was bold enough to propose building Europe. I remember his powerful words: ‘A united Europe was not achieved, and we had war’.”

With this dramatic warning, Macron underscores the necessity to defend the European project against nationalist and authoritarian forces. He critiques their illusion of seeking security by closing borders: “We can no longer choose to turn inwards within national borders; this would be a collective disaster. We must not allow ourselves to be intimidated by the illusion of retreat. Only by refusing this lie will we be able to meet *the demands of our time, its urgency, its seriousness*. (Emphasis in italics by the author).” In addition, he also describes, in a hyperbolic manner, the political divisions and the fighting among member states about issues like the budget and the eurozone as an ongoing “civil war” harming the European project.

Then, impressing his message on his audience with the rhetorical devices of repetition, Macron urges them to break away from old routines and “refound” Europe: “*This ambition* must be promoted now. This is the right time. [...] They want us to miss another opportunity! We have been shaken up! There are threats! Boldness is our only answer. *Renewed ambition* is the only way of responding. Let’s not be afraid, let’s move forward (Emphasis in italics by the author).”

Thus, the speaker promises to be the untiring European Sisyphus, who will continue to promote European union: “To those who say that is an

76 Jack Selzer, “Rhetorical Analysis: Understanding How Texts Persuade Readers”, op. cit., p. 284.

impossible task, I reply: you may be used to giving up; I am not. To those who say it is too difficult, I say: think of Robert Schuman five years after a war, from which the blood was barely dry”⁷⁷.

This is one more example of Macron’s masterful use of rhetorical devices and the creative combination of different formats and styles in the Sorbonne speech. In brief, this extraordinary speech contains, on the one hand, the passionate testimony of a missionary (“I believe”) and the bold commitment of a political leader (“I take responsibility”), and, on the other hand, an urgent appeal by a citizen to his fellow Europeans (“we must”) to unite in the face of a double menace: the imminent menace of nationalist “obscurantism” (“them”), but also the creeping danger of doubt towards the European project (“them”, sometimes “we”, but never “I”)⁷⁸. In front of all this, the rhetor at times adopts a heroic pose: “*I will not cede anything, anything to those who promote hate, division and national isolationism* (Emphasis in italics by the author)”.

With this heroic pose of “no surrender” and its menacing scenario of a political community on the brink of disaster (“sad passions”, “civil war”, “inner divisions”) if no new regime emerges, the Sorbonne speech of 2017 is reminiscent of speeches by General Charles de Gaulle, especially of his famous *Discours de Bayeux* of 16 June 1946, which is considered to have provided the blueprint of the constitution of the Ve Republic. Indeed, as Mayaffre recalls, “If Gaullism stands for a “certain idea of France”, Macronism presents itself as a “certain idea of Europe”, with forceful words, strong momentum and a burst of enthusiasm (translated by the author)”⁷⁹.

77 EM pp 23/24. This citation is another good example of Macron’s rhetorical skills: The speaker is rhetorically anticipating possible reactions to his speech, and answering them, effectfully combining the rhetorical devices of procatalepsis and anaphora.

78 Macron, Sorbonne Speech 2017, “They are lying to the people, but we have let them do it, because we wanted to establish the idea that Europe had become a powerless bureaucracy. Throughout Europe, we explained that when there was a constraint, it was Europe’s fault! When powerlessness was at the door, it was not us but Brussels! And in doing so, forgetting that Brussels is us, always, at every moment! We stopped proposing, we stopped wanting. I will not cede anything, anything to those who promote hate, division and national isolationism.”

79 Damon Mayaffre, *Macron ou le mystère du verbe: Ses discours décryptés par la machine*, L’Aube, 2021, p. KK

3.2. A road map to tomorrow's Europe: Sovereignty, Union, Democracy

In the policy-oriented part of his speech, Macron bases his road map towards tomorrow's Europe on the premise that "sovereignty, unity and democracy are inextricably linked". The French President calls upon Europeans to ensure their sovereignty by deepening their cooperation at a variable speed in different policy areas, with a coalition of the willing as a vanguard and in permanent dialogue with the citizens of Europe. He wants to build tomorrow's Europe around the core of the monetary union, while seeking more strategic autonomy in the field of defence and more social and economic convergence in the inner market, and, finally, while cementing the common European ground of knowledge and culture by intensifying student and trainee education and exchange.

Table 2 The policy dimension of the Sorbonne speech

EUROPE'S INDIVISIBLE TRIANGLE		
Sovereignty	Union	Democracy
<i>"Only Europe can guarantee genuine sovereignty or our ability to exist in today's world to defend our values and interests"</i>	<i>"The single market – simple, effective, protecting – must become, once again, an area of convergence rather than competition"</i>	<i>"We need to overhaul the European project, through and with the people"</i>
Security in all dimensions (Strategic autonomy/defense, terrorism, digital security, food security...)	Solidarity through social and fiscal convergence (e.g. harmonization of corporate taxes, European taxes)	Organizing and promoting grassroots and transnational citizen debates: Democratic conventions (Instead of the "fallacy" of binary decisions in referendums)
Migration	Knowledge and culture as a means for promoting a sense of belonging	
Special focus on Africa and the Mediterranean	Promoting exchange programs for European youth and promoting language skills: every student should speak two foreign languages until 2024	Strengthening the European parliament: transnational lists
Europe as a model for sustainable development		
Europe as a driver of technological innovation and digital regulation	Democracy and rule of law as binding European governance standards	
Europe as a monetary and economic power	Strengthening the European/supranational outlook of the institutions (European Commission membership, competence not nationality)	

Source: Stefan Seidendorf 2018⁸⁰, translated and complemented by the author

Since it is impossible to grasp the political weight of Macron's policy ideas without considering chance of them gaining support, the politics aspect will, to a certain degree, also be taken into account. This will be the case in all instances where the speaker addresses his potential allies or adversaries. As has been already observed above, the policy-oriented sequences of the speech are more specifically addressed to other political leaders in Europe, and foremost to the German government. In fact, a renewed Franco-German partnership is a central proposition of the speech,

80 Compilation by Stefan Seidendorf, in Dominik Grillmayer, Eileen Keller, Stefan Seidendorf, "Ein Jahr Macron", in *Aktuelle Frankreichanalysen*, no. 32, May 2018, DFI Ludwigsburg, p. 18, <https://www.dfi.de/pdf-Dateien/Veroeffentlichungen/afa/afa32.pdf>, accessed 15 July 2021.

and forms a strategic element in Macron's design that is closely linked to the most audacious institutional reforms he proposes as an inherent *conditio sine qua non*.

During his Presidential campaign, Macron had already publicly talked—in English—about “French-German Relations and the Future of Europe” at Humboldt University in Berlin on 10 January 2017.⁸¹ Thereby, he made clear that he wished a Franco-German partnership to be the supporting pillar in building the future Europe. After his coming to office, he had surrounded himself with an unprecedented number of experts on Germany, among them France's former ambassador to Germany Philippe Etienne, who became his national security advisor.⁸² Consequently, very consciously, Macron scheduled his Sorbonne speech after the German parliamentary elections to be able to address “dear Angela”—to whom he had given the script of the speech in advance⁸³—directly, urging her to seize the historic chance to redress the integration process with him. Little did he know about the 171-day long struggle Angela Merkel would have to fight to form a coalition government, until she finally became Chancellor for the fourth time in a row on 14 March 2018—and until she responded to Macron's invitation, albeit not in the “courageous way” that Macron had anticipated in this speech.⁸⁴

3.2.1. Sovereignty

In the Sorbonne amphitheatre, Macron concretised his notion of sovereignty for a whole number of areas, derived from a contemporary

81 Emmanuel Macron, “The Franco-German relation and the future of the European Union”, Speech Humboldt University Berlin, 10 January 2017, <https://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/de/lf/oe/whi/FCE/2017/rede-macron>, accessed 15 July 2021.

82 William Drozdiak, *The Last President of Europe*, New York: Public Affairs Book, 2020, p. 91/2.

83 Michaela Wiegel, Emmanuel Macron: *Ein Visionär für Europa – eine Herausforderung für Deutschland*, Berlin: Europa-Verlag, 2018, p. ii.

84 For Germany's response, see William Drozdiak, “The Last President of Europe”, op.cit., pp. 95–110 and Ulrich Krotz, Lucas Schramm, “An Old Couple in a New Setting: Franco-German Leadership in the Post-Brexit EU” in *Politics and Governance* 2021, vol. 9, Issue 1, pp. 48–58 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v9i1.3645. See also Merkel's answer to Macron through a newspaper interview: Thomas Gutschker, Eckart Lohse, „Europa muss handlungsfähig sein – nach außen und innen“, in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 June 2018, Thomas Gutschker, „So antwortet Merkel auf Macron“, in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 June 2018.

understanding of “security”, the provision of external and internal security being the key legitimization of sovereignty in classical political theory. Therefore, the French president not only addresses the subject of international defence policy and the fight against terrorism, but also food security, climate change, migration, the economy and digital security.

In the first place, this section of the analysis centres on the Macron’s case for a self-reliant defence policy. Macron stresses that the new power constellation—with the USA and China as rival global players and autocratic powers like Russia on the offensive—has forced Europe to shore up its capacities and level up to a new era of European integration. As he points out, the original frame in which the European integration process had begun and developed has vanished: “Europe grew up sheltered. [...] Security was not its business: this was performed by America.” Confronted with the disengagement of the US in Europe, which became blatant in Trump’s Presidency, the need for more autonomous defence capabilities has been widely acknowledged in Europe. To achieve this aim, Macron advocates a common defence budget, a common intervention force and building up a common strategic culture:⁸⁵ “What Europe, Defence Europe, lacks most today is a common strategic culture. Our inability to work together convincingly undermines our credibility as Europeans. We do not have the same cultures, be they parliamentary, historical, or political, or the same sensitivities. And that cannot be changed in one day. But I propose trying, straight away, to build that common culture, by proposing a European intervention initiative aimed at developing a shared strategic culture.” The proposal of a “European intervention initiative” marks a major change, because it opens up European defence cooperation to countries outside the EU, and works independently of the existing institutional frameworks of the EU or NATO, thus inviting further cooperation with the UK after Brexit. At the time of the speech, these ideas were already under discussion, and have since then been translated into funds and institutions, in particular the PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), created on 11 December 2017 by 25 EU member states⁸⁶ and the European Defence Fund (EDF). The EDF started to function on 1 January 2021 with

85 Macron also suggested the creation of a European Intelligence Academy to better fight against terrorism, and a joint Civil Protection Force.

86 This cooperation structure, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, is “member driven” and thus an example of multi-speed European integration.

a total agreed budget of €7.953 billion (in 2021 prices) for defence research and for capability development in the period from 2021 to 2027⁸⁷.

However, there is not only a lack of common strategic culture in Europe, but deep-rooted dissent between the member states on the role and importance of NATO and the transatlantic frame. Even though Macron had asserted at the Sorbonne that a strengthened European defence capability was conceived to “complement NATO”, an indirect, a belated rebuttal came from the German Defence minister and then candidate for the German chancellorship, Annegret Kamp-Karrenbauer: “Illusions of European strategic autonomy must come to an end: Europeans will not be able to replace America’s crucial role as a security provider”⁸⁸. Obviously, these words were addressed to the US Administration, not the European partner(s). Still, they are indicative of the fact that transatlantic relations and the role of NATO are defining parameters (and have divisive potential), not only for the Franco-German partnership but more widely for a common European defence policy⁸⁹. Without doubt, the clarification of the role and goal of NATO as well as the form and degree of US engagement in Europe, despite the evident shift of the US’s strategic focus to the Southeast Pacific, will determine the outlook for a common European defence policy⁹⁰.

In addition, the position of France also seems in need of clarification. On the one hand, France has, under the Macron presidency, committed itself to reinforcing Europe’s capacity for independent common action.

87 European Defence Agency, [https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/european-defence-fund-\(edf\)](https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/european-defence-fund-(edf)), accessed 1 August 2021.

88 Annegret Kamp-Karrenbauer, “Europe still needs America. No matter who is in the White House, we are in this together”, Opinion Editorial, in *Politico*, 2 November 2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-still-needs-america/>, Accessed 15 July 2021.

89 Barbara Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza, Volker Perthes (eds.), “European Strategic Autonomy. Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests”, *SWP Research Paper* 2019/RP 04, 21.03.2019, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin 2019, https://www.swpberlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2019RP04_lpt_orz_prt_web.pdf, accessed 15 July 2021.

90 Two years after the Sorbonne speech, Macron’s provocative sentence “NATO is brain-dead” may have been bluntly undiplomatic, but very revelatory with respect to the necessity to strategically redefine NATO and the architecture of European defence. In this interview, he also said: “I’d argue that we should reassess the reality of what NATO is in the light of the commitment of the United States,” in *The Economist*, 7 November 2019, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-in-his-own-words-french>, accessed 15 July 2021.

For instance, it has, in a legally binding treaty, agreed to renounce a purely national conception of sovereignty: On 22 January 2019, Macron signed the Treaty of Aachen, in which France and Germany agree to deepen their cooperation and, in the field of defence policy, to “provid[e] aid and assistance *by all means at their disposal, including armed forces, in the case of aggression against their territory*”. In public, the nuclear implications of this reciprocal engagement were not further discussed⁹¹, but it is remarkable that the commitment in the Treaty of Aachen goes beyond the obligation of mutual assistance of article 5 of the NATO Treaty⁹².

On the other hand, Macron’s France was clearly not willing to sacrifice national prerogatives. When the German defence minister Kramp-Karrenbauer suggested that Macron should prove his commitment to European sovereignty by handing the French permanent seat in the Security Council to the EU, this suggestion received an evocative non-response. More particularly, France’s European partners were irritated by Macron’s solitary initiatives in Libya, as well as by his rapprochement with Russia. This penchant for unilateralism in diplomatic and military action contradicted Macron’s rhetoric and hurt his credibility as the “champion of European interests”, as Martin Quentecz appropriately states: “The French vision, to be materialized, requires a critical mass of European countries to unite and embrace its project. Paris therefore still has some work to calibrate both its rhetoric and its actions to achieve its goal”⁹³.

The problem of calibrating words and actions also becomes apparent with regard to migration, another field in which Macron wants Europe to assume its responsibility and adhere to its values in terms of a humane asylum policy, as well as to defend its sovereignty and control its borders. During his election campaign, he had stressed the idea of France (and Europe) being ‘terre d’asile’ and praised Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany for saving Europe’s “collective dignity” through her pro-refugee policy during the height of the crisis in 2015. At the Sorbonne, he calls for

91 It seems probable that Macron was not thinking in terms of classical war and warfare. His intention was, supposedly, to secure France Germany’s assistance in case of terrorist attacks. The most serious attack that Germany has encountered recently were cyber-attacks. It is no coincidence that there have been new Franco-German projects in the field of technology.

92 Drozdiak, “The last president of Europe”, p.109.

93 See Martin Quentecz, “Europe as a Power: A French Vision for Europe in the World, Analysis”, *Heinrich Boell Stiftung/The Green Foundation*, 8 January 2021, https://www.boell.de/en/2021/01/08/europe-power-french-vision-europe-world?dimension1=ds_aupo21, accessed 1 August 2021.

“the construction of a common area for borders, asylum and migration” and “building the terms for genuine, chosen, organized and concerted solidarity”. Whereas progress has been made with regard to closer cooperation in the field of European border control⁹⁴, a form of solidary burden sharing in asylum and refugee policy has still to be found. In his Sorbonne speech, Macron wanted France to be exemplary in this policy area. However, the *Aquarius* incident in June 2018 demonstrates the inconsistencies and dilemmas in this policy area, and the difficulty of “controlling our borders and preserving our values”. When Macron heavily criticised the Italian government (at that time led by the far right politician Salvatore Salvini) for denying the *Aquarius*, a ship run by the charity SOS Méditerranée with more than 600 rescued migrants on board, access to Italian ports, his criticism was easily reversed to France for her repeated refusal to take in refugees that had landed on Italian territory. This is also a striking example of how a well-built narrative can collapse and lose credibility when confronted with contradictory evidence.⁹⁵

3.2.2. *Union*

Overall, Macron’s view on European union is based on Jacques Delors’ vision of a social Europe⁹⁶. Criticising the policies of “unbridled competition” in the early 1990s with the terms “diktat”, “distortion”, and “environment of the lowest bidder”⁹⁷, Macron follows the former President’s footsteps and shares his understanding of the common market: “As

94 European Commission, A Reinforced Border and Coast Guard, November 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20191108_managing-migration-factsheet-european-border-and-coast-guard_en.pdf, accessed 15 July 2021.

95 On the *Aquarius* incident, see William Drozdiak, “The Last European President”, op. cit., pp. 75–77. For further inconsistencies in Macron’s discourse and policy on migration, see Norimitsu Onishi, “France Announces Tough New Measures on Immigration”, *New York Times*, 6 November 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/world/europe/france-macron-immigration.html>, accessed 15 July 2021.

96 During this presidency of the European Commission (1985 to 1995), the French Social Democrat succeeded in laying the foundation for a European social policy (Charter on Social Rights for Workers in 1989 and the Social Protocol in 1992).

97 The whole sentence reads “Europe and its single market—its foundations—are not a race to the bottom, as we thought in the early 1990s, distorting the ambition of the common market, giving the idea that it was an environment for the lowest bidder: it was the diktat of a market that had lost its sense direction!”

Jacques Delors said, it is meant to ‘create competition that stimulates, cooperation that strengthens and solidarity that unites—all at once.’ Thus, President Macron supports the EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s proposal to create a *European Labour Authority*, and the EU Commission’s revision plan for the *Posting of Workers Directive* to avoid “social dumping”. Despite the opposition of some Eastern European countries, which criticised this plan on the grounds that it hurt the interests of the Eastern European economies and their emigrant workers, revised rulings on posted workers were to become effective in 2020⁹⁸. In contrast, President Macron’s proposal of setting a minimum wage in Europe is still under discussion at this time of writing, and offers a good example of the challenging task of balancing the idea of equal social standards and the diversity of economic circumstances.

Macron also supported the demand to harmonise the disparate corporation tax rates in Europe with the introduction of a taxation corridor. Compliance to it would determine access to the European Cohesion Fund. However, member countries like Ireland or Hungary opposed this proposal on the grounds that attracting (in the case of Ireland mostly US Tech-) companies by lowering (or forgoing raising) corporate taxes constituted for them a way of developing their economies. In addition, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his Irish counterpart Leo Varadkar argued that taxation was an important component of competition, and that tax harmonisation would damage the European economy⁹⁹. At the Sorbonne speech, Macron fought for a diametrically opposed view: Whereas he claims competitiveness as a goal for Europe in global trade, he sets out convergence as a key goal for the internal development of the common market. In his view, the convergence of social models constitutes a social as well as a political necessity: He points to the Brexit vote as well as the political developments in the United States to illustrate that the trust of the people in their political leadership had been destroyed as

98 On 8 March 2016, the European Commission had proposed a revision, and the proposal was adopted on 28 June 2018. One of its main changes concerns the case of long-term postings (longer than 12 or 18 months) and stipulates that the conditions of employment of the receiving member state are to be applied. For details, see <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=471>, accessed 1 August 2021.

99 Reuters, Hungary, Ireland oppose EU-wide tax harmonization efforts, 4 January 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-ireland-taxation-idUKKBN1ET1ZY>, accessed 1 August 2021. Similar arguments were advanced when the G7 meeting in Cornwall, UK, decided to push forward a global minimum corporate tax of 15 per cent in June 2021.

a consequence of the one-sided prioritisation of competition which has harmed the middle class¹⁰⁰.

Originally, the Sorbonne speech had been planned to be on a new design for the eurozone. Conscious of the fact that this was a highly divisive issue, first for France's most important ally Germany, Macron had decided on a comprehensive speech, aiming at giving a mobilising vision of a renewed Europe. Still, as he made clear, "[I]t is through its Economic and Monetary Union, at its heart, that we can create the heart of an integrated Europe". At the same time, his proposal of transforming the European Stability Mechanism in a European Monetary Fund is conceived to strengthen Europe as a monetary and economic power. In the Sorbonne amphitheatre, Macron also repeated his claim that the eurozone should have a common budget, thus allowing a certain pooling of financial resources in order to even out imbalances, under the political direction of a European minister as well as under strict parliamentary control. He suggested that the budget should be financed by new European digital and environmental taxes as well as by corporate taxes as soon as they have been harmonised at the eurozone level. He was very mindful of the German aversion to a "transfer union", and expressly denied having anything similar in mind: "It is not to pool our debts, nor to solve public financing problems in one state or another". In May 2017, the cover of the German news magazine *Der Spiegel*¹⁰¹ had shown Macron's portrait with the equivocal title "Teurer Freund", the German word "teurer" meaning "beloved" as well as "expensive". To counter this argument in this speech, Macron pointed at his "unprecedented reforms" in France to prove the seriousness of France's commitment and to refute the suspicion that "our European ambitions were merely a means of fixing domestic problems". Macron argued that a more political monetary union was necessary "to reduce unemployment, which still affects one young person in five in the eurozone".

However, in Germany, the plan to reform the eurozone met with massive criticism from within Merkel's CDU party and especially her potential

100 Macron's argument in his own words: "What did the British people say ahead of the Brexit vote? The British middle class said 'your competitiveness is all well and good, but it is not for me. The attractiveness of London's financial centre is not for me.' When you listen closely, what were the American people really saying? 'This open America, this competitiveness that you have sold us, isn't made for us, the middle classes.'"

101 In German, the title read: "Teurer Freund. Macron rettet Europa, und Deutschland soll zahlen", in *Der Spiegel*, no. 20, 13 May 2015.

coalition partner the FDP, a business-friendly liberal party. The FDP party leader Christian Lindner had described a eurozone budget as a “red line” for his party’s support and rejected Macron’s reform proposal “if that means that there will be a pipeline pumping money from Germany to other countries”.¹⁰² In his speech at the Sorbonne, Macron directly slammed his adversary with the punchline: “I have no red lines, only horizons”. However, there were also some voices in favour of Macron’s proposal, among which that of the pro-European German philosopher Juergen Habermas stands out: “She (Merkel) too is fully aware that the European currency union, which is in Germany’s most fundamental interest, cannot be stabilized in the long term if the current situation—characterized by years of deepening divergence between the economies of Europe’s north and south when it comes to national income, unemployment and sovereign debt—is allowed to persist. The specter of the “transfer union” blinds us to this destructive tendency.”¹⁰³ Nonetheless, only a minority in German party politics—the Green party and (parts of) the Social Democrat Party—agreed to adopt this position. The German reluctance follows a deep-rooted policy pattern¹⁰⁴, and the counter-mobilisation of the economic elites against a more political and redistributive European Union remains strong¹⁰⁵. In addition, the scepticism towards stronger political unification of the eurozone (as opposed to the more technocratic form of monetary governance modelled on the German Bundesbank) is shared by the so-called “Hanseatic League” of Northern eurozone member

102 Alexander Mühlauer, „Alptraum für Europa“ in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 21 September 2017, <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/koalition-alptraum-im-elysee-1.3673073>, accessed 15 July 2021.

103 Jürgen Habermas, “What Macron Means for Europe. How Much Will the Germans Have to Pay?”, in *Der Spiegel*, 26 October 2017, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/juergen-habermas-on-the-european-vision-of-emmanuel-macron-a-1174721.html>, accessed 15 July 2021.

104 David Howarth, Joachim Schild, “‘Nein’ to ‘Transfer Union’: the German brake on the construction of a European Union fiscal capacity” in *Journal of European Integration*, no. 43, vol. 2, pp. 209–226, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2021.1877690>

105 Among the outspoken critics were Hans-Werner Sinn, the former president of the Ifo-Institute, and Jürgen Stark, a former member of the European Central Bank’s executive board. They pleaded for the introduction of an orderly insolvency procedure for states and an orderly withdrawal procedure for states in the eurozone. See Claire Jones, Jim Brunsten, “German economists join forces against eurozone reform. Group says Macron’s proposals for deeper integration will undermine growth”, in *Financial Times*, 22 May 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/33d7bdd6-5da0-11e8-ad91-e01af256df68m>, accessed 15 July 2015.

states, which allies Denmark, the Netherlands, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Ireland and Sweden¹⁰⁶.

In his Sorbonne speech, Macron acknowledges the existing differences and divides among member states and, therefore, strives to pursue an ever-deeper union at different speeds, based on the coalition of the willing¹⁰⁷. This recipe has already been debated on the European level since the end of the 20th century, when it became clear that the heterogeneity of member states would dramatically grow with the new round of Eastern enlargement. In fact, differentiation of integration already exists in fields such as monetary policy (eurozone) or customs and border policy (Schengen Area). For instance, this variable integration mode was prominently proposed by the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer in his famous speech at Humboldt University in 2000 [see chapter in this book]. Contrary to Fischer, who had outlined a bicameral, federal constitution, Macron doesn't elaborate on the institutional frame that would be able to hold together this multi-speed Europe. In particular, he does not use the term "federal" even once. Thus, some observers—and European governments, like that of Poland—objected to Macron's proposal on the grounds that it does not specify how the voice of the "slower" member states would be included. The only institutional proposal in this regard is linked to the idea that the future European Commission should no longer be composed of commissioners delegated by their nation state but, after a reduction of the number of seats, be composed of the most competent and devoted Europeans capable of governing in the common interest.

In fact, Macron was not concerned by the question of equality among existing member states, but by the survival of the Union and by membership in the Union as such. First, he was, obviously, thinking of Brexit. Only at this point in the speech is the elephant in the room explicitly addressed, and Macron expresses the conviction that the UK will find its way

106 For economic and other reasons causing this political divide, see Andrea Boitani, Roberto Tamborini, Crisis and Reform of the Euro Zone. Why do we disagree? A reflection paper on the North–South divide, *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, March 2020, <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/rom/16042.pdf>, accessed 15 July 2021.

107 Emmanuel Macron: "Let me say, going back to what Mario Monti and Sylvie Goulard proposed a few years ago: the idea that whoever wants the least can block the others is a heresy. We must accept these many differences and, as at every key moment in its history, Europe will move forward first of all through the determination of a few. This ambition is never a source of exclusion, it is the seed of European unity and sovereignty."

back to a “simplified, revamped Europe”.¹⁰⁸ Second, according to Macron, a multi-speed Europe would also be able to welcome new members like the Balkan states, avoiding them gravitating towards rival regional powers like Turkey and Russia, “and authoritarian powers that don’t currently uphold our values”¹⁰⁹. This points to the speaker’s intention to expand the European orbit to guarantee the persistence of European “civilization” and the European project, which is defined essentially by democracy and the rule of law, both of which form a *conditio sine qua non* of membership: “On values, there can be no two-speed Europe”. With the rise of self-proclaimed “illiberal democracies” like Hungary under the rule of Victor Orban, this seemingly self-evident assumption is increasingly turning into a political issue in the European arena.

3.2.3. *Democracy*

As has been shown above, democracy is a central pillar of Macron’s narrative construction of a Pan-European civilisation that legitimatises political integration. Is it also, as he points out, a central dimension of the European project itself that needs a complete overhaul: “We have drawn a line under one form of European integration. The founding fathers built Europe in isolation from the people, because they were an enlightened vanguard and perhaps because they could do that, and they made progress by *proving subsequently that it worked*. Perhaps they enjoyed a *trust* that is no longer exclusive to leaders; that is how things are. They lived in *another time*, when *means of communication* were not the same (emphasis in italics by the author)”. In this statement, Macron makes three assumptions consequential to his own outline of democracy on the European level: First, the former elite-driven integration model was legitimised by its performance (“...it worked”); second, the relationship between the European administration and “the people” is no longer founded on trust; and third, new means of communication demand a new form of relations between the government and the people.

Because of the first assumption, Macron sees a more efficient, less bureaucratic EU as a way of countering the EU’s legitimacy shortcomings. In

108 Emmanuel Macron: “This is why you haven’t heard me talking about Brexit this afternoon. The discussions under way will not define Europe’s future.”

109 Interestingly, Emmanuel Macron does not mention China and its New Silk Road Initiative in his speech. He only cites China once, together with the United States, as Europe’s rivals on the global market.

this sense, his suggestions to create several new agencies and institutions to tackle current challenges better (a disruptive innovation agency, common asylum agency, European Public Prosecutor's Office for organised crime and terrorism, and so on) are connected to the dimension of democracy in the current context of Eurosceptical critique and rising illiberal and authoritarian forces: "In Europe today there is a fascination with 'illiberal' democracies. There is a fascination with brutal unilateralism, because *Europe has supposedly become ineffective, and with it democracy*." Thus, Macron's reform proposal is in part centred on the output side of the political system of the EU. This, indeed, corresponds to a scholarly perspective on the EU's legitimacy being mainly dependent on the normative criteria of output effectiveness of the people, and less so on the criteria of input participation by the people¹¹⁰. However, as Macron has put it, trust as a condition for former elitist-driven integration has been eroded, and means of communication have changed. Therefore, he suggests more direct citizen participation. However, he clearly objects to the idea that this goal can be obtained using the instrument of referendums: "We mustn't fall into the trap of the populists or extremes, which consists in saying: 'let's ask the question in a simplistic way: yes or no?'. We know the answer: it is always 'no', whatever the question. We need to overhaul the European project, through and with the people, with much greater democratic stringency than a mere binary question."

Macron rather imagines a more deliberative form of democracy for Europe, and pleads for large and ongoing citizen debates, outside the party system and electoral democracy: "I will not leave those major European parties a monopoly on the debate about Europe and the European elections! Because citizens must overhaul it, via the *grassroots*, from the bottom up, on the basis of *truth* (emphasis in italics by the author)." This, for some observers, had the ring of a French technocrat speaking, underestimating the role of intermediary actors like political parties, and believing in an objective "truth" that can be found by the means of non-partisan debate and informed by science. It comes as no surprise that Macron's ideas on democracy reform were not greeted with a lot of enthusiasm when he presented them in another speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg in 2018¹¹¹, since he made no proposal to strengthen the role

110 For a prominent example of this argument, see Fritz W. Scharpf, "Problem-solving effectiveness and democratic accountability in the EU", in *MPIfG working paper*, no. 3, vol. 1, 2003, <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41664>

111 Elysee, Transcript of the speech by Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, at European Parliament, Strasbourg, <https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-ma>

of the European Parliament, only a proposal to strengthen its genuinely pan-European legitimacy by introducing transnational lists for the parliamentary elections. This proposal was blocked in the European Parliament by opposition from the European People's Party, which labelled it a "centralist and elitist artificial construct".¹¹² The federalist counterargument to Macron's proposal is perfectly put into words by the EU parliamentarian Elmar Brok: "The democratic legislation is made above all by being *close to the citizens*, i.e. the voters. I want to be on the list for election in my own region, in Ostwestfalen-Lippe, and not on some list between Helsinki and Lisbon, where no citizen sees me as a representative"¹¹³. Still, transnational lists are under discussion for the European elections of 2024.

In total, Macron's ideas on reforming European democracy have been criticised in very similar terms as his overall strategy on Europe: According to the French daily *Le Figaro*, for instance, Macron's individualistic method of getting a collective project going again equals the attempt to "bring Charles de Gaulle and Jacques Delors to a common denominator", that is, an authoritarian claim to leadership and a communal dialogue¹¹⁴.

4. Conclusion

With the Sorbonne speech, the narrative on the European integration project entered a new chapter: As Macron recounts himself, the first phase of the process had been founded on the idea of bringing lasting peace to a continent torn by war, in the second, on the promise of prosperity, and, in the third, on emancipation and freedom. Nowadays, in a new geostrategic environment and in front of rising illiberal ideologies, Macron warns that the specific European civilisation—defined by values and beliefs such as democracy, rule of law, respect for science, demand for social justice—is

cron/2018/04/17/speech-by-emmanuel-macron-president-of-the-republic-at-european-parliament, accessed 15 July 2021.

112 See *Vote Watch Europe*, 8 February 2018, <https://www.votewatch.eu/blog/bad-news-for-macron-as-majority-of-policymakers-opposed-transnational-lists-for-ep-elections/>, accessed 15 July 2021.

113 Elmar Brok, MEP, President of UEF (Union of European Federalism), Interview, 5 April 2018, <https://www.thenewfederalist.eu/transnational-lists-are-a-sin-against-federalism?lang=fr>, accessed 15 July 2021.

114 *Le Figaro* cited by Rudolf Balmer, "Macrons Brief an die ‚Bürger Europas‘: Fragwürdige Initiative" in *taz*, 5 March 2019, <https://taz.de/Macrons-Brief-an-die-Buerger-Europas/!5578263/>, accessed 15 July 2021.

under existential threat¹¹⁵. Thus, the sense of European integration can now be resumed in ensuring “European sovereignty”.

The originality of Macron’s outline lies in its institutional fluidity: He not only pleads for positively opting for multi-speed integration, but also suggests, in contrast to former constitutional reform proposals like the Federal Europe outlined by the German foreign minister Fischer in 2000, no concrete constitutional frame, but rather opening up and allowing new cooperative arrangements beyond the institutional frame of EU membership, which would, for instance, allow the UK to participate in the field of defence policy.

In an interview in 2021, Macron prided himself on having changed the way of thinking about Europe: “Three years ago, when I spoke about European sovereignty and strategic autonomy, I was taken for a lunatic, and these ideas were dismissed as French whims. We managed to get things moving. In Europe, these ideas have taken hold. We have built European defence capabilities, although it was thought unthinkable. We are making progress in the field of technological and strategic autonomy, whereas people were surprised when I started talking about sovereignty over 5G. So first of all, there is ideological work to be done, and it is urgent”¹¹⁶. Macron’s merits in sparking this debate can certainly be acknowledged.¹¹⁷

In his speech, Macron himself had assumed it would take roughly a decade for “Tomorrow’s Europe” to take shape, although the overall time frame given in the speech remains unclear, ranging from immediate measures like the workers directive, to long term goals like the development of a common strategic culture. In addition, Macron had obviously not counted on the COVID-19 pandemic, which, starting in early 2020, disrupted social, economic and political life in unprecedented ways. The pandemic’s

115 Macron’s discourse on Europe is marked by a sense of urgency and drama. See, for instance, a recent interview: “If we don’t wake up [...] there’s a considerable risk that in the long run we will disappear geopolitically, or at least that we will no longer be in control of our destiny. I believe that very deeply”, Emmanuel Macron, Interview *Le Grand Continent*.

116 Atlantic Council, Transcript: President Macron on his vision for Europe and the future of transatlantic relations, Event Transcript 4.2.2021, *Europe Center of the Atlantic Council*, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/transcript-president-macron-on-his-vision-for-europe-and-the-future-of-transatlantic-relations/>, accessed 15 August 2021.

117 See for an example Tara Varma, “Rocking the boat: The Macron method”, 8 November 2019, *European Council of Foreign Relations*, Paris Office, https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_rocking_the_boat_the_macron_method/, accessed 15 July 2021.

effects on the European project have, so far, been ambivalent. First, the pandemic crisis revealed governance failures, and a lack of coordination and, above all, solidarity: When Italy, at first the most heavily hit European country, asked for the activation of the *EU's Civil Protection Mechanism of European Solidarity*, no member state responded. Instead, every state was busy protecting their national stocks, as little or nothing had been done to produce or import protective equipment. The Europeans learned the hard way that “sovereignty” must also imply a health dimension, and that their union was still to be built.

Nevertheless, there were also developments which seemed to give Macron’s vision a future perspective: After the long German stalemate and French frustration that had followed the Sorbonne speech, the “Franco-German motor” sprang into motion again during the pandemic¹¹⁸. The Franco-German compromise of May 2020 on the *European Recovery Fund*, which served as the basis for the European agreement, fulfilled a French demand—that of investing in Europe’s future through a common debt mechanism. Still, it is an instrument in intergovernmental, not supranational European control. Notwithstanding, some observers have spoken of a “Hamiltonian moment” for the EU, recalling the strengthening of the US federal government after the takeover of the debts of 13 states by treasury secretary Alexander Hamilton in 1790.¹¹⁹ Others have rightly objected that German long-term policy preferences will probably hinder the transformation of this emergency measure into a permanent collective

118 As they did before during the Brexit negotiations. As Ulrich Krotz and Lucas Schramm observe, the Franco-German duo works best in the field of crisis management, but is at pains to push forward long-term reforms because of the discrepancies in their interests. Ulrich Krotz, Lucas Schramm, “An Old Couple in a New Setting: Franco-German Leadership in the Post-Brexit EU”, in *Politics and Governance* 2021, vol. 9, Issue 1, pp. 48–58 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v9i1.3645.

119 This comparison has been widely used in the European and American Press; for instance, see Barry Eichengreen, “Europe is doing what Alexander Hamilton did in 1790 when he arranged for the federal government to assume the debts of the 13 U.S. states. Hamilton’s singular achievement established that the nascent republic would be more than a loose confederation of states with independent economic policies. And by creating a federal treasury with its own sources of revenue, Hamilton saw to it that the nation would have a common fiscal policy to complement its common currency.” 23 October 2020, in *The Milken Review*, <https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/europes-hamilton-moment>, accessed 15 July 2021.

instrument of the EU, and, anyway, there is no structural reform of the eurozone implied¹²⁰.

Apart from Macron's construction of European civilisation as a polity-founding narrative and his conceptual innovation enshrined in the syntagm of European sovereignty, another memorable aspect of the Sorbonne speech may be found on the tactical and strategical side of his argument, which established a strong link between domestic and European politics: While his predecessors had already argued for more strategic autonomy and more economic and financial integration, Macron had done so by engaging in his domestic agenda ("We are making reforms, we are changing the face of the country, but we are doing so with a European ambition"¹²¹). At the same time, he had unmistakably made clear, first to Angela Merkel and the German government, that his domestic success was in the wider interest of the European project as a value-based, democratic project. If there was no support for reforming the EU, he would fail and so would the EU. When in winter 2018/2019 the yellow vest protests for more economic justice¹²² were shattering France in the heaviest social unrest since the late 1960s, Macron's quest for European leadership was dealt an evident blow.

Nevertheless, there were some silver linings for Macron's European project. The European Commission under its new president Ursula von der Leyen has committed itself to being a "geopolitical" Commission, echoing the strategic concerns of Macron. After the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of summer 2021, European policymakers, like the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, stressed the necessity for the EU to have its own military capacity¹²³.

120 See Christian Freudlsperger, Markus Jachtenfuchs, „Wendepunkt Corona-Krise? Deutsche Präferenzen zur europäischen Integration staatlicher Kerngewalten seit Maastricht" in *Vierteljahrszeitschrift des Instituts für Europäische Politik*, 44, 2021, pp. 81–96.

121 Sophia Besch, Benjamin Haddad, "The Plan to Save Europe", in *The Atlantic*, 7 October 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/the-plan-to-save-europe/542361/>, accessed 15 July 2021.

122 As my colleague Andrew L. Yarrow rightly commented, the protest became an anti-elitist, and an especially anti-Macron, movement, with anti-immigrant overtones and in parts hijacked by the far right.

123 Valerio Polambaro, "Afghanistan catastrophe and EU strategic autonomy", in *NEU. Newsletter for the European Union*, 6 September 2021, <http://www.newslettereuropean.eu/afghanistan-catastrophe-eu-strategic-autonomy/>, accessed 10 October 2021.

In addition, its ambitious Green Deal corresponds to Macron's demand that Europe should become a world leader in the environmental and technological fields. On the side of the European population, too, a change might be under way. Opinion polls like *YouGov Eurotrack*¹²⁴ from January 2020 indicate that public opinion has slightly shifted to a friendlier view on European integration since 2016, the year of the Brexit vote. Even when the coronavirus pandemic disrupted European daily lives, attitudes towards the EU remained positive, according to the Standard Eurobarometer conducted in February–March 2021¹²⁵. However, this optimistic view on Europe's future isn't overly prevalent, which comes as no surprise, regarding the fact that in several European countries¹²⁶, Anti-EU parties are not only represented in the national parliament but part of a governing coalition. In the European Elections of 2019, Eurosceptical forces gained ground and now have about a third of the seats¹²⁷, although the nightmare of these forces gaining a veto position didn't happen. For the time being, they don't form a bloc as they are hampered by their dissension about Russia. Still, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is pressing for an alliance to “build a European democratic right that offers a home to European citizens who do not want migrants, who do not want multiculturalism, who have not descended into LGBTQ lunacy, who defend Europe's Christian traditions, who respect the sovereignty of nations, and who see their nations not as part of their past, but as part of their future”¹²⁸. So the tides that Macron wished to turn are still there.

124 The *Yougov Eurotrack* study from January 2020 showed that optimism has been growing about the future of the European integration project—even in the now ex-member state UK (from 25 per cent in June 2016 to 32 per cent in January 2020). In France and Germany, the equivalent numbers went up from 26 to 31 and 41 to 45 respectively. See Sam Fitzpatrick, “Eurotrack: Pro-European sentiment has risen across continent since Brexit vote”, *Yougov*, 31 January 2020, [yougov.co.uk, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2020/01/31/eurotrack-pro-european-sentiment-as-risen-across](https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2020/01/31/eurotrack-pro-european-sentiment-as-risen-across), accessed 15 July 2021. However, these gains for the EU seem to be very modest, and might even be just a phenomenon of non-reliable measurement methods.

125 European Union, Standard Eurobarometer 24, Winter 2020/2021, <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2355>, accessed 1 November 2021.

126 In 2019: Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Slovenia.

127 For election results, see European Parliament, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en>, accessed 15 July 2021.

128 Eszter Zalan, “Orbán hosts first major meeting on new right wing alliance”, in *EU Observer* <https://euobserver.com/democracy/151408>, accessed 15 July 2021.